真正强大的共和国和君主不会靠金钱收买盟友,而是依靠美德和军队的威望
罗马人被围困在卡庇托山,虽然希望得到来自维伊和卡美卢斯的援救,但由于饥荒,他们不得不向高卢人求和,同意缴纳大笔黄金。当卡美卢斯率领军队抵达时,他们正在按照约定给黄金称重。因此,历史学家说,命运注定“罗马人不应该用金钱换取性命”。
此事不但引人注意,而且深刻说明了此共和国的行为特征。罗马从未购买城镇或者换取和平,因为其一直都是靠军队的威名取得二者。其他共和国却不曾做过类似事情。强国权力的象征之一就是它与其邻国的条约关系。当其处于支配地位,为了获得友谊,它的邻国想成为其附庸国,这是国家强大的明显标志;但是如果邻国虽然实力不济,却仍然能得到进贡,这是国家弱小的明显标志。
纵览罗马历史,你会看到马西利亚人、埃杜维、罗得斯岛人、锡拉库扎的希罗国王、欧迈尼斯国王和马西尼萨国王,都曾与罗马帝国为邻,愿意花费金钱向罗马进贡,以获取罗马的友谊,而只要求得到她的保护作为回报。在弱国,你会发现情况正好相反。首先,佛罗伦萨声名显赫的辉煌时代已经过去,罗马涅的领主都能从它那里收取钱财。同时,它也会给佩鲁贾人、卡斯泰拉尼人以及所有其他邻国赠款。如果佛罗伦萨国力强盛、兵强马壮,那么情况将正好相反,即为了得到它的保护,许多国家会向它进贡钱财,以得到它的友谊,而并非出卖它自己。
不止是佛罗伦萨人曾自贬身价,威尼斯人和法国国王也有过同样遭遇。后者的国家虽强盛,却习惯于给瑞士人和英国国王进贡。这样可以剥夺民众的武装,而且还因为,法国国王和上述提到的其他国家宁可享受现有剥削其人民的优势,不居安思危,也不愿意装腔作势地去保护其人民以使国家长治久安。像这样的荒唐统治,虽然可以暂时换取安宁,但是日久必然会引发危机、灾难和无法弥补的损失。佛罗伦萨人、威尼斯人和法国人花钱避战、自取其辱的事情不计其数,罗马人有且只有一次。佛罗伦萨人和威尼斯人曾买下许多城镇,但后来遭遇动乱时,他们却无法用刀剑来守住用黄金换来的城镇。罗马人只要依然享受自由,就会保持其优良传统。但是当其处于罗马皇帝统治之下时,皇帝逐渐荒唐堕落,远离光明,坠入黑暗,他们也开始向帕提亚人,有时向德国和其他邻国进贡,于是这个伟大帝国开始走向衰亡。
这种种不利情况的产生,是因为你剥夺了民众的武装。更糟糕的是,敌人的攻击力越强大,你会发现自己越虚弱。因为上述的统治者对居住在其统治范围内的臣民施行暴政,但是为了让其能阻敌于国门外,却对那些处于边境的民众施以仁慈。为了更好地防止敌人入侵,他资助邻近的领主和民众,为的是维持自己国家的统治,确保边境太平。但是一旦敌人越境侵犯,则无计可施。这样的国家没有意识到,其统治方式完全违背了正常规律。因为身体最需要加强的是心脏和重要器官,而不是四肢。如果没有四肢,人还可以继续存活,但是如果前者受了伤,人就会死去。这样国家就好比一个拥有全副武装的手脚而无任何心脏保护的身体。
佛罗伦萨因这种秩序的缺乏而遭受的恶果显而易见,也是可预见的。敌军越过边境,逼近它的心脏时,它会发现自己黔驴技穷。同理,几年以前威尼斯人也证明了这一点,如果他们的城市不是有护城河环绕,那么就没有希望了。在法国很少发生这种事,因为法国是一个大国,很少有比它更强大的敌人。尽管如此,1513年英国人入侵法国,整个国家陷入恐慌之中,国王和其他人都认为一次失败就会断送国王和国家。罗马人在这种情况下就与法国人不同,敌军越是接近罗马,他们发现罗马城的抵抗就会变得越坚决。汉尼拔入侵意大利,他发现尽管罗马三次惨败,损失了那么多将军和士兵,但它不仅依然能够抵抗敌人,而且最终赢得了战争。这都归功于“心脏”得到了最好的防护,而不是四肢。因为在这个国家中,主要人口是罗马人,也就是拉丁人,意大利的其他地方和殖民地也有相似的背景。因此,罗马拥有源源不断的兵员可以补充,延续战争。汉尼拔在坎尼取胜后派回信使,从迦太基亲罗马派首领汉诺对信使提出的问题中,就可以看出以上事实。在信使们赞颂汉尼拔的丰功伟绩后,汉诺问他们罗马人是否答应和谈,拉丁人和殖民地的城镇是否已经反叛罗马,这两个问题的答案都是否定的,因此汉诺说道:“这场战争仍然如开始一样远没有结束。”
可见,现今的共和国与古代共和国的作风迥异。正因如此,每天有多少成就铸成,就有多少失败降临。在缺乏美德之人的身上,命运展现了它的力量。因命运变迁,各个共和国和政府也随之而变,而且会一直持续下去,直到某个人带着古人的宠爱降临,他可以控制万物,如同太阳运行,命运之神不必时时展示她之所能。
相信流亡者是危险的事情
相信那些被驱逐出自己国家的流亡者是非常危险的事,鉴于这是每一个当权者都不得不解决的问题,因此这个观点在别的专题中可能并非错误。为了支持这一观点,举一个泰特斯·李维在其史书中曾引用过的典型例子,尽管这不在他的研究范围。亚历山大大帝进军亚洲时,他的一个亲戚——实际上是他叔叔——伊庇鲁斯王国亚历山大,受到卢卡尼亚流亡者的邀请,让其带领军队进入意大利,使其相信通过他们的斡旋,他能得到整个王国。带着他们的承诺和由此而生的希望,他进入意大利,结果被他们害死了,因为同城的公民答应,如果能杀死他,他们就可以回到自己的祖国。因此,我们应该反思那些被自己国家流放的人许下的协议和承诺的不可靠性,要弄清这种人是否言而有信,一定要牢牢记住:一旦他们有机会无需你的帮助就可以回归故土,他们将不顾对你许下的任何承诺,抛弃你投靠别人。相比空洞的承诺和希望,回家的渴望更强烈,以至于他们认为那是错误,并且狡诈地夸大:所以在他们所信与所说之间,他们相信他们使你有了这样的希望,如果你依赖它,你会一无所获或者自取灭亡。
亚历山大和雅典的地米斯托克利的例子足以明证。地米斯托克利被宣布为叛国者后,在亚洲大流士寻求庇护,他向大流士郑重承诺,如果大流士有决心,他会协助进攻希腊。但是后来他没有履行承诺,无论是因为出于愧疚还是害怕惩罚,地米斯托克利最终饮鸩自尽。由此可见,如果像地米斯托克利这样杰出的人物都会犯下如此错误,那么那些德行逊于他的人则更可能犯错,更可能被自己的欲望和冲动左右。因此,统治者应该对流亡者承诺的事情保持谨慎,因为他得到的往往是巨大的屈辱或伤害。
因为利用偷袭或城里居民提供的情报来夺取城镇,极少能够成功,所以我觉得探讨这个与下个章节无关,罗马人照样有很多攻城之法。
罗马人各种攻城之法
罗马人热衷于战争,所以他们总是在任何场合利用任何事情牟利,比如说花钱,以及任何能有所帮助的事情。这就是为什么他们不愿意围困城市,他们认为此战术代价太高,而且过于死板,围城的劣势更多地会抵消胜利带来的优势。因此他们认为最好是采用其他战术而不是围困。在罗马人长年的征战史上,极少有围困城市的事例。
为了得到一座城市,罗马人要么攻城,要么逼其投降。他们进攻时既会凭其强大军队而强攻,也会使用计谋。强攻时,他们会使用两个战术,一是在不破坏城墙的情况下,从所有方向同时进攻,称之为“给城市加冠”,因为所有军队都参与包围并与敌交战。运用这个战术,他们取得了多次胜利,甚至有的大城市在被第一次攻击时就在所难免,例如西皮奥夺取了西班牙的新迦太基城。其次,当攻击失败后,他们就开始用攻城锥或其他围城器具破坏城墙,或者挖掘直通城里的地道,例如维伊城就是这样被攻取的。再者,为了化解守军的高度优势,他们会建造木质塔楼,或在城墙外修筑土山,以便和守军处在同一高度。
为了抵抗上述进攻,城里的守军在面对罗马人第一个战术即全面进攻时,会很快暴露在危险面前,而且没有有效的对策。因为各处都需要守军防守,他们没有足够的预备队和援军,即使人手充足,也不是所有人都能英勇作战,一旦一处攻破,则全线溃败。这种情况时常发生,所以这个战术非常有效。但是,当第一轮进攻失利后,他们不会保持很久,因为这对军队来说很危险,它涉及太多战场,作为整体抵抗是可以的,但对于守军却无力突围。军队失去控制且疲惫不堪;但是如果能出其不意,他们只会尝试一次这种战术。如果在城墙上有突破口,可以暂时借助壁垒进行反击。对付地道,他们可以使用现有的武器或其他工具进行反地道战,如装满羽毛的大桶,点燃之后,把它们投入地道中,烟雾和恶臭会阻止敌人进入地道。如果受到塔楼攻击,他们可以尝试用火攻摧毁它。对付土山,他们可以在城墙的低处开个洞,此处是土山倚靠城墙的地方,然后将外面的泥土吸到城里来,因为泥土从外面堆起,却从内部被掏空,所以土山就垒不起来。
这些攻城战术都不能持久,所以他们要么安营扎寨,要么改变取胜策略,西皮奥在非洲就是这么做的。当他进攻尤蒂卡受挫后,在外面扎营寻机与迦太基军队交战,消灭他们。或者他们可以依靠围困战术,正如他们采用围困战术攻取了维伊、加普亚、迦太基、耶路撒冷和其他城市一样。
借助内应密谋夺城的例子是帕拉奥波利,罗马人在内应的接应下占领了它。罗马人和其他人时常尝试这种战术,但是很少成功。原因就是,即使最小的失误也会导致满盘皆输,这种失误很容易发生。一开始在阴谋计划时就有可能暴露,因为有人会去告发,所以很容易被发现。有时也是因为困难重重。除非你能找到借口,否则并不允许和他们交谈,但此种情况下你就必须要与敌人接触。即便计划顺利进行,没有被发觉,开始实施时还会遇到一大堆问题。如果你比约定时间提前或者推迟都会扰乱计划。再者,如果有任何意外的响声,像卡庇托山的白鹅那样,或者如果正常的过程被打断,即使是最小的错误或失误,进攻也会注定失败。除此之外,黑暗的夜晚会给执行危险任务的人增加恐惧,实际上大多数参与者不熟悉所要去往的地方。他们会迷茫、怯懦,轻微的意外也会使他们心惊胆战,任何错觉都足以使他们掉头逃跑。
在这样隐秘的夜间冒险中,比起西西尼亚人,阿拉托斯则更幸运,没有人被发现,然而,即使他很大胆,在白天公开进行,也会同样感到紧张。我们可以归因于他所具有的某种神秘品行,而不是使他们比其他人更幸运的带有夜间冒险特征的任何事物。虽然经常计划用此战术,但是极少能成功奏效。
城市的投降有可能是自愿的,也有可能是被迫的。如果是自愿的,一方面是因为某些外部情况使城市居民想得到他国的保护,如加普亚希望得到罗马的庇护。另一方面是渴望拥有仁慈的统治者,这种愿望是来自英明君主领导下的好政府,此君主会考虑那些自愿接受他统治的人民,如罗得斯岛人、马西利亚人和其他投降罗马的人。如果是被迫投降,可能是因为上述长期围困,也可能是因为想摆脱由于袭击、劫夺和其他难忍之事而生的苦难。
上述所有方法中,罗马人使用最多的是最后一种。在四百五十多年里,他们通过战场上的胜利和袭击使邻国筋疲力尽,通过条约能获得比他们对手更大的荣誉。这是他们最倚重的方法,虽然他们试过所有方法,但发现其他方法危险且无用。因为围城耗费时间,代价高昂,攻城则无把握且风险高,计谋也不可靠。他们也意识到,如果敌军被击溃,他们一天之内就可以占领敌国,然而,如果他们包围一座顽抗的城市,可能需要几年才能取得。
罗马人给予军队统帅自主权
如果一个人能够重视罗马民众和元老们采用的全部程序模式,他就能通过熟读李维的史书而有所斩获,最引人关注的一点是,他们会赋予执政官、独裁官和军队统帅在战场上的权力。这是非常高的权力,因为罗马元老只为自己保留了开战和确认和平条约的权力。其他所有权力都留给了执政官。举例来说,当民众和元老决定对拉丁人发动战争,他们将其余事情都留给执政官自行决定,可以决定如何战斗,以及选择进攻的城市。
很多例子都证实了这一点,尤其以远征托斯卡纳人一例为典型。执政官费边在苏特流姆附近击败了他们,接着计划带领军队穿过直通托斯卡纳的奇米尼森林。尽管战争在一片新的未探索过的危险地区进行,但是对于其计划,他没有与元老院商议,甚至没有告知他们。正好与之相反,元老院可以接受的行动就是进一步确认。听说了费边取得的胜利,元老院很想知道他下一步是否要穿过奇米尼森林进军托斯卡纳,他们认为最好不要冒险,于是派了两名使者去阻止费边进军。但是当使者到达时,费边已经到达托斯卡纳,并大获全胜,于是,使者干脆抛弃使命,将胜利的消息带回罗马,宣扬他赢得的荣誉。
凡是认真思考这种方式的人都会发现,善于使用它是非常明智的。如果元老院要求执政官一步步按照他们的指示指挥战争,那么他就会变得谨小慎微,反应迟缓。元老院认为胜利的荣耀不能全部归功于执政官,他们也要分享,因为战争原本是在他们指挥下进行的。而且,元老院本可以对一些不需要立即处理的事情提出建议,虽然元老们都是在军事方面经验丰富的人,但他们远在千里之外,并不熟悉战场的种种重要细节,因此无法给出正确的建议,会犯下许多错误。正因如此,他们更希望执政官自行决定,他们认为他会因热爱荣誉而尽力约束和节制自己的行为。
说到这点,我想唤起读者的注意,因为我注意到现今的共和国,像威尼斯和佛罗伦萨共和国,表现有所不同。如果他们的统帅、执政官或地方长官要安排战术,他们了解它并给出建议——这套程序与其他值得称赞的相同程序一样,让我们走上如今的道路。
对战略、策略、新装备和纪律的各种评论
如果敌人不惜一切代价决意与之交战,统帅则无法避战
“独裁官盖乌斯·苏尔比基乌斯与高卢人作战,在其作战时机和不利状况继续恶化时,不会孤注一掷与敌人决战。”对于所有人或大多数人都可能犯的错误,经常警告他们应对错误不是一件坏事。因此,我们现今处理重大事件的方法比不上古人的水平。在这个时候再次指出这点并不多余。如果说有什么已经违背了古代传统的话,那么一定是在军事方面,古人们看重的东西现在都消失了。这种不幸是由于共和国和君主已经将这些事情委托给其他人执行。为了避免危险,他们置身军事行动之外,虽然有时君主也会亲自带兵出征,但我不会因此认为他能做出值得称颂的事。实际上,他们参与军事行动,只是为了炫耀而非可敬的原因。这是事实,他们会偶尔检阅一下军队,保留统帅的头衔,他们犯错误的次数要比共和国少一些,尤其是意大利的那些共和国,他们严重依赖他人,自己则对战争一无所知,然而他们希望自己在军队眼中仍贵为君主,于是参与制定决策,结果犯下了数不清的错误。
虽然在别的地方讨论过一些错误,但我依旧无法对一些大错保持沉默。当这些懒散的君主或无能的共和国派遣他们的将军征战时,他们认为任命他去做的最明智的事情,不是在战场上与敌人交战,而是恰恰相反,防守敌人进攻高于一切。他们认为这么做是在效仿费边·马克西姆斯,即避免交战从而拯救罗马。但他们忽略了这样一个事实:这样的委任多半是荒谬或危险的。应谨记于心的一点是,如果敌军不惜一切代价决意与之交战,留在战场上的将军将无法避免战斗。因此,这样的委任相当于:“迫不得已时方可参战,否则不可主动进攻。”如果一个将军想留在战场又不想交战,那么唯一的保险办法就是,与敌军保持至少五十英里的距离,然后派出精锐的侦察员,如果敌人向你进军,你可以有时间远离他们。另一个方法就是躲在城里。但两个方法都极其危险。第一个方法会让你的国家受制于敌,英勇的君主宁可在战场上决一死战,也不愿意以他的臣民为代价拖延战争。第二个方法注定会失败,如果事情果真这样,把军队带进城里,你可能会被包围,而且用不了多久你就会被饥饿折磨而开城投降。因避战而采用这两个办法都极其不利。只要费边·马克西姆斯的军队依然英勇无畏使敌人不敢到你的阵前挑战,那么他采纳的坚守险要的计划就会一直有效。所以说费边没有避战,他只是更想利用他的优势进行交战。如果汉尼拔想与他交战,他本可以一整天等待他。但汉尼拔不敢在这样条件下和他交战。可以说汉尼拔和费边一样避战;但如果任何一方决意不惜代价决战,另一方将不得不采用三个方法之一,即前面已经说过的两个方法,还有逃跑。
以上所述千真万确,有很多例子可以清楚地证明,尤其是罗马人和马其顿的菲利普(珀修斯之父)之间的战争。当菲利普被罗马人攻击时,他决定不与之交战,如同费边·马克西姆斯一开始在意大利那样避免交战一样。他和他的军队驻扎在山顶上,建立防御工事,原以为罗马人不敢来找他交战。但是罗马人来了,和他交战,还把他从山上赶走了。他无力抵抗,和他大部分的军队一起逃跑了。恶劣难行的地形阻止了罗马人的追击,使他免遭彻底被歼。菲利普仍然不愿意与罗马人交战,他在罗马的附近扎营,不得不离开。他从失败经验中学会了如何避战,在山顶上扎营是不够的,也不能把自己关在城里。于是决定采用余下的方法,让自己与罗马的营地保持很远的距离。因此,当罗马人进驻这个省,他就转移到另一个省,如此这样捉迷藏,只要罗马人退走,他就回去。但最后他终于意识到靠拖延战争,他的处境会越来越糟,双方都让他的百姓遭受很多痛苦。他决定在战争中一决高下。于是在适当的时候,他与罗马人展开了正面决战。
在费边军队身处的情况下避免交战是有利的,对盖乌斯·苏尔比基乌斯也是如此,即当你有一支善战之师,敌人不敢应战,无法把你赶出防御工事时,或者当敌人在你的国家立足未稳,无法保证后勤补给供应时,这个方法有用,李维给出的理由是:“只要时机和不利状况每天都会使敌人的处境变得越坏,那么他就不愿意孤注一掷与敌人决战。”但是在其他情况下,避战会带来耻辱和危险,因为如果你逃跑了,正如菲利普那样,其结果会和被击溃一样糟糕,而且更可耻,以至于有损你的美德。尽管他成功逃脱了,但是那些无有利地形帮助的人可能就没有他那么幸运了。
无人否认汉尼拔是一位战争奇才。当他在非洲与西皮奥较量时,如果他能看出拖延战争的任何好处,他一定会这么做。或者,身为一名拥有一支常胜之师的高明统帅,他本可以效仿费边在意大利的做法。但是,他既然没有这么做,一定有更强有力的理由。他的军队已经集结完毕,他知道自己军费匮乏,缺少盟友,不能进行持久战,作为统帅,如果在他的军队被迫解散之前不与敌人进行决战,那么他一定是疯了。如果他继续等待,肯定会失败;但如果进攻,他可能会成功。
还有一点值得思考,如果一个人注定要失败,又试图赢得荣誉,那么与敌人战斗至最后一兵一卒将比其他让你蒙羞的方法更能让你得到敌人的尊敬。汉尼拔一定是被困境限制了手脚。另一方面,如果汉尼拔当时推迟交战,而西皮奥没有勇气进军攻击他坚固的工事,那么西皮奥本可以不会为此蒙受损失,因为他已经打败了西法克斯,并占领了非洲大部分城市,如同在意大利一样处境无忧。与汉尼拔的战争不是他当初对抗费边时的情景了,同样与高卢人的战争也不是他当初对抗苏尔比基乌斯时的情景了。
带领军队进攻别的国家而又想避免交战是不可能的。如果想进军敌国,敌军出现时,交战是不可避免的。如果在一座城市前列阵,也必须交战。我们这个时代就发生过这样的事情,当勃艮第公爵查尔斯在瑞士城镇穆尔滕前安营扎寨时,被瑞士人击溃了。同样,当法国军队包围诺瓦拉时,也被瑞士人击败了。
当被迫对抗多个敌人时,即使比敌人弱小,假如能抵挡住敌人的首次进攻,你实际上已经胜利了
罗马城民众的护民官的权力非常大,这很有必要,否则,他们就不可能监控贵族的野心。正如前述,在此情况下,贵族原本会很快腐蚀共和国。然而,我在别处提到过,因为体制内特有的弊病,导致了新的灾难,所以共和国必须颁布新的法令对抗他们。因此,护民官因权力在握而变得越来越傲慢,威胁了贵族和整个罗马。如果阿庇乌斯·克劳狄未提出制衡护民官权力的措施,那么由此产生的危险会对罗马的自由造成不利影响。这包括从他们中间甄别出哪些人怯懦、容易腐化,哪些人能投身于公众利益,以及当他们的建议与元老院的建议相左时,哪些人易被诱导以致反抗其他人的意志。这个措施在很大程度上限制了护民官过大的权力,有益于罗马。
这让我们不禁思考下面情况是如何发生的,众多力量联合起来对抗单一力量,虽然通过联合使其力量比对方高出许多,然而单一力量却被期望得更多,虽然力量比联合力量弱小,即使它很强大,单一力量还有许多联合力量所没有的众多优势,因此,其只要稍稍努力,较弱一方就可以瓦解联合力量,使原本强大的联盟变弱。我不再引证古代史中的例子,因为例子太多,但是我会用引用一些发生在我们时代的现代事例。
1483年,所有的意大利行省组成了反威尼斯联盟。威尼斯人失去了所有领土,他们的军队在战场也落败了,于是靠贿赂诱使取得米兰统治权的卢多维科爵士与其成功达成了协议,按照协议威尼斯人不仅收回了他们失去的土地,而且还获得菲拉拉国的一块领地。因此,虽然他们战败了,但是当和平来临时,他们却比之前更富有。
几年前,整个欧洲组成了反法同盟,但是在战争结束之前,西班牙退出了同盟,出于自身利益的考虑与法国人讲和,结果导致其他同盟国在很短的时间内也纷纷与法国达成和解。
由此结论显而易见。如果许多国家对一个国家宣战,那么这个国家摆脱此局面最好的方法是:它必须抵抗住第一轮的进攻,然后拖延时间,等待时机的来临。如果做不到这一点,许多危险将随之而生,威尼斯就遭遇了这种情况。如果可以拖住法国军队,有时间争取到反威尼斯联盟中的某个国家的支持,它就可能避免灾难的发生。但是威尼斯的军队不够强大到可以拖住敌军,没有时间劝说任何国家脱离联盟,因此失败了。我们注意到,罗马教皇在收复失地后,成为了它的同盟国,随后西班牙也与其结盟。如果这两位君主有能力,他们本来很愿意帮助它拯救伦巴第,因为这样可以阻止法国在意大利称霸。因此,威尼斯人原本可以通过放弃部分领土,而保住其他部分。如果在战争爆发之前能实现的话,这将会是一个明智的选择,这样他们就不会被赶出来。但是在战争开始后,这样做反而会受到谴责,而且很可能没有作用。然而,在开战前,几乎没有威尼斯人预见到这种危险,更别说应对措施,也没有人给他们提出建议。
由此,我们的结论是,罗马元老院找到了从护民官的野心中挽救国家的方法,即设置多个护民官。所以,如果有很多人辅佐的君主非常英明地采取适当的措施化解联盟,那么他就能控制国家。
谨慎的统帅应该让他自己的军队绝对相信作战的必要性,但应避免迫使敌人也这么做
以上论述已经表明,生存欲望在人类生活中发挥了非常大的作用,它可以引领人们取得光荣的业绩。正如德高望重的哲学家在他们作品中写到的那样,如果没被生存欲望驱使,那么人最高贵的工具,即双手和舌头,就不可能完美地完成工作,或者将他们的工作带到前所未有的高度。因此,古代军队统帅意识到了生存欲望的作用,即当受到生存欲望的驱使,士兵就能在战斗中变得坚定不移,作战勇敢,因此他们会将其部队置于绝境中,另一方面,不让敌人有破釜沉舟的可能。为达此目的,他们经常会向敌军打开他们原本关闭的道路,而对自己的士兵封闭原本开放的道路。要想让一个城市能顽强抵抗,或者让军队在战争中勇敢作战,那么他首先应该做的就是,将这种生存欲望灌输到参战士兵的头脑中。
结果就是,谨慎的统帅在攻打和包围一城市时,应该考虑促使城中居民抵抗的生存欲望程度,从而估计出攻城的难度。如果发现促使他们守城的生存欲望非常大,他就应该知道围困将很困难,反之,将很容易。这就是为什么平定反叛的城市比首次攻取它时要困难的多。起初,他们不会担心因为抵抗而受到敌人的惩罚,于是轻易地投降了,但是后来他们害怕由于再次抵抗而受到惩罚,于是征服他们就会变得困难。这种固执源于邻国之间天然的仇恨。出于野心与嫉妒促使国家之间互相征伐,尤其是共和国之间,托斯卡纳就是例子,这种敌对和竞争使得征服对方变得艰难,而且艰难程度会越来越大。仔细思考一下佛罗伦萨城的邻国有哪些,威尼斯城的邻国有哪些,就不难理解,佛罗伦萨在战争中本不应该花费比威尼斯多,所得到的却比它少,因为威尼斯周边的城镇没有比佛罗伦萨周边城镇的抵抗更顽强。这是因为威尼斯人更习惯于在君主而不是自由城邦的统治下,而习惯于服从的城市通常不介意更换统治者,恰好相反,他们愿意这么做。因此,虽然威尼斯的邻国比佛罗伦萨的邻国更加强大,但由于这些城镇的抵抗并不顽强,所以威尼斯能比佛罗伦萨更快地征服他们,而后者的周围都是自由城邦。
我们回到这个论述的主题。当一位将军攻击一座城市时,他应该尽其所能使守军放弃生存欲望,以及他们顽抗的意志,如果他们害怕惩罚,则通过承诺赦免他们,如果他们害怕失去自由,则跟他们解释他们大多数人的公共利益不会受到侵犯,只是剥夺少数野心家的利益。这样做有助于攻取城市。虽然这些花言巧语很容易被人看穿,尤其是谨慎之人,但平民依然时常上当。因为他们渴望和平早日来临,于是对慷慨承诺掩盖下的陷阱视而不见。许多城市就是因此沦为奴役之地的。佛罗伦萨就是最近的例子。这发生在克拉苏和他的军队身上,虽然他意识到帕提亚的承诺是空洞的,但敌人的和平建议却使他的军队失去了抵抗的必要信念,他无法维持军队的志气,迷失了方向。如果重新审视自己的人生,我们就能看清这一点。
由于少数人的野心,撒姆尼人违反他们的条约,袭击和掠夺罗马同盟国的领土。后来他们派遣使节到罗马请求和平,提出愿意归还他们掠夺的东西,并交出导致战乱和抢掠的罪魁祸首,但他们的请求被罗马人拒绝了。当他们两手空空地回到撒姆尼后,撒姆尼军队的统帅克劳迪厄斯·庞提乌斯,在他著名的演说之一中指出:虽然他们这方希望和平,但是罗马人无论如何都想发动战争,生存欲望驱使他们必须参战,他说道:“如果生存欲望迫使人们参战,则战争是正当的,如果人们的希望寄于武力,则拿起武器就是他们的职责。”他将军队胜利的希望建立在此生存欲望上。
还有一个罗马事例中更值得注意的例子,即盖乌斯·曼利厄斯领导他的军队对抗维伊人,当一部分维伊人的军队突破他们的防御栅栏后,他急忙带领一队人马抵抗他们,为了不让维伊人逃掉,他在军营中的每个出口都设置了守卫。因此,当维伊人发现他们无路可逃时,反而勇猛异常,竟然杀死了曼利厄斯,如果不是一位护民官头脑清醒放他们出去,他们也许会将其他罗马人也杀死。因此,只要生存欲望仍在约束维伊人战斗,他们就会勇不可挡,但是,当他们看见有路可逃时,反而只会想着逃跑,而不是战斗。
当沃尔西人和埃魁人的军队越过罗马边境时,罗马派遣执政官抵抗他们。维提乌斯·麦西乌斯指挥的沃尔西军队在战斗中,发现被罗马人的防御栅栏包围了。他知道要么战死,要么拼死作战求得生机,于是对他的士兵说:“跟我一起上,在战场上没有城墙和壁垒,只有刀剑对刀剑,虽然我们勇气相当,但生存欲望是我们最后的武器,也是最好的武器,你拥有这种优势。”因此,李维称生存欲望是“最后和最好的武器”。
