对第二组反驳的答辩
(a)你们又问:我如何论证物体不能思维。如果我回答说我还没有谈到这个问题,就请你们谅解我,因为要到第六个沉思时我才会谈这个问题。我是用如下几句话谈的:我能够清楚、分明地领会一个东西而不牵涉到别的东西,就足以确定这一个东西和那一个东西有所不同,等等,后面不远的地方又谈到:
虽然我有一个肉体,我和它非常紧密地结合在一起,不过,一方面我对我自己有一个清楚、分明的观念,即我只是一个在思维的东西而没有延伸空间,而另一方面,我对于肉体有一个清楚、分明的观念,即它只是一个有延伸空间的东西而不能思维,所以肯定的是这个我,也就是我的精神或我的灵魂,即我之所以为我的那个东西,是完全、真正跟我的肉体有分别的,它可以没有肉体而存在。
在这上面很可以加上一句:凡是能够思维的就是精神,或者就叫作精神。由于身体和精神是实际上有分别的,那么任何身体都不是精神。所以任何物体都不能思维。
在这上面我看不出有什么是你们可以否认的;是因为你觉得我们清楚地领会一个东西而不牵涉到另外一个东西就不足以知道它们实际上是有分别的吗?要是那样的话,你应给提供一些能够分辨真正不同的标准,但我很肯定,你给不出来。你们又会说什么呢?如果两个东西能够不依托于对方而存在,他们就真的有分别了吗?可是我再问你们,你们怎么知道一个东西可以不依托另一个而存在?如果这是一个分别的标准,人们应该知道它。也许你们会说:感官使你们知道,因为你们看见两个东西彼此分离,不依附,或者你们摸到了它,等等。可是对感官的信任比对理智的信任更不可靠;同一个东西可能以不同的方式给我们的感官表现出各种不同的形式,或者在几个地方表现为几种样子,这样它就被当作是两个。最后,如果你们还记得我在第二个沉思的末尾说过的关于蜡的话,你们就会知道物体本身不能真正地被感官认识,而只能被理智认识;因此,感觉一个东西而不牵涉到另一个东西无非是一个东西的观念,即这个观念和另外一个东西的观念不是同一的。我们只能从这样一个事实来理解,一个东西在不受另一个东西的影响下可以被感知,而且只有一个东西在不牵涉到另一个东西也能被领会的情况下才能被认识。这样一来,关于“真正的区分”的标准就应该还原到我的标准上才是靠得住的。
(b)当我说我们不能确切地认识上帝,除非我们预先知道他的存在时,我声明,我谈论的只是那些不用考虑前提条件就能推导出结论的知识。但是逻辑学家还没有把原理的知识称作科学知识的习惯。但当我们发觉我们是在思维着的东西时,这是一个第一概念,这个概念并不是从任何三段论式推论出来的。即使有人说:我思维,所以我存在,他因思维而得出存在这个结论并不是根据三段论式,而是从一种不言自明的简单精神洞察出来的。从以下的事实看,事情是很明显的,如果他是从一种三段论式推论出来的,他必须预先认识这个大前提:思维的东西都存在。然而,他是从他不存在就不能思维这个事实体会到这一点的。由个别的认识推论出广泛通用的命题,这是我们精神的本性。
(c)我们一旦认为清楚地领会了一件事情,我们就自然地相信它。如果这种信念坚强到我们永远没有任何理由怀疑那些像这样相信的东西的程度的话,那么就没有任何东西要去进一步追寻了,我们已经有了我们希望的一切。如果也许有人硬说我们如此强烈相信其真实性的东西在上帝眼里或者在天使眼里是有偏差的,并且因此说他是完全错误的,这跟我们有什么关系呢?既然我们根本不相信,也没有丝毫有力的证据,我们为什么要在意这样一个绝对的错误?我们坚信一个信念,坚信到不可动摇的程度,那么这个信念就成了非常可靠的真理。
但人们可能会怀疑是否有人有像这样的可靠性,或者某种坚定不移的信念。
当然,人们不能对于模糊不清的东西有什么信念,即使是一点点的模糊不清也不行;因为不管是什么样的模糊不清都是使我们对这些东西产生怀疑的原因。对于由感觉得来的东西也不能有信念,因为我们经常发现感官会出现偏差,就像当一个水肿病人口渴或者有黄胆病的人看雪是黄色的,那个人看雪清楚、分明的程度不比我们差,而我们看雪却是白色的。因此,如果人们能够有信念,那仅仅是精神领会得清楚、明白的东西。
可是,在这些东西里边,有一些是那么清楚,同时又是那么简单,以致我们不可能认为它们不是真的。例如,当我思维时我存在;做了的事情无法回到没做的状态;以及诸如此类的东西。对于这些东西,我们显然是有十足把握的。因为如果我们不想那些东西,我们就不能怀疑它们;但如果我们不相信它们是真的,我们就决不会想到它们,就像我刚才说的那样。所以如果不同时相信它们是真的,我们就不能怀疑它们,也就是说,我们永远没办法怀疑它们。
我们时常遇到有些人在他们以为比看见太阳还清楚的一些事物上弄错,这也没有什么用处;因为,不管是我们或者任何人都没有看见过这样的事情发生在那些能够单独从他们理智知觉中得出全部清楚、分明性的人的身上,只看见过这样的事情发生在那些从感官或者从什么错误的偏见中得出全部清楚、分明性的人的身上。
想要假装认为这样的事情在上帝或者天使看来是错误的,也没什么用,因为我们知觉的明显性决不允许我们去相信如此假装的人。
还有一些其他东西,我们不能怀疑它们,因为我们的理智,根据我们已有的理解能力,对它们领会得十分清楚;但是,我们可能忘记那些原因,并且记住从这些原因推论出的结论,人们问道,对于这些结论,在我们记得它们是从一些非常明显的原则推论出来的时候,是否能够有一个坚定不移的信念;因为这个记忆必须设定,以便这些结论能够被称之为结论。我回答说,只有那些认识上帝到如此程度,以致他们知道由上帝给予的理解功能只能以真理作为对象的人,才能够对于这些结论有一个坚定不移的信念;不过其他人不能够有这样的信念。
(d)当批评我由一个三段论式构建的结论时,你们好像犯了一个错误。因为,为了得出你们所要的结论,大前提应该是这样的:凡是被我们清楚、分明地领会为属于某事物本性的东西,都能真正地被说成或者被肯定为是属于这个事物的本性。这样一来,这个大前提除了无用的、多余的重复以外,没有包含什么东西。可是我的论据的大前提是这样的:凡是被我们清楚、分明地领会为属于某事物本性的东西,都能真正地被说成或者被肯定为是属于这个东西的。这就是说,如果“是动物”属于人的本性,那么可以肯定人是动物;如果三角之和等于二直角属于直角三角形的本性,那么就可以肯定直角三角形三角之和等于二直角;如果存在属于上帝的本性,那么就可以肯定上帝存在,等等。小前提是这样的:而存在是属于上帝的本性的。从这里显然必须得出像我所说的那样的结论,即:所以我们可以真正地肯定说上帝存在,而不是像你们所想那样:所以我们可以真正地肯定说存在是属于上帝本性的。
这样,为了能够使用你们提出的特例,你们本来应该否认大前提,说我们清楚地理解什么是属于东西的本性,不能因此就被说成是或被肯定是属于这个东西,除非是它的本性是可能的,或者不矛盾的。不过,我请你们看一看这个特例的缺点。因为,要么是你们用可能这个词,像一般人所做的那样,指的是凡是与人类思想不相矛盾的东西,在这种意义上,上帝的本性,按照我所描写的方式来说,显然是可能的,因为在上帝的本性身上,除了我们清楚、分明地领会为应该属于他的东西以外,我并没有假定什么东西,这样我就没有假定什么与思想或人类概念相矛盾的东西;要么是你们假想出什么其他的可能性,从对象本身来说,这种可能性如果与前一种可能性相矛盾,就决不能被人类理智所认识,从而它就和否定人的认识中的其他一切东西一样,没有什么力量来迫使我们去否定上帝的本性或者上帝的存在。因为,如果把上帝的本性是可能的这件事加以否定,虽然从概念或从思想方面来说没有什么不可能,可是相反,凡是包含在上帝本性的这个概念里的东西都是如此地互相衔接,以致如果说其中有某一个不属于上帝的本性,这对我们来说似乎是矛盾的;因此,如果上帝的本性是可能的这件事可以去否定,那么同样道理,也可以去否定一个三角形三角之和等于二直角是可能的,或者现实在思维的人存在是可能的;尤有甚者,人们甚至可以否定凡是我们由感觉知觉到的一切东西都是真的。那样一来,人类的一切知识都将既无丝毫理由,又无任何根据而被完全推翻。
(e)至于你们补充说,从灵魂与肉体之间的区别不能得出灵魂不死这个结论来,因为虽然有区别,可是人们可以说上帝把灵魂做成这样一种性质,使它的延续时间和肉体的生命的延续时间同时完结,我承认我没有什么可答辩的,因为我没有那么大的胆量去企图用人类的推理力量来规定一个只取决于上帝的纯粹意志的东西。自然的认识告诉我们精神是与物体有别的,精神是一种实体;同时,人的肉体,就其与其他物体有别而言,不过是由某一种外形的肢体以及诸如此类的偶性组合而成;最后,肉体的死亡仅仅取决于形状的某种分解或改变。然而,我们没有任何论据也没有任何例证使我们相信,像精神这样一个实体的死亡或毁灭应该随着一个形状的改变这种如此轻微的原因所致,而形状的改变不过是一个样态,更何况这个样态又不是精神的样态,而是与精神实际上有别的肉体的样态。我们甚至没有任何论据或例证可以使我们相信有些实体是可以被毁灭的。这就足以得出结论说,人的精神或灵魂,按其能够被自然哲学所认识的程度来说,是不死的。
可是如果有人问道,是否也许上帝用他的绝对能力,规定了人的灵魂会因它与之联合的肉体的毁灭而同时停止存在?这只能由上帝自己来回答。既然他现在向我们启示这样的事不会发生,关于这件事我们不应该再有任何怀疑了。
证明方式是双重的:一个是由分析法或决定法做的,一个是由综合法或组合法做的。
分析法指出一条一件事物由之而被有条不紊地发现出来的真正道路,同时也指明结果如何取决于原因;这样,如果读者们愿意遵循这个方法并且仔细注视它所包含的一切东西,他们就会把这样证明了的东西理解得同样完满,就跟他们自己发现了它一样成为他们自己的东西。不过这种证明不足以使顽固的、不用心的读者信服;因为,如果一不经心漏掉了它所提出的一点点小事情,它的结论的必然性就不会出现;人们没有习惯大量检查那些本身足够明确的东西,虽然那是最应该注意的东西。
综合法则相反,它走的是一条完全不同的道路,好像从结果里检查原因一样(虽然它所包含的证明经常也是由原因检查结果),它固然清楚地证明在结论里所包含的东西,并且使用了一长串的定义、要求、公理、定理和问题,以便如果否认它的什么结论的话,它就指出这些结论是怎样包含在前提里边的,这样它就会使读者们(不管他们是多么顽固不化)不得不同意,不过它不像另外那种方法那样,使那些希望学习的人感到完全满足,因为事物是用什么方法发现的,它不告诉你。
几何学方式证明上帝的存在和人的精神与肉体之间的区别的依据
一、关于思维这一词,我是指凡是像这样存在于我们的心里,使我们对之有直接认识的东西。这样一来,凡是意志的活动、理智的活动、想象的活动和感官的活动都是思维。可是我加上“直接”这个词,这是为了把附加和取决于我们思维的东西排除在外。举例来说,出于意愿的运动虽然真正来说是以意志为其原则的,但是它本身并不是思维。
二、关于观念这一词,我是指我们的每个思维的这样一种形式,由于这种形式的直接知觉,我们对这些思维才有认识。因此,当我理解我所说的话时,除非肯定在我心里具有关于用我的言词所意味着的东西的观念,我用言词什么都表明不了。因此,仅仅是任意描绘出来的影像,我不把它们称之为观念;相反,这些影像,当它们是由肉体任意描绘出来的时候,也就是说,当它们是大脑的某些部分描绘出来的时候,我不把它们称之为观念,而只有当它们通知到大脑的这一个部分的精神本身的时候,我才把它们称为观念。
三、关于一个观念的客观实在性,我是指用观念表象的东西的实体性或存在性,就这个实体性是在观念里边而言。同样,人们可以说一个客观的完满性,或者一个客观的技巧等等。因为凡是我们领会为在观念的对象里边的东西都是客观地或者通过表象存在于观念本身里。
四、当这些东西在观念的对象里边就如同我们所领会那个样子时,这些东西就叫作形式地存在于观念的对象里;当这些东西在观念里边实际上不是像我们所领会的那个样子,而是如此的伟大以致它们能够用它们的优越性来弥补这个缺点时,它们就叫作卓越地存在于观念的对象里。