全罗马最谨慎的统帅卡美卢斯,当他率领军队进入维伊城后,为了巩固取得的胜利,让敌人失去抵抗的最后一丝生存欲望,在维伊人能听见的情况下,大声发布命令:任何人只要放下武器,就不会受到伤害。结果就是维伊人扔掉了武器,整个城市几乎兵不血刃就屈服了。这个方法后来被很多将领效仿。
哪一方最值得相信,强将弱兵,还是弱将强兵?
科里奥兰纳斯被罗马驱逐出境后,投靠了沃尔西人,在那里集结了一支军队,借此向他的罗马同胞复仇。他开始向罗马进军,但是最终撤退了,原因是他对他母亲的爱,而非对罗马军队的爱。在对这件事情的评论中,李维说道:我们可以从中知道,罗马共和国更多是通过她将领的美德,而不是士兵的美德而成长。虽然沃尔西人以往总是失败,但这次他们本可以获胜,但由于科里奥兰纳斯是他们的统帅,才没有取胜。虽然李维提出这个观点,但在他的历史著作中有许多文章表明,没有统帅指挥的士兵们也曾表现出证明他们品行的非凡行为,在执政官死后,他们甚至比他战死前更加纪律严明,更加意志坚决。这样的事情发生在西班牙由西皮奥家族领导的罗马军队身上,尽管这两个统帅均战死了,但罗马士兵的品行不仅保护了自己,而且打败了敌人,为罗马共和国挽救了西班牙。考虑上述许多例子中只凭士兵的品行就赢得了战争,还有许多其他例子中是将军的品行发挥了同样的作用,所以我们可以说,将军与士兵需要彼此。
在这一点上,我们应该首先考虑哪一个更让人害怕:弱将强兵,还是强将弱兵。如果我们相信恺撒的观点,则双方同等重要。恺撒前往西班牙与阿夫拉涅乌斯和彼得利乌斯作战时,虽然对手有一流的军队,但是他没有表现出一丝恐惧,他说道,他是在和一支无将之师作战,意此表明统帅的无能。另外,当他前往塞萨利与庞培交手时,他说道:“我将遇到一位无兵之将。”
更进一步探讨此问题:究竟是常胜将军铸造了常胜之师,还是常胜之师成就了常胜将军。我倾向于这个观点:众人之力皆为一人之志,则易;而一人之力皆为众人之志,则难。当卢库勒斯被派遣与米特里达梯交战时,完全没有任何战争经验,然而他带领的军队很精锐而且有杰出的军官,很快他就成长为优秀的统帅。同样,罗马人因为人力短缺,武装了许多奴隶,并把他们交由森普罗尼乌斯·格拉古斯训练,在很短的时间里,他就把他们培养成了一支优秀的军队。曾在别处提到过的佩洛皮达斯和伊巴密浓达,当他们把底比斯从斯巴达人的奴役中解放出来后,在短期内将底比斯农夫打造成了优秀的战士,他们不仅能够对抗斯巴达的民兵,而且还打败了他们。
这场争论是势均力敌的,因为一方是好的,就可以使另一方变得和它一样好。一支优秀的军队,如果缺少一个英明的统帅就会变得躁动而危险,亚历山大死后的马其顿军以及内战中的老兵就是这样。因此,我们应该对有时间训练士兵并将他们全副武装的杰出统帅更有信心,而不是一个狂躁之徒被临时选为乱军的头头。更多的荣誉与赞美应该给予那些既能打败敌人,又能将军队在迎敌前训练成虎狼之师的将军们,因为他们展示出了双重的美德,即使将这种美德给与众人,使其成为严厉的纪律严明者,他们也远不能像那些将军那样受到尊敬和赞颂。
由于战争中新发明的出现或不熟悉的叫喊而产生的作用
许多事件都表明,在冲突和战争中因第一次被人看见或听到的事物而发生前所未有的事件非常重要,以罗马人与沃尔西人的战争为例。当奎因久斯发现他军队的一个侧翼在后撤,于是大声喝叱他们坚守阵线,因为另一个侧翼正在获胜,通过这些激励的话语,他让自己的士兵重新获得勇气,同时也让敌人惊恐万分,于是他获胜了。对于纪律严明的军队,这些话语会有很大作用,对于混乱不堪和军纪涣散的军队仍会有更大作用,可以说是,一语重于泰山。
举一个发生在我们时代的不同寻常的例子。几年前,佩鲁贾城因奥迪和巴利奥尼两支势力而分裂。后者当权之后,前者被流放了。但是在朋友的帮助下,巴利奥尼召集了一支军队,集结在靠近佩鲁贾的一座城镇里。在城内追随者的协助下,夜晚他们神不知鬼不觉地潜入城中,然后向广场的方向前进。因为城中的每个街头都设置了铁链阻挡道路,所以在奥迪军队的前列有一个人手持铁狼牙棒负责砸开固定铁链的锁,以便让骑兵通过。当呼喊声“拿起武器!”响起时,正在砸锁的人被后面的人群推挤得无法举起胳膊抡棒,于是,他大喊了一声“退后!”,这句话被后面的人一级级传下去,结果变成了“撤退!”。于是后面的人开始逃跑,一个接一个,其他人也随着自己人产生的混乱而溃逃。因此,奥迪人的计划就这么泡汤了,就因为一句不起眼的话。
严明的纪律不仅能使军队在战斗中保持有序的队列,而且也会防止一些小意外扰乱军心。仅以此原因,就说明平民大众在战争中毫无用处,因为任何谣言、喊声、骚动都会影响他们的情绪,使他们落荒而逃。因此训导是有必要的,高明的统帅应该委派专人听从其口头命令,并将命令传递给其他人。他应该使他的军队不去理会别人,军官们不得擅离职守。疏忽这些要点会导致无法控制的混乱。
至于疑兵之计,每位统帅都应该在战斗中,尝试使用这种方法鼓舞士气,同时挫伤敌人的锐气,尤其是在侥幸获胜的战斗中非常有效。以罗马独裁官盖乌斯·苏尔比基乌斯为例。在他与高卢人作战时,他把武器分发给所有脚夫和随从们,让他们骑上骡子和其他乘骑,让他们伪装成一支骑兵部队,然后让他们手持旌旗隐蔽在山后。在战斗白热化的时候,命令他们收到信号后,出现在战场上,让敌人看到。如此疑兵之法,让高卢人惊恐万分,于是溃败了。有两件事是一位优秀统帅应该做的:第一,他应该知道是否应该采用新奇的战法惊吓敌人;第二,他应该保持警惕,观察敌人是否会用同样的花招来对付他,从而察觉出并化解它。
印度国王就是这么做的,但当塞米勒米斯注意到印度国王有很多大象后,为了威吓住他,让他看到她也有很多大象,于是将水牛和母牛的兽皮披在骆驼的背上伪装出许多假大象。但她的计谋让印度国王发现了,她的计划不仅无用,而且变成了她的劣势。同样,当独裁官玛莫库斯与费德奈人交战时,为了惊吓罗马人,在战斗最激烈的时候,他们命令许多军队将火把绑在长枪上从费德奈城出来,自以为借此就可以分散罗马人的注意力,结果自乱阵脚。
但须注意,这种计谋如果实大于虚,则可以用于占优势的一方,因为如果他们足够勇猛,弱点就不会很快被发现。但是如果虚大于实,则最好不要采用,或者如果采用了,要尽量多伪装一会儿,别让骗局很快被揭穿,就像盖乌斯·苏尔比基乌斯的“骡兵”做的那样。如果疑兵之术有内部弱点,只要走到近前就会被看穿,那将对你是百害而无益,就像塞米勒米斯的大象和费德奈人的火把一样。虽然一开始他让罗马军队变得有点不安,然而,独裁官赶过来,喝住他的士兵,告诉他们不要像胆小鬼一样被一点点小烟吓跑,应该转身冲过去,他高呼道:“既然你们无法用仁慈使他们安静,那么就用火焰摧毁费德奈。”这种方法被证明对费德奈人没有用处,他们是战斗的失败者。
军队的统帅应该只有一位,而非多位,令出多门是祸事
当费德奈人反叛并屠杀了罗马人派到费德奈的移民后,罗马人为了报仇雪耻任命了四位有领事权的护民官,其中一人留下保卫罗马,另外三个人被派遣去与费德奈人和维伊人交战。由于指挥权分散,护民官之间相互对立,虽然没有造成严重后果,但他们回到罗马时名誉扫地。幸亏罗马军队英勇善战,才没有因他们的无能而引发灾难。因此,当罗马人意识到问题根源后,就任命了一位独裁官,负责将三位护民官引发的混乱恢复正常。这表明,多人指挥同一支军队或者负责防御同一座城市毫无用处。泰特斯·李维对这件事是再明白不过,他写道:“三位有领事权的护民官向我们展示了在战争中令出多门是多么的徒劳无用,每个人都倾向于自己的意见,认为别人的都是错误的,于是他们给了敌人可乘之机。”
虽然这个例子足够说明号令不统一在战争中会引起混乱,我想再举两个例子,一个来自现代,另一个来自古代,能更好地支持这个观点。
1500年,在法国国王路易十二重新征服了米兰之后,他派出军队进军比萨城,想从佛罗伦萨人手中夺回它。军队由吉奥凡巴蒂斯塔·里多尔菲和卢卡·蒂·安东尼奥·第格利·阿尔卑兹同时指挥。因为吉奥凡巴蒂斯塔威望很高,而且经验丰富,卢卡将一切事务均交由他管理。虽然没有显露出,但卢卡通过沉默、疏忽和批评的方式表现出反对吉奥凡巴蒂斯塔的野心,结果他既没有为围城作战出力,也没有献计献策,表现得像自己并不存在。后来,因为某件事情的发生让吉奥凡巴蒂斯塔不得不返回佛罗伦萨。当卢卡一人独掌大权之后,事情发生了变化,他通过勇气、勤奋和明断表现出了他的价值,只要他的同僚还在军营,所有这些特质都不会被展示出来。
为了证实泰特斯·李维的话,引用另一个例子:罗马派遣一支军队讨伐在奎因久斯和他同僚阿格里帕指挥下的埃魁人。阿格里帕想从奎因久斯手中取得对战争的绝对控制权,他说道:“只有当最高指挥权在一人之手时,军队事务管理才会最明智。”
这和我们现在的共和国和君主的做法正好相反,为了加强管理,他们为一个地方加派了多名行政长官和多名军队指挥官,导致了难以形容的混乱。在我们的时代里,如果人们想找到灾难降临到意大利和法国军队上的原因,那么这是最有效的通途。总而言之,可以确信,将征战之事委托给一位才智平庸的人,要好过交给两位拥有同等权力的杰出之人。
给征战中统帅们的建议
为什么法国人曾被而且如今依旧被称为开战如虎,后继如鼠
高卢人在战斗激情的鼓舞下,时常在阿尼奥河岸上向罗马人提出挑战,这引发了他们与提图斯·曼利厄斯的战争。高卢人的斗志也使我想起泰特斯·李维曾数次说到他们,即在战斗刚开始的时候比男人更加勇敢,但是随着战斗的持续,他们会变得比女人还不如。至于为什么会这样,许多人认为这是本性使然,这正确无疑。但不能由此推断出曾使他们一开始勇敢战斗的本性,不能被规则控制以至于他们无法将勇猛坚持到底。
为了证明这一点,我们先了解一下军队的三种类型。第一种,既有斗志又有秩序。秩序能提升斗志和品德,这在罗马军队中得以体现。在他们的整个历史中,罗马军队总是秩序井然,军纪的使用由来已久。在纪律严明的军队中,没有人不按照军规行事。因此,罗马军队征服了全世界,他们是其他军队的榜样——没有人好吃懒做或嫖娼,而且没有执政官的命令,不会有人擅自执行军事或民事行动。不遵守纪律的军队不是真正的军队,即使他们做了不起的事,也是由于激情和冲动,而不是因为英勇。遵守纪律的品德能在恰当的时间以恰当的方式使用激情,军队不会因此遭遇困难或损失。严明的军纪能激发勇气和斗志,从而增加胜利的希望,只要军纪尚存,则胜利尤在。
与上述类型正好相反,第二种类型是只有激情而无纪律的军队,高卢人就是这样,他们在战斗中纪律涣散。如果第一次进攻受挫,他们就会动摇不定,因为激情不能维持长久,当他们的激情冷却下来,他们就无所依靠。罗马人,正好相反,因为他们纪律严明,所以他们不在乎危险,不会丧失胜利的信心,他们能保持坚定和顽强,自始至终用同样的勇气和品德进行战斗。当战斗意志被激发起来,他们就会勇往直前。
第三种类型的军队就是既无天生的斗志也无纪律进行补充的军队,就是我们时代的意大利军队,非常无能,除非遇到一支因意外而逃跑的军队,否则决不可能获胜。没有必要引述更多例子,因为他们每时每刻都在证明着自己多么的软弱无能,毫无勇气可言。因此,泰特斯·李维的话简明扼要地阐述了优秀的军人和无能的军人是如何产生的,我引用帕披里乌斯·克塞在指责费边时所做的演讲:“没人会尊重人或众神,他们不会遵守统帅的法令或指示,他们会在和平或敌对的领土上到处游荡劫掠;他们会忘记自己的誓言,未经许可就脱离军队,而且他们很愿意这么做;他们会让旗帜无人守卫,不会再听从命令集结或解散;他们会为争夺领地而不停争斗,不管这个地方是否适宜,也不管统帅的命令;他们不会保留军团或军阶;就像一群强盗,盲目而狂躁,而不是守纪和尽职的军人。”在这段话中,我们能立刻看出我们时代的军人是否盲目而狂躁,或者是否守纪和尽职,他们远没达到军人的标准,而且远不及罗马人那样有斗志有纪律,或者仅仅像高卢人那样有战斗的激情。
大战前的小规模战斗是否有必要,如果统帅不这样做,怎么才能了解新的敌军
我们在上文提到过,在世事中,还有这种困境:当人们想将事情办得达到完美程度时,会发现灾祸总会与福祉同行,祸易变成福,这两者共存似乎是可能的。这是世之常情。正因如此,福祉总是难以得到,除非命运的眷顾为你消除天然的麻烦。我不得不说,这是曼利厄斯与高卢人的战争,对此泰特斯·李维说道:“这场战斗将决定整个战争的结局,高卢人的军队在恐惧中丢弃了他们的营地,最先逃进提泊坦,然后流窜到坎帕尼亚。”一方面,无论如何,优秀的统帅都应避免因偶然事件而损害军队的行为,因为他的军队不是雇佣兵,因此孤注一掷的冒险是极其鲁莽的,正如上文在谈论守卫关口时所述。
另一方面,当英明的统帅发觉他将与享誉盛名的不熟悉的敌军交战时,在决战之前,他们应让军队通过小规模的接触战来探得敌人的实力,从而了解敌人,继而找出应对之法,这可以消除因谣言和敌人声望而生的恐惧。对统帅而言,这么做至关重要。在此过程中,生存欲望会约束你去采用它,因为你不想看到自己置身危难之中,如果要和敌人交战,首先要让你的军队与敌人有所接触,从而使他们内心摆脱由敌人的声望而生的恐惧。
瓦列利乌斯·科尔维努斯受命指挥罗马军队对付撒姆尼人,但迄今罗马人没有与撒姆尼人交战的经验,对他们的作战能力也不了解。因此,泰特斯·李维说到瓦列利乌斯让罗马士兵与撒姆尼人进行小规模接触战,“于是他们可能就不再害怕未知的战争与敌人”。巨大的危险依然存在,如果你的士兵在接触战中被打败了,反而会增加他们的恐惧与胆怯,造成与你希望相反的局面,即你将使他们感到害怕,与你原本想让他们感到安全的初衷相反。于是这就是祸福之间紧密相连的事情之一,它们之间是如此密切,以至于很容易让你弄巧成拙。
有鉴于此,杰出的统帅应该采取一切预防措施,以防止消磨军队志气的危险事情发生。首战失利就是能打击士气的事情。因此对于接触战,应该慎重行事,除非有很大的优势,确信会获胜,否则就不应出战。也不应该试图据守关隘,因为那里无法使其军队施展开。也不应该防守城市,除非其损失将不可避免地使其灭亡。再者,如果决心守城,他应该安排他的军队与驻军协防以反击进攻,这样他所有的军队在应对围攻时就能发挥作用。否则,他就应放弃防守城市。放弃可能守不住的城市,保全军队,他不会在战争中失去声誉或取胜的希望。但是当你没有守住你原本打算防守的城市,而且人人皆知你在进行防守,那么损失将很严重而且可能是灾难性的。因此事实上,你会像高卢人那样,由于暂时的胜利而失去战争。
珀修斯的父亲即马其顿王国的菲利普,在他那个时代,是声誉显赫的战士,当他受到罗马人攻击时,主动放弃了他认为无法守住的大片国土,并采取坚壁清野的策略,作为谨慎之人,他认为如果他没有守住他原本打算防守的地方,他将失去声望,这远比故意让那些好像他不在乎的地方落入敌手要更加可怕。当坎尼的失利使罗马人行为变得更加残暴时,他们拒绝帮助他们的追随者和臣民,吩咐他们要尽力自我防御。这个做法要比帮助盟友防守却最终让他们失望要好得多,因为如果那样做,他们会同时失去盟友和自己的军队,但如果不那样做,失去的只是盟友。
话题重新回到小规模接触战,我坚持认为,如果一位统帅因为他对敌人一无所知而必须倚靠接触战,那么他应该在他处于绝对优势不会有任何闪失的时候行动。他应该像马里厄斯在与辛布里人作战时那样。辛布里人是一个凶猛的部落,他们前来掠夺意大利,因为他们凶暴残忍、人多势大,而且已经打败了一支罗马军队,所以马里厄斯在进军时非常害怕。他由此判断,在与敌人交战之前,他必须消除由于畏敌而在军队中蔓延的恐慌情绪,作为慎重的统帅,他不止一次将他的军队驻扎在辛布里人必经的关口附近,旨在让他的军队能躲在防御工事的后面,亲眼看到并熟悉敌军的模样,所以当他们看到敌军如此杂乱无序、辎重拖累、武器落后,甚至还有人赤手空拳时,他们打消了疑虑,重新燃起斗志。马里厄斯非常明智地使用了这个方法,其他人也应该积极效仿,不再招致上述危险,也不要像高卢人表现得那样,“他们由于一些偶然事件而害怕,最先逃进提泊坦,然后流窜到坎帕尼亚”。
既然在这段论述中提到过瓦列利乌斯·科尔维努斯,那么我将在下个章节中使用他关于统帅该如何表现的演说。
统帅怎样才能获得军队的信任
如上所述,瓦列利乌斯·科尔维努斯带兵与撒姆尼人交战。由于罗马人不熟悉他们的作战方式,为了安定军心、了解敌人,他让军队与敌人进行一些接触战,仅仅这么做是不够的,于是他决定对士兵们做战前演说,极有说服力地指出他们应该多么藐视敌人,他的演说唤起了士兵们及他自己的勇气。从李维记录的这个演说中,我们了解到统帅应如何表现以获得军队的拥戴。他说道:“仔细看看指挥和支持你们奋战的统帅!扪心自问一下,这个你们将要听命于他的人是否只是一个言过其实、光鲜但没有任何军事才能的演说家,他是否知道如何使用武器,冲锋在前,在战斗最激烈时上阵杀敌!我要你们,我勇敢的兄弟们,跟随我的脚步,而不是我的言语,不要只关注我的命令,而是视我为榜样,因为凭着我执政官的右手已经获得了无数的最高赞誉。”可以从演说中得知,他是否认真思索过,如果他想占据统帅的地位,他将如何去做;如果反其道行之,则无论是因运气或野心而取得的地位,都会在某个适当的时候毁掉他的名誉,而不是成就它。因为不是头衔成就了人的伟大,而是人成就了伟大的头衔。
我们须再次注意以上所述,当伟大的统帅在面对不熟悉的敌人时,他是否使用了非凡的方法来鼓舞久经沙场的军队,当他指挥一支新组建的从未见过敌人的军队时,他是否会殚精竭虑地训练他们。如果一支经验丰富的军队都会害怕不熟悉的敌人,那么从未上过战场的新军则情况更糟。然而事实上,这些困难通常会被优秀的统帅以他的谨慎行事化解,上文曾提及的罗马人格拉古和底比斯人伊巴密浓达都是这么做的,他们指挥没有经验的新军打败了经验丰富的老兵。
他们采取的方法就是先用数月时间训练军队,并通过模拟战使他们逐渐习惯服从命令,在对新军有足够信心的时候,再带领他们参加实战。因此,在不缺乏人力时,受过训练、掌握了作战技能的平民就能组成一支优秀的军队。所以说,拥有丰富人力的君主却缺乏善战的士兵,不是由于他的人民懦弱,而仅仅是由于他自己的懒惰与愚蠢。
统帅应该熟悉地形
在统帅必备的才能中,熟知地形和地利是其中之一。如果没有这方面综合详细的知识,那么他就无法有效指挥战斗。正如科学需要实践一样,如果渴望得到完美,就需要经常练习。这种练习和详细的知识通过狩猎获得的比其他锻炼更多。因此,古代作家告诉我们,在他们的时代,统治世界的英雄们都是在森林和追逐中成长起来。追逐不仅能为他们提供必不可少的知识,而且教会了他们在战争中的其他必需技能。因此,色诺芬在他的《居鲁士传记》这样说道,当他准备进攻亚美尼亚王国时,委派任务后,他提醒领受任务的下属,这些任务就像他们以前经常随他进行的狩猎活动一样。他说,那些他派往山区埋伏的人应该像在山脊设陷阱的猎人,而那些前往扫荡平原的人应该像捕猎的人,先将野兽从它的巢穴中赶出来,然后追逐它,直至把它赶到罗网中。
上文所述是为了表明,色诺芬认为狩猎活动与战争极为相似,所以,伟人们将狩猎视为高贵和必要的运动。没有比狩猎更简便的方法来获得地理知识,因为追逐猎物的过程为猎手提供了解地形的绝佳机会。同时它使猎手熟悉了当地的环境,轻松掌握了未知地区的细节。所有国家和地区的地理特征都具有一致性,于是在一个地区掌握的地理知识可以被借鉴到另一地区,但是没有任何经验的人很难掌握另一地区的地形,除非他在那里生活了很长时间,否则不可能了解当地环境。例如,实践过的人一眼就能看出平原的面积,山脉的高度,河谷的走向等等,因为他已经能学以致用了。
泰特斯·李维在普布利乌斯·德西乌斯的例子中阐明了这一观点。在撒姆尼人的战争中,普布利乌斯·德西乌斯是护民官,负责指挥执政官科尼利厄斯的军队,当执政官打算率领罗马军队进入一条可能会被撒姆尼人切断退路的山谷时,德西乌斯看出其中的巨大危险,于是对执政官说:“奥留斯·科尼利厄斯,你看到敌人上面的那座山峰了吗?如果我们能迅速占领它,它的险要位置可以保证我们的安全,撒姆尼人愚蠢地忽视了它。”在告诉大家德西乌斯的话之前,泰特斯·李维说:“普布利乌斯·德西乌斯,一个受过军事训练的护民官,观察到树木繁茂的山谷中有一座能威胁到敌人的山峰,虽然它不利于大部队进攻,但是轻装的小股部队却可以登上。”因此,执政官命令他带领三千名士兵占领了它,从而挽救了罗马军队。然后,当夜幕降临时,他思考如何能安全撤退,保全自己和他的部队,李维是这么记录的:“跟我来,让灯火继续亮着,我们去侦察一下敌人设置岗哨的地方,看看是否有办法逃出去。”他穿了件短小的军队斗篷,以免让敌人看到他是一位军官。
这件事证明了对于统帅而言了解地形的内在本质非常有用和必要,假如德西乌斯不是明智之人,没有这种本事,他就不可能看出占领那座山对罗马人有利,也不可能从远处看出如何占领此山,也不能在山顶被敌人四面包围时,发现一条在敌人严密防守下的出路,返回执政官的军队。从中我们可以推断出,德西乌斯一定有这样惊人的才能,才会使罗马军队占领山头转危为安,才会使他在敌人的重重包围中发现安全突围的生路。
人民的利益是至高无上的法律
在战争中使用欺诈不是可耻的事情
虽然使用欺诈是可憎的行为,但在战争中却值得称赞和夸耀。一个人使用欺诈战胜敌人,与他使用武力打败敌人一样值得赞许。我们可以从传记作家对伟人的评价中看出,他们赞扬汉尼拔和其他著名人物的这种行为。这样的例子举不胜举,在此不再赘述,但我想强调,关于失信或毁约的欺诈是不光彩的,虽然如上所述它会偶尔为你赢得国家或王国,但是不会为你带来荣誉。我所说的欺诈,是用于对付与你没有信用可言的敌人,即与战争有关的欺诈。例如,汉尼拔在佩鲁贾湖边假装逃跑,引诱罗马执政官和军队进入圈套,以及借助被点燃牛角的牛群逃出费边·马克西姆斯的包围。
庞提乌斯就善于使用欺诈,作为撒姆尼人的统帅,他在考地乌姆叉口使罗马军队落入圈套。他将自己的军队靠山埋伏好后,派出几个士兵化装成牧羊人,带着一群羊穿过平原。他们被罗马人抓住后被问到撒姆尼军队的位置,于是把庞提乌斯事先准备好的话告诉了罗马人,即撒姆尼军队已经动身去包围诺切拉。罗马执政官听信了他们的假情报,当罗马军队抵达那里时,他们马上被撒姆尼人包围在考地乌姆的悬崖峭壁之间。如果庞提乌斯能听从他父亲的建议,要么放罗马人一条生路,要么把他们赶尽杀绝,那么他用欺诈战术取得这场胜利就应该给他带来诸多荣誉,但是他采用了折中办法,即“既没有化敌为友,也没有彻底消灭敌人”,折中办法总是不利于国家事务,我在别的论述中已经提出过。
无论将面对耻辱还是荣誉,我们都应该保卫自己的国家,无论用什么手段都是正当的
如上文所说,罗马执政官和军队被撒姆尼人包围了。撒姆尼人极大地羞辱了罗马人,把他们的武器和装备都收缴了,强迫他们从牛轭下经过返回罗马。罗马执政官们惊恐万分,整个军队也陷入绝望中。罗马副将卢修斯·图鲁斯说道,为了拯救国家不应该拒绝任何可行的方法,罗马的存亡系于这支军队的存亡,应该想方设法地挽救它,无论用什么手段保卫国家都是正当的,无论带来的是耻辱还是光荣。因为如果这支军队保住了,罗马还有机会一雪前耻,但是如果没有成功,即便光荣地战死沙场,罗马及其自由也将随之湮没。所以,图鲁斯的建议最终被采纳了。
这个忠告值得关注,应该被每个为国家献策的公民遵守。当国家的安危依赖于所采用的决定时,就不应理会正义与非正义,善良或残酷,值得赞扬或有辱名誉。相反,任何其他顾虑都应置之不理,全心全意地执行能挽救国民生命与保全国家自由的措施。
这是法国人采纳的方法——他们所言与所行都是如此——为了捍卫他们的国王或他们王国的权力,没有人会发出不和谐的声音,“这样做会为国王带来耻辱”。他们说,国王没有做出可耻的决定,无论是福还是祸,无论他赢得还是葬送了整个王国。
城下之盟不应该被遵守
当执政官带着被剥夺武器且遭受撒姆尼人极尽羞辱虐待的军队回到罗马时,第一位在元老院发言的人说道,不应该遵守在考地乌姆达成的和平协议。他是罗马执政官斯普利乌斯·普斯图米尔斯。他认为,罗马人民不能受它束缚,只有他和其他承诺和平的人才受此约束。因此,如果人民想免除责任,他们应该将他和所有做出承诺的人当作犯人送给撒姆尼人。他坚决的要求最终使元老院让步了,于是他和其他人被当作囚犯交给了撒姆尼人,以此抗议和平无效。命运似乎垂青于普斯图米尔斯,撒姆尼人没有关押他,在他回到罗马后,在罗马人眼中他靠投降赢得的荣誉,竟然比在撒姆尼人眼中庞提乌斯靠胜利获得的还要多。
有两件事应该引起我们关注。一件事是,荣誉可以通过两个行为中任意一个获得,即在正常情况下靠胜利取得,以及如果你能证明失败与你无关或者借助义举在失败中将功补过。另一件事是,你没有兑现被迫做出的承诺并不可耻。实际上,当武力威胁消除时,影响共和国的城下之盟总是自动瓦解。这样的例子在历史中随处可见,而且人人皆知,即使在现代也会发生。不仅仅是当武力威胁消除时君主不再遵守被胁迫的承诺,我们发现当最初做出承诺的原因不再适用时,其他承诺也会失效。无论这是否值得称颂,无论君主应该不应该如此行事,《君主论》中已经详细地探讨过。因此在这里,无需再做说明。
On conspiracies
Introductory