五、凡是被别的东西作为其主体而直接寓于其中的东西,或者我们所领会的(也就是说,在我们心中有其实在的观念的某种特性、性质或属性的)某种东西由之而存在的东西,就叫作实体。因为实体是这样的一种东西,在它里边形式地或卓越地存在着我们所知觉的,或者客观地在我们某一个观念里边的东西;除此而外,严格说来我们对实体没有其他概念,因为自然的光明告诉我们“无”不能有任何实在的属性。
六、思维直接寓于其中的实体,在这里就叫作精神。我所指的是精神不是灵魂,因为灵魂这个名称是有歧义的,人们可能会用它来指代物质性的东西。
七、作为广延以及以广延为前提的偶性(如形状、位置、地点的运动等等)的直接主体,叫作物体或肉体、身体。不过,如要知道叫作精神的实体是否同时就是叫作物体的实体,或者是否它们是两个不同的实体,这留待以后再去研究。
八、我们把理解为至上完满的、我们了解其中没有包含着任何缺点或对完满性有限制的东西的实体就叫作上帝。
九、当我们说某种属性包含,或者在其概念里在一个东西的本性时,我们可以说如果这个事物是真实的,那么它所包含的事物也是真实的。
十、当两种实体之间,不以另一个的存在为前提而存在的,这两种实体就是相互区别的。
第三组反驳
反驳
因为从我思维或从我有一个观念,可以推论出我是有思维的,因为我思维和我是在思维的,二者是一个意思。从我是在思维的,得出我存在;因为思维的东西并非什么都不是。不过,我们的著者在这里加上了“也就是说,一个精神,一个灵魂,一个理智,一个理性”,从这里我就产生出来一个疑问。因为我认为:说我是在思维的,因而我是一个思维,或者说,我是有理智的,因而我是一个理智,这样的推理是不正确的。因为我也可以用同样的推理说:我是在散步,因而我是一个散步。笛卡尔先生把有理智的东西和理智当作一回事了;或者至少他说在理解的东西和理智是一个东西。可是所有的哲学家都把主体跟它的功能和行为,也就是说,跟它的特性和本质分别开来。因为这跟东西本身的存在和它的本质不是一回事;因此一个在思维的东西可以是精神、理性或者理智的主体,从而是物体性的东西,可是他提出来的倒是与此相反的东西而没有加以证明。虽然如此,笛卡尔先生想要建立的结论,其根据好像就在于此。
在同一地方,他说道:“我认识到了我存在,现在我追问,我认识了我存在这个我究竟是谁。可是,非常可靠的是,关于我自己的这个概念和认识,严格来说不取决于我还不知道其存在的那些东西。”
他说得非常正确:对我存在这个命题的认识之取决于我思维这个命题是非常可靠的;可是对我思维这个命题的认识是从哪里来的呢?不错,这无非是来自:没有主体,我们就不能领会其任何行为,就像没有一个在思维的东西就不能领会思维,没有一个在知道的东西就不能领会知道,没有一个散步的东西就不能领会散步一样。
答辩
我曾经说的“也就是说,一个精神,一个灵魂,一个理智,一个理性……”,我用这几个名称不是指单独的功能,而是指能有思维功能的东西,就像人们习惯于用前头两个所指的,以及人们经常用后头两个所指的那样。这是我经常而且用非常明显的词句解释过的,我看不出有什么可疑的地方。
在散步和思维之间,没有什么关系;因为散步除了行动本身之外,从来不指别的,而思维有时指行动,有时指功能,有时指寓于这个功能之内的东西。
我并没有说理智和在理解的东西是一回事,也没有说,如果把理智当作一种功能,而仅仅是当理智被当作在理解的东西的时候,我才说它们是一回事。我坦率地承认,为了说明一个东西或一个实体,我要把凡是不属于它的东西都要从它身上剥掉起见,我尽可能使用了简单、抽象的词句;而相反,这位哲学家为了说明同一的实体,却使用了另外的一些非常具体、非常复杂的词句,比如主体、物质以及物体,以便尽可能地不把思维和物体(或身体)分别开来。
我并不害怕他所使用的方法,也就是说把几种东西连接在一起,比我所使用的方法(即用以尽可能地分辨每一个东西)更能有效地认识真理。但是不要再多说空话了,还是让我们看看问题的所在吧。
他说:“一个在思维的东西可以是物体性的,可是他提出来的倒是与此相反的东西,而没有加以证明。”这是不对的,我没有提出相反的东西,我也绝对没有把它当作根据,我不过是完全未置可否,一直把它留到第六个沉思才对它加以证明。
后来,他说得很好:“没有主体,我们就不能领会其任何行为,就仿佛没有一个在思维的东西,就不能进行思维一样,因为在思维的东西不是无。”不过他接着说,“从这里似乎应该得出这样一个结论,即一个在思维的东西是某种物体性的东西”,这就毫无道理,不合逻辑,甚至跟通常说话的方式相反了。因为一切行为的主体当然是指实体说的(或者,如果他愿意的话,是指物质,即抽象的物质);不过不能因此就说它们是物体。
反驳
而且,当笛卡尔说上帝的观念和灵魂的观念是与生俱来的,我想知道那些正在熟睡而没有做梦的人是否在思考。如果他们没有,那么他们在那个时候则没有观念。因此,没有任何观念是与生俱来的,而任何与生俱来的都是当下存在的。
答辩
当我们说有些观念是与生俱来的,这并不意味着这种观念时时伴随着我们,依照那样的说法,没有任何观念是与生俱来的了。我们这里仅指我们自身有产生观点的能力。
第四组反驳
(a)假如有人知道半圆上的圆周角是直角,从而用这个角和圆的直径做成的三角形是直角三角形,可是,他怀疑并且还不确定,并且由于一些诡辩误导了他的思维,他会否认由直角三角形的斜边做成的正方形等于由两条直角边做成的两个正方形之和,按照笛卡尔先生的意见,他好像应该坚持他的错误见解。因为他会说,我清楚、分明地领会这个三角形是直角三角形,但是我怀疑由它的斜边做成的正方形等于由它的两条直角边做成的两个正方形之和:因此,由直角三角形的斜边做成的正方形等于由两个直角边做成的两个正方形之和是不属于这个三角的本质的。
以后,虽然我否认由它的斜边做成正方形等于由两个直角边做成的两个正方形之和,不过我确实知道它是直角的,而且这个三角形的一个角是直角这件事在我的心中一直是清清楚楚的,就是上帝自己都不能使它不是直角三角形。
从而,我所怀疑的,我甚至可以否认的,一直存在于我心中的这个观念并不属于它的本质。
此外,由于我知道凡是我清楚、分明地领会的东西,都能像我领会的那样由上帝产生,所以只要我能够清楚、分明地领会一个东西而用不着一个别的东西,就足以确定这一个东西和那一个东西有分别,因为上帝可以把它们分开。可是我清楚、分明地领会这个三角形是直角三角形,用不着我知道由它的斜边做成的正方形等于由它的两直角边做成的两个正方形之和;因此,有可能是由三角形的斜边做成的正方形不等于由它的两直角边做成的两个正方形之和,至少是上帝可以使它这样。
我看不出在这里能够回答什么,除非这个回答的人不是清楚、分明地领会直角三角形的性质。可是我怎么知道我认识我的精神的性质比他认识这个三角形的性质认识得更好呢?因为,他之确知半圆的圆周三角形有一个直角(这是直角三角形的概念),和我之确知我思维所以我存在是同样的。
所以,跟那个认为这个三角形的斜边上做成的正方形等于两直角边上做成的两个正方形之和并不是这个三角形(他所清楚、分明认识的直角三角形)的本质这件事上弄错的人完全一样,也许我也在我认为除了我是一个在思维着的东西以外,没有什么别的东西是属于我的本性(我清楚、分明地知道我是一个在思维着的东西)这件事上弄错,因为也许我是一个有广延的东西这件事也是属于我的本质的吧?
(b)我只剩下一个疑虑了,那就是,对于他所说的话,只有由于上帝存在,我们才肯定我们所清楚明白地领会的东西是真的,他怎么辩护才能免于陷入循环论证。因为,我们之所以肯定上帝存在,只因为我们对这件事领会得非常清楚、非常明白,因此,在我们肯定上帝存在之前,我们必须先肯定凡是我们领会得清楚、分明的东西都是真的。
有一件事情我之前想不起来了,现在把它提出来,那就是,就他是一个在思维的东西而言,不管什么东西,如果他对这个东西没有认识,就不能存在于他的内心。这个命题我认为是错误的,而笛卡尔先生认为是非常正确的。因为在他的内心,就其是一个在思维的东西而言这句话,在他的内心里面的“他”,就精神之有别于肉体而言,除了指他的精神,不指别的东西。但是,有谁看不出来,在精神里能够有很多东西,而精神本身对这些东西毫无认识?举例来说:一个在母亲肚子里的小孩子的精神当然有思维的能力或功能,可是他对它没有认识。类似这样的东西还有很多,我就不讲了。
对第四组反驳的答辩
(a)虽然如此,我们这位博学的朋友强调说:虽然我可以对我自己不用物体的概念而取得什么概念,可是不能由此得出结论说这个概念是完全的、全部的,从而我可以确知当我从我的本质排除物体时,我没有弄错。他用内接于半圆的三角形的例子来说明我们能够很清楚、分明地领会这是直角三角形,虽然我们不知道或者甚至否认在它的斜边上的正方形等于两个直角边上的正方形。虽然如此,我们不能由之而得出我们能够作出一个直角三角形而其斜边上的正方形不等于两个直角边上的正方形之和。
不过,就这个例子来说,它在许多方面跟所提出的东西不同;因为,第一,虽然也许对于一个三角形,我们可以把它理解为一个实体,这个实体的形状是三角的,可是有着斜边上的正方形等于两个直角边上的正方形之和这个特点肯定不是一个实体,从而这两个东西的任何一个都不能被理解为完全的东西。精神和肉体也是这样。甚至这个特点也不能称之为东西,按照我说过这足以使我能够领会一个东西(指一个完全的东西)而用不着领会另外一个东西等等的意思,下面的话是非常容易理解的:再说,我在里边找到一些功能,等等。因为,我并没有说这些功能是东西,不过我特别想在东西(也就是说实体)与这些东西的方式(也就是说这些实体的功能)之间作出分别。
第二,虽然我们用不着知觉到它的斜边上的正方形等于两个直角边上的正方形之和,就能够清楚、明白地领会内接于半圆的三角形是直角三角形,可是我们不能这样清楚地领会一个三角形的斜边上的正方形等于两个直角边上的正方形之和,而用不着同时领会这个三角形是直角的;不过我们用不着肉体就清楚、分明地领会精神,反过来也一样,我们用不着精神就清楚、分明地领会肉体。
第三,虽然内接于半圆的三角形的概念或观念可以不包含斜边上的正方形等于两个直角边上的正方形之和,可是这个概念或观念不能是这样的,即我们不能领会能够在斜边上的正方形和两个直角边上的正方形之间,没有一个比例关系是属于这个三角形的。从而,当我们不知道这个比例关系是什么的时候,除了我们清楚地领会的那个比例关系不属于它以外,我们不能否认任何一个别的比例关系。不过,在它们两个之间的相等的比例关系上来理解这一点,这是绝对办不到的。但是,在肉体的概念里边不包含任何属于精神的东西;反过来,在精神的概念里边也不包含任何属于肉体的东西。
因此,虽然我说过只要我用不着一个别的东西就能够清楚、分明领会一个东西就足够了,等等,不能因此就作出这个小前提:可是我清楚、分明地领会到这个三角形是直角三角形,虽然我怀疑或者否认它的斜边上的正方形等于两直角边上的正方形之和,等等。因为第一,在斜边上的正方形和两直角边上的正方形之间相等的比例关系并不是一个完全的东西;第二,这个相等的比例关系只有在一个直角三角形中我们才能清清楚楚地理解到。第三,如果我们否认在一个三角形的斜边上的正方形和它的两直角边上的正方形之间的比例关系,我们就不能清清楚楚地领会这个三角形。
(b)最后,我已经在我对第二组反驳的答辩中……清楚地指出,当我说我们确知我们非常清楚、非常明白地领会的东西之所以都是真的是因为上帝存在,而我们确知上帝存在是因为我们对上帝存在领会得非常清楚、非常分明。我这样说并没有陷入循环论证中,我是把我们事实上领会得非常清楚的东西同我们记得以前曾领会得非常清楚的东西区别开来。之所以这样是因为,首先我们确信上帝的存在,因为我们注意到那些证明上帝存在的理由;不过在这以后,还需要我们记得曾经把一个东西领会得清清楚楚以便确知它是真的,如果我们不知道上帝存在,不知道他不可能是骗子,这就不行。
关于是否任何东西都不能存在于我们的精神里(就精神只是一个在思维的东西而言),假如精神本身对那个东西没有实现认识的话,这个问题,我认为非常容易解决,因为当我们这样认为它的时候,我们看得很清楚,就精神只是一个在思维着的东西而言,除了思维或者完全取决于思维的东西之外,没有什么东西存在于它里边,否则就不属于精神;而在我们心中不可能有任何思维(在它存在于我们心中的同时)是我们对之没有一种现实认识的。因此我不怀疑精神渗入到一个小孩子的身体里就开始思维,从这时起他就知道他思维,虽然他以后不记得他思维什么,因为他所思维的东西没有刻印在他的记忆里。