Since conspiracies are of such dangerous consequence alike to princes and to private persons,I cannot well omit to discuss their nature,for it is plain that many more princes have lost their lives and their states in this way than by open war,because it is given to but few to make open war on a prince,whereas anyone can conspire against him.There is,on the other hand,no enterprise in which private persons can engage more dangerous or more rash than is this,for it is both difficult and extremely dangerous in all its stages.Whence it comes about that,though many conspiracies have been attempted,very few have attained the desired end.Hence,in order that princes may learn how to guard against these dangers,and that private persons may think twice before undertaking them and may learn,instead,to be content with life under the regime which fate has placed over them,I shall speak of conspiracies at length,omitting nothing of importance that is relevant either to a prince or to a private person.There is,in fact,a golden saying voiced by Cornelius Tacitus,who says that men have to respect the past but to submit to the present,and,while they should be desirous of having good princes,should put up with them of whatever sort they may turn out to be.And unquestionably those who act otherwise usually bring disaster both upon themselves and upon their country.
In starting to deal with this topic the first thing to be considered is against whom conspiracies are formed.It will be found that they are formed either against one's fatherland or against a prince.I propose here to discuss both these types,for of conspiracies formed with a view to handing over a town to the enemy besieging it or conspiracies which for one reason or another resemble this,enough has been said elsewhere.
Causes
We shall deal in the first part of this discourse with conspiracies against a prince,and shall inquire first as to their causes,which are many.There is,however,one which is much more important than all the rest.This consists in the universal hatred a prince may evoke,for when a prince has aroused such universal hatred it is to be expected that there will be certain persons to whom he has given greater offence and that they will seek vengeance.This desire will be intensified by the universal ill will which they notice has been aroused against him.A prince,therefore,should avoid incurring these personal reproaches,and since what he has to do in order to avoid them has been discussed elsewhere I shall refrain from discussing it here:I mention it because,if he does guard against this,the mere giving of offence to individuals will evoke less hostility.The reason is,first,that one rarely comes across men so indignant at an unjust act as to endanger themselves to such an extent by seeking vengeance;and secondly,that,should they actually be inclined to do this and have the requisite power,they are restrained by the universal goodwill which they see that the prince enjoys.
Injuries may affect either a man's property,his life or his honour.The threat of bloodshed is more dangerous than is the shedding of blood.To threaten to shed blood is,in fact,extremely dangerous:whereas to shed it is attended with no danger at all,for a dead man cannot contemplate vengeance,and those that remain alive usually leave you to do the contemplating.But a man who has been threatened and sees that he must of necessity either do something or be for it,has been turned into a real menace for the prince,as we shall cite cases presently to show.
Prescinding from the case in which action is imposed by necessity,injuries affecting a man's property or honour are the two things which give men greater offence than anything else,and against them the prince should be on his guard,for he can never so despoil anyone but that there will remain to him a knife with which to wreak vengeance.Nor can he deprive a man of his honour to such an extent that his mind will cease to be set on vengeance.And of the honours of which men may be deprived,that which imports most is a woman's honour,and,after that,contempt for a man's person.It was this that caused Pausanias to take up arms against Philip of Macedon;and this that has caused many others to take up arms against many other princes.In our day Lucio Belanti would not have been moved to conspire against Pandolfo,the tyrant of Siena,if he had not given him his daughter to wife and then taken her away again,as we shall relate in due course.The chief cause which led the Pazzi to conspire against the Medici was the inheritance of Giovanni Bonromei of which they had been deprived by the Medici's orders.
Another cause,and this a very powerful one,that makes men conspire against a prince,is the desire to liberate their fatherland of which a prince has seized possession.It was this that caused Brutus and Cassius to turn against Caesar;this that led to many other conspiracies,against Phalaris,Dionysius and against other usurpers of their country's rights.Nor can any tyrant prevail over this spirit,except by discarding his tyranny.And since one does not find tyrants doing this,one finds few who have not come to a miserable end.Hence the verse of Juvenal:
To Pluto's realm few kings unscathed descend,
Nor tyrants oft escape a sticky end.
Oneman conspiracies
The dangers involved in conspiracies,as I have said above,are considerable,and go on all the time,for in a conspiracy dangers crop up alike in forming the plot,in carrying it out,and as a result of its having been carried out.Plots may be formed by one conspirator,or by several.If by one person only,it cannot rightly be called a conspiracy.Rather it is a firm resolve on the part of some individual to kill the prince.Of the three dangers conspiracies entail,a oneman conspiracy lacks the first.For no danger can arise before the time for action comes,since no one else being privy to the secret,there is no danger of the plot being carried to the ears of the prince.To make a resolve of this kind lies within the competence of anybody whatsoever,be he great,small,noble or insignificant,intimate or not intimate with the prince.For anyone is allowed at some time or other to speak to the prince,and anyone who gets the chance of speaking to him,gets a chance to relieve his feelings.Pausanias,of whom we have already spoken several times,killed Philip of Macedon as he was on his way to the temple with a lot of armed men about him and his son on one side and his soninlaw on the other.The former,however,was a nobleman and an acquaintance of the prince.[But there are others.]A poor,miserable Spaniard stuck a dagger in the neck of Ferdinand,king of Spain,and,though the wound was not fatal,it shows us that a man of this type may have both the intention and the opportunity of doing such a thing.A dervish,or Turkish priest,struck at Bajazet,the father of the present Turk,with a scimitar.He did not kill him,but he certainly had the intention and the opportunity of so doing.One finds plenty of people,I think,who would like to do such things,for the intention is attended neither with penalty nor danger of any kind.Yet there are but few who actually do such things,and of those who do,there are very few,if any,who do not themselves get killed in the very act.Hence one does not find men keen on going to certain death.But let us leave these oneman plots and turn to conspiracies involving several people.
Conspiracies formed by the weak
I maintain that one finds in history that all conspiracies have been made by men of standing or else by men in immediate attendance on a prince,for other people,unless they be sheer lunatics,cannot form a conspiracy;since men without power and those who are not in touch with a prince are devoid alike of any hope and of any opportunity of carrying out a conspiracy successfully.For,first of all,men without power cannot get hold of anyone who will keep faith with them,since no one can consent to do what they want under any of those prospects which induce men to take great risks,so that,once the plot has been communicated to two or three people,an informer will turn up and they are ruined.Moreover,should they actually be lucky enough to avoid informers,the carrying out of the plot will involve them in such difficulties,owing to the lack of easy access to the prince,that it will be impossible for them to escape disaster in carrying out their scheme.For,if men of standing and those who have easy access succumb to these difficulties,which will be dealt with presently,it is to be expected that in the case of these others such difficulties will be magnified without end.Consequently,since when their lives and property are not at stake,men do not entirely lose their heads,they become cautious when they recognize their weakness,and when they get sick of a prince confine themselves to cursing him,and wait for those of higher standing than they have,to avenge them.So that,should one in fact come across somebody of this kind who has attempted such a thing,one should praise his intention but not his prudence.
Conspiracies formed by the strong
It would seem,then,that conspirators have all been men of standing or intimates of the prince,and,of these,those who have been moved to conspire by too many benefits are as numerous as those moved to conspire by too many injuries,as was the case with Perennis versus Commodus,Plautianus versus Severus,and Sejanus versus Tiberius.For to all these men their emperors had granted such wealth and so many honours and titles that there seemed to be nothing wanting to complete their power,save the imperial title;so,since with the lack of this they were unwilling to put up,they were moved to conspire against their prince,and their conspiracy in each case was attended with the results which their ingratitude merited.
Of similar conspiracies which have occurred in more recent times there is,however,one that met with success,that of Jacopo di Appiano against Messer Piero Gambacorti,prince of Pisa;for this Jacopo had been brought up by,reared by,and owed his reputation to,the very person whom later on he deprived of his power.There is also in our own times the conspiracy of Coppola against king Ferdinand of Aragon;the said Coppola having attained a greatness such that the only thing that seemed to him to be lacking was a kingdom,and since he made up his mind to acquire this,he lost his life.And yet,if any conspiracies against a prince,made by men of standing,ought to have succeeded it should surely have been this,since it was made by another king,so to speak,who had every convenience requisite to satisfying his desire.But that lust for domination,which blinds men,blinds them yet again in the way they set about the business:for,if they knew but how to do their evil deeds with prudence,it would be impossible for them not to succeed.
A warning to princes
A prince,therefore,who wants to guard against conspiracies,should fear those on whom he has conferred excessive favours more than those to whom he has done excessive injury.For the latter lack opportunity,whereas the former abound in it,and the desire is the same in both cases;for the desire to rule is as great as,or greater than,is the desire for vengeance.Consequently princes should confer on their friends an authority of such magnitude that between it and that of the prince there remains a certain interval,and between the two a something else to be desired.Otherwise it will be a strange thing if that does not happen to them which happened to the princes we have been talking about.But to return to the lines of our discourse.
The danger due to informers
Having said that conspirators must be men of standing and have easy access to the prince,I must now discuss the success of these,their undertaking,and inquire as to why some have succeeded and others have failed.As I have remarked above,in conspiracies there are three stages at which danger may be found to occur:at the start,while carrying them out,and afterwards.One finds that few conspiracies prove successful because it is impossible,or almost impossible,to pass through all three stages successfully.Let us begin by discussing the dangers incurred at the outset.These are the more important,I maintain,since there is need of great discretion and one must have considerable luck if,in making one's plans,the plot is not to be discovered.Plots are discovered either from information received or by conjecture.Leakage of information is due either to lack of loyalty or to lack of discretion among those to whom you communicate the plot.Lack of loyalty may easily occur,because you can only communicate your plan to those in whom you have such confidence that you think they will risk death for your sake,or else to men who are discontented with the prince.Now there may be one or two persons whom you can trust,but it is impossible to find such men if you reveal your plans to many people,for the goodwill they bear you must indeed be great if the danger and the fear of punishment is not to outweigh it in their estimation.Men,too,quite frequently make mistakes about the affection another man has for them,nor can you be sure of it unless of it you have previously had experience,and to acquire experience in such a matter is a very risky business.Even should you have had experience of some other dangerous affair in which they have been loyal to you,you cannot infer from their loyalty in this case that they will be equally loyal in another which far exceeds it in dangers of all kinds.While if you judge of a person's loyalty by the degree of disaffection he has for the prince,here,too,you may easily be mistaken;for by the very fact of your having opened your mind to such a malcontent,you provide him with material with which to obtain contentment,so that,if he is to keep faith with you,either his hatred must be great or your influence over him must be very great indeed.
It thus comes about that conspiracies are frequently revealed and are crushed at the very start.Indeed,it is looked on as a marvel if a plot which has been communicated to many people,remains secret for any length of time,as was the case with that formed by Piso against Nero,and in our day with that formed by the Pazzi against Lorenzo and Juliano de’ Medici,to which there were privy more than fifty persons and yet it was not discovered till it came to the point of execution.
The danger due to indiscretion
As to discovery due to lack of discretion,this comes about when a conspiracy is spoken of without due caution and a servant or some third person gets to hear of it,as happened to the sons of Brutus who were overheard discussing their plans with Tarquin's messengers by a servant who informed against them.Or it may be due to your having lightly communicated it to a lady friend or to a boy friend or to some other frivolous person,as did Dymnus,who with Philotas and others conspired against Alexander the Great,and talked of the conspiracy to Nicomachus,a boy of whom he was fond,who at once told his brother,Cebalinus,about it,and Cebalinus told it to the king.
Discovery due to conjecture
As to discovery due to conjecture,we have an example of this in the Pisonian conspiracy formed against Nero,in which Scaevinus,one of the conspirators,made his will on the day before he had to kill Nero,ordered Milichus,his freedman,to have his old and rusty dagger sharpened up,freed all his slaves and gave them money,and had bandages got ready for binding up the wounded;from which facts Milichus conjectured that there was a plot and told Nero.Scaevinus was arrested,together with Natales,another conspirator,who had been seen talking together for a long time and in secret the day before;and,as their explanations did not agree,they were forced to tell the truth;so that the conspiracy was discovered,with disastrous results for all concerned in it.
The difficulty or preventing discovery
Against discovery due to such causes it is impossible so to guard as to prevent the plot being revealed,whether owing to malice,to indiscretion or to frivolous conversation,in all cases in which the number of those who are cognizant of it exceeds three or four.For,should more than one of the conspirators be arrested,it is impossible to prevent its coming out,because two cannot possibly agree as to every detail in the explanations they give.If only one man is arrested and he be a man of resolution,he may have sufficient strength of mind to be silent about his fellow conspirators.It is essential,however,that the other conspirators have no less courage than he has in standing their ground and not running away,for the conspiracy will be revealed by either party in which courage is lacking,whether by the man who has been arrested or those who are still at large.
There is,indeed,a rare case given by Titus Livy,namely,the conspiracy formed against Hieronymus,king of Syracuse,in which,when Theodotus,one of the conspirators,was arrested,he showed great virtue in concealing all the other conspirators,and accused the king's own friends;and the other conspirators,on their part,had such confidence in Theodotus's virtue,that not one of them left Syracuse or showed any other sign of fear.
Precautions against discovery
These,then,are the dangers to which a conspiracy is exposed in the course of its formation before the time comes for it to be carried out;and,if they are to be avoided,these are the remedies.The first,the safest and,to tell the truth,the only one,is not to allow the conspirators time to give information against you,and to tell them of your plan only when you are ready to act,and not before.Those who have so acted,at any rate escape the dangers involved in contriving the plot,and more often than not,the others also.All of them,in fact,have been successful,and any prudent man should find it possible to conduct things in this fashion.I shall cite two cases,and leave it at that.
Nelematus,being unable to stand the tyranny of Aristotimus,tyrant of Epirus,collected in his house many of his relations and friends,and exhorted them to set their country free.Some of them asked for time to consider the matter and to put their affairs in order.Whereupon Nelematus told his servants to lock the doors of the house,and to those whom he had called together said:‘Either you swear to go and do the deed now,or I shall hand you all over as prisoners to Aristotimus.’ These words got them going;they took the oath,and,having set out without delay,they successfully carried out Nelematus's instructions.When one of the Magi by subterfuge got possession of the Persian throne,and Otanes,one of the leading men in the kingdom,heard of it and discovered the fraud,he conferred with six other leading men in the state,and told them that it was for them to rid the kingdom of the tyranny of this Magus.When one of them asked for time,Darius,one of the six who had been called together by Otanes,got up and said:‘Either we go at once and put this business through,or I shall go and lay information against the lot of you.’ So with one accord they got up,and succeeded in carrying out their plan before anyone had time to repent.Similar to these two cases also was the method the Aetolians adopted in order to kill Nabis,the Spartan tyrant;for they commissioned their fellowcitizen,Alexamenes,to go with thirty horse and two hundred foot ostensibly to the assistance of Nabis,communicated the secret only to Alexamenes,and told the rest to obey him on each and every point under pain of banishment.So Alexamenes went to Sparta and never mentioned the commission entrusted to him till he was ready to carry it out;with the result that he succeeded in killing Nabis.These folk,then,by adopting these methods,have avoided the dangers which attend the planning of a conspiracy;and those who follow their example will always avoid them.
Their practicability
That anyone can do as they did,I propose now to prove by citing the case of Piso,of whom mention has already been made.Piso was a man of very high standing and great repute,and was intimate with Nero,who had considerable confidence in him.Nero used frequently to dine with him in his gardens.Piso,therefore,could have made friends with men who in mentality,courage and inclination were of the right kind to carry out such a scheme,for to a man of standing this is quite an easy matter;and while Nero was in his gardens,he could have told them of the business and with suitable words got them to do what there would have been no time for them to refuse and what could not but have succeeded.Hence if we inquire into conspiracies in general,but few will be found that could not have been carried out in the same way.Ordinarily,however,men pay but little attention to the affairs of the world and so make frequently the gravest blunders,especially in matters which lie outside the ordinary run of things,as this does.
Further precautions
A plot,then,should never be divulged unless one is driven to it and it is ripe for execution,and if you,perforce,have to divulge it,it should be told to but one other person,and this a man of whom you have had very considerable experience,or else one who is actuated by the same motives as you are.To find such a man is far easier than to find several,and for this very reason is less dangerous.Moreover,should you,in fact,make a mistake,you have here a chance of protecting yourself,which is not the case where many conspirators are involved.For I have heard a wise man say that you can talk about anything to one person alone,since,unless you allow yourself to be persuaded to commit yourself in writing,one man's ‘yes’ will be worth just as much as the other man's ‘no’.And against writing anything down everybody should be on his guard as against a rock,for nothing is more likely to convict you than is your own handwriting.Plautianus,having made up his mind to kill the emperor,Severus,and his son,Antoninus,entrusted the secret to Saturninus,the tribune,who wanted to inform against him instead of doing what he wished,but was afraid that,when he brought the charge,more credence might be given to Plautianus than to himself.So he asked for something in writing that might serve as evidence of the commission entrusted to him.Blinded by ambition,Plautianus gave it him,with the result that the tribune brought the accusation and he was convicted.Yet without this commitment in writing and certain other evidence against him,Plautianus would have got the better of him,so brazen was he in denying the charge.There is then some chance of getting off when a charge is brought by but one person provided you cannot be convicted by a written document or other evidence telling against you,which one should take care not to provide.
In the Pisonian conspiracy there was a woman called Epicharis,who had formerly been Nero's mistress.Since she thought it would help to get a captain of some triremes which served as Nero's guard to join the conspirators,she told him of the plot,but not who the conspirators were.Subsequently,when the captain broke his word and charged her with it to Nero,Epicharis denied the charge with such vehemence that Nero could not make up his mind and let her off.There are,then,in communicating a plot to a single other person two dangers:the first is that he may accuse you of his own accord;and the second is that he may get arrested on suspicion or because there is some evidence against him,and accuse you when convicted and constrained by torture to do so.In both these cases the danger is not irremediable;for in the first case you can deny the charge and allege that he made it because he hated you;and in the second you can deny it,alleging that under force he has been compelled to tell a lie.
Unpremeditated assassination
The wisest thing,therefore,is not to tell anybody what you are about,but to act in accordance with the examples given above;or,if you have to tell somebody,not to tell more than one,in which case,though the danger will be somewhat greater,it will not be so great as if you had told it to many.The case is somewhat the same when necessity constrains you to do that to a prince which you see that the prince is about to do to you,for your need is then so great that it does not give you time to think of precautions.A necessity of this kind almost always leads to the end desired;and,to prove it,I propose to give just two examples.
Among the chief friends and intimates which the em peror,Commodus,had,were Laetus and Eclectus,who were in charge of his praetorian troops,and for one of his principal concubines or lady friends he had Marcia;and because they sometimes reproached him for sullying alike his person and his imperial position by his behaviour,he decided to put them to death,and made out a list on which he wrote the names of Marcia,Laetus and Eclectus,and several others whom he proposed on the following night to put to death.This list he put under the pillow of his bed.Having gone to wash himself,a favourite little boy of his was romping about the room and on the bed when he came across the list,and,having gone outside with it in his hand,met Marcia,who took it from him,and,having read it and noted its contents,sent at once for Laetus and Eclectus.All three of them,realizing the danger in which they stood,decided to forestall it;so,without wasting any unnecessary time,they killed Commodus the following night.
Again,the emperor Antoninus Caracalla,when with his army in Mesopotamia,had as his prefect Macrinus,who was more of a civilian than a soldier;and,as is usually the case with princes who are not good,he was for ever afraid that others should not act towards him as he thought he deserved.So Antoninus wrote to Maternianus,a friend of his in Rome,to request him to inquire of the astrologers whether anybody was aspiring to become emperor,and to advise him accordingly.Maternianus,therefore,wrote him that Macrinus was the man who had this idea in mind,but the letter fell into the hands of Macrinus before it got to the emperor,and,in consequence,Macrinus saw that it was necessary either to kill him before a further letter came from Rome,or to be killed;so he instructed Martialis,a centurion who was devoted to him and whose brother Antoninus had killed a few days before,to assassinate the emperor,a commission which he carried out successfully.
Hence we see that when necessity becomes so urgent that it leaves no time for delay,it produces much the same effect as does the method adopted by Nelematus of Epirus,which I have described above.We see,too,that what I have said almost at the beginning of this discourse also holds good,namely,that threats do more harm to princes and are more likely to result in conspiracies than the actual infliction of injuries.Against threats,therefore,a prince should be on his guard;for either he should make a fuss of men or should make sure they will do him no harm,but in no case should he put them in such a position that the only courses which appear open to them are either to get killed or to kill somebody else.
Dangers arising from a change of plan
As to the dangers which occur during the carrying out of a plot,these are due either to a change of plan,or to lack of courage on the part of the person who is to carry it out,or to the operative's making some mistake owing to carelessness,or to failure to complete the job in that there remain alive some of those who were to have been killed.I would here point out,therefore,that nothing so perturbs and interferes with anything undertaken by men as does their having suddenly and without due notice to change their plan and to give up that laid down at the start.And,if such a change of plan anywhere gives rise to disorder,it is in military operations and in affairs such as those of which we are speaking;because in a business of this kind what it is essential to do first and foremost is to get clearly into the heads of those concerned the part which each of them has to play,and,if men have for several days been picturing to themselves a certain course of action and a certain plan,and this is suddenly changed,it is impossible but that it should throw everything out of gear and spoil the whole scheme.So that it is much better to carry out the original plan,even if one sees in it certain inconveniences,than it is to cancel it and thereby to involve oneself in a host of inconveniences.This applies to cases in which there is no time to draw up a new plan,for,if there is time,a man can arrange matters as he pleases.
The conspiracy of the Pazzi against Lorenzo and Giuliano de’ Medici is familiar to all.According to the plan that had been given out,they were to be invited to dinner with the Cardinal of St George,and at the dinner were to be assassinated.Those who were to kill them,those who were to seize the palace and those who were to run about the city calling on the people to free themselves,had all been detailed.It happened that,when the Pazzi,the Medici and the Cardinal were attending a solemn function in the cathedral church of Florence,it became known that Giuliano was not going to dine with them that day;so the conspirators got together and decided that what they had been going to do in the house of the Medici should be done in the church.This upset the whole plan,for Giovambatista da Montesecco declined to take part in the murder,since he was not going to do it in church,he said.So they had to find new operatives and to redistribute the parts assigned,and,since there was no time for them to get clear as to their parts,they made such blunders in carrying it out that they were overcome.
Failure due to irresolution
Irresolution on the part of operatives in doing their job,is due either to human respect or to personal cowardice.Such is the majesty and the respect inspired by the presence of a prince that it may easily damp the resolution of an operative or terrify him.When Marius was taken prisoner by the Minturnians a slave was sent to kill him,but,so overawed was he by the presence of such a man and by the recollection of what his name stood for,that he lost courage and hadn't the strength to kill him.If,then,such power appertains to a man who is chained up in prison and overwhelmed with misfortune,how much greater must be that of a prince who is not thus encumbered,but is there in his majesty,wearing his robes and decorations,surrounded by pomp and by his courtiers.Such pomp as this may well affright you,or again the graciousness of his welcome may soften you.Certain persons were conspiring against Sitalces,king of Thrace,had settled the day on which the deed was to be done,and had got to the place assigned at which the prince then was;yet none of them ventured to attack him,so that at length they went away without trying to do anything and without quite knowing what had prevented them,each laying the blame on the other.They made the same mistake more than once,so that in the end the conspiracy was discovered and they were punished for a crime which they could have committed but were reluctant to commit.Two of his brothers conspired against Alfonso,Duke of Ferrara,and used as an intermediary Giannes,a priest and a cantor in the duke's employ.Several times at their request he got the duke to meet them,so that it lay in their power to kill him;in spite of which not one of them dared to do it,so that,the plot being discovered,they suffered the penalty of their wickedness and their want of prudence.Such negligence could not have been due to anything except their being frightened by the presence of the prince or humbled by some gracious act of his.
Failure due to perturbation of mind
Inconveniences in the carrying out of a conspiracy are due to mistakes caused either by lack of prudence or by lack of courage,for both these two things may befall you and cause you such confusion of mind that you say and do what you oughtn't to say or do.That men do get thus overwhelmed and confused cannot be better illustrated than by what Titus Livy tells us of Alexamenes,the Aetolian,who had made up his mind to kill Nabis the Spartan,of whom we have already spoken.When the time came to do it,he explained to his men what it was they had to do,and,says Livy,‘pulled himself together,for his mind had become confused by thinking of so great a matter’.It is,indeed,impossible,that any man,even though he be strongminded,familiar with death and accustomed to using the sword,should not become confused.Hence men should be chosen who have had experience in doing such deeds,and one should entrust them to no one else,brave as he may be thought to be.For when it comes to doing big things of which a man has had no previous experience,no one can say for certain what will happen.This confusion,for instance,might be such as to cause you to let the weapon fall from your hand,or to let slip some word which would have precisely the same effect.Lucilla,the sister of Commodus,arranged with Quintianus to kill him.Quintianus lay in wait for Commodus at the entrance to the amphitheatre,and,going up to him with a naked dagger,greeted him with the words:‘The senate sends you this!’,words which led to his being arrested before he had lowered his arm to strike.Messer Antonio de Volterra was deputed,as we have already said,to kill Lorenzo de’ Medici.On coming up to him he said:‘Ah,traitor!’,an exclamation which saved Lorenzo's life and ruined the conspiracy.
Conspiracies directed against more than one prince
It is not easy to do the thing perfectly when a conspiracy is directed against one ruler,for the reasons alleged,and still less is it easy to do it perfectly when a conspiracy is directed against two.On the contrary,it is so difficult that it is almost impossible for the conspiracy to succeed.For it is almost impossible to do similar actions in different places at one and the same time,and you cannot perform them at different times if you do not want one to spoil the other.Hence,if to conspire against one prince is a doubtful,dangerous and imprudent undertaking,to conspire against two is altogether foolish and frivolous.Were it not for my respect for the historian I should never have thought that what Herodian says of Plautianus were possible,namely,that he should have commissioned the same person,Saturninus the centurion,to kill both Severus and Antoninus who dwelt in different places,for the thing is so utterly unreasonable that nothing short of his authority would make me believe it.
Certain Athenian youths conspired against Diocles and Hippias,tyrants ruling in Athens.They killed Diocles,but Hippias escaped and avenged him.Chion and Leonides of Heraclea,disciples of Plato,conspired against the tyrants,Clearchus and Satyrus.They killed Clearchus,but Satyrus remained alive to avenge him.The Pazzi,whom we have mentioned more than once,only succeeded in killing Giuliano.Hence no one should engage in conspiracies against more than one ruler since he will do not good either to himself or to his country or to anybody at all.On the contrary,those who survive,will become more insupportable and more bitter,as Florence,Athens and Heraclea,to which I have already alluded,found out.True,the conspiracy which Pelopidas formed for the liberation of Thebes,his fatherland,involved all these difficulties,and yet was successful;for Pelopidas conspired not only against two tyrants,but against ten,and not only was he an outsider to whom access to the tyrants presented a difficulty,but he was a rebel.None the less,he was able to get into Thebes,to kill the tyrants and to liberate his country.Actually,however,it was with the assistance of Charon,counsellor to the tyrants,that he did all this,for it was through him that he gained easy access to do the deed.Nor should anyone nevertheless emulate his example;for it was an impossible undertaking and a marvellous thing that it succeeded.It was also,as all writers are agreed who have mentioned it,a rare and almost unparalleled thing.
Failure due to false impressions
The carrying out of a plot may be ruined by a false impression or by an unforeseen accident which occurs in the course of it.On the very morning on which Brutus and the other conspirators had decided to kill Caesar,it happened that he held a long conversation with Gaius Pompilius Lenas,who was one of the conspirators,and when the others saw him talking for so long,they wondered whether the said Pompilius was not telling Caesar of the conspiracy,and were on the point of killing him there and then,without waiting for him to come into the senate.They would,indeed,have done this,had the argument not come to an end and had they not then been reassured when they saw Caesar gave no sign of unusual emotion.False impressions of this kind should be taken into account and due attention be paid to them,if one would be prudent;the more so in that it is easy to get such false impressions.For,when a man has a bad conscience,he readily believes that people are talking about him,and a remark which is irrelevant may disturb your equanimity and make you think that it has bearing on your business,and this causes you either to give the conspiracy away by running off,or to muddle it by acting before the proper time.And the more there are who are in the know,the more likely is this to happen.
Failure due to unforeseen accidents
As to accidents,since they cannot be foreseen,the only thing one can do is to give examples showing how cautious men ought to be in regard to them.Lucio Belanti of Siena,of whom mention has already been made,was so indignant with Pandolfo,who had taken away the daughter he had previously given him in marriage,that he decided to kill him,and chose the occasion as follows.Pandolfo used to go daily to visit a sick relative,and,in doing so,passed by Lucio's house.Lucio,having noticed this,arranged for his conspirators to be ready in his house to kill Pandolfo as he was going by.He placed them inside the doorway with their arms,and stationed one of them at the window ready to give the signal when Pandolfo was to pass by the doorway,whereupon they were at once to issue forth.It so happened that,when Pandolfo came along and the signal had been given,Pandolfo met a friend who stopped him,and some of those who were with him went on ahead,saw what was happening,heard the clatter of arms and so discovered the trap;with the result that Pandolfo escaped and Lucio and his accomplices had to fly from Siena.Thus this accidental meeting interfered with the business in hand and caused Lucio's scheme to end in disaster.Since accidents,such as these,are of rare occurrence,it is impossible to prescribe any remedy.What one must do is to consider everything that is likely to happen,and to provide accordingly.
Dangers subsequent to a conspiracy
It remains now for us to discuss the dangers that may occur after a conspiracy has been successfully carried out.There is but one.It is that someone may be left alive who will avenge the death of the prince.There may,for instance,remain brothers or sons or other supporters to whom the principality was expected to come.Survival of those who may wreak vengeance may be due either to your negligence or to the causes mentioned above.Thus,when Giovanni Andrea da Lampognano and his accomplices had killed the Duke of Milan,there remained one of his sons and two of his brothers,who in due course came to avenge his death.In cases such as these the conspirators have an excuse,for there is nothing they can do about it;but when it is owing to lack of prudence or to their negligence that someone is left alive,they have in that case no excuse.Some conspirators who were citizens of Forli,killed Count Girolamo,their Lord,and took prisoner his wife and his children,who were little ones.It seemed to them,however,that their lives would scarce be safe unless they could get hold of the citadel,which its governor declined to hand over.So Mistress Catherine,as the countess was called,promised the conspirators that,if they would let her go to the citadel,she would arrange for it to be handed over to them.Meanwhile they were to keep her children as hostages.On this understanding the conspirators let her go to the citadel,from the walls of which,when she got inside,she reproached them with killing her husband and threatened them with vengeance in every shape and form.And to convince them that she did not mind about her children she exposed her sexual parts to them and said she was still capable of bearing more.The conspirators,dumbfounded,realized their mistake too late,and paid the penalty for their lack of prudence by suffering perpetual banishment.