不过需要注意的是,我们对于我们的精神的行为或活动有一种现实的认识而并不总是对于它的功能才有现实的认识,除非是潜在的。因此,当我们打算使用什么功能的时候,如果这个功能是在我们的精神里,我们立刻就得到关于它的现实认识。就是因为这个缘故,如果我们不能得到关于它的这种现实认识,我们就可以确定无疑地否认它在那里。
第五组反驳
(a)每当你说出或在心里想到“有我,我存在”这个命题时,它就必然是真的。不过我看不出你为什么需要费那么多的事,既然你已经确实知道你存在,既然你能够从你别的什么行动上得出同样的结论,既然自然的光明明显地告诉我们,凡是起作用的东西,都有,或都存在。
(b)你接着又说如果事物的一部分有可能出现错误会比所有的部分都一样不出现错误更完满,这就好比说,一个国家,如果一部分公民作恶多端反而比所有的公民都是遵纪守法的公民要完美。这样一来就可以得出,既然统治者希望他的臣民都是遵纪守法的公民,那么宇宙的创造者在创造世间万物的各个部分时会让他们免于犯错误,并且也应该这样做。尽管你可以说与容易犯错误的部分相比,那些不会犯错误的东西才显得更为完美,这是很偶然的事情。同样地,与邪恶之人相比善良之人的品格在某些程度上大放光彩,这也是偶然才大放光彩的。这样,要是有些公民作恶才能显示出另外一部分公民的良好品德,这显然是不合适的。如果为了显示部分不会犯错的更完满而把另一部分创造得容易出现错误,这显然是不应该的。
如果上帝是为你在这个世界中选择一个特定的角色,而这个角色既不是最完美的也不是最重要的,你说你没有权利去抱怨这件事。但是,这样的回答却不能帮助我们解答这个问题,也就是说,比起一个不完满的角色,上帝为什么不在各种完满的角色中为你挑选一个级别比较低的呢?如果一个统治者并没有委任所有的公民以高位,相反地却把一部分人安排在中层,一部分人安排在基层,这没有什么不对的。如果一个统治者不仅仅把一些人安排在最基层位置,还把一些人安排在违法作乱的位置上,那么这个统治者就会遭到人们的诟病了。
(c)然后,对于你对你自己的观念,在我主要关于第二个沉思上已经说过了,我没有更多的话说。因为,在那上面,大家看得很清楚,你绝不是对你自己有一个清楚、分明的概念;相反,似乎你对你自己根本没有概念。因为虽然你肯定知道你在思维,可是你并不知道在思维的你是什么东西,因而尽管你清清楚楚地知道了这一个活动,但主要的你还不知道,即你还不知道这个实体是什么,而思维只是这个实体的许多活动之一。从而我觉得我很可以用一个瞎子来比喻。瞎子感觉到热,听人说热是来自太阳的,因而会以为对于太阳有一个清楚明白的观念;这样,假如有人问他太阳是什么,他就会回答说这是一个发热的东西。
但是你将会说,我在这里并不是只说我是一个在思维的东西,我还说我是一个没有广延的东西。不过,先不要说这是一件你并没有证明的事,虽然这在我们之间还是问题;我请你告诉我,你由此对你自己就有一个清楚、分明的概念吗?你说你不是一个有广延的东西;当然我由此就知道了你不是什么,但不知道你是什么。为了对于某一个东西有一个清楚、分明的概念,也就是说,有一个真实、自然的概念,难道不是必须正面地认识那个东西本身是什么,也就是,姑且这样说,肯定地认识那个东西吗?光知道它不是什么就够了吗?谁要是仅仅知道布塞法勒不是一个苍蝇,他对于布塞法勒就算有一个清楚、分明的概念吗?
然而,为了不在这上面有什么更多的纠缠,我只请问你:你说你是一个没有广延的东西,那么你不是渗透到全身去吗?当然我不知道你要怎么回答,因为虽然在一开始我认为你仅仅是在大脑里,这不过是仅仅由于猜测,而不是真正相信这是你的意见。我的猜测是根据你不久以后所说的那句话。你说:灵魂并不直接接受肉体一切部分的感染,而仅仅接受大脑的感染,或者也许大脑最小的那些部分之中的一个部分的感染。不过这并不能使我完全肯定你究竟是在大脑里,还是在大脑的一部分里,因为你可以是散布在全身里而只能在一部分里感觉到,正好像我们平常所说的:灵魂散布在全身,然而它只能通过眼睛去看。
(d)关于你必须发送到全身来传达感觉和运动的那些精气,我认为也是那样,且不说不可能理解你怎么把运动印到那些精气上,假如你是在一个点里,假如你不是一个物体,或者假如你没有一个物体用来整个地接触和推动它们的话。因为,假如你说它们是自动的,而你只是指引它们的运动,你要记得你在某一个地方曾说过物体不能自动,因此我们可以推论你是它运动的原因。然后请你给我们解释,没有某种专注,没有从你这方面的某种驱动,这种指引怎么进行?没有能动和被动的相互关联,怎么能够对一个东西或其驱动有压力呢?既然自然的光明告诉我们只有物体才能触动和被触动,那么没有物体怎么能有这个触动呢?
对第五组反驳的答辩
(a)当你说我从我的任何一个行动中都本来可以毫无差异地得出同一的结论时,你完全弄错了,因为这些行动中没有一个是我完全清楚的,我是指这种抽象的可靠性,除了思维以外,在这里,问题只在于这种抽象的可靠性。因为,举例来说,我散步,所以我存在,这个结论是不正确的,除非我具有的、作为内部认识的是一个思维,只有关于思维,这个结论才是可靠的,关于身体的运动就不行,它有时是假的,就像在我们的梦中出现的那样,虽然那时我们好像是在散步,这样从我想我是在散步这件事我就可以推论出我的精神(是它有这种思想)的存在,而不能推论出我的身体(是它在散步)的存在。其他一切也都是这样。
(b)你在这里到处不恰当地把好犯错误当成正面的不完满性,而这不过是(主要是有关上帝的)对存在于造物之中的更大的完满性的否定。把一个国家的公民们拿来同宇宙的各部分作比较也套不上;因为一些公民们的不好,对于国家来说,是一件肯定的事;可是人是好犯错误的,也就是说,人并不具有一切种类的完满性,这跟宇宙是好的,不能同日而语。不过,拿下面这样两种人来作比较更好一些:有人希望人的身体满都是眼睛以便他表现得更美一些(由于对他来说没有比眼睛更美的部分),另一个人认为在世界上不应该有不犯错误的创造物,也就是说,不应该有完满无缺的创造物。
(c)你所说的关于太阳的观念,一个天生的瞎子是单独用他对于热的认识做成的,这是不难反驳的;因为这个瞎子对太阳虽然没有想一个明亮的、发光的东西那样的观念,可是他总还有一个发热的东西的清楚、明白的观念吧。你把我拿来同这个瞎子相比,这是毫无道理的。首先因为对一个在思维的东西的认识比对一个发热的东西的认识要延伸到远得多的范围,它甚至比我们对于任何别的东西所有的认识更广阔,就像我在别处已经指出过的那样;其次也因为没有人能证明这个瞎子对太阳所作成的观念并不包含人们对太阳所能认识的一切东西,只不过是那个有视觉器官的人除此而外还认识它的形状和它的光。可是对你来说,关于精神,你不但不比我认识得更多,而且你并没有看到我在那里所看到的全部东西。因此不如说是你,是你像一个瞎子,而从你那方面来说,我最多只能被称为近视眼或者目光短浅的人,和其他的人一样。
(d)即使思想与整个肉体融为一体,思想也无需随着肉体的伸展而伸展,因为思想不是肉体伸展的必须因素,而却是思想的必须因素。因此,即使思想能够移动肉体,却不是构成肉体的必须要素。
第六组反驳
(a)第六个问题来自判断的无所谓或者自由。按照你的学说,它远不是使自由意志更高贵,更完满,而是相反,你是把它的不完满放在无所谓里,因此,什么时候只要理智清楚、分明地认识必须相信的、必须做的,或必须不做的事物,意志就绝不是无所谓的。因为,难道你没有看见当上帝创造这个世界而不创造别的世界,或者当他什么世界都不创造时,你用这些原则完全破坏了上帝的自由,从上帝的自由上你去掉了无所谓吗?虽然这是由于信仰让我们相信上帝曾经在创造一个世界或者很多世界或者甚至连一个世界也不创造上,他是完全永恒地无所谓的。有谁能怀疑上帝对一切事情什么应该做,什么不应该做不是永远看得非常清楚?因此,不能说对事物的非常明白的认识和对这些事物的清楚的知觉,排除了自由意志的无所谓,这种无所谓,如果它对于人的自由不符合,对上帝的自由就绝不符合,因为事物的本质,就连数目的本质也一样,是不可分的、常住不变的;从而无所谓包含在上帝的自由意志的自由里并不比包含在人的自由意志的自由里少。
(b)第七个问题是面。你说一切感觉都发生在面上或者通过面而发生。因为我们看不出来为什么它不可以是被知觉到的物体的一部分,或者是空气的一部分,或者是水汽的一部分,甚至是这些东西任何的外表;我们还不很理解你怎么可以说没有实在的偶性(不管它们是属于什么物体或实体的)能够被上帝的全能从它们的主体分开并且没有主体而存在,而在祭台上的圣体中这样的事确确实实地存在。虽然如此,我们的博士们在看见是否在你向我们答应的那本《物理学》里你将充分证明所有这些东西之前,是没有理由感到烦恼的;不错,他们很难相信那本《物理学》能够把这些东西给我们提出得如此明白以致我们应该接受它们而抛弃掉古人教导我们的东西。
(c)你给第五组作的答辩引起第八个问题。真的,几何学的真理或者抽象的真理,就像你在那个地方所提到的那样,怎么能够是常住不变的、永恒的,而同时却是取决于上帝的呢?因为,它们是在什么种类的原因上取决于上帝的呢?他怎么能够把三角形的性质消灭掉?或者他怎么能使二乘四等于八从来就不是真的,或者一个三角形没有三个角?从而,这些真理或者只取决于理智,当理智在思维的时候;或者取决于事物本身的存在性;或者是独立的。因为,上帝能使这些本质或真理之中的任何一个从来就不存在,这似乎是不可能的。
(d)第九个问题是,你说不应该信任感官,理智的可靠性比感官的可靠性大得多,因此我们认为这个问题是非常重要的。因为,如果理智本身只有从安排得很合适的感官搬过来的可靠性而没有别的可靠性,这怎么能够做到呢?事实上,难道我们看不见,如果首先不是一个别的感官把它从错误中挽救出来,它就不能改正我们的任何一个感官的错误吗?举例来说,一根棍子插在水里,由于折光作用而表现为折断了,谁来改正这个错误?是理智吗?绝不是,而是触觉。其他的感官也一样。从而,如果一旦你的一切感官都安排得很合适,而且它们总是给我们报告同样的东西,你就把用感官的办法获得的、一个人所自然地做得到的最大的可靠性认为是可靠的吧;如果过于信任你的精神的推理,你肯定会经常弄错;因为时常发现我们的理智在它认为毫无可疑之处的一些东西上骗了我们。
(e)以上这些就是我们的主要问题。对这几个问题,也请你加上什么可靠的规则和一些肯定有效的标记,以便我们按照它们得以靠得住地认识到,在我们领会一件事物到这样的程度,即完全用不着别的东西,真的是一个东西完全与另外一个东西不同,以致它们能够分开存在,至少由于上帝的全能能够把它们分开,也就是说,一句话,请你告诉我们,我们怎么才能清楚、分明、真切地认识我们的理智所形成的这个区别不是建立在我们的精神之上,而是建立于事物本身。因为,当我想到上帝的广大无垠而不想到他的正义时,或者当我们想到他的存在性而不想到圣子或圣灵时,也就是说,离开三位一体的其他两位,我们就不能完整地领会这个存在性,或者上帝本身存在吗?而这个存在性是一个不信教的人可以有和你否认物体有精神或思维同样多的理由否认它的神圣性的。这和有人错误地得出结论说,圣子和圣灵在本质上是和圣父有分别的,或者他们可以和他分开一样,人们永远不会向你让步,认为思维,或者不如说人类精神,是实在与物体有分别的,尽管你清楚地领会这一个而用不着另一个,尽管你承认一个而否认另一个甚至你可以承认用你的精神的任何一个抽象作用能够这样做。但是,当然,如果你能充分地解答所有这些问题,你就可以肯定再没有什么东西能够使我们的神学家们不安了。
最后,既然你不认识肉体的能力和运动能够达到什么地方,因为你自己承认没有人能知道,除非是由于上帝的特别启示,上帝都是给一个主体里放进了或能放进什么,那么你从哪里能够知道上帝没有把这种能力和特性如思维、怀疑等等放进什么物体里呢?