But of all the dangers that may ensue after a successful conspiracy there is none more inevitable or more to be dreaded than when the people are well disposed to the prince you have killed;for in such a case,since there is no remedy to which the conspirators can have recourse,there is no chance of their ever obtaining security.Caesar is a case in point,for he was avenged by the people of Rome who were friendlily disposed towards him;and of the conspirators,after they had been driven out of Rome,one and all were killed at various times and in various places.
Conspiracies against one's country
Conspiracies against one's country are less dangerous to those who take part in them than are conspiracies against princes,since fewer dangers occur in the planning of them than in the latter case;in carrying them out they are the same;and afterwards there are none.There are not many dangers in planning the conspiracy because a citizen can scheme to obtain power without revealing his mind or his plan to anybody else,and,if his schemes are not interfered with,success will attend his undertaking;while if they should be interfered with by some law or other,he must bide his time and look for some other opening.This applies to a republic which is to some extent corrupt,for,since in one that is not corrupt no starting on evil courses there finds a place,no citizen is likely to harbour such thoughts.There are,then,all manner of ways and means of which citizens who aspire to a principality can avail themselves without running any risk of getting into trouble,alike because a republic is slower to take action than is a prince,is less suspicious,and for this reason less cautious,and because it has more respect for citizens of standing,and,in consequence,the latter are more daring and more inclined to act contrary to its interests.Everybody has read Sallust's account of the conspiracy of Catiline,and is aware that Catiline not only remained in Rome after the conspiracy was discovered,but attended the senate,where he made opprobrious remarks about the senate and about the consuls,so great was the respect which this city had for its citizens.Nor,when he had left Rome and was already in touch with the armies,would Lentulus and others have been arrested if they had not had in their possession letters in their own hand which plainly showed their complicity.
Again,when Hanno,one of the leading citizens in Carthage,who hoped to set up a tyranny,had arranged to poison the whole senate at the marriagefeast of one of his daughters,and afterwards to make himself prince,all the senate did,when it got to hear of the business,was to pass a law restricting the amount to be spent on banquets and marriages,so great was the respect they had for a man in his position.
On the other hand,it may well be that in carrying out a conspiracy against one's country there is more difficulty and the dangers are greater,for in a conspiracy aimed at so many people your own forces will scarce suffice;and not everybody has an army at his disposal,as had Caesar,Agathocles,Cleomenes and suchlike,who have at one stroke subjugated their country by means of the forces they commanded.For to such folk the way is easy enough and safe enough;but others who have not such forces at their disposal,must give effect to their designs either by means of deceit and artifice or with the help of foreign troops.The use of deceit and artifice is illustrated in the case of Pisistratus,the Athenian,who by his victory over the Megarians gained favour with the people.One morning he appeared in public,wounded,said that the nobility out of envy had attacked him,and asked that he might go about with an armed force for the protection of his person.This being authorized,he had no difficulty in arrogating to himself such great power that he became tyrant of Athens.Pandolfo Petrucci,on his return to Siena with other exiles,was given command of the guard in the Piazza,a routine business which others had refused;yet this armed force in course of time acquired for him such repute that he became before long a prince.Many others have adopted other devices and other methods and in course of time and without danger have achieved their aim.
Those who have conspired to get control of their country by means of their own forces or with foreign armies have met with varied success according as fortune has favoured them or not.Catiline,whom we mentioned above,perished in the attempt.Hanno,of whom also we made mention,having failed to succeed by using poison,armed several thousands of his partisans,and both he and they were slain.Some of the principal citizens of Thebes called in a Spartan army to help them,and set up a tyranny in that city.If,then,we inquire into all the conspiracies men have made against their country,it will be found that none of them,or but few,have been suppressed while the plot was being contrived,but that all of them have either succeeded or been ruined when it came to carrying them out.Nor,when successful,do they entail any subsequent dangers other than those which pertain to a principality by its very nature.For,given that a man has become a tyrant,he is faced with the dangers which tyranny naturally and normally involves,and to avert them has no remedies other than those that we have already discussed.
The use of poison
This is all that needs to be said about conspiracies,and if I have taken account of those in which the sword and not poison has been used,it is because they are all of one and the same pattern.It is true that the use of poison is more dangerous owing to its being more uncertain,for not everybody has the commodity,so that those who have it must needs be consulted and the necessity of consulting others means danger to yourself.Again,for a variety of reasons,a poisoned drink may not prove fatal,as those discovered who were to kill Commodus,for,on his throwing up the poison they had given him,they were forced to strangle him if they wanted him to die.
Tactics to be used in suppressing a conspiracy
There is nothing,then,more inimical to princes than a conspiracy.For,when a conspiracy is formed against them,either they get killed or they incur infamy;since,if it succeeds,they die,and if it is discovered and they kill the conspirators,the conspiracy is apt to be regarded as a device on the part of the prince whereby to cloak his avarice and his cruelty visàvis the lives and property of those he has put to death.I must not,therefore,neglect to warn that prince or that republic who knows that a conspiracy has been planned,to endeavour to discover its precise character before they take punitive action,and to compare carefully the strength and standing of the conspirators with their own;and,should they find it large and powerful,to take no notice of it until they have at their disposal enough forces to crush it.To act otherwise is but to court disaster.Hence they should practise dissimulation as best they can,lest the conspirators,finding themselves discovered,be driven of necessity to take immediate action regardless of the result.
The Romans afford us an example of this.Two legions of soldiers were left to guard Capua against the Samnites,as we have pointed out elsewhere.Those who were in command of these legions conspired together to reduce the Capuans to subjection.When this came to be known in Rome,Rutilus,a new consul,was commissioned to look into the matter.To keep the conspirators quiet,he made public the senate confirmation of the Capuan legions’ lodging quarters.The troops believed this,and,since there seemed to them to be plenty of time to carry out their plan,they made no attempt to hurry things.So matters stood until they came to realize that the consul had separated one legion from the other,which caused them to grow suspicious,to come out into the open and to give orders for their scheme to be put into execution.Nor can there be a better example than this from whichever point of view we look at it,for we see how slow men are to act when they think they have time,and how quick to act when the need becomes urgent.Nor yet can a prince or a republic that wants to postpone the discovery of a conspiracy in its own interests do better than artfully to provide the conspirators with an opportunity at some future date,so that,while they await it in the belief that there is no hurry,that prince or that republic may have time to arrange for their punishment.
Those who have acted otherwise have but hastened their own downfall,as the Duke of Athens did,and Guglielmo de’ Pazzi.When the duke became tyrant of Florence and heard that a conspiracy had been formed against him,he had one of the conspirators arrested but did not inquire further into the matter,with the result that the rest at once flew to arms and deprived him of the government.When Guglielmo was commissioner in the Val di Chiana in 1501 and learned that a conspiracy in favour of the Virelli had been formed in Arezzo whereby the Florentines were to be deprived of that town,he went at once to that city,and without considering either the strength of the conspirators or his own and without having any forces in readiness,on the advice of the bishop,his son,he had one of the conspirators arrested.After the arrest,the remaining conspirators at once took up arms,took the town from the Florentines and Guglielmo became a prisoner instead of a commissioner.
But when conspiracies are weak they both can,and ought,to be suppressed without further ado.Nor should either of the two following expedients be adopted,though one is almost the exact opposite of the other.One was used by the aforesaid Duke of Athens,who to show that he believed the Florentines to be well disposed towards him,put to death a man who had told him of a conspiracy.The other was adopted by Dion,the Syracusan,who,to discover the intentions of someone of whom he was suspicious,allowed Callippus,whom he trusted,to pretend to be forming a conspiracy.Both these expedients led to disaster,for the first discouraged informers and encouraged wouldbe conspirators,and the second made it an easy matter to compass Dion's death by means of the very conspiracy of which he was the real head,as he learned by experience,for Callippus was now able without further ado to plot against Dion,and he plotted so well that he deprived him both of his state and of his life.
The army,its discipline and component parts
How far the Discipline of Troops in our Day falls short of that maintained in Days gone by
The most important battle ever fought by the Romans in any war with another nation was the battle they fought with the Latin peoples in the consulate of Torquatus and Decius.For everything shows that,just as the Latins by losing became a subject people,so the Romans would have become a subject people,had they not won.This is the view held by Titus Livy,for in all respects the two armies were alike in discipline,virtue,truculence and in numbers;the only difference was that the commanders of the Roman army had more virtuosity than those of the Latin army.
One notes,too,how in the conduct of this battle there occurred two unprecedented incidents of which there have been but few examples since;namely,to strengthen the resolution of the soldiers and to make them obey orders,of the two consuls one killed himself and the other killed his son.The parity which Titus Livy says held between the two armies was due to their having for a long time waged war together,and consisted in their having the same language,the same discipline,and the same kind of arms,for in drawing up troops for battle they used the same formation,and both units and officers bore the same names.It was essential,therefore,since both in strength and in virtù they were equal,that something extraordinary should take place whereby to strengthen the ardour and truculence of the one rather than the other,for,as we have remarked on other occasions,it is on determination that victory depends,since,so long as it lasts in the breasts of those who are fighting,an army will never turn tail.And in order that it might last longer in the breasts of the Romans than with the Latins it came about,owing partly to chance and partly to the virtue of the consuls,that Torquatus had to kill his son and Decius to kill himself.
When pointing out this parity in strength Titus Livy describes in detail how the Romans drew up their armies and how they disposed them for battle.He has done this at considerable length,so I shall not repeat it all,but shall discuss the points which I deem worthy of note,points which are ignored by all presentday commanders,with the result that there is a grave lack of proper order alike in drawing up armies and in battle.From Livy we gather that in the Roman army there were three main divisions for which the Tuscan term three ‘ranks’ may be used.They called the first Hastati,the second Principes,the third Triarii.Each had its own cavalry attached.In drawing them up for battle,they put the Hastati in front;in the second place,immediately behind the Hastati,they put the Principes;in the third,all covering precisely the same space,they placed the Triarii.The cavalry pertaining to each of these divisions they put on the right and on the left of the three formations.These mounted troops,on account of their formation and their position,were called alae,because they looked like two wings attached to the body.They drew up the first rank,consisting of the Hastati who were in front,in close formation,so that they might thrust forward and hold up the enemy.The second rank,consisting of Principes,since they were not to be engaged at the outset,but were to come to the aid of the first should they be beaten or hard pressed,they did not draw up in such close formation,but kept their lines thinner so that this rank could receive the first rank,without disturbing its formation,should the latter be overcome by the enemy and have to fall back.The third rank consisting of Triarii,were drawn up in yet thinner lines than the second,so as to receive the two first ranks,comprising Principes and Hastati,should need arise.When their ranks had thus been drawn up in this formation,they went into battle;and,should the Hastati be forced back or defeated,they fell straight back upon the thinner ranks of the Principes,and the two ranks,thus united to form one compact body,resumed the fight.Should these ranks be beaten and forced to retreat,they retired upon the thinner ranks of the Triarii,and all three ranks,together forming one body,renewed the fight.But should they be overcome,the day was lost,since they had no further chance to reform.Wherefore,since every time this last rank of Triarii became engaged,it meant danger to the army,there arose the proverb:‘It all depends on the Triarii’,or,as we say in the Tuscan idiom:‘We have played the last stake’.
As generals in our days have abandoned all other traditions and pay no attention to any point in ancient military discipline,so they have abandoned it in regard to this point,which is of no small importance.For where an army is so drawn up as to be able to reform three times during a battle,to lose the day luck must go against it three times and the valour of those attacking it must be sufficient to beat it three times over.But an army that can withstand but one attack,as is the case with all Christian armies,may easily lose,for,if it become in any way disorganized or its valour be but indifferent,its chance of victory goes.The inability of our armies thrice to reform is due to their having dropped the custom of receiving one rank into the other.This in turn is due to there being in presentday battleformations one of two defects:either they station their ranks one alongside the other,and make their formations broad in extent but thin in the line of attack,which makes them weaker owing to their lack of depth;or when,to make them stronger,they actually draw up the ranks in Roman fashion,then,since no arrangement is made for the first to be received by the second,when the first is routed,all get mixed up together and defeat themselves.For if the rank in front gets the worst of it,it collides with the second;and,if the second wants to advance,it is impeded by the first.Hence when the first falls back on the second,and the second on the third,so much confusion arises that the whole army is frequently ruined should the least misadventure befall.
At the battle of Ravenna,in which Monsieur de Foix who commanded the armies of France was killed – a wellfought battle as things go today – both the Spanish and the French armies were drawn up in one of the ways just described,i.e.each of the two armies advanced with all its troops drawn up shoulder to shoulder so that both presented but a single front which was much greater in extent than it was in depth.This is always their procedure when they are operating on a large plain such as they had at Ravenna;for,realizing the disorder a retreat causes when troops are arranged in files,they avoid this,when they can,by making their front broad,as has been said.But should the available space be narrow they put up with the aforesaid bad arrangement without providing any remedy.And in the same bad formation they ride through the enemy's country,whether to loot it or to perform any other military manoeuvre.
Again,at San.Regolo in the territory of Pisa,as also at other places in which the Florentines were routed by the Pisans during the war which took place between the Florentines and that city owing to its having rebelled after Charles,king of France,passed through Italy,the disaster was entirely due to the allied cavalry which,being in front and having been repulsed by the enemy,fell back on the Florentine infantry and broke it up,so that the rest of the troops all turned tail.Messer Ciriaco dal Borgo,once a captain of Florentine infantry,has also often stated in my presence that he had never been routed except by the cavalry of his allies.The Swiss,who are masters of modern warfare,when fighting on the French side,make it their first care to station themselves on the flanks,so that,should the allied cavalry be driven back,it will not clash with them.Yet,though such things are both easy to understand and very easy to carry out,none the less there has not appeared as yet any of our contemporary generals who has adopted the ancient formations and emended the modern ones.And though they may again have the threefold army formation,called respectively the vanguard,the main body and the rearguard,it serves no purpose other than that of disposing men in billets.Moreover,when they make use of it,as was said above,it rarely happens that the selfsame fortune does not befall all these bodies.
Since many,to cover their ignorance,assert that the destructive power of artillery does not in these days permit the use of many ancient practices,I propose to discuss this question in the following chapter,and to inquire whether artillery renders it impossible to display the valour of days gone by.
In what Esteem Artillery should be held by Armies at the Present Time,and whether the Opinion universally held in its Regard is Sound
When in addition to what I have just written,I consider how many open battles which in our time the French call ‘days’ and the Italians call ‘feats of arms’,were fought by the Romans at different times,there comes to my mind the common opinion so many hold,an opinion which would have it that,had there been artillery in those days,it would not have been possible for the Romans to have conquered provinces and to have made peoples become their tributaries so easily as they did;nor would they have been able in any way to make such bold acquisitions.They allege,too,that the use of these destructive weapons prevents men from employing and displaying their virtue as they used to do of old.And as a third point they add that it is more difficult than it was then to come to an engagement,and that it is impossible to keep to the ancient usages.In fact,war before long will be reduced to the question of artillery.
I do not think it beside the point to discuss whether this view is sound,or to inquire whether artillery has increased or has lessened the strength of armies,and whether it has deprived good generals of,or has provided them with,an opportunity for acting ‘virtuously’.So let me begin by dealing with the first of these claims,namely,that Roman armies of old would not have made the acquisitions they did make,if in those days there had been artillery.
In reply to this I would point out that wars are either offensive or defensive.Hence we must first ask to which of these two kinds of warfare artillery is the more useful or the more dangerous.Though there is something to be said for either view,yet I am convinced that artillery is incomparably more harmful to defenders than to those who attack.The reason why I say this is that the defenders are either in a walled town or are encamped behind a stockade.If they are within a walled town,either it is small,as are most fortresses,or it is large.In the first case,it is all up with the defenders,for the force of artillery is such that no wall can stand it,not even the thickest,for more than a few days.Hence if those within have not a goodly space into which to retire and dig trenches and build ramparts they are doomed.Nor can they withstand the attack of an enemy determined to force his way through a gap in the walls,even if they have artillery to help them,for it is an accepted maxim that against a heavy massed attack artillery is powerless.For this reason the defending of towns against the fury of ultramontane attacks has not been successful but against the assaults of Italians they have been highly successful,for the latter do not attack en masse but in detachments,a form of attack for which much the best name is skirmishing.To advance thus coolly in such weak formation towards a breach in the walls where there is artillery,is to advance to certain death,and against such attacks artillery is of service.But when the attackers form a dense mass and come on one after the other to a breach in the walls,they get through anywhere unless held up by trenches and ramparts.Artillery will not hold them,for,though some get killed,there will not be so many killed as to prevent a victory.
That this is so is shown by the many towns stormed by the ultramontanes in Italy,and especially by that of Brescia.For when this town rebelled against the French who still held the citadel on behalf of the king of France,in order to prevent raids being made on the town from the citadel,the Venetians fortified the whole of the street leading down from the citadel to the city with artillery,placing it both in front and on the flanks and in any other convenient place.But of this Monsieur de Foix made no account.On the contrary,with a squadron of his cavalry,who dismounted,he got right through the artillery and took the city;nor do we hear that the artillery caused him any appreciable loss.So that the defenders of a small town,as we have said,when they find their walls laid low and have no space into which to retire behind ramparts and in trenches,but have to rely on their artillery,are speedily undone.
If you are defending a large town where you have all you need for a withdrawal,artillery is still of far greater use to those who are outside than to those who are within.First,because,if artillery is to do any damage to those who are outside,you must needs raise it above the level of the ground,for,if on the level,every little trench the enemy digs and every rampart he puts up will afford him security,and you can do him no harm.So much so that,having raised your artillery and dragged it into some recess in the walls or having in some other way elevated it above the ground,you will then meet with two difficulties.First,you cannot bring into action artillery of the same size and power as those outside can avail themselves of,since in a small space it is impossible to manipulate large pieces.Secondly,should you succeed in getting it there,you will not be able to construct reliable and safe ramparts whereby to protect the said artillery,which can be done quite easily outside,on terra firma ,where there are all the conveniences and as much space as anyone can want.Hence it is impossible for the defenders of a town to have their artillery in high positions when those who are outside have enough artillery and that of a powerful kind;and if they are driven to place it in a low position,it is in large part useless,as has been said.Consequently,the defence of a city has to be carried on by handtohand fighting,as was done of old,supported by artillery of very light calibre.Wherefore,though some slight benefit may accrue from this light artillery,it brings with it a disadvantage which counterbalances the advantage due to artillery,because,owing to the heavy artillery,the walls of towns are demolished and lie flat,buried,as it were,in ditches,so that,when it comes to handtohand fighting,the defenders have a worse time of it than they had before,since their walls have been battered down or their trenches filled up.These engines of war,therefore,as was said above,are of more use to the besiegers of towns than they are to the besieged.
As to the third point,if your camp has been placed behind a stockade so as to avoid open battle unless it suit your convenience and is to your advantage,I claim that in this case you are ordinarily no better off in regard to preventing an engagement than was the case in the old days,and that there are times when,on account of artillery,you may be at a greater disadvantage.For,should the enemy come upon you and have a slight advantage in position,as may easily happen should he find himself on higher ground than yours;or should you on his arriving not yet have made your trenches and dug yourself well in;straightway,and without your being able to do anything about it,he will dislodge you and you will have to quit your fortified position and join battle.This happened to the Spaniards at the battle of Ravenna.They had fortified themselves on the banks of the Ronco,but the earthworks they had thrown up were not sufficiently high and the French had a slight advantage in position,so that they were compelled by artillery to quit their fortifications and join battle.But suppose,as should usually be the case,that the site you have chosen for the camp is above that occupied by the enemy and that its earthworks are good and strong,so that,owing to your position and the other preparations you have made,the enemy does not dare to attack,it will be found that in such a case recourse will be had to the methods that were used in ancient times when someone had his army in a position in which it could not be attacked,namely,to scouring the country,taking or laying siege to towns that are friendly to you,and cutting off your supplies,so that you will be forced under such conditions to leave your camp and come out into the open,where artillery,as I shall presently point out,cannot do much.In view,therefore,of the reasons for which the Romans made war,and seeing that almost all their wars were of the offensive and not of the defensive type,it would seem that what we have said above holds good,namely,that it would have been to their advantage and would have speeded up their conquests,had there been artillery in those days.
As to the second charge,which alleges that men cannot display their valour as they used to do of old,on account of artillery,I admit it is true that,where men in small detachments have to expose themselves,there is greater danger now than then,should they have to scale the walls of a town or to make an assault of this kind not with a compact body of troops but individually,first one appearing and then another.It is also true that the officers and generals of an army are more exposed to the danger of death now than then,since anywhere they may come under artillery fire.Nor does it help them to be in the last squadron or to be supported by very brave men.One finds,none the less,that rarely does either of these two dangers occasion any outoftheway loss.For the walls of wellfortified towns cannot be scaled,nor are attacks on them made with weak troops.If a town is to be taken,it has to be besieged,just as it was of old.Nor,even when it is taken by assault are the dangers much greater now than they were then,for the defenders of towns even in those days did not lack equipment for launching projectiles,which,if not so terrifying,were no less effective in the matter of killing men.As to the death of officers and army commanders,in the last twentyfour years during which there have been wars in Italy,there have been fewer cases than there were during ten years of war in olden times.For,except for Count Ludovico della Mirandola,who was killed at Ferrara when the Venetians attacked that state a few years ago,and for the Duke of Nemours,who was killed abroad at Cerignuola,artillery has not killed anybody;for Monsieur de Foix was killed with a sword,not by a cannonball.Hence if men do not,as individuals,display their valour,it is not due to artillery,but to bad methods and to the weakness of [modern] armies,for since they lack valour as a whole,they cannot display it in the part.
To their third allegation which is that it is impossible to bring about a handtohand fight and that war will eventually become a matter of artillery,I reply that this statement is altogether false,and will always be looked on as false by those who want their armies to display in their operations the virtue of ancient times.For it behoves him who wants to form a good army,to accustom his men by means of sham fights or real fights to engage the enemy at close quarters,sword in hand.Hence he should rely more on infantry than on cavalry,for reasons which will presently be given.And,if he does rely on infantry,trained as we have said,artillery becomes quite useless,since it is easier for infantry when engaging the enemy to avoid cannonballs than it was of old for them to avoid an attack by elephants or by chariots armed with scythes,or other unfamiliar weapons such as the Roman infantry had to encounter.Against such devices they always found a remedy;and against artillery would the more easily have found a remedy in that the time during which it may harm you is shorter than that during which elephants and scythed chariots could do you harm.For the latter throw you into disorder during a battle,whereas the former is a nuisance only before the fight begins;and this nuisance infantry easily avoid either by availing themselves of such cover as the site offers or by lying flat on the ground when a volley comes.Experience,however,has shown that this is unnecessary,especially as a defence against heavy artillery;for with heavy artillery the range cannot be so nicely adjusted.Hence either the fire is too high,and does not get you,or it is too low and falls short of you.
Again,when armies come to handtohand conflict,it is as clear as the day that neither heavy nor light artillery can hurt you.For if the enemy place it in front,you capture it;and,if he puts it behind,it hits his own folk before it hits you;while on the flanks it cannot do you so much damage but that you can go and get it,so that in the end it all comes to much the same thing.Nor is there much question about this.For it is clear from the case of the Swiss,who at Novara in 1513 were without either artillery or cavalry,yet went for the French army,which was supported by artillery in a fortified position,and found no difficulty on this account in breaking it up.
The reason for this,besides what I said above,is that,if artillery is to function,it must be protected either by walls or trenches or earthworks,and,if either form of protection is lacking,it either gets taken or becomes useless,just as happens when men have to defend it in pitched battles and open engagements.Nor can it be used on the flanks except in the way the ancients used projectile launching devices.Such instruments were then placed outside the main body,in order that they might function outside the ranks,and,should those who used them be overcome at any time by cavalry or other forces,they took refuge behind the regular troops.Those who expect anything more from artillery do not understand it properly and place their trust in what can easily let them down.And if by using artillery the Turk gained a victory over Sophy and the Sultan,it was solely in virtue of the panic caused among their cavalry by its unfamiliar noise.
On coming,then,to the end of this discourse,my conclusion is that artillery is useful to an army provided it be backed by valour such as was displayed of old;but,without this,it is of not the least use against a valorous army.
That Infantry should be more highly esteemed than Cavalry is shown by the Authority of the Romans and by the Example of Ancient Military Practice
It is possible to give many reasons and to cite many cases showing clearly how much greater esteem the Romans had for footsoldiers than for cavalry in all military operations,and how upon this basis they drew up all plans for their forces.Numerous instances illustrate this;among others the battle fought with the Latins near Lake Regillus,where,when the Roman army began to give way,to support them some troops on horseback were ordered to dismount and fight on foot,by which means the battle was renewed and a victory gained.From which it is obvious that the Romans had more confidence in their men when on foot than when mounted.They used this expedient in many other battles,and always found it the best remedy in dangerous situations.
Nor can this be countered by the opinion expressed by Hannibal when during the battle of Cannae he noticed that the consuls had made their cavalry dismount,and joked about it,saying:‘Quam mallem vinctos mihi traderent equites,’ i.e.‘I should have liked it better had they handed the horsemen over to me bound.’ Though this opinion is voiced by a firstclass man,yet,if it be a question of authority,one should put more credence in a Roman republic and in the many firstclass generals who were in it than in Hannibal alone.Furthermore,apart from an appeal to authority,sound reasons can be adduced;for a footsoldier can get to many places to which a mounted man cannot go;infantry can be taught to keep their ranks,and,when broken,know how to reform them,whereas it is difficult for cavalry to keep their ranks,and impossible for them to re-form when their ranks are disorganized.Besides which,one finds that horses,like men,sometimes have little spirit and sometimes a great deal,and quite often it happens that a spirited horse is ridden by a timid man and a timid horse by a man of spirit;and of whichever kind the disparity be,the result is subversive of utility and order.
Infantry,when well drawn up,can easily break cavalry,but with difficulty are routed by them.This view is corroborated not only by many instances,both ancient and modern,but also by authors who prescribe rules for the conduct of civic affairs and in them show that wars were first fought with cavalry,since there were then no rules for drawing up infantry;but when these were made,it was at once recognized that infantry are more useful than cavalry.But it does not follow from this that cavalry is not essential to an army alike for the purpose of scouting,of raiding and pillaging the country,of pursuing the enemy when in flight,and again as a partial counterpoise to the cavalry of the adversary:but it is infantry that should constitute the basis and sinews of an army and that should be held in the higher esteem.
Among the sins committed by Italian princes who have made Italy the slave of the foreigner,there is none more grave than that of having held this arm of small account and of having devoted all their attention to mounted troops.This mismanagement is due to the perversity of captains and to the ignorance of those who hold office.For the Italian militia having lost all official status during the last twentyfive years had become like soldiers of fortune.It occurred to the militia that their reputation would be made if they had the armed forces while the rulers had none.Since,then,they could not maintain a large number of infantry continually in their pay and they had no subjects of whom they could avail themselves,and since a small number would not make their reputation,they turned to cavalry;for with two or three hundred cavalry in his pay,the reputation of a condottiere was safe,and the pay was not such as to prevent him getting it from ministers of state.So the more easily to attain their end and to keep up their reputation they made light of all the esteem and repute in which infantry was held,and applied it instead to their own cavalry:an abuse which has grown to such an extent that even of the largest armies the infantry constitute but a fraction.It is this practice,conjoined with numerous other abuses associated with it,that has made the Italian militia so weak that Italy has become an easy prey,downtrodden by all the ultramontanes.
To show yet more clearly what a mistake it is to prefer cavalry to infantry,I shall take another example from Rome.The Romans were encamped before Sora.From the town there came forth a troop of cavalry to attack their camp.The Roman master of horse advanced to meet them with his cavalry.When they met,luck would have it that at their first encounter the officers commanding both bodies of troops were killed.Though without their leaders,the fight none the less went on,and that they might the more easily get the better of their foes,the Romans dismounted,and forced the enemy's cavalry in order to defend themselves,to do the same;by which means the Romans gained the victory.Than this example none shows better how much more virtue there is in infantry than in cavalry;for in other actions the consuls made the Roman cavalry dismount that they might help the infantry who were hard pressed and were in need of support;but in this case they dismounted,not to help the infantry,nor yet to engage the enemy's footsoldiers,but because,while fighting as cavalry against cavalry,it occurred to them that,since as cavalry they could not prevail,they might win more easily by dismounting.Whence I infer that it is only with the greatest difficulty that infantry when properly drawn up,can be overcome except by other infantry.
Crassus and Mark Antony,two Romans,overran the domains of the Parthians for many days with very few cavalry but plenty of infantry,though against them they had vast numbers of Parthian cavalry.Crassus with part of the army got killed,but Mark Antony fought valiantly and escaped.None the less,in the misfortunes the Romans suffered,we see how much more value infantry were than cavalry,for the country was vast,mountains scarce,streams very scarce,the sea far away,and no conveniences at hand;yet Mark Antony,as the Parthians themselves admitted,saved himself by his outstanding virtue;nor did the Parthian cavalry,numerous as it was,ever dare to try conclusions with his army.And,if Crassus was left behind,he who studies closely the record of his doings,will see that it was by deceit rather than by force that he was undone,for,in spite of all his troubles,the Parthians never ventured to attack him.On the contrary,they always went roaming about,intercepting his convoys,making promises which they did not keep,till they had reduced him to dire extremity.
I should have been at more pains,I think,to prove that the ‘virtue’ of infantry is more potent than that of cavalry if there had not been so many recent examples which provide abundant evidence of this.There were the nine thousand Swiss we have already mentioned,who at Novara proceeded to attack ten thousand cavalry and as many infantry,and beat them;for the cavalry could not get at them,and they thought little of the infantry,since it consisted for the most part of Gascons and was badly organized.Then there were the twentysix thousand Swiss who went as far as Milan to look for Francis,king of France,who had with him twenty thousand cavalry,forty thousand infantry,and a hundred pieces of artillery;and if they did not win the day as they had done at Novara,they fought valiantly for two days,and,though routed,got away with half their forces.Marcus Regulus Atilius had the courage to oppose not only cavalry,but elephants,with infantry;and,if his project did not succeed,it was not because his infantry were so lacking in virtue,that he had not sufficient confidence in them to believe that they would overcome the difficulty.I repeat,then,that to get the better of welldisciplined infantry it is necessary to bring against them better disciplined infantry;otherwise the case is plainly hopeless.
In the days of Philip Visconti,Duke of Milan,there descended on Lombardy about sixteen thousand Swiss.Whereupon the Duke,whose forces were then commanded by Carmignuola,sent him with about a thousand cavalry and a few infantry to meet them.Carmignuola,unacquainted with their way of fighting,attacked them with his cavalry,assuming that he would be able to break them at once.But they stood firm,and,having lost many of his men,he retired.Being,however,a very brave man,who knew how to take fresh chances when circumstances changed,as soon as reinforcements came along to make up his strength,he went to meet them,told all his menatarms to dismount,and,putting them at the head of his infantry,set out to attack the Swiss.For whom there was no escape,because Carmignuola's menatarms having dismounted and being well protected by armour,they could easily pierce the ranks of the Swiss without suffering any harm,and,having got through,could easily overcome them.The result was that of all the Swiss there remained alive only those whom the humanity of Carmignuola chose to spare.
I believe many are aware of the difference in virtue that exists between these two kinds of troops,but so unhappy are these our times that neither ancient nor modern examples nor its being admittedly a mistake is sufficient to make modern rulers revise their point of view and realize that,if a province or a state is to keep up its military reputation,it is essential to resuscitate these services,to have them at hand,to restore their credit,to put fresh life into them,so that they may bring to the ruler both life and reputation.But,as rulers have departed from these ways,so they have departed from others mentioned above,and in consequence acquisitions do harm to a state instead of contributing to its greatness,as will presently be pointed out.
Mistakes often made in connection with war
Fortresses in General are much more Harmful than Useful
To the wiseacres of our times it may perhaps seem a foolish thing that when the Romans wanted to ensure the loyalty of the people of Latium and the city of Privernum it did not occur to them to build any sort of fortress to curb them and keep them loyal,especially as in Florence it is an accepted principle,so our wiseacres say,that Pisa and other such cities should be held by means of fortresses.Had the Romans been of their calibre,it would undoubtedly have occurred to them to build fortresses,but since their virtue,judgement,and power was of different order they did not do so.So long as Rome enjoyed freedom and was loyal to her institutions and to her efficient constitution she never held either cities or provinces by means of fortresses save where they were already built.In view,then,of the way the Romans acted in this matter and of the way rulers act today,it seems to me worth while considering whether it is good to build fortresses and whether they are harmful or useful to those who build them.
It must be borne in mind,then,that fortresses are constructed as a defence either against enemies or against subjects.In the first case they are unnecessary,and in the second case harmful.Let us begin by explaining why in the second case they are harmful.I maintain that when a prince or a republic is afraid of its subjects and fears they may rebel,the root cause of this fear must lie in the hatred which such subjects have for their rulers:a hatred which is due to their misbehaviour;and a misbehaviour which is due to their fancying they can hold them by force,or to their foolish way of governing them.And one of the things that makes rulers believe in force is the fact that they have fortresses to fall back on.For when mismanagement gives rise to hatred it is mainly due to a prince or a republic having fortresses;and,when this is the case,fortresses are far more harmful than useful.For,in the first place,they make you more foolhardy and violent in dealing with your subjects,as has been said.Next,they do not afford you internally that security you fancy they do.For no force and no violence is of the least use in controlling your people except under one of two conditions:either you have a good army which you can put in the field,as the Romans had;or your people are so exhausted,spent,disorganized and divided,that they cannot unite to do you hurt.For if you reduce them to poverty,‘though despoiled,they still have arms’,and,if you disarm them,‘their fury will provide them with arms’.If you kill their leaders and suppress all other signs of insurrection,like the heads of the Hydra other leaders will arise.If you erect fortresses,they are useful in time of peace because they give you more courage in illtreating your subjects,but in time of war they are quite useless,for they will be attacked both by your enemies and by your subjects,and against both it is impossible for them to stand.And if there ever was a time when they were useless,it is now on account of artillery,for against its fire it is impossible to defend such small places where there are no embankments behind which men can retire,as we have shown above.
In discussing this question I am going to particularize.Do you,my prince,with your fortresses want to keep a firm hand on the people in your city? Do you,be you a prince or a republic,want to tighten your grip on a city you have taken during a war? I tell you,if you be a prince,that as a means of controlling your citizens,nothing can be more futile than a fortress for the reasons I have given:it makes you quicker to use,and less careful in using,harsh measures,and by such measures you make them long for your downfall,and they become so furious that,for this very reason,your fortress will afford you no protection.So obvious is this,that a wise and good prince never constructs fortresses if he wants to remain good and to avoid providing his sons with a reason for wanting to become bad,for he would have them rely not on fortresses,but on their subjects’ goodwill.
And if Count Francesco Sforza,having become Duke of Milan,was reputed a wise man,and yet built a fortress in Milan,I maintain that in this he was not wise,and the result has proved that this fortress did harm to his heirs instead of affording them security.For with a fortress they thought they were safe and could oppress their citizens and subjects,so lost no opportunity of doing them violence;with the result that they came to be detested beyond all measure,and lost their state to the first enemy who attacked them.Nor was this fortress any protection or of any service to them in time of war,while in time of peace it did them much harm,since,if they had not had it,yet had been so unwise as to treat their citizens harshly,they would have realized their danger sooner and would have withdrawn from it.In which case they would have been able to put up a more spirited resistance to the French attack with loyal subjects but without a fortress than with a fortress and disloyal subjects.
In no way,then,do fortresses help you,for you will lose them either through the treachery of their keepers,or by some violent attack,or,by their being starved out.While,if you do want them to help you,and to enable you to recover a state you have lost,in which there remains to you only a fortress,you must have an army with which to attack those who have driven you out,and when you have such an army,you will recover your state anyhow,even if there be no fortress there;and this the more easily when your men are friendly and have not been badly treated owing to the arrogance a fortress instils.Experience then shows that this Milanese fortress was not the least use either to the Sforzas or to the French when with either of them things went wrong.On the contrary,to both it brought disaster and ruin in that it prevented them from considering whether there might not be a more honest way of maintaining their position.
Guidobaldo,Duke of Urbino,the son of Frederick,who was highly esteemed in his day as an army commander,was expelled from his state by Caesar Borgia,the son of Pope Alexander VI.When later,owing to an accident,he got back,he had all the fortresses in that district razed to the ground since he thought them mischievous.For with respect to his people who were fond of him,he did not need fortresses and,so far as his enemies were concerned,he realized he could not protect the fortresses,since he would require to have an army in the field to defend them.So he resolved to get rid of them.
Pope Julius,when he had expelled the Bentivogli from Bologna,erected a fortress in that city,and afterwards caused its inhabitants to be cruelly oppressed by one of his governors so that they rebelled;and straightaway he lost the fortress,which thus did not help him,but harmed him in as much as,had he acted otherwise,it would have helped him.
Niccolò da Castello,father of the Vitelli,on returning to his country from which he had been exiled,at once pulled down two fortresses which had been built there by Pope Sixtus IV,for he held that it was not the fortress,but the affection of his people which would preserve his state for him.
But of all such cases the most recent and the most noteworthy in every way as illustrating the futility of building fortresses and the utility of demolishing them,is what happened at Genoa not long ago.Everybody knows that in 1507 Genoa rebelled against Louis XII,King of France,who came in person with all his forces to reconquer it,and that,on recovering it,he constructed a fortress stronger than any at present known,since,situated on the point of a hill which juts into the sea,called by the Genoese Codefà,it was,owing to its position and to a number of other circumstances,impregnable,and commanded the port and a large part of the city of Genoa.It none the less came about that in 1512,when the French were driven from Italy,Genoa rebelled,despite the fortress;Ottaviano Fregoso seized the government;and,after a siege of sixteen months in which he used all possible devices,he starved the fortress out.Everyone then expected,and many advised,that it should be kept as a refuge in case of emergency,but Fregoso,like a prudent man,destroyed it,for he recognized that it is not fortresses but the wills of men that keep rulers in power.Thus,instead of relying on a fortress,he relied on virtue and sound sense,and so held his position and holds it still.And,whereas to change the government of Genoa,a thousand infantry used to suffice,its adversaries have since attacked it with ten thousand and have done it no harm.Hence one sees that dismantling a fortress did not hurt Ottaviano,and erecting one did not help the king.For so long as he could come with an army into Italy,he could recover Genoa without having a fortress there;but,when he could not come into Italy with an army,he could not hold Genoa,though he had the fortress.Thus,constructing the fortress was expensive to the king,and losing it shameful;whereas to Ottaviano the reconquering of the fortress brought glory and the demolishing of it advantage.
We come now to republics which erect fortresses not in their native land but in towns which they have acquired.If the instances already given,of France and of Genoa,do not suffice to show the fallacy involved,it should be enough if I cite those of Florence and Pisa.The Florentines erected fortresses to hold the city of Pisa,not considering that,since the Pisans had always been hostile to Florentine power,had enjoyed freedom and regarded rebellion as a means to freedom,it was necessary,if they were to retain Pisa,to adopt the Roman method,i.e.either to make it an ally or to destroy it.For the virtue of the fortresses became evident on the arrival of King Charles,to whom they surrendered owing either to the bad faith of their custodians or for fear of worse to come.Whereas if there had been no fortresses,the Florentines would not have based on them their power to hold Pisa;nor would the king have been able by means of them to deprive the Florentines of that city;for the means they had taken thus far might perchance have enabled them to keep it,and unquestionably would not have proved more disastrous than the fortresses.
I conclude,therefore,that for the purpose of holding one's own country fortresses are hurtful,and that for the purpose of holding acquired towns they are futile.The authority of the Romans is enough for me here,for round the towns they wanted to hold by force they did not build walls but pulled them down.And,if against this my view anyone should cite in ancient times the case of Tarentum,and in modern times Brescia,both of which places were regained,thanks to fortresses,after their subjects had revolted,I answer thus.To recover Tarentum Fabius Maximus,at the beginning of his year of office,was sent with a whole army,which would have sufficed for its recovery even if there had been no fortress there;and though Fabius made use of it,if it had not been there he would have adopted other means which would have produced the same effect.What use there is in a fortress I do not know,if,to recover a town,one needs a consular army and a Fabius Maximus to command it.Moreover,that the Romans would have recovered it in any case,is seen from the example of Capua,where there was no fortress,but which the Romans retook by the valour of the army.
But let us turn to Brescia.I maintain that what happened in that rebellion is a rare occurrence.Rarely when a town rebels does it happen that the fortress remains in your hands and that you have a large army in the neighbourhood,as the French then had.For Monsieur de Foix,the king's commander,had an army at Bologna,and when he heard that Brescia was lost,he went without delay to deal with the revolt,in three days reached Brescia,and with assistance from the fortress recovered the town.Here again,then,for the fortress at Brescia to be of any use,it needed a Monsieur de Foix and a French army to relieve it after three days march.The case of Brescia,therefore,is not enough to refute examples of the opposite kind;for in wars recently waged,numbers of fortresses have been taken and retaken with the same fortune that has attended the taking and retaking of open country,not only in Lombardy,but in the Romagna,in the kingdom of Naples,and in every part of Italy.
As to building fortresses for defence against external foes,I maintain that they are unnecessary where peoples or kingdoms have good armies and that to those who have no such armies they are useless;for good armies without fortresses suffice for defence,and fortresses without good armies are no defence.This is borne out by the experience of men of high repute as rulers and in other matters,for instance,the Romans and the Spartans;for if the Romans did not build fortresses,the Spartans not only abstained from doing this,but did not permit their cities to have walls,because they chose to rely for defence on the virtue of the individual,and wanted no other.Hence,when a Spartan was asked by an Athenian whether the walls of Athens did not look fine,he answered:‘Quite! provided it be ladies who live there.’
The ruler,then,who has good armies,may sometimes find it useful,though not essential,to have fortresses on the coast and on the frontiers of his domains to hold off the attack of an enemy till he gets properly going.But,if he has not a good army,to have fortresses within his state or on its frontiers is either harmful or useless:harmful because he so easily loses them and,when lost,they make war on him;or,if they should chance to be so strong that the enemy cannot capture them,they get left behind by the hostile army and so come to be useless.For,when good armies do not meet with very strong opposition,on entering a country they pay no attention to cities and fortresses,which they may leave behind them.We see this in ancient history just as we have seen it done by Francesco Maria,who in quite recent times,when on his way to attack Urbino,left behind him ten of the enemy's cities,without bothering about them.
The ruler,then,who can muster a good army,can do without fortresses,and the ruler who has not a good army had better not build them.The best thing he can do is to fortify the city where he dwells,to keep it provisioned and its inhabitants well disposed,so as to hold off an enemy's attack till he can either come to terms or get outside help to relieve him.All other plans are expensive in time of peace and useless in time of war.In view,then,of all I have said,it will be seen that,as the Romans were wise in their other institutions,so,too,were they prudent when they decided in the case of the Latins and the Privernates to dispense with fortresses and took more virtuous and wiser means of securing their loyalty.
To attack a Divided City in the Hope that its Divisions will facilitate the Conquest of it is Bad Policy
There was so much discord between the plebs and the nobility in the Roman republic that the Veientes,in conjunction with the Etruscans,thought this disunion would enable them to destroy the power of Rome.Having,therefore,formed an army and invaded Roman territory,the senate sent Gaius Manlius and Marcus Fabius to engage them.When the army they were leading drew near to the army of the Veientes,the latter kept on attacking and vilifying the Roman name with insults and abuse.And so great was their rashness and insolence that the Romans became united instead of disunited,and,when it came to a fight,broke and defeated the enemy.Thus one sees,as we have said above,how mistaken men are when in coming to decisions they rely on discord,and how often,when they think they have a sure thing they lose.The Veientes thought that if they attacked the Romans,when disunited,they would overcome them;but their attack caused the Romans to unite and brought about their own ruin.For discord in a republic is usually due to idleness and peace,and unity to fear and to war.Had the Veientes been wise,then,the more disunited they found the Romans to be,the more studiously should they have refrained from going to war with them,and have striven to get the better of them by the artifices men use in time of peace.