对第六组反驳的答辩
(a)至于意志的自由,毫无疑问,上帝的自由和人的自由大不相同;因为如果说上帝的意志对已有的或者将要有的一切东西亘古以来就不是无所谓的,这是说不通的,因为我们想象不出有任何代表善或真的观念,什么应该相信的观念,或者什么应该做或者不应该做的观念在上帝的意志规定他自己这样做之前就存在于他的理智之中。而且我在这里并不是谈一种时间上的在先,而更重要的,我是说这样的一种观念不可能由于一种次序的在先或者性质的在先,或者像经院哲学中所说的那样,经过推理的道理在先,而在上帝的意志规定之先存在,以便善的观念迫使上帝不得不选择这一个而不选择另外一个。举例来说,上帝愿意把世界创造在时间里,并不是因为他看到世界被创造在时间里比创造在永恒里好,他愿意让一个三角形的三角之和等于二直角也并不是因为他认识到这只能是这样,等等。而是,相反,就是因为他愿意把世界创造在时间里,所以它比创造在永恒里好;同样,就是因为他愿意一个三角形的三角之和必然等于二直角,所以它现在就是这样,并且不可能不是这样;其他一切事情也都是如此。而且这并不妨碍人们说圣人们的功绩是他们得到永恒的天福的原因,因为圣人们的功绩并不是他们规定上帝愿意做什么的原因,它们不过是上帝永恒地愿意它们成为一个结果的原因。这样,在上帝那里的一种完全无所谓是他的全能的一个非常大的证明。然而在人这里可不是这样,由于人已经找到了上帝所建立和规定的善意和真理的性质,而且人的意志只能自然地趋向于好的东西,那么显然,人越是明显地认识好和真,就越能自由地接受好和真,只有在人不知道什么是更好的或者更真的,或者至少当他看得不够清楚,不能不怀疑的时候,他才抱无所谓的态度;这样一来,合适于人的自由的无所谓就跟合适于上帝的自由的无所谓完全不一样。而且说事物的本质是不可分的,这也毫无用处,因为首先,没有什么本质同样地既合适于上帝又合适于创造物;最后,无所谓并不属于人的自由的本质,因为,不仅仅是当我们对于善和真的无知使我们抱无所谓的态度时我们是自由的,而且主要也是当我们对一件事物的清楚、分明的认识推动和迫使我们去追求时我们是自由的。
(b)为了全面驳斥那些承认实在的偶性的人的意见,我认为我所提出的那些理由就够了,用不着再提别的理由。因为,首先,没有接触就没有感觉,除了物体的面没有什么能被感觉。然而,假如有实在的偶性,那么这些偶性一定是和这个仅仅作为一个样态的面不是一回事;因此,假如有实在的偶性,这些偶性也不能被我们感觉。但是,谁曾相信过它们之存在仅在于他认为它们被他感觉到?
其次,如果说实在的偶性是存在的,因为凡是实在的东西都能同任何别的主体分开存在,那是一件说不通的事,完全没有可能。能够分开存在的是实体,而不是偶性。光说实在的偶性不能由自然的力量而只能由上帝的全能同它们的主体分开,这是毫无用处的;因为由自然的力量做成和由上帝平常的能力做成完全是一回事,而上帝平常的能力和上帝特别的能力没有什么不同,这种能力,由于不在事物里面加上任何东西,因此不改变事物的性质,所以,如果凡是可以由自然的力量没有主体而存在是一个实体的话,那么凡是由于上帝的能力(无论它有多么特别)没有主体而存在的东西,也必须用实体这个名称来称呼。老实说,我承认一个实体可以是另外一个实体的偶性;不过在发生这样的事的时候,采取一个偶性的形式的并不是实体,而是样态或方式。举例来说,当一件衣服穿到一个人身上的时候,成为偶性的不是衣服,而是被穿。对于促使哲学家们建立一些实在的偶性的主要理由是,他们认为没有实在的偶性,我们就不能解释我们感官的知觉是怎么做成的,因此我答应在写《物理学》的时候细致地解释我们的每一个感官被它的对象所触动的方式。这并不是我想要在这上面或者在任何别的东西上面让人们相信我的话,而是因为我相信我在我的《折光学》里所解释的视觉能够用作对于其余感官的足够证明。
因为,如果好的理由或现象是先在于他事先安排的,那么他一定规定他去做更好的。但是,恰恰相反,因为他规定他自己去做出世界上的东西是因为这个理由,就像在《创世记》里所说的那样,它们是非常好的,也就是说,它们的好,其理由取决于他愿意把它们做成这样。而且用不着问这个好以及其他一切真理,无论是数学的或形而上学的,在什么种类的原因上取决于上帝;因为,原因的种类既然是由那些也许没想到因果关系这个理由的人建立的,因而当他们没有给它起什么名称时,就没有什么可奇怪的了。虽然如此,他们还是给它起了一个名称,因为他可以被叫作动力因;和君主的意志可以说成是法律的动力因一样,虽然法律本身并不是一个自然的存在体,而仅仅是(就像他们在经院里说的那样)一个精神上的存在体。问上帝怎么能一直使二乘四等于八,等等,也同样没有用,因为我承认我们无法知道;不过另一方面,我知道得很清楚,不取决于上帝,什么都不能存在,不管是哪一种存在体,以及把某些东西安排得使人们不可能知道它们可以是另外一个样子而不是现在这个样子,这对他来说是非常容易的,如果由于我们不知道并且我们看不出我们应该知道的什么别的东西,而怀疑我们知道得很清楚的一些东西,这是完全违反理性的。因此,不要以为永恒的真理取决于人的理智或者事物的存在,而是仅仅取决于上帝的意志;上帝,作为一个至上的立法者,永恒地安排了并且建立了这些真理。
(d)要明白感官的可靠性是什么,就要把感官分为三个阶段。在第一个阶段里应该考虑的只是外在对象直接在物体性的感官之内所引起的东西;这只能是这个官能的分子的运动以及由这个运动产生的形状和地位的改变。第二个阶段包含直接在精神上产生的一切东西,这是由于精神与物体性的官能结合所产生的,而物体性的官能是受它的对象所推动和感染的,就像疼痛、痒、饿、渴、颜色、声音、滋味、气味、热、冷以及其他类似的感觉,就像我们在第六个沉思里所说的那样,它们来自精神和肉体的结合,或者(姑且这样说)混合。最后,第三个阶段包含我们的全部判断,这些判断是我们从年轻时代起关于我们周围的事物在我们的感官里产生的印象或运动的机会上所习惯于作出的。
举例来说,当我们看见一根棍子时,不要想象是从棍子上飞到空中的一些飞舞的、人们普遍称为“有意种类”的细小的图像进到我的眼睛里;这不过是从这根棍子反射出来的光线刺激出来视神经里的什么运动,通过它达到了大脑,(就像我已经大量地在《折光学》里讲到的那样)我们和兽类共同的是大脑的这种运动,这种运动是感觉的第一阶段做成的。由第一阶段接着就进入第二个阶段,它只达到被这根棍子所反射的颜色和光的知觉。并且它是这样产生的:精神跟大脑连接得十分紧密,以致它甚至感觉到并且好像被在它里边的运动所触动似的;这就是必须归之于感官的全部东西,如果我们想要把感官准确地同理智分开的话。因为,虽然从我感到其印象的这种颜色的感觉上我判断在我之外的这根棍子是有颜色的,而从这个颜色的广延、从它的终止点以及从它的地位与我大脑的各部分的关系上,我决定有关这个棍子的大小、形状和距离的什么东西,尽管人们习惯于把它归之于感官,而在这方面我把它归之于感觉的第三个阶段,可是显然它是只取决于理智的;我甚至在《折光学》里指出:大小、距离和形状只有经过推理才能知觉,推理把它们彼此分开。但是在这里只有这一个不同,即对于出现在我们的感官的一切东西所作的新的、不是习惯作出的一些判断,我们把它们归之于理智,同时,对于我们从幼年起关于可感觉的东西,在这些东西在我们的感官上所产生的印象的机会上习惯于作出的那些判断,我们把它们归之于感官;其理由是:习惯使我们推理和把那些东西判断得非常仓促(或者不如说使我们记起我们以前作过的一些判断),我们区分不出这种方式的判断和我们感官的单纯的感知或知觉来。
由此,显然是,当我们说理智的可靠性比感官的可靠性大时,我们的话只意味着由于我们所做的一些新的观察,我们的年纪越大,我们作的判断就比自从我们幼年以来没有经过反复思考而作的判断可靠;这是丝毫不能怀疑的,因为,确实是,这里不是第一阶段的感觉,也不是第二阶段的感觉,因为在这两个阶段里不可能有错误,因此,当人们说,一根棍子插在水里,由于折光作用而表现为折断了时,这就跟人们说一个小孩子判断它是折断了以同样方式显现给我们;这也和按照自从我们幼年以来所习惯的成见一样,我们也这样判断。但是,我不能同意他们接下来的话,即:这个错误不是由理智来改正,而是由触觉来改正;因为,虽然触觉使我判断为一根棍子是直的,而且自从我们幼年以来就习惯于这样判断,因此这也可以叫作感觉,可是这并不足以改正视觉的错误,而是除此之外,需要有什么理由来告诉我们在这个地方相信我们在摸了它以后作的判断,而不相信视觉似乎给我带来的判断,这个理由不是我们自从幼年以来就有的,因而不能归之于感官,只能单独归之于理智。从而,就是在这个例子里,改正感官的错误的只有理智,没有可能提出任何一个例子来说明错误是来自相信精神的活动而不相信感官的知觉。
(e)实际上,我从来没有看见过,也没有了解过人的肉体能思维,而是看到并且了解到同一的人们,他们既有思维,同时也有肉体。而且我认识到这是由于思维的实体和物体性的实体组合到一起而造成的,因为,单独考虑思维的实体时,我一点都没有看到它能够属于物体,而在物体的本性里,当我单独考虑它时,我一点没有找到什么东西是能够属于思维的。但是,相反,把各种样态都拿来检查一下,不管是物体的还是精神的,我看不出有一个样态,它的概念不是完全依附于事物的概念本身,而这个概念就是事物的样态。同样,从我们经常看见两个东西结合在一起这件事,我们不能因此就推论说它们是一个东西;但是,从我们有时看见两个东西之一而没有另一个东西的时候,我们就很可以结论说两个东西是不同的。不要让上帝的能力阻止我们得出这个结论;因为,认为我们清楚、分明地领会为两个东西的一些东西是由一个在本质上同一的东西做成的而绝不是组成的,这和认为可以把一点分别都没有的东西分开,同样是说不通的。从而,如果说上帝把思维的功能放到某些物体里(就像他事实上把它放在人的肉体里那样),他什么时候愿意,什么时候就可以把它们分开,这样一来,思维实际上不能不是与这些物体有分别的。
Preface to the Reader
I have already briefly discussed questions about God and the human mind in the Discourse on the Method for Guiding One's Reason and Searching for Truth in the Sciences ,published in French in 1637.I did not intend to discuss them in detail in that book,but simply to provide an introduction and to learn from readers' reactions how they should be presented subsequently.I thought that these questions were so important that they should be discussed more than once,and that the way in which I explain them is so novel and so different from what is usually done that it was unhelpful to teach it in greater detail in a book written in French and available to be read by everyone,lest minds even less gifted than mine might believe that they should follow the same path.