The way to set about this is to win the confidence of the city which is disunited;and,so long as they do not come to blows,to act as arbitrator between the parties,and,when they do come to blows,to give tardy support to the weaker party,both with a view to keeping them at it and wearing them out;and,again,because stronger measures would leave no room for any to doubt that you were out to subjugate them and make yourself their ruler.When this scheme is well carried out,it will happen,as always,that the end you have in view will be attained.The city of Pistoia,as I have said in another discourse and apropos of another topic,was acquired by the republic of Florence by just such an artifice;for it was divided and the Florentines supported now one,now the other party and,without making themselves obnoxious to either,led them on until they got sick of their turbulent way of living and in the end came to throw themselves voluntarily into the arms of Florence.
The city of Siena has never changed its form of government with the help of the Florentines except when their help was weak and infrequent;for,when it was frequent and strong,its effect was to make that city united in defence of the government in power.
I wish to add to the abovementioned examples a further example.Filippo Visconti,Duke of Milan,several times made war on the Florentines,relying on their disunion,and in all cases came out the loser,so that when he was bewailing these attacks,he used to say that the follies of the Florentines had involved him in an expenditure of two millions in gold to no purpose.
It remained,then,that the Veientes and the Tuscans were mistaken on this point,as was said above,so that in the end there came a battle when the Romans conquered them.And in like manner will others find themselves mistaken,should they imagine that by such means and in such circumstances they can bring a people into subjection.
Scorn and abuse arouse Hatred against those who indulge in them without bringing them any Advantage
I hold it to be a sign of great prudence in men to refrain alike from threats and from the use of insulting language,for neither of these things deprives the enemy of his power,but the first puts him more on his guard,while the other intensifies his hatred of you and makes him more industrious in devising means to harm you.This is seen in the case of the Veientes,whom we were discussing in the previous chapter.Besides the injury done by the war,they abused the Romans by word of mouth,a thing which every sensible general should prevent his soldiers from doing,for such language does but exasperate the enemy and move him to vengeance,nor,as has been said,does it in any way interfere with his attack:so that in fact they are weapons which turn against you.
Of this a notable instance occurred in Asia.When Cobades,the Persian commander,had been besieging Amida for a considerable time,he grew weary of the tiresome business and decided to withdraw.While he was striking camp the townsmen,exhilarated by their victory,all climbed on the walls and used every sort of abuse,calumniating and accusing and upbraiding the enemy for his cowardice and poltroonery.This so annoyed Cobades that he changed his mind,and,indignant at the injustice,returned to the siege and in a few days had taken and sacked the city.
The same thing happened to the Veientes,who,as I have said,were not content to make war on the Romans,but also spoke of them contemptuously,going up to the stockade surrounding their camp and shouting abuse at them.This annoyed the troops much more than the fighting did;so that,whereas they had at first fought unwillingly,they now pressed the consuls to join battle,with the result that the Veientes,like those mentioned above,were punished for their contumacy as they deserved.Good army commanders and good republican rulers should take all appropriate measures to prevent the use of abusive language and taunts,whether in the city or in their army,and whether used one towards another or towards the enemy.For,if used towards the enemy,there ensue the aforesaid inconveniences,and still worse inconveniences if used one towards the other,unless precautions be taken,as they always have been by prudent men.
When the Roman legions,left in Capua,conspired against the Capuans,as will be narrated in due course,and in connection with this conspiracy a mutiny arose,subsequently quelled by Valerius Corvinus,among other points in the convention he drew up,it prescribed the severest penalties on those who should reproach any of the troops for having taken part in the mutiny.
Tiberius Gracchus,who,during the war with Hannibal,had been put in command of a certain number of slaves,whom,owing to the shortage of men,the Romans had armed,made a special point of the capital punishment he prescribed for anyone who should reproach any slave with his servitude.
We see,then,how harmful the Romans thought it to calumniate others or to reproach them for a shameful deed,as has been said,for than this there is nothing that inflames the mind more,or arouses greater indignation,whether the taunt be true or be said in jest,‘For smart sayings,when they border on the truth,leave a bitter taste behind them.’
Prudent Princes and Republics should be content with Victory,for,when they are not content with it,they usually lose
Speaking to the disparagement of an enemy is usually due to the arrogance aroused in you by victory or by the false hope of victory.False hopes of this kind not only cause men to make mistakes in what they say,but also in what they do.For,when such hopes enter men's breasts,they cause them to dispense with caution,and often to miss the chance of obtaining a sure thing in the hope,but by no means the certainty,of improving on it.This matter is worth considering,since very often men make mistakes in regard to it,detrimental to their Tyre,elated with success,not only refused to accept his terms,but killed the envoy who came to arrange matters.Whereupon Alexander,becoming indignant,put such life into the siege that he took and demolished the city,and either killed or made slaves of its inhabitants.
In 1512 a Spanish army invaded the dominions of Florence with a view to restoring the Medici and levying a tax on the city,acting on behalf of fifth columnists who had led them to expect that,once they had crossed the border,they would take up arms in their favour.On entering the plain [of the Arno] they found none of them,and,as they were short of provisions,they made overtures of peace.The people of Florence were too proud to accept them.Hence the loss of Prato,and the ruin of that state.
Rulers of states,when attacked,therefore,cannot make a greater mistake than to refuse to come to terms when the forces attacking them are a good deal stronger than their own,especially if the overtures are made by the enemy:for the terms will never be so hard but that in them some benefit will accrue to those who accept them,so that in a way they will share in the victory.The people of Tyre,for instance,should have been content that Alexander had accepted the conditions which he had at first refused,and the victory thus gained would have been considerable,since with their armed forces they had compelled a great man to condescend to their wishes.It should,in like manner,have sufficed the people of Florence that the Spanish army had yielded to any of their demands instead of fulfilling all their own,for this,too,would have been a considerable victory.For what the Spanish army wanted was to change the form of government in Florence,to put an end to its attachment to France,and to levy tribute.If of these three things the Spaniards had gained the last two,and the people of Florence had gained the first,that is the retention of their form of government,each would have acquired a certain honour and a certain satisfaction;nor would the people have been likely to trouble much about the other two things,so long as their lives were safe.Nay,even had they seen there was a good,and almost certain,chance of a greater victory,they should not have placed themselves wholly at the discretion of fortune and ventured their last stake,which it is never wise to risk unless driven to it.
When Hannibal,who had enjoyed great glory in Italy for sixteen years,left it on being recalled by the Carthaginians to help his own country,he found Hasdrubal and Syphax routed,the kingdom of Numidia lost,and the Carthaginians cooped up within their own walls,destitute of hope except what he and his army should bring.Realizing that his country was reduced to its last stake,he was determined not to risk that till he had tried all other remedies,and so was not ashamed to sue for peace,since he was convinced that,if there was any hope at all for his country,it lay in this and not in war.When peace was refused,he did not decline to fight though bound to lose,since he felt that he could still win,but if he had to lose,he could at least lose gloriously.If,then,Hannibal,who was so full of virtuosity,and had his army still intact,preferred peace to war when he saw that,by losing,his country would be enslaved,what should a man do who has neither the efficiency nor the experience of Hannibal? Yet there are men who make this mistake,in that to their hopes they set no bound,and are ruined because they rely on such hopes and take no account of other things.
Rome's dealings with neighbouring states and cities in peace and war
How Dangerous it is for a Republic or a Prince not to avenge an Injury done either to the Public or to a Private Person
What is likely to make men indignant with others may easily be learnt from what happened to the Romans when they sent the three Fabii as ambassadors to the Gauls,who were about to attack Tuscany and,in particular,Clusium.The people of Clusium had appealed to Rome for help against the Gauls.Hence the Romans sent the three Fabii as ambassadors to the Gauls to insist in the name of the Roman republic on their abstaining from a war with the Tuscans.When they arrived at their destination the ambassadors,who were better at acting than speaking,found the Gauls and the Tuscans about to join battle,whereupon they were the foremost to enter the fray.It thus came about that when the Gauls became aware of this,their annoyance with the Tuscans was turned against the Romans.And their indignation was intensified when the Gauls,having complained to the Roman senate through their ambassadors of this unfairness and demanded that the aforesaid Fabii be handed over to them to compensate for the harm they had done,they were not only not handed over or punished in some other way,but an election was held in which they were made tribunes with consular power.Consequently when the Gauls saw those being honoured who ought to have been punished,they took it as an affront and an indignity offered to themselves,and,inflamed with indignation and anger,marched on Rome and took it,except for the Capitol.A disaster which the Romans brought on themselves through their disregard of justice,for since their ambassadors had offended against the ‘Law of Nations’,they should have been punished,instead of being honoured.
This leads one to consider how important it is for every republic and every prince to take account of such offences,not only when an injury is done to a whole people,but also when it affects an individual.For if an individual is grievously offended either by the public or by a private person,and does not receive due satisfaction,he will,if he lives in a republic,seek to avenge himself,even if it lead to the ruin of that republic;and,if he lives under a prince and has a spark of manliness,will never rest content till he has in some way or other wreaked vengeance on him even though he sees that,in doing so,he will bring disaster on himself.
In verification of this there is no finer or more relevant instance than that of Philip,king of Macedon,the father of Alexander,in whose court there was a handsome and noble young man,Pausanias.With him Attalus,one of the chief men in Philip's entourage,was enamoured,and had on several occasions sought to get him to assent,but found that he had no liking for such things;so,seeing that he could not get what he wanted otherwise,he decided to set a trap for him and to use force.He gave,therefore,a great banquet,which Pausanias and other noble barons attended,and,when they had had their fill of food and wine,he had him seized and bound;then he not only used force in order to gratify his lust,but,to his greater shame,got others to treat him in the same disgusting way.Of this affront Pausanias complained several times to Philip,who,having kept him for a time in expectation of vengeance,not only did not avenge him,but made Attalus governor of a Grecian province.Pausanias,therefore,seeing his enemy honoured instead of being punished,gave full vent to his indignation not only against the perpetrator of the deed,but against Philip who had not avenged it.So,one morning,the day of the solemn wedding of Philip's daughter,who was being married to Alexander of Epirus,he killed Philip as he was going to the temple for the celebration standing between the two Alexanders,his son and his soninlaw.Of this incident,which is akin to that which happened to the Romans,all who rule should take note,so that they may never esteem any man so lightly as to think that,if injury be added to injury,the injured person will not consider how to vindicate himself,even though it involve him in all manner of dangers and entail his own downfall.
Fortune blinds Men's Minds when she does not wish them to obstruct her Designs
If one ponders well the course of human affairs,it will be seen that many events happen and many misfortunes come about,against which the heavens have not been willing that any provision at all should be made.Since this statement holds good in the case of Rome,which was conspicuous alike for virtue,religion and orderly conduct,it is no wonder that the same thing happens yet more often in cities and provinces which are lacking in these respects.There is a wellknown passage in which Titus Livy shows at length and with great force the power that heaven exercises over human affairs.He says that,with a view to making the Romans recognize its power,heaven first caused the Fabii to act wrongly when sent as ambassadors to the Gauls,and by means of what they did excited the Gauls to make war on Rome;then ordained that in Rome nothing worthy of the Roman people should be done to meet their attack;for first it brought about that Camillus,who was the only hope they had in those evil days,should be sent as an exile to Ardea;then that,when the Gauls were marching on Rome,they did not appoint a dictator,as they had done many times to meet the attack of the Volsci and other enemies in the neighbourhood.It also caused them to be weak and to take no particular care in calling up troops,who were so slow in taking up arms that they scarce had time to confront the Gauls on the banks of the Allia,which was but ten miles from Rome.There the tribunes set up their camp without their accustomed diligence,since they did not inspect the site beforehand,nor surround it with trenches and stockades,nor take any other precautions,either human or divine;while in preparing for battle they made their ranks thin and weak,and neither troops nor officers behaved as Roman discipline required.No blood was shed during the battle because at the first onslaught the Romans ran away,the greater number going to Veii,and the rest retiring on Rome,where they sought refuge in the Capitol without first going home;whereupon the senate took so little thought for Rome's defence that,for one thing,they omitted to close the gates;and some of its members fled,while others went with the rest into the Capitol.Granted,in their defence of the Capitol they used some sort of discipline,for they did not pack all the useless people inside,and they got in all the corn they could,so as to be able to stand the siege;while of the useless crowd of old men,women and children,most fled to the country round about,and the rest stayed in Rome at the mercy of the Gauls.So that no one who had read of what was done so often in years gone by and were to read what was now being done,would think they were one and the same people.
Having described all the disorders mentioned above,Titus Livy concludes with the remark:‘To such an extent does fortune blind the minds of men when she does not want them to oppose the force she is using.’
Nor can anything be more true than the conclusion Livy draws.Hence men who in this life normally either suffer great adversity or enjoy great prosperity,deserve neither praise nor blame;for one usually finds that they have been driven either to ruin or to greatness by the prospect of some great advantage which the heavens have held out,whereby they have been given the chance,or have been deprived of the chance,of being able to act virtuously.Fortune arranges this quite nicely.For,when it wants a man to take the lead in doing great things,it chooses a man of high spirits and great virtue who will seize the occasion it offers him.And in like manner,when it wants a man to bring about a great disaster,it gives precedence to men who will help to promote it;and,if anyone gets in the way,it either kills him off or deprives him of all power of doing good.
It plainly appears from Livy's evidence that,in order to make Rome greater and to lead it on to its future greatness,fortune decided it was necessary first to chastise it in a way that will be described at length in the beginning of the next book,but did not want to ruin it altogether.Hence we see that it made an exile of Camillus,but did not cause him to die;that it caused Rome to be taken,but not the Capitol;that it arranged matters so that nothing useful was thought of to help Rome,nor anything overlooked that could help in the defence of the Capitol.It brought it about that,since Rome was to be taken,the greater part of the troops which were routed at Allia,should go on to Veii,thus leaving the city without any men to defend it.But in arranging things thus,it also prepared the way for Rome's recovery;for since there was a Roman army at Veii,and Camillus was at Ardea,it became possible to make a more vigorous attempt to deliver the fatherland under a general whose career was free from the stain of defeat and whose reputation was untarnished.
In confirmation of this one might adduce further examples from modern times,but I do not think this necessary,so pass them over,since that I have given should be enough to satisfy anybody.I assert once again as a truth to which history as a whole bears witness that men may second their fortune,but cannot oppose it;that they may weave its warp,but cannot break it.Yet they should never give up,because there is always hope,though they know not the end and move towards it along roads which cross one another and as yet are unexplored;and since there is hope,they should not despair,no matter what fortune brings or in what travail they find themselves.
Really Powerful Republics and Princes do not purchase Alliances with Money,but obtain them by means of the Virtue and the Reputation of their Forces
The Romans were being besieged in the Capitol,and,though they expected help from Veii and from Camillus,were in such bad case owing to famine that they came to terms with the Gauls and agreed to pay them so much gold.They were weighing out the gold agreed upon when Camillus arrived with his army;whereupon fortune,says the historian,decided that ‘the Romans should not by purchase save their lives’.
This kind of thing is not only noticeable in this case but characterizes the behaviour of this republic throughout.We never find the Romans purchasing towns,or paying in order to obtain peace.They always acquired both by virtue of their arms.Nor do I think that this has ever happened in the case of any other republic.Among other indications of the power of a strong state one looks to the terms on which it lives with its neighbours.When it is so governed that,to obtain its friendship,its neighbours become its tributaries,it is a sure sign that the state is powerful;but when the said neighbours,though inferior in strength,extract payment from it,it is a sure sign of its weakness.
As one runs through Roman history,one sees how the Massilians,the Aedui,the Rhodians,Hiero of Syracuse,king Eumenes and king Masinissa,who were neighbours with estates bordering on the empire of Rome,were ready to incur expense and pay tribute in order to obtain the friendship of Rome,and in return ask only for her protection.In weak states one finds just the opposite.To begin with,in our own state,Florence,in times past when its reputation stood at its highest,there was no lord in the Romagna who did not receive payment from it.It also made grants to the Perugians,the Castellani and all its other neighbours.Had this city been armed and strong,everything would have been just the contrary,for to secure its protection many states would have paid money to it,and would have sought to purchase its friendship,not to sell their own.
Nor are the Florentines the only people who have thus demeaned themselves since the Venetians and the King of France do the same thing;for the latter,great as his kingdom is,habitually pays tribute to the Swiss and to the King of England.This all comes from depriving the people of arms,and from the fact that this king and the other states mentioned have chosen rather to enjoy the present advantage of being able to despoil their people and of being able to avoid an imaginary rather than a real danger,instead of so acting as to secure their people's goodwill and to make their state happy for ever.A malpractice such as this,though it may bring a little temporary quiet,in time becomes the cause of crises,disaster and irremediable ruin.It would take too long to relate how often the Florentines,the Venetians,and this kingdom,have bought off wars and submitted to an ignominy which the Romans submitted to but once.It would take too long to recount how many towns the Florentines and the Venetians have purchased in which one afterwards saw disorder,and how they failed to protect with steel what gold had purchased.The Romans kept up their standards so long as they remained free;but when they fell under the yoke of the emperors,and the emperors began to behave badly and to prefer the shadow to the sun,they,too,began to make grants sometimes to the Parthians,sometimes to Germany,sometimes to other neighbouring peoples;which was the first step towards that great empire's downfall.
Such are the inconveniences,then,that arise from depriving your people of arms.And there is a worse trouble,too,for the greater the force of the enemy's attack,the weaker do you find yourself;for he who lives in the aforesaid way treats ill the subjects who reside within his domain,but treats well those who live on its confines in order to have people well disposed to keep the enemy off.It thus comes about that,in order the better to keep the enemy off,he subsidizes the lords and peoples who are his nextdoor neighbours,with the result that the states which he has thus kept going,offer a modicum of resistance on the frontiers,but,when the enemy has crossed them,no further remedy is available.Such states do not see that their way of proceeding is incompatible with any kind of good order.For it is the heart and the vital parts of the body that have to be strengthened,not its extremities,since without them the body can survive,but,if the former be injured,it dies;yet such states keep unarmed the heart,but arm the hands and the feet.
What this lack of order has done for Florence is clear,and may be seen any day;for when an army crosses its frontiers and gets near its heart,it finds itself without further remedy.Of it the Venetians also gave proof a few years ago,and,if their city had not been girt about by water,it would have been the end of it.In France this experience is not found so frequently,for it is so large a kingdom that it has but few enemies superior to it.None the less,when the English attacked this kingdom in 1513,the whole realm was in trepidation,and the king and everybody else thought that a single defeat would spell ruin to the king and to the state.Very different was it in the case of the Romans,for the nearer the enemy approached to Rome the greater he found the city's power of resistance to be.When Hannibal invaded Italy,one sees how,after three defeats and the death of so many generals and soldiers,it was still able,not merely to withstand the enemy,but to win the war.All this comes from having fortified well the heart,but of the extremities made less account.For of basic importance in this state were the people of Rome,the people known as Latins,the other parts of Italy associated with it,and its colonies.Thence came the vast number of soldiers which enabled it to fight and to hold the whole world.That this is so may be seen from the question asked by Hanno,the Carthaginian,of the messengers who came from Hannibal after the rout at Cannae.Having made much of Hannibal's exploits,they were asked by Hanno whether the Roman people had sent to ask for peace,and whether among the Latins and in its colonies any town had revolted against the Romans.To both questions the answer was in the negative,whereupon Hanno remarked:‘This war,then,is still in as full swing as it was at the start.’
We see from this discourse and from what I have said in other places,how great is the difference between the procedure of presentday republics and that of ancient republics.We see,too,how,because of this,astonishing acquisitions are made and astonishing losses occur daily.For where men have but little virtue,fortune makes a great display of its power;and,since fortune changes,republics and governments frequently change;and will go on changing till someone comes along,so imbued with the love of antiquity that he regulates things in such fashion that fortune does not every time the sun turns round get a chance of showing what it can do.
How Dangerous it is to put Confidence in Refugees
It may not be amiss among other topics to show how dangerous it is to trust those who have been driven from their country,since this is a matter with which everyone who holds office has to deal.In support it is possible to adduce a noteworthy case which Titus Livy cites in his histories,though it lies outside his main topic.When Alexander the Great crossed with his army into Asia,Alexander of Epirus,a relative – in fact his uncle – went with some troops to Italy,having been invited by some Lucanian refugees who had led him to expect that through their mediation he would gain the whole of that country.Relying on their word and on the hopes they aroused,he came to Italy and was put to death by them;for their fellowcitizens had promised that,if they would kill him,they might return to their own country.One should reflect,therefore,on the unreliability of agreements and promises made by men who find themselves shut out from their country,because in determining what such men's word is worth it must be borne in mind that,once they get a chance of returning to their country without your help,they will desert you and turn to others in spite of any promises they may have made you.While in regard to the vain promises and hopes,so intense is their desire to get back home that they naturally believe much that is false and artfully add much more:so that between what they believe and what they say they believe they fill you with a hope which is such that,if you rely on it,either you incur expense in vain or take up what will ruin you.
I propose to let this example of Alexander suffice,conjoined with that of Themistocles the Athenian,who,having been proclaimed a rebel,sought refuge with Darius in Asia;to whom he promised so much if he would but attack Greece that Darius resolved to do so.When later he was unable to fulfil these promises whether out of shame or for fear of punishment,Themistocles poisoned himself.Wherefore,if so eminent a man as Themistocles made this mistake,how much more likely are those to err who are less virtuous and let themselves be swayed by their desires and their passions.A ruler,therefore,should be slow to take up an enterprise because of what some exile has told him,for more often than not all he will get out of it is shame or most grievous harm.
And because the taking of towns by stealth and owing to information supplied by their inhabitants rarely succeeds,it does not seem to me irrelevant to discuss this in the next chapter,as also in how many ways the Romans acquired them.
On the Various Methods used by the Romans in taking Towns
Since the Romans were all keen on war,they always and on all occasions took advantage of anything,alike in the matter of expense and of any other matter,that promised to help.It was for this reason that they took care not to besiege the towns they took,for they thought this method so costly and so clumsy that its disadvantages would much more than counterbalance the advantages likely to accrue from the conquest.Hence they deemed it better and more useful to subjugate towns by any other means rather than lay siege to them,so that in all their wars and in all the years they took,there are very few instances of their having used sieges.