Although I asked in the Discourse that anyone who found anything objectionable in my writings should kindly bring it to my notice,only two objections worth mentioning were raised concerning these questions,to which I will now reply briefly before undertaking a more detailed explanation.
The first objection is:from the fact that the human mind reflecting on itself does not perceive itself as anything other than a thinking thing,it does not follow that its nature or essence consists merely in the fact that it is a thinking thing,where the word‘merely’excludeseverything else that might also be said to belong to the nature of the soul.I reply to this objection that,in that context,Ididnotwishtoexcludeotherthingswithrespect to the truth of the question(which I was not discussing at that stage)but merely with respect to my own perception.Thus what I meant was:I did not discover anything clearly that I knew belonged to my essence except that I was a thinking thing or a thing that possesses in itself a thinking faculty.I will show below how,from the fact that I do not know anything else that belongs to my essence,it follows that nothing else does in fact belong to it.
The other objection is:from the fact that I have within me an idea of something which is more perfect than me,it does not follow that the idea itself is more perfect than me and,much less,that the reality which the idea represents exists.I reply that the word‘idea’is equivocal here.It can be understood either materially,as an operation of the intellect and,in this sense,it cannot be said to be more perfect than me.Or it can be understood intentionally,as the thing represented by the idea and,even if this thing is not assumed to exist outside the mind,it may be more perfect than me with respect to its essence.But how,from the fact that I have an idea of something which is more perfect than me,it follows that this thing really exists,will be explained in detail below.
Apart from those two objections,I also saw two fairly long pieces that challenged my conclusions rather than my reasoning on these questions,by means of arguments borrowed from standard atheists'sources.Since such arguments cannot have any influence on those who understand my reasons,and since many people's judgements are so perverse and foolish that they are more convinced by the first views they hear,no matter how false and unreasonable they are,than by a true and sound refutation which they hear later,I do not wish to reply to these objections here lest I be the first to report them.I will say simply,in general terms,that all the things commonly invoked by atheists to challenge the existence of God always depend either on falsely attributing human affections to God,or on arrogating so much power and wisdom to our minds that we try to determine and comprehend what God can and should do.Therefore,as long as we remember that our minds should be considered finite but that God is in finite and incomprehensible,they will not pose any difficulty for us.
Now that I have finished examining the judgements of others,I return to the same questions of God and the human mind and to the beginnings of the whole of First Philosophy,but without waiting for popular approval or a wide readership.Indeed,I would not encourage anyone to read these pages unless they are willing and able to meditate with me seriously and to detach their minds from the senses and simultaneously from all prejudices,and I know that there are few such readers.As for those who do not bother to understand the order and interconnection of my arguments but try to snipe at individual sentences,as they usually do,they will derive little benefit from reading this book.They may find an opportunity to cavil in many places,but they will not easily raise any objection that is signi ficant or deserves a response.
However,I do not even promise to satisfy the remaining readers on all questions on their first reading,and Iam not so arrogant as to believe that I can anticipate everything with which readers may find some difficulty.For that reason I initially expound,in the Meditations ,precisely those thoughts by which I think I have reached a certain and evident knowledge of the truth in order to test if I might be able to convince others by the very same reasons that convinced me.After that,I will reply to the objections of some eminently intelligent and learned people to whom these Meditations were sent for comments before they were printed.Their objections were so numerous and varied that I dare hope that no objection–at least no signi ficant objection–will easily occur to anyone else which they have not already raised.Therefore I repeat that readers should not pass judgement on the Meditations until they have taken the trouble to read through these objections and my replies.
Summary of the Following Six Meditations
The First Meditation introduces reasons why we can have doubts about everything,especially about material things,as long as we have no other foundations for the sciences apart from those that we have had to date.Although the usefulness of such an extensive doubt may not be apparent initially,it is extremely useful because it frees us from all prejudices,provides the easiest way to detach the mind from the senses and eventually makes us such that we cannot subject to further doubt the things that we later discover to be true.
In the Second Meditation the mind,by exercising its own freedom,assumes that nothing exists if its existence can be even slightly doubted,and realizes that it is impossible that it does not exist itself during that time.This is extremely bene ficial because it thereby distinguishes what belongs only to itself,that is to an intellectual nature,and what belongs to the body.
But since some readers may expect to find arguments about the immortality of the soul in this section,I should warn them immediately that I tried to write nothing that I was unable to demonstrate rigorously.Therefore I could not follow any method apart from that used by geometers,which is to write down first everything on which some proposition that is sought depends before deriving any conclusion from it.Now,the first and principalprerequisite for knowing the soul's immortality is that we form as clear a concept of the soul as possible,and one which is clearly distinct from every concept of body.That is what has been done in this Meditation.Furthermore,we also need to know that all those things which we clearly and distinctly understand are true in the way in which we have understood them.It was impossible to prove this before the Fourth Meditation.One also needs a clear concept of bodily nature,which is partly in the Second Meditation itself and partly in the Fifth and Sixth Meditations.From these one ought to conclude that all those things which are conceived clearly and distinctly as distinctsubstances–andmindandbodyaresoconceived–are truly substances that are really distinct from each other,and I came to that conclusion in the Sixth Meditation.That is also con firmed in the same place by the fact that we can understand body only as divisible whereas,in contrast,we can understand the mind only as indivisible.Nor can we conceive of half a mind,as we can of even the smallest body.Thus their natures are recognized as being not only distinct but even in some sense opposites.
However,I have not discussed this question any further in this book,both because these considerations are enough to show that the annihilation of the mind does not follow from the corruption of the body and thus to provide mortals with hope for an afterlife,and because the premises from which one can conclude that the mind really is immortal presuppose an explanation of the whole of physics.First one needs to know that all substances–that is,things which,in order to exist,have to be createdby God–are without exception incorruptible by their nature,and they can never cease to exist unless they are reduced to nothingness by the same God if he stops maintaining their existence.Then we need to acknowledge that even body,considered in general,is a substance and therefore can never perish either.But the human body,insofar as it is distinct from other bodies,is constituted merely by a certain combination of parts and other variable features of the same sort;the human mind,however,is not composed of variable features in this way,but is a pure substance and even if all its variable features change so that it understands different things,wills different things,senses different things,and so on,the mind itself does not thereby become a different mind.The human body,however,does become a different body by the mere fact that the shape of some of its parts is changed.It follows that the body may indeed perish very easily but that the mind is by its own nature immortal.
In the Third Meditation I think I have explained in sufficient detail my principal argument for proving the existence of God.However,since,in order to detach my readers' minds as much as possible from the senses,I did not wish to use any comparisons drawn from bodily things,many obscurities may have remained but I hope they will later be resolved completely in the Replies to Objections.One example,among others,is this:how does the idea of a supremely perfect being which is found in us contain so much intentional reality that it is impossible for it not to result from a supremely perfect cause? This is illustrated,in the Replies,by analogy with a very perfect machine,the idea of which is in the mind of somedesigner.Just as the intentional arti fice of this idea must have some cause,namely the knowledge of the designer or of someone else from whom they got it,so likewise the idea of God that we have must have God himself as its cause.
In the Fourth Meditation,everything that we clearly and distinctly perceive is proved to be true,and I also explain at the same time what is the essence of falsehood.These must be known both in order to con firm earlier arguments and to understand what comes later.(Meantime one should note that there is no discussion there about sin,that is,a mistake made in pursuing good and evil,but merely of mistakes that occur in deciding truth and falsehood.Nor does it apply to anything related to religious belief or to human conduct,but only to theoretical truths,which are known by means of the natural light of reason.)
In the Fifth Meditation,apart from what is explained about bodily nature in general,there is a new argument to demonstrate God's existence.Here,too,there may be some difficulties,which are resolved later in the Replies to Objections.Finally,it is shown in what sense it is true that even the certainty of geometrical demonstrations depends on knowledge of God.
Lastly,in the Sixth Meditation,the intellect is distinguished from the imagination;the criteria for this distinction are explained;the mind is proved to be really distinct from the body,but it is shown to be so closely joined with it that together they form a single entity;all the errors that usually arise from the senses are reviewed;ways by which errors may be avoided are presented;and finally,all the reasons from which the existence of material things may be deduced are introduced.I do not think that these arguments are very useful on account of the fact that they prove what they establish–namely,that there really is a world,that human beings have bodies,and similar things–for no one of sound mind has ever seriously doubted these things.Rather,by considering these arguments,they are recognized as being less sound and clear than those by which we acquire knowledge of our own mind and of God.Thus the latter are the most certain and evident of all the arguments that can be known by human intelligence.My only objective in these Meditations was to prove that one thing.Therefore I will not review here the various other questions which also happen to be discussed as they arise in the Meditations.
Meditations on First Philosophy
in which God's existence and the distinction between the human soul and the body are demonstrated
First Meditation
Things which can be called into Doubt
Some years ago I noticed how many false things I had accepted as true in my childhood,and how doubtful were the things that I subsequently built on them and therefore that,once in a lifetime,everything should be completely overturned and I should begin again from the most basic foundations if I ever wished to establish anything firm and durable in the sciences.But that task seemed enormous,and I waited to reach such a mature age that no more appropriate age for learning would follow.Thus I waited so long that,from now on,I could be blamed if I wasted in further deliberation whatever time remains for me to begin the project.Therefore today I appropriately cleared my mind of all cares and arranged for myself some time free from interruption.I am alone and,at long last,I will devote myself seriously and freely to this general overturning of my beliefs.
To do this it is not necessary to show that they are allfalse–something I might never be able to accomplish!But since reason already convinces us that we should withhold assent just as carefully from whatever is not completely certain and indubitable as from what is clearly false,if I find some reason for doubt in each of my beliefs,that will be enough to reject all of them.However,they need not all be reviewed individually,for that would be an in finite task;as soon as foundations are undermined everything built on them collapses of its own accord,and therefore I will challenge directly all the first principles on which everything I formerly believed rests.
Everything that I accepted as being most true up to now I acquired from the senses or through the senses.However,I have occasionally found that they deceive me,and it is prudent never to trust those who have deceived us,even if only once.
But despite the fact that the senses occasionally deceive us about things that are very small or very far away,perhaps there are many other things about which one surely cannot have doubts,even if they are derived from the senses;for example,the fact that I am here,sitting by the fire,wearing a dressing gown,holding this page in my hand and other things like that.Indeed,how could I deny that these hands or that this body is mine,unless perhaps I think that I am like some of those mad people whose brains are so impaired by the strong vapour of black bile that they con fidently claim to be kings when they are paupers,that they are dressed up in purple when they are naked,that they have an earthenware head,or that they are a totally hollowedout shell or are made of glass.Butthose people are insane,and I would seem to be equally insane if I followed their example in any way.
Very well.But am I not a man who is used to sleeping at night and having all the same experiences while asleep or,sometimes,even more improbable experiences than insane people have while awake? How often does the nocturnal quietness convince me of familiar things,for example,that I am here,dressed in my gown,sitting by the fire,when I am really undressed and asleep in my bed? But at the moment I certainly see this sheet of paper with my eyes wide open,the head I shake is not asleep,I extend and feel this hand,carefully and knowingly;things which are as clear as this would not occur to someone who is asleep.As if I do not remember having been deluded by similar thoughts while asleep on other occasions!When I think about this more carefully,I see so clearly that I can never distinguish,by reliable signs,being awake from being asleep,that I am confused and this feeling of confusion almost con firms me in believing that I am asleep.
Let us assume therefore that we are asleep and that those things are not true–that I open my eyes,move my head,extend my hand–and that we do not even have such hands nor this whole body.But it must be admitted that the things we see while asleep are like certain familiar images,which can be painted only as copies of things which are real.Therefore at least these general things–eyes,head,hands,the whole body–exist as real things rather than as some kind of imaginary things.For clearly even painters,when they try to imagine the most unusual sirens or satyrs,cannot assign natures to them which arecompletely new;rather,they simply mix up the parts of different animals.Even if they happen to think up something so novel that nothing like it was ever seen before–so that it is therefore very clearly fictitious and false–nonetheless,at least the colours from which they paint it must surely be real.In a similar way even if these general things–the eyes,the head,the hands and so on–were imaginary,it must still be admitted that at least some other things are real,that they are even more simple and general and that it is from them,as if from true colours,that all those images of things in our thought,both true and false,are constructed.Physical nature in general and its extension seem to be of this kind;likewise,the shape of extended things;also quantity,or their size and number;similarly the place in which they exist,the time through which they last,and similar things.
Thus we might conclude reasonably from these considerations that physics,astronomy,medicine,and all other disciplines that involve an examination of composite things are indeed doubtful;but that arithmetic,geometry,and other such disciplines that discuss only very simple and general things,and are not concerned with whether or not they exist in nature,contain something that is certain and beyond doubt.For whether I am awake or asleep,two and three added together make five and a quadrilateral figure has no more than four sides.It seems impossible that one could ever suspect that such clear truths are false.
However,there is an ancient belief somehow fixed in my mind that God can do everything and that I was created by him with the kind of existence I enjoy.Buthow do I know that,although he created absolutely no earth,no sky,no extended things,no shape,no magnitude,no place,he still arranged that all these things would appear to exist,as they currently do? Besides,just as other people are sometimes mistaken about things that they think they know perfectly,is it not possible that God may have caused me to be mistaken in a similar way when I add two and three together,or think about the number of sides in a quadrilateral figure,or something even simpler if that can be imagined? But perhaps God did not allow me to be deceived like that,for he is said to be good in the highest degree;however,if it is inconsistent with God's goodness for him to create me in such a way that I am always mistaken,it would seem to be equally foreign to his goodness to allow me to be occasionally mistaken.But this last claim cannot be made.
There may be some people who would prefer to deny the existence of such a powerful God rather than believe that everything else is uncertain.But let us not contradict them and let us assume that everything said about God above is fictitious.Assume that I have arrived at my present condition by fate,by chance,by some uninterrupted series of events,or by any other means one wishes.Since to be deceived and mistaken seems to be some kind of imperfection,the less powerful the author they assign to my origin,the more likely it is that I was made in such a way that I am always mistaken.I have no reply to such arguments,but I am forced to concede eventually that there is nothing among my former beliefs that cannot be doubted and that this is so not as a result of levity or lack of reflection but for sound andconsidered reasons.Therefore,I should carefully withhold assent in future from those beliefs just as much as from others that are clearly false,if I wish to discover anything that is certain.
But it is not enough simply to know this;I must try to keep it in mind.For familiar beliefs return constantly and,almost in spite of me,they seize hold of my judgement as if it were bound to them by established custom and the law of familiarity.And I shall never overcome the habit of relaxing in them and believing them as long as I think they are as they are in fact,namely,in some way doubtful(as has been shown)and yet,despite that,very probable and such that it would be much more reasonable to believe them than to deny them.Therefore,I think I shall not act badly if,having turned my will around in exactly the opposite direction,I deceive myself and pretend for a while that these beliefs are completely false and imaginary until at length,as if I were balanced by an equal weight of prejudices on both sides,no bad habit would any longer turn my judgement from the correct perception of things.For I know that no danger or error will result from this in the mean time,and that I cannot exaggerate my cautiousness since I am concerned here not with doing things but merely with knowing them.
Therefore,I will suppose that,not God who is the source of truth but some evil mind,who is all powerful and cunning,has devoted all their energies to deceiving me.I will imagine that the sky,air,earth,colours,shapes,sounds and everything external to me are nothing more than the creatures of dreams by means of which an evil spirit entraps my credulity.I shall imagine myself as if Ihad no hands,no eyes,noflesh,no blood,no senses at all,but as if my beliefs in all these things were false.I will remain resolutely steady in this meditation and,in that way,if I cannot discover anything true,I will certainly do what is possible for me,namely,I will take great care not to assent to what is false,nor can that deceiver–no matter how powerful or cunning they may be–impose anything on me.But this is a tiring project and a kind of laziness brings me back to what is more habitual in my life.I am like a prisoner who happens to enjoy an imaginary freedom in his dreams and who subsequently begins to suspect that he is asleep and,afraid of being awakened,conspires silently with his agreeable illusions.Likewise,I spontaneously lapse into my earlier beliefs and am afraid of being awakened from them,in case my peaceful sleep is followed by a laborious awakening and I live in future,not in the light,but amid the inextricable darkness of the problems just discussed.
Second Meditation
The Nature of the Human Mind,and that it is better known than the Body
I was thrown into such serious difficulties in yesterday's Meditation that I can no longer forget them;however,I cannot see how they can be resolved either.In fact,I am so tossed about,as if I had fallen suddenly into a deep whirlpool,that I can neither put my foot on the bottom nor swim to the surface.However,I will work my wayup and test once more the same strategy on which I embarked yesterday,that is,setting aside everything which is subject to the least doubt as if I had found that it was completely false.I will follow this strategy until I discover something that is certain or,at least,until I discover that it is certain only that nothing is certain.Archimedes looked for only one firm and immovable point in order to move the whole earth;likewise,I could hope for great things if I found even the smallest thing that is certain and unmoved.
Thus I will assume that everything I see is false.I believe that,among the things that a deceptive memory represents,nothing ever existed;I have no senses at all;body,shape,extension,motion,and place are unreal.Perhaps that is all there is,that there is nothing certain.
How do I know that,apart from all the things I have just listed,there is not something else about which there is not even the least opportunity for doubting? Is there not some God,or whatever I might call him,who puts these very thoughts into me? Why should I think that,when I myself may perhaps be the author of those thoughts? Is it not true then,at the very least,that I myself am something? However,I have already denied that I have any senses or any body.I still cannot make any progress,for what follows from that? Am I so tied to a body and senses that I am incapable of existing without them? Nonetheless I convinced myself that there is nothing at all in the world,no sky,no earth,no minds,no bodies;is it not therefore also true that I do not exist? However,I certainly did exist,if I convinced myself of something.There is some unidenti fied deceiver,however,all powerful and cunning,who is dedicated to deceiving me constantly.Therefore,it is indubitable that I also exist,if he deceives me.And let him deceive me as much as he wishes,he will still never bring it about that I am nothing as long as I think I am something.Thus,having weighed up everything adequately,it must finally be stated that this proposition‘I am,I exist’is necessarily true whenever it is stated by me or conceived in my mind.
However,I do not yet understand sufficiently who this‘I’is who now necessarily exists.I must be careful in future that I do not perhaps carelessly substitute something else in place of me,thereby being mistaken in the very knowledge that I claim is the most certain and evident of all.I shall therefore meditate once again about what I formerly believed I was before I began to think along these lines,and from that concept I will subtract anything that can be weakened,however slightly,by these arguments,and thus eventually there will remain precisely only that which is certain and unshakeable.
Up to the present,then,what did I think I was? A human being,surely.But what is a human being? Will I not say:a rational animal? No,because then the following questions would arise:what is an animal? and what is rational? Thus I would lapse from one question into two more difficult questions,and I do not have so much free time that I wish to spend it on such subtleties.But I will look instead at what used to come into my mind spontaneously and naturally whenever,formerly,I wondered about what I was.What used to occur to me first was that I had a face,hands,arms and this whole machine of limbs,which is also observed in a corpse and which Iused to call a body.It also occurred to me that I was nourished,that I walked,sensed and thought;I referred these actions to the soul.Now,what this soul was,either I did not consider or else I imagined it was some unknown thing,which was subtle,like wind,fire or ether,and which was infused into the more observable parts of me.As regards the body,however,I had no doubts.I thought I knew its nature clearly and,if I ever tried to describe how I conceived it in my mind,I would have explained it as follows:by a body I understand anything that can be limited by some shape,can be circumscribed in a place,and can so fill a space that every other body is excluded from it.It can be perceived by touch,sight,hearing,taste or smell and can be moved in various ways–however,not by itself but by whatever else touches it.For I thought that it did not belong in any way to the nature of body to have a power to move itself,any more than it has the power of sensing or thinking.In fact,I was surprised to find such powers in certain bodies.
But what will I say now about myself,when I suppose there is some very powerful and,if I may say so,evil deceiver who is committed to deceiving me in everything possible? May I claim to have even the least of all those things I just said belonged to the nature of the body? I consider them,think about them,reflect on them,but nothing occurs to me;it is tiring to repeat the process with the same lack of success as before.What about the things,then,that I attributed to the soul? To be nourished or to walk? Since I no longer have a body,these are only fictions.To sense? But even this cannot be done without a body and I seemed to sense many things whiledreaming that I later realized I had not sensed.To think? That's it.It is thought.This alone cannot be detached from me.I am,I exist;that is certain.But for how long? As long as I think,for it might possibly happen if I ceased completely to think that I would thereby cease to exist at all.I do not accept anything at present that is not necessarily true.I am,therefore,precisely only a thinking thing,that is,a mind,soul,intellect or reason–words the meaning of which was formerly unknown to me.But I am a genuine thing and I truly exist.But what kind of thing? I just said:a thinking thing.
What else? I shall imagine that I am not the collection of limbs that is called a human body,nor some subtle air that is infused into those limbs;I am not a wind; fire,vapour or breath,nor anything that I imagine,for I have supposed that those things do not exist.That supposition stands but,nonetheless,I am still something.Is it possible that these very things,which,I am supposing,do not exist because I have no knowledge of them,are not in fact distinct from the me that I knew? I do not know,and I am not discussing that issue for the moment.I can make a judgement only about those things that I do know.I know that I exist,and I am asking who is this‘I’whom I know.I can be quite sure that knowledge of this‘I’,in that precise sense,does not depend on things that I did not know existed,nor therefore on any of those things that I construct in my imagination.This verb‘to construct’warns me about my mistake.For I would really be constructing if I imagined myself to be something,because imagining is only the contemplation of the shape or image of a physical thing.However,I already knowthat I exist and,at the same time,that it is possible that all those images and,in general,whatever pertains to the nature of bodies may be merely dreams.Having recognized that,it seems to be just as foolish to say,‘I imagine,in order to understand more clearly what I am,’as to say,‘I am now clearly awake and I see something true,but because I do not yet see it clearly enough I shall fall asleep so that my dreams will represent it to me more truly and clearly.’Thus I know that none of those things that I can understand with the help of my imagination is relevant to what I know of myself,and that the mind must be turned away carefully from those things so that it can perceive its own nature as distinctly as possible.
But what,then,am I? A thinking thing.And what is that? A thing which doubts,understands,affirms,denies,wills,does not will,and which also imagines and senses.That is obviously a fair number of things,if they all apply to me.Am I not the very one who was just doubting almost everything,who still,however,understands something,who affirms that this one thing is true,who denies the rest,who wishes to know more,who does not wish to be deceived,who imagines many things even despite myself and who notices many things as if they came from the senses? Which of these is not as true as the fact that I exist,even if I am constantly asleep and even if whoever created me deludes me as much as they can? Which of these is distinct from my thought? Which of them can be said to be distinct from myself? For the fact that it is I who doubt,who understand,who will,is so obvious that there is nothing which could make it more evident.In fact,I am also identical with the‘I’whoimagines because even if it happened,as I supposed,that none of the things I imagined were any longer true,the power of imagining itself truly exists and is part of my thought.Thus I am the same subject who senses,or who notices physical things as if through the senses;for example,I already see light,hear sound and feel heat.Those are false,because I am asleep.But I certainly seem to see,to hear and to get warm.This cannot be false.This is what is meant,strictly speaking,by me having a sensation and,understood precisely in this way,it is nothing other than thinking.
From these considerations I begin to know somewhat better what I am.However,it still seems to me–and I cannot prevent myself from thinking–that physical things,the images of which are formed in my thought and which the senses themselves explore,are much more distinctly known than the unknown me who is outside the scope of the imagination,although it really is surprising that I understand more distinctly things which I realize are doubtful,unknown and foreign to me than what is true,what is known and,ultimately,what is myself.But I see what the problem is.My mind likes to wander and is not yet willing to stay within the boundaries of the truth.Let it be and allow it once again to be completely unconstrained so that soon afterwards,when the constraints are reimposed,it will find it easier to be directed.
Consider those things that are commonly thought to be understood most distinctly,namely bodies which we touch and see–not bodies in general,because such general perceptions are usually inclined to be moreconfused–but a single body in particular.For example,let us take this wax.It has just been extracted from the honeycomb.It has not yet completely lost the taste of honey and it still retains some of the scent of theflowers from which it was collected.Its colour,shape and size are obvious.It is hard,cold,easy to touch and,if tapped with a finger,it emits a sound.Thus it has everything that seems to be required for a body to be known as distinctly as possible.But notice that,as I speak,it is moved close to the fire.It loses what remains of its taste,its smell is lost,the colour changes,it loses its shape,increases in size,becomesaliquid,becomeshotandcanbarelybetouched.Nor does it still emit a sound if tapped.But does the same wax not remain? It must be agreed that it does;no one denies that,no one thinks otherwise.