In order to get hold of a city,therefore,the Romans either took it by assault or got it to surrender.Their assaults were either carried out openly in strength and with violence,or by force conjoined with fraud.When storming a town openly they used two methods.Either they attacked it on all sides without first demolishing the walls,which is called ‘putting a crown round the city’ since the whole army surrounds it and engages it at all points;and in this way they often succeeded in taking a city,even a very large one,at the first assault,as Scipio took New Carthage in Spain.Or,when an attack failed,they set about breaking down the walls with rams and other siege implements,or made a sap by which they obtained entrance to the city,as was done when Veii was taken;or to get on a level with those defending the walls,they constructed wooden towers,or raised earthworks against the walls from without,so as to be at the same height as the defenders.
Against such assaults the city's defenders in the first case,where the attack came from all sides,were more quickly exposed to danger and had more dubious remedies.For,since many defenders were needed everywhere,either those they had were not enough to provide them all with reserves and reliefs;or,if they could,not all were equally courageous in resisting,and,if a section shirked the battle,all was lost.Hence it often happened,as I have said,that this method proved successful.But when the first assault was not successful,they did not keep it going long,because this was too dangerous for the army;for,since it covered so much ground,it could as a whole resist but feebly a sortie made by those within.The troops,too,got out of hand and grew weary;but for just once,when it was unexpected,they would try this method.When a breach was made in the walls,it was countered by means of ramparts as at the present time.And to counteract a sap,they made a countersap through which they got at the enemy either with their weapons or by other devices;of which one consisted of barrels filled with feathers to which they applied a light,and,when burning,put them in the sap so that the smoke and the stench might prevent the enemy getting through.While,if attacked from towers,they tried to destroy them by fire;and,if from earthworks,they made a hole in the lower part of the wall on which the earthwork was leaning,and drew in the earth which those outside had put there,so that,since the earth was being piled up outside and being taken away from the inside,the earthwork did not grow.
Such methods of storming a town could not be kept up for long,so they had either to raise their camp or to devise other methods of winning the war,as Scipio did when he got to Africa;for when he attacked Utica,but did not succeed in taking it,he raised his camp and sought to engage the Carthaginian armies and break them.Or they would have recourse to a siege,as they did at Veii,Capua,Carthage,Jerusalem and other towns which they took by means of sieges.
The acquiring of towns by furtive violence is illustrated in the case of Palaeopolis,which the Romans took by arrangement with fifth columnists inside.This form of attack has often been tried by the Romans and by other peoples,but has seldom succeeded.The reason is that at the smallest setback the plan breaks down,and such setbacks easily happen.For in the first place the conspiracy may be discovered before it comes to a head,and in discovering it there is not much difficulty,owing sometimes to the treachery of those who have been told of it,sometimes to practical difficulties.For you must get in touch with the enemy,with whom it is not permitted to speak unless you can find some excuse.And,should the plot not be discovered while arrangements are being made,a host of difficulties occur when the time comes for action.For if you arrive before the time appointed,or get there late,anything may upset the plot.So,too,if there occurs some unexpected noise,such as the geese made at the Capitol,or if the normal course of events is interrupted.Given the least blunder or the smallest mistake,the attack is bound to fail.In addition to which there is the darkness of the night to add to the fear of those engaged in such dangerous tasks;and the fact that most of the men who are taken on such expeditions,having had no experience of the country or of the place to which they are being led,may get muddled and fainthearted,or upset by some tiny and accidental mishap;and any false impression is enough to make them turn tail.
Anyone more lucky in such stealthy nocturnal ventures than Aratus the Sicyonian is not to be found,yet,bold as he was in these,he was equally nervous about ventures in daylight and in the open.This we may put down to some occult virtue with which he was endowed,rather than to anything in the nature of nocturnal expeditions which makes them more fortunate than others.Though such means are frequently planned,therefore,but few arrive at fruition,and very few succeed.
When towns are acquired by surrender,the surrender may either be voluntary or compulsory.When voluntary,it is due either to some external circumstance which compels a town to seek protection under another's wing,as Capua sought Rome's;or to the desire to be well ruled,a desire evoked by the good government exercised by the prince in question over those who of their own accord have placed themselves in his hands,as was the case with the Rhodians,the Massilians and other such cities which surrendered to the Roman people.When the surrender is compulsory,it is either brought about by a long siege,as we have said above;or it is due to the continued vexation produced by raids,depredations and other annoyances,to escape which a city surrenders.
Of all the methods mentioned above,the Romans used the last more than any.For more than four hundred and fifty years they sought to tire out their neighbours by defeats in the field and by raids,and by means of treaties managed to acquire greater repute than their rivals did,as we have pointed out elsewhere.It was on this method that they always relied most,though they tried them all,but found the others fraught with danger or of no use.For sieges are long and costly,assaults of doubtful issue and risky;and conspiracies are unreliable.They also realized that,if the enemy's army was routed,they acquired a kingdom in a day;whereas,if they besieged an obstinate city,it might take years to get it.
The Romans gave to Army Commanders Discretionary Powers
If one is to profit from the perusal of Livy's history one ought,I think,to take account of all the modes of procedure used by the people and senate of Rome and among other points worthy of notice there is the authority we find them giving to their consuls,dictators and other army commanders when in the field.It was of a very high order,for the senate reserved to itself only the power to initiate fresh wars and to confirm peace treaties.All else was left to the discretion and power of the consul.For,when the people and senate had decided to go to war,against the Latins,for instance,they left everything else to the discretion of the consul,who could either give battle or not give it,and attack this or that town as he thought fit.
This is confirmed by numerous examples,but especially by what occurred in an expedition against the Tuscans.The consul,Fabius,had defeated those who were near Sutrium,and was planning next to lead his army through the Ciminian forest en route for Tuscany.About this,not only did he not consult the senate,but he did not even inform them,though the war was to be carried on in a new,unexplored and dangerous country.Further confirmation is afforded by the action the senate here took,which was of the opposite kind;for,when they heard of the victory which Fabius had gained and wondered whether his next step would be to pass through the said forest into Tuscany,they thought it best not to run the risk this war would entail,and so sent two legates to Fabius to stop him from going on to Tuscany.But,when they arrived,he had already got there and had won a victory,so that,instead of preventing a war,the legates came home bringing news of a conquest and of glory won.
Whoever considers carefully this technique will see that it was very wise to make use of it.For,if the senate had required a consul in conducting a war to proceed step by step according as they directed,it would have made him less circumspect and slower to act,for it would have seemed to him that the glory of victory would not be wholly his,but that the senate would share in it,since it would have been carried out under its directions.Furthermore,the senate would have had to advise on matters of which it had no immediate cognizance;for,though the senators were all men of considerable experience in military matters,yet,as they were not on the spot,they would not be acquainted with the multitudinous details which it is essential to know before one can give sound advice,and so would have made numerous mistakes.This being so,they preferred that the consul should decide what to do,and that the glory should be wholly his,for they thought his actions would be so restrained and regulated by his love of glory that he would do his utmost.
To this I have the more willingly called attention,because I notice that the republics of today,such as the Venetian and the Florentine republics,act differently,for if their generals,administrators or commissioners,have to set up a piece of artillery,they want to know of it and to advise about it – a procedure as praiseworthy as are others of that ilk,which together have brought us to our present pass.
Sundry remarks on strategy,tactics,new devices and discipline
That a General cannot avoid an Engagement if the Enemy is determined to force him to it at All Costs
‘Gaius Sulpicius,the dictator,when waging war with the Gauls,was unwilling to try his fortune in an engagement with an enemy whose position time and an awkward situation was steadily making worse.’ When there occurs an error which all men,or most men,are liable to make,it is not a bad thing,I think,to warn them often against it.Since,therefore,as I have frequently pointed out,the way in which important matters are dealt with today does not come up to the standard of the ancients,it does not seem to me superfluous at this juncture to point it out once again.For,if there be any way in which there has been a departure from ancient customs,it is especially so in military matters,in which none of the things the ancients esteemed so highly are now done.This inconvenience is due to republics and princes having entrusted such matters to other people.To avoid danger they themselves keep clear of military operations and,though one does sometimes find a king in these days sallying forth in person,I do not on this account think that it leads him to do much else that is worthy of commendation.For when they actually do engage in military operations,they do it for the sake of display and not for any praiseworthy reason.True,in that they occasionally review their troops and reserve to themselves the title of commander,they make mistakes of less moment than do republics,especially Italian republics,which rely on others and understand nothing which has to do with war,and yet in their desire to look like a prince in the eyes of the army,make decisions,and,in doing so,commit innumerable blunders.
And although some of these blunders I have discussed elsewhere,I cannot here be silent about one which is very important.When these idle princes or effeminate republics are sending one of their generals on an expedition,it seems to them that the wisest thing they can commission him to do,is on no account to engage in open battle,but,on the contrary,above all else to be on his guard against an engagement;for they think that in so doing they are emulating the prudence of Fabius Maximus who,by putting off an engagement,saved the Roman state from destruction;wherein they overlook the fact that,more often than not,such a commission is nonsensical or dangerous.The point one has to bear in mind here is that a general who proposes to remain in the field cannot avoid battle if the enemy is determined to force one on him at all costs.Hence what such a commission amounts to is just this:‘Join battle at the enemy's behest,not at your own’.For,if one wants to remain in the field and not join battle,the only safe thing to do is to put at least fifty miles between oneself and the enemy,and then to have good scouts so that,should he come your way,you may have time to get farther off.Another alternative in this case is to shut yourself up in a city.But both courses are extremely harmful.For the first leaves your country at the mercy of the enemy,and a valiant prince would sooner try his fortune in battle than prolong a war at such cost to his subjects.While the second alternative is manifestly that of a lost cause,for what it comes to is that,when you have got your army into a city,you may be besieged,and before long to be reduced by the pangs of hunger to surrender.Hence to avoid battle in either of these two ways is extremely hurtful.The plan adopted by Fabius Maximus of occupying strong positions is good so long as you have so valiant an army that the enemy does not dare come and seek you out in your position of vantage.Nor can it be said that Fabius avoided battle,but rather that he preferred to fight when he had the advantage.For,if Hannibal had gone to seek him out,he would have awaited him and made a day of it.But Hannibal did not dare to fight with him on these terms.So that it was as much Hannibal who avoided battle as Fabius;but,if either had determined at all costs to fight,the other would have had to adopt one of three courses,i.e.either to adopt one of the two courses mentioned above,or else to run away.
That what I am saying is true can be clearly seen from a host of cases,and especially in the war the Romans had with Philip of Macedon,the father of Perseus.For,when Philip was attacked by the Romans,he decided not to join battle,and,to avoid it,did at first what Fabius Maximus did in Italy:posted himself with his army on top of a mountain where he erected fortifications,thinking that the Romans would not dare to go and seek him out.But they did go,and,having fought with him,drove him from the mountain,and he,being powerless to resist,fled with the greater part of his forces.What saved him from being utterly undone was the impossible country,which prevented the Romans from following him up.Philip,therefore,still desirous of avoiding battle and being encamped in the neighbourhood of the Romans,had to get away;and,having learned by experience that,to avoid battle,it is not enough to take up a position on top of a mountain,and being averse to shutting himself up in towns,decided to take the remaining course and to put many miles between himself and the Roman camp.Hence,when the Romans were in one province,he moved to another,and,in like manner,whenever the Romans moved out,he moved in.But when at length he came to see that by prolonging the war in this way his situation was getting worse,and that,now by him,now by the enemy,his subjects were being harassed,he decided to try his fortune in battle.He thus came to an engagement with the Romans,as was proper.
It is useful then not to fight under the conditions in which Fabius’ army found itself,or again in those in which Gaius Sulpicius found himself,i.e.when you have so good an army that the enemy does not dare to come and oust you from your fortified position;or when the enemy is in your country,but without having the footing there that would guarantee provisions.In this case the course adopted is useful for the reasons Livy gives when he says:‘he was unwilling to try his fortune in an engagement with the enemy so long as time and his adverse situation were daily making the enemy's position worse’.But under all other conditions battle cannot be avoided without incurring dishonour and danger,for if you run away,as Philip did,it is as bad as being routed,and is the more shameful in that you afford less proof of your virtue.And if he thus succeeded in getting away,another who is not helped by the country may not be so successful as he was.
That Hannibal was a past master in warfare no one will deny.Hence,when he was up against Scipio in Africa,if he had seen any advantage in prolonging the war he would have done so;and peradventure,being a good general and having a good army,he might have done as Fabius did in Italy.But,as he did not do it,it must be supposed that strong grounds impelled him to act thus.For a commander who has an army massed together and sees that for lack of funds or of allies he cannot keep it long in the field,is quite mad if he does not put his fortune to the test before his army has to be disbanded;because,if he waits,he is surely lost;but if he tries,he may succeed.
Another point of importance to be considered here is that one ought,if one is going to lose,to try to acquire glory,and there is more glory in being overcome by force than there is when it is through some other inconvenience that you come to lose.Hannibal must have been constrained by these necessities.On the other hand,should Hannibal have put off giving battle and Scipio had not enough courage to go and attack him in his strong positions,Scipio would have been none the worse for this,since he had already beaten Syphax and acquired so many towns in Africa that his position there was as safe and as comfortable as if he were in Italy.This was not the case with Hannibal when he was up against Fabius,nor with the Gauls when they were up against Sulpicius.
Still less,again,is it possible for him to avoid battle who with his army is attacking a foreign country,for if he wants to get into the enemy's country,it behoves him when the enemy shows fight,to give battle,and if he takes up his position before a town,he is so much the more obliged to give battle.This happened in our times in the case of Charles,Duke of Burgundy,who,when encamped before Morat,a Swiss town,was attacked and routed by the Swiss;and in the case of the French army which was besieging Novara and was in like manner routed by the Swiss.
That he who has to deal with several Foes,even though he be Weaker than they are,can actually Win,provided he can sustain their First Attack
The power of the tribunes of the plebs in the city of Rome was considerable,which was necessary since otherwise they could not have checked the ambition of the nobility,as we have frequently pointed out;and the nobility would in that case have corrupted the republic long before they did.Nevertheless,because inherent in everything is its own peculiar malady,as has been said elsewhere,and this gives rise to fresh misfortunes,it is necessary to provide against them by fresh enactments.Hence,when the tribunes grew arrogant in the use of their authority and became a menace alike to the nobility and to the whole of Rome,there would have arisen an inconvenience harmful to Roman liberty if Appius Claudius had not shown how the ambition of the tribunes might be counteracted.This consisted in looking among them for someone who was either timorous or corruptible or devoted to the common good,and who could thus be induced to oppose the will of the rest when they were proposing to do something contrary to the will of the senate.This remedy acted in no small measure as a restraint on the excessive authority of the tribunes and was often of service to Rome.
This leads me on to consider how it sometimes happens that,when many powers are united against a single power,though in combination they are much more powerful than it is,yet more is always to be expected from the single power,though less strong,than from the many even though very strong,for apart from the many advantages which a single power has over the many – and they are countless – there is always this:it will be able by using a little industry to break up the many,and to make what was a strong body,weak.I shall not adduce examples from ancient history,for they would be many,but shall content myself with modern examples which have happened in our own times.
In 1483 all Italy formed a confederation against the Venetians,who,since they had lost everything and their army could no longer hold its own in the field,suborned Signor Ludovico who was ruling in Milan and by means of this managed to obtain terms by which they not only recovered their lost lands,but obtained part of the state of Ferrara.Thus,though they were losing the war,when peace came,they were better off than before.
A few years ago the whole world formed a confederation against France,yet,before the war came to an end,Spain had fallen out with the confederation and made peace on its own account,with the result that the remaining confederates shortly afterwards also had to come to terms with France.
The conclusion to be drawn from this is obvious.If the many make war on the one,the one will come out of it best provided her virtue be such that she can sustain the first attack and await her opportunity by procrastinating.For,should she not be able to do this,a host of dangers may ensue,as happened to Venice in 08 when,could she have temporized with the French army and have found time to win over one of the states confederated against her,she might have avoided disaster.But since in arms she was not sufficiently strong to be able to temporize with the enemy,and so had not time to persuade any power to leave the confederation,she was undone.Yet one finds that the Pope,once he had recovered his lost territory,became her ally,and so did Spain;and either of these two princes would have been very glad to help her to save Lombardy so as to prevent the French becoming too powerful in Italy,had they been able to do so.Hence the Venetians,by giving up part of their territories,might have saved the rest;and this would have been a very wise course had it been done in time before the war broke out so that they should not appear to have been driven to it.But after the war had begun it would have been reprehensible,and probably of but little use.Yet,before war broke out,few Venetian citizens saw the danger,and still fewer the remedy;and there was no one to advise them.But to come back to where we started.The conclusion I draw from this discourse is that,just as the Roman senate found means to save their country from the ambition of the tribunes because there were many tribunes,so any prince who is assailed by many,has a remedy to hand,if he be wise enough to take appropriate steps to break up the confederation.
That a Prudent General should make it absolutely necessary for his own Troops to Fight,but should avoid forcing the Enemy to do so
We have in other discourses shown how useful a part necessity plays in human affairs,and to what glorious deeds it may lead men.As some moral philosophers in their writings have remarked,neither of the two most noble instruments to which man's nobility is due,his hands and his tongue,would have attained such perfection in their work or have carried man's works to the height which one can see they have reached,if they had not been driven to it by necessity.Since,therefore,army commanders of old were aware of the virtue that lies in necessity,and how steadfast,when necessity drives,the minds of soldiers can become in their resolve to fight,they used every endeavour to put their troops under such constraint and,on the other hand,employed any device that would free the enemy from such constraint.To this end they often left open to the enemy a route they might have closed,and closed a route to their own soldiers which they might have left open.If,then,anyone wants a city to be obstinately defended or an army in the field to fight obstinately,he should,first and foremost,seek to instil this necessity into the minds of those who have to do the fighting.
It follows that a prudent general who has to go and lay siege to a city should base his estimate of how easy or how difficult it is going to be to take it on the knowledge and consideration of the extent to which necessity will constrain the inhabitants to defend it;and,if he find the necessity constraining them to defend it,considerable,should account the siege difficult,but,if otherwise,should account it easy.It is for this reason that towns which have rebelled are more difficult to acquire than they are to acquire in the first instance;for in the first instance they have no cause to expect punishment for having given offence,and so surrender easily;but,since they are aware,when in revolt,of having given offence,and in consequence fear punishment,they become difficult to take.Again,obstinacy of this kind is also aroused by the natural hatred which neighbouring princes and neighbouring republics have for one another;which,in turn,is occasioned by the ambition which moves states to dominate one another,and by their jealousy,especially if they are republics,as was the case in Tuscany,and this rivalry and competition have made it difficult,and will continue to make it difficult,for one to seize the other.If,therefore,one considers carefully what neighbours the city of Florence has and what neighbours the city of Venice has,it is not so extraordinary as many make out that Florence should have spent more on wars and have acquired less than Venice,since it is all due to the towns in the neighbourhood of Venice not being so obstinate in defending themselves as are those in the neighbourhood of Florence.This comes about because the cities abutting on Venetian territory are accustomed to live under a prince,and are not free cities;and cities accustomed to subjection are usually not so particular about changing masters:on the contrary,they are often glad to do so.Hence,though Venice's neighbours are more powerful than those of Florence,yet,on account of its having found the towns less obstinate,Venice has been able to subdue them more quickly than has Florence,which is surrounded entirely by free cities.
But to return to the main topic of this discourse.When a general is attacking a town he should endeavour with all diligence to relieve its defenders of the necessity we have been discussing,and so of their obstinacy;by promising them pardon if they are afraid of punishment,and,if they fear for their liberty,by explaining that no attack is being made on the common good,but only on a few ambitious citizens.This has often facilitated the attack on,and the taking of,towns.And,though such false colours are easily seen through,especially by men of prudence,the populace is none the less often deceived;for,in its eagerness for a speedy peace it shuts its eyes to any trap which may underlie generous promises.Innumerable cities have by this means been reduced to servile states.It was so with Florence,for instance,quite recently;and it happened to Crassus and his army;for,though he realized the emptiness of Parthian promises,made merely to deprive his troops of the need to defend themselves,this did not enable him to sustain their steadfastness,blinded as they were,by the offers of peace which the enemy had made:a point one sees clearly if one reads his life.
In this connection I might mention that when the Samnites,in contravention of their treaty and owing to the ambition of the few,raided and pillaged the lands of Rome's allies;and then sent ambassadors to Rome to sue for peace,offering to restore what they had taken and to hand over those responsible for the disturbances and for the booty taken,their offer was turned down by the Romans.On their returning to Samnium without hope of an agreement,Claudius Pontius,then in command of the Samnite army,in one of his remarkable speeches,pointed out that the Romans had anyhow wanted war,and that,though on their part they were anxious for peace,necessity constrained them to go to war.He then used these words:‘War is justified,if necessity forces one to it,and to arm is a duty,if in arms lies one's hope’ and upon this necessity he based the hope of victory for his troops.
That I may not have to return later to this topic,it will be best for me to mention the more noteworthy instances in Rome's case.There was that of Gaius Manlius who led his army against the Veientes,and,when a section of the Veientine army broke through his stockades,hurried with a detachment to defend them and,to prevent the Veientes escaping,put a guard on all the exits from the camp.Hence,finding themselves shut in,the Veientes began to fight so furiously that they killed Manlius,and would have got the better of all the rest of the Romans if one of the tribunes had not had the sense to let them out.Thus we see that,so long as necessity constrained the Veientes to fight,they fought with great ferocity,but,when they saw the way was open,thought more of getting away than of fighting.
The armies of the Volsci and the Aequi had crossed the Roman frontiers.Against them the consuls were sent.In the course of the battle the Volscian army,commanded by Vettius Messius,found itself at one moment shut up between its stockades which the Romans had taken,and the other Roman army.Seeing that he must needs die or use his sword to fight for his life,Vettius Messius said to his soldiers:‘Follow me.There is neither wall nor rampart in the way,but just armed forces to oppose armed forces.In valour we are equal,but in necessity which is the last weapon and the best of all,you have the advantage.’ Thus Livy calls necessity ‘the last and best of all weapons’.
Camillus,the most prudent of all Rome's generals,having already got into the city of Veii with his army,in order to facilitate the taking of it and to deprive the enemy of a last necessity to defend it,gave orders within the hearing of the Veientes to the effect that no one should touch those who were without arms.The result was that they threw down their arms and the city was taken almost without bloodshed.This device was afterwards adopted by many generals.