What was it about it,then,which was understood so distinctly? Certainly none of those things that I reached through the senses,for whatever fell within the scope of taste,smell,sight,touch or hearing has already changed.The wax remains.Was it perhaps what I now think,namely,that the wax itself was not really that sweetness of honey,nor the fragrance offlowers,nor that whiteness,shape or sound,but the body,which a short time ago presented itself to me with those modes and which now appears with different modes? But what exactly is this thing that I imagine? Let us pay attention and,having removed whatever does not belong to the wax,let us see what remains.It is nothing but something that is extended,flexible and changeable.But what do the words‘flexible’and‘changeable’mean? Is it what I imagine,namely,that this wax can change shape from being roundto square or from square to triangular? Not at all.For I understand that it is capable of innumerable similar changes,even though I cannot review whatever is innumerable in my imagination and therefore this understanding does not result from the faculty of imagining.What is meant by‘extended’? Is it not the case that even its very extension is unknown? For melting wax increases in volume,increases further when it boils and increases further again if the temperature rises further.Nor could I correctly judge what this wax is unless I thought it could assume many more variations in extension than I have ever grasped in my imagination.I have to concede,then,that I cannot in any way imagine what this wax is,but that I can perceive it only with my mind.I say this about a particular piece of wax;it is even clearer about wax in general.What,then,is this wax that can be perceived only by the mind? It is the same wax that I see,touch,imagine,and finally the same wax that I thought was there from the beginning.But what should be noticed is that perceiving it is not a case of seeing,touching or imagining,nor was it ever such although it seemed that way earlier,but it is an inspection of the mind alone,which may be either imperfect and confused as it was earlier,or clear and distinct as it is now,depending on whether I pay more or less attention to what it is composed of.
Meanwhile,I am surprised at how much my mind is inclined to errors.For although I think about these things to myself,silently and without speaking,I am still restricted to these words and am almost deceived by ordinary language.For we say that we see the wax itself if it ispresent,not that we judge that it is there from its colour and shape.From this way of talking I might conclude immediately that the wax is therefore known by how the eye sees and not by an inspection of the mind alone,had I not looked out of the window at people passing on the street below and said,in the same customary way as in the case of the wax,that I saw the people themselves.But what do I see apart from hats and coats,under which it may be the case that there are automata hidden? Nonetheless,I judge that they are people.In this case,however,what I thought I saw with my eyes I understand only by the faculty of judging,which is in my mind.
But whoever wishes to know things better than they are commonly known should be ashamed to find reasons for doubt in commonly used ways of talking.Let us continue,then,by considering whether I perceived what wax is more perfectly and clearly when I first looked at it and thought I knew it by means of the external senses or,at least,by the socalled common sense,that is,the faculty of imagining;or do I know it better now,having carefully investigated both what it is and how it is known? It would surely be foolish to doubt this,for what was distinct in the first perception? What did it include that was not apparently available to any animal whatsoever? However,when I distinguish the wax from its external forms and consider it as if it were bare and without its clothes on,then,although there may still be a mistake in my judgement,I cannot perceive the wax correctly without a human mind.
What shall I say,however,about this mind itself,or about myself,for I do not yet admit that there is anythingin me apart from a mind? What,I ask,am I,who seem to perceive this wax so distinctly? Do I not know myself much more truly and certainly and also more clearly and distinctly? For if I judge that the wax exists from the fact that I see it,it would certainly follow much more clearly,from the fact that I see it,that I myself exist.For it may be the case that what I see is not really wax;it might even be true that I have no eyes,by which to see anything;but obviously it cannot be the case,while I see or while I seem to see(something that,so far,I have not distinguished from seeing),that I myself am nothing as long as I am thinking.Likewise,if,from the fact that I touch it,I judge that the wax exists,it follows again that I exist.If I judge the same from the fact that I imagine it or for any other reason,clearly the same conclusion follows.Now what I notice about the wax may be applied to everything else that exists outside me.Besides,if the perception of the wax was more distinctly seen after it became known to me not only by sight and touch but from many other causes,must I not grant that I now know myself much more distinctly,because all the reasons that could assist in perceiving the wax or any other body establish the nature of my mind better.But there are also so many other things in the mind itself,by which knowledge of the mind can be made more distinct,that it hardly seems worth considering those that emanate from the body to the mind.
Here at last I have returned unaided to where I wished to be.I know now that even bodies are not perceived by the senses or the faculty of imagining,but are perceived only by the mind,and that they are not perceived bybeing touched or seen but only by being understood,and therefore I know clearly that there is nothing that can be perceived by me more easily or more clearly than my own mind.However,since the habit of old views cannot be changed so quickly,it is appropriate that I rest here so that this new knowledge may be lodged more deeply in my memory by the length of my meditation.
Third Meditation
The Existence of God
I will now close my eyes,block my ears and shut down all my senses.I will erase from my thought all images of physical things or,since this is almost impossible,I will regard them as nothing,as false and empty,addressing only myself and looking more deeply into myself.I will try to make myself gradually better known and more familiar to myself.I am a thinking thing,that is,something which is doubting,affirming,denying,understanding a few things,not knowing many,willing,not willing,even imagining and sensing.As I already mentioned,even if the things that I sense or imagine happened not to exist,I am still certain that the modes of thinking that I call sensations and imaginings,insofar as they are simply certain modes of thinking,are in me.And in these few things I have listed everything that I know or,at least,what I have so far noticed that I know.
I will now look about more carefully to see if there happen to be other things in me which I have not yetexamined.I am certain that I am a thinking thing.Do I not therefore also know what is required in order for me to be certain of anything,namely,that there is nothing in this first thought other than a certain clear and distinct perception of what I claim? Evidently that would not be enough to make me certain about something if it could ever happen that what I perceived clearly and distinctly in this way could be false.It seems,therefore,that I could establish as a general rule that everything that I perceive very clearly and distinctly is true.
However,I have in the past accepted as completely clear and distinct many things that I later discovered were doubtful.What kinds of things were they? The earth,sky,stars and all the other things that I used to perceive by means of the senses.But what was it that I used to perceive clearly about them? It was that the very ideas or thoughts of those things were presented to my mind.Even now I still have no doubt that these ideas are in me.But there was something else that I used to claim,and I even thought that I perceived it clearly as a result of believing it whereas,in fact,I did not perceive it clearly:that was,that some things existed outside me from which those ideas originated and which they resembled in every way.But I was either mistaken in that or,at least,if I judged correctly,it did not result from my faculty of perceiving.
However,when I used to think of something very simple and easy in arithmetic or geometry–for example,that two and three together make five,or other things like that–did I not see at least those things sufficiently clearly to claim that they are true? Indeed,I subsequentlydecided that I should doubt them simply because it occurred to me that some God may have endowed me with such a nature that I could be deceived even about things that seemed most evident.For whenever this preconceived belief about the supreme power of God occurs to me,I cannot avoid conceding that,at least if he wishes,it is easy for him to make me err even about things that I think I see most clearly with my mind's eye.On the other hand,whenever I turn to those things that I think I perceive very clearly,I am so completely convinced by them that I spontaneously say:let me be deceived by whoever can deceive me,but it will never happen that I am nothing as long as I think I am something,that it could ever be true that I never existed when it is already true that I am,or even perhaps that two and three added together are more or less than five,and similar things in which I recognize a manifest contradiction.Certainly,since I have no reason to think there is such a deceptive God and,in fact,I do not even know yet if any God exists,any reason for doubting which depends exclusively on that belief is a veryflimsy and,I would say,a metaphysical reason for doubting.In order to remove even this reason as soon as possible,I should examine whether God exists and,if he exists,whether it is possible that he is a deceiver.As long as this is unknown,I cannot see how I can ever be certain of anything else.
Now,order seems to require that I classify all my thoughts into certain kinds and that I find out in which kinds truth or falsehood are properly found.Some thoughts are like the images of things,and the term‘idea’applies in a strict sense to them alone:for example,whenI think of a person,a chimera,the sky,an angel or God.Other thoughts,however,also have additional forms;for example,when I will,fear,affirm,or deny,I always grasp something as the subject of my thoughts but I include in my thought something more than a resemblance of the thing in question.Some of these thoughts are called volitions or emotions,and others are called judgements.
When ideas are considered only in themselves,since I do not refer them to anything else they cannot,strictly speaking,be false;for whether I imagine a goat or a chimera,it is no less true that I imagine one thing rather than the other.Likewise,there is no danger of falsehood in volitions as such,or in emotions;for although I can choose what is evil or even what does not exist,it does not follow that it is not true that I choose them.That leaves only judgements and this is where I have to be careful not to be mistaken.The principal error,however,and the one most likely to occur here consists in the fact that I judge that the ideas,which are in me,resemble or correspond to things which are outside me.For if I consider the ideas merely as certain modes of my thought,and if I do not refer them to anything else,they can hardly provide me with any material for error.
Among these ideas,some seem to be innate,some acquired and some seem to have been fabricated by me.The fact that I understand what a thing is,what truth is and what thought is,seems to result from my own nature alone.However,up to now I have thought that,when I hear a noise,see the sun,or feel the fire,these result from certain things which are external to me.Finally,sirens,hippogriffs and the like are fabricated by me.Perhaps,however,I can think that they are all adventitious,or all innate,or all fabricated,for I have not yet seen clearly what is their true origin.
But the main question I wish to ask here is about ideas that I think originate from things which are external to me,namely:what reason would persuade me to believe that those ideas are similar to the things in question? I do indeed seem to be taught this by nature;and I also experience the fact that these ideas do not depend on my will nor,therefore,on me,because they are often present against my will.For example,I now feel heat whether I want to or not,and therefore I think that the sensation or idea of heat comes to me from something that is distinct from me,namely,from the heat of the fire beside which I am sitting.The most natural thing for me to judge is that the external thing sends me its own likeness rather than something else.
I will now see whether these reasons are convincing enough.When I say here that I was taught this by nature I only mean that I am led to believe it by some spontaneous impulse and not that I have been shown that it is true by some natural light.There is a big difference between the two.For whatever is shown to me by the natural light of reason–for example,that from the fact that I doubt it follows that I exist,and similar things–cannot in any way be doubtful,because there cannot be another faculty which I trust as much as that light and which could teach me that the conclusion is not true.By contrast,I have often judged in the past that I was pushed in the wrong direction by natural impulses in situations of choosingwhat is good,and I cannot see that I should put more trust in the same natural impulses in other situations.
However,even if these ideas do not depend on my will,that does not prove that they originate from external things.For just as those impulses about which I just spoke seem to be distinct from my will even though they are within me,so likewise it is possible that there is some other faculty,of which I am not yet sufficiently aware and which is the origin of those ideas,in the same way as it always seemed to me up to now that,when I was dreaming,ideas were formed in me without any assistance from external things.
But finally,even if they originated from things that are distinct from me,it does not follow that they must resemble them.In fact,I seem to have found in many cases that there is often a great disparity between them.For example,I find I have two different ideas of the sun.One idea,which seems to have been acquired from the senses and is a paradigm example of an adventitious idea,makes the sun appear very small.The other idea,however,is derived from astronomical reasoning–that is,from certain notions which are either innate in me or are fabricated by me in some way–and it makes the sun appear to be several times greater than the earth.They cannot both be truly similar to the same sun that exists outside me,and reason convinces me that the one that seems to have originated more directly from the sun resembles it the least.
All these considerations are enough to show that,to date,I believed that there are some things outside me which send me their ideas or images through the senseorgans or by some other means,as a result of some blind impulse rather than as a result of a judgement that is certain.
But there is also another way to find out if,among the things of which I have ideas,some exist outside me.Insofar as those ideas are simply certain modes of thinking,I do not see any inequality between them and they all seem to originate in me in the same way.But insofar as one idea represents one thing and another represents something else,it is clear that they are very different from each other.For undoubtedly those that represent substances to me are something more and,so to speak,contain more intentional reality than those that represent only modes or nonessential features of substances.Again,the idea by which I understand a supreme God,who is eternal,in finite,allknowing,omnipotent and the creator of everything that is outside himself,clearly contains more intentional reality than those ideas that represent finite substances.
Now,it is evident by the natural light of reason that there must be at least as much reality in an efficient and total cause as in the effect of that cause.For I ask:where could the effect get its reality from,apart from its cause? And how could the cause give it that reality unless it also possessed it? It follows from this that something cannot be made from nothing and,likewise,that something which is more perfect–in other words,that which contains more reality in itself–cannot be made from that which is less perfect.But this is no less evidently true in the case of effects,the reality of which is actual or formal,than in the case of ideas when only their intentionalreality is considered.Thus not only is it impossible,for example,that some stone which previously did not exist could now begin to exist unless it was produced by something which contained,either formally or eminently,all the reality which is produced in the stone;in the same way,heat cannot be produced in something that was not previously hot except by something that is at least of the same order of perfection as heat,and so on for other examples;but it is also true that there cannot be an idea of heat or of a stone in me unless it was put there by some cause in which there is at least as much reality as I conceive in heat or a stone.Although the cause in question does not transfer any of its actual or formal reality to my idea,it should not for that reason be considered as less real,for the reality of the idea is such that,in itself,it requires no more formal reality than what is borrowed from my thought,of which it is a mode.But when an idea contains one particular intentional reality rather than another,it must surely get this from some cause in which there is at least as much formal reality as is contained intentionally in the idea.For if we claimed that an idea contained something that was not in its cause,it would therefore get it from nothing.But however imperfect may be the mode of being by which a thing exists intentionally in the mind by means of an idea,clearly it is still not nothing and therefore it cannot come from nothing.
Nor should I suppose that,because I am considering only the intentional reality of my ideas,it is not necessary for that same reality to be contained formally in the causes of those ideas and that it is enough for it to befound there intentionally.For just as the intentional mode of being belongs to ideas because of their nature,so likewise the formal mode of being belongs naturally to the causes of ideas or,at least,to their principal and primary causes.And although it is possible for one idea to generate another,this does not lead to an in finite regress.Eventually one has to reach some first idea,the cause of which is like an archetype that contains all the formal reality which is found only intentionally in the idea.Thus it is evident to me by the natural light of reason that my ideas are like images of some kind that can easily fall short of the perfection of the things from which they are derived,but they cannot contain something that is greater or more perfect than themselves.
However,I recognize all these things as true more clearly and distinctly as I examine them further and in greater detail.What may I finally conclude from this? It is that,if the intentional reality of any one of my ideas is so great that I am certain that I do not contain this reality in myself either formally or eminently and,therefore,that I myself cannot be its cause,it follows necessarily that I am not alone in the world and that something else also exists,which is the cause of that idea.However,if I find no such idea in myself,then clearly I have no argument that makes me certain of the existence of something distinct from myself because I have examined everything very carefully and,so far,I have not been able to find any other argument.
Now among my ideas–apart from the idea that represents me to myself and about which there can be no question at this point–there is one that represents God,there are some that represent physical and inanimate things,others that represent animals and,finally,there are ideas that represent other people similar to myself.
As regards the ideas that represent other people,animals or angels,I understand easily that they could be fabricated from ideas that I have of myself,of physical things and of God,even if there were no people,animals or angels in existence.
As regards ideas of physical things,there is nothing in them that is so great that it seems incapable of having been derived from myself.For if I look into them further and examine them one by one in the same way as I examined the idea of wax yesterday,I notice that there is very little about them that I perceive clearly and distinctly.There is magnitude,or extension in length,width and depth;there is shape,which results from the termination of magnitude;there is the position that differently shaped things adopt in relation to each other;and there is motion or change of position.To these may be added substance,duration and number.The rest,such as light and colours,sounds,odours,tastes,heat and cold,and other tactile qualities–I think about these only in a very confused and obscure way,with the result that I do not even know if they are true or false,that is,whether the ideas I have of them are or are not ideas of real things.
Although I mentioned a little earlier that falsehood understood in a strict sense,or formal falsehood,can occur only in judgements,there is still clearly some kind of material falsehood in ideas when they represent what is not a thing as if it were a thing.For example,the ideas I have of heat and cold are so lacking in clarity and distinctness that I cannot learn from them whether cold is merely a privation of heat or heat is a privation of cold,or whether both of them are real qualities or whether neither of them is.Since there can be no ideas that do not seem to be ideas of things,if it really is the case that cold is nothing but a privation of heat,then the idea that represents it as if it were a real and positive thing is rightly said to be false and the same applies to other similar ideas.Ideas of this kind are such that it is clearly unnecessary that I assign them some cause apart from myself.For if indeed they are false–that is,they do not represent things of any kind–I know by the natural light of reason that they originate from nothing,that is,that the only reason I have them is that there is something de ficient in my nature,because it is obviously imperfect.Even if they are true,they represent such an insubstantial reality to me that I can barely distinguish it from a nonreality and therefore I still do not see why they could not originate from me.
Insofar as some features of our ideas of physical things are clear and distinct,they seem to have been partly borrowed from the idea of myself–for example,from the ideas of substance,duration and number and,possibly,others of the same kind.For when I think that a stone is a substance,that is,the kind of thing that can exist on its own,and when I also think of myself as a substance then,even though I conceive of myself as thinking and not extended but think of the stone as not thinking and extended,and hence there is the greatest difference between the two concepts,they still seem to agree insofar as they are both substances.Likewise,when I perceivethat I exist at present and remember that I have existed for some time,and when I have different thoughts and understand how many of them there are,I acquire the ideas of duration and number,which I can subsequently transfer to anything else.All the other features of which the ideas of physical things are constructed,namely extension,shape,position and motion,are not formally contained in me since I am nothing but a thinking thing.However,they are merely modes of a substance,whereas I am a substance,and therefore it seems possible for them to be in me eminently.
Thus the idea of God is the only one left about which to ask the question:does it contain something that could not have originated from me? By the word‘God’I understand some in finite substance,which is independent,supremely intelligent and supremely powerful,and by which both I,and everything else that exists(if anything else exists),were created.All these ideas are surely such that,the more carefully I examine them,the less likely it seems that they could have originated from myself alone.Therefore one should draw the conclusion from what has been said that God necessarily exists.And even though I have an idea of a substance from the very fact that I am a substance myself,it would not,however,be an idea of an in finite substance because I am finite,unless it originated from some substance that is genuinely in finite.
Nor should I think that I do not perceive the in finite by means of a true idea but merely by the negation of the finite,in the way in which I perceive rest and darkness by the negation of motion and light.On the contrary,Iunderstand clearly that there is more reality in an in finite substance than in a finite substance and therefore the perception of the in finite occurs in me in some way prior to that of the finite,that is,the perception of God is prior to the perception of myself.Indeed,how would I understand that I doubt,that I desire–that is,that I lack something and am not completely perfect–if I had no idea of some more perfect being by comparison with which I could recognize my own de ficiencies?
Nor can it be said that this idea of God may be materially false and may therefore come from nothing,as I have just observed about the ideas of heat and cold and others like that.On the contrary,since this idea has the highest clarity and distinction and contains more intentional reality than any other idea,there is no other idea which of itself is more true or in which there is less suspicion of falsehood.This idea of a supremely perfect and in finite being is,I claim,true to the highest degree because,although I could perhaps pretend that such a being does not exist,I cannot pretend that the idea of such a being represents nothing real to me,as I claimed earlier about the idea of cold.It is also clear and distinct to the highest degree because whatever I perceive clearly and distinctly as real and true,and as containing some perfection,is completely included in it.Nor does it matter that I do not comprehend the in finite or that there are innumerable other things in God that I do not comprehend and which may be completely outside the scope of my thought.It is the nature of the in finite not to be comprehended by me,who am finite.In order for the idea I have of God to be the most true,and the most clear and distinct of all myideas,it is enough if I understand it and if I judge that all those things that I perceive clearly and which involve some perfection–and perhaps even innumerable others of which I am ignorant–are in God formally or eminently.
But perhaps I am something greater than I myself understand,and all those perfections that I attribute to God are in me in some way potentially,even if they have not yet appeared and been transformed from potency to act.I already experience the fact that my knowledge increases slightly,and I see nothing to prevent it from thus increasing more and more to in finity.Nor do I see why,with my knowledge thus increased,I could not acquire with its assistance all the other perfections of God nor why,finally,the potentiality for those perfections,if I already have it,would not be enough to produce the corresponding ideas.
But none of this is possible.In the first place,if it were true that my knowledge increased gradually and if there are many things in me in potency which are not yet actualized,none of that is relevant to the idea of God in which there is absolutely nothing in potency.Even this feature–to increase gradually–is a most certain argument for imperfection.Besides,even if my knowledge always increased more and more,nevertheless I understand that it would never be actually in finite because it would never reach a point at which it could not become greater still.I think of God,however,as actually in finite,so that nothing can be added to his perfection.Finally,I perceive that the intentional being of an idea can be produced not by a merely potential being,which,strictlyspeaking,is nothing,but only by a formal or actual being.
There is evidently nothing in all this that is not evident to whoever examines it carefully by the natural light of reason.However,when I examine it less carefully and when the images of sensible things blind the eye of the mind,I do not easily remember why the idea of a being more perfect than myself originates necessarily from some being which is more perfect in reality;and therefore I would like to inquire further whether I myself,who have this idea,could exist if no such being existed.
From whom,then,would I derive my existence? It would be from myself,or from my parents,or from some other beings which are less perfect than God,for nothing can be thought or imagined that is more perfect than,or even as perfect as,God.
But if I derived my existence from myself,there would be nothing that I would either doubt or wish for,nor would I lack absolutely anything.For I would have given myself every perfection of which I have some idea and thus I would be God himself.Nor should I think that those things which I lack are perhaps more difficult to acquire than those I already possess.On the contrary,it was evidently much more difficult for me–that is,for a thing or substance which thinks–to emerge from nothingness than to acquire knowledge of many things that are unknown to me and that are merely nonessential attributes of that substance.Certainly,if I derived the greater of those two from myself,I would not have denied myself at least those items of knowledge that are easier to acquire,nor even any of those that I perceive arecontained in the idea of God,for it does not seem more difficult to do any of that.And if there were some things that were more difficult to do,they would surely also seem to me to be more difficult,at least if I derived whatever else I have from myself,for I would experience the limits of my powers in that situation.
I do not escape the force of these arguments by assuming that I may have always existed as I do now,as if it would follow from that assumption that there is no need to look for the author of my existence.For a lifetime can be divided into innumerable parts that do not depend on each other in any way.The fact that I existed a short while ago does not imply that I must exist at present unless some other cause recreates me,as it were,in the present moment or,in other words,conserves me.It is clear to anyone who thinks about the nature of time that the same power and action is obviously required to conserve anything during the individual moments of its duration as would be required to create it for the first time,had it not already existed.Thus there is only a distinction of reason between conservation and creation,and this is one of the things that are evident by the natural light of reason.
Therefore,I should now ask myself:have I some power by which I can bring it about that I,who exist at present,will still exist a short time in the future? Since I am only a thinking thing or,at least,I am discussing only those features of that part of me which is speci fically a thinking thing,if I had such a power I would undoubtedly be aware of it.But I do not experience any such power,and therefore I know very evidently that I depend on some being which is distinct from me.
However,perhaps that being is not God.Perhaps I was produced either by my parents or by some other causes that are less perfect than God.Hardly.As I have already said,it is clear that there must be at least as much reality in a cause as in its effect.Therefore,since I am a thinking thing and I have some idea of God,whatever cause is eventually assigned to me,it must be agreed that it is a thinking thing and that it includes an idea of all the perfections that I attribute to God.One can ask about that cause in turn:does it derive its existence from itself or from something else? If it derives its existence from itself,it is obvious from what has already been said that it is itself God because,since it derives the power to exist from itself,it undoubtedly also has the power of possessing actually the perfections of which it has an idea,that is,all the perfections that I conceive of in God.If,however,it derives its existence from something else,then the question arises again in the same way about that,whether it derives its existence from itself or from something else,until finally one arrives at the ultimate cause,which is God.It is clear enough that there cannot be an in finite regress here,especially since I am not concerned at this stage with the cause that produced me in the past but much more with the cause that maintains me in existence at present.
Nor is it plausible that there may have been many partial causes which cooperated to produce me,and that I got the idea of one of the perfections that I attribute to God from one cause and,from another,the idea of a second perfection,so that all these perfections occur somewhere in the world although they are not all joinedtogether in the same being,which is God.On the contrary,the unity,simplicity,or the inseparability of all those attributes that are found in God is one of the principal perfections that I understand is present in him.And it is certain that the idea of the unity of all these perfections could not have been produced in me by some other cause unless I had the ideas of his other perfections from the same source;nor could it have made me understand them as joined together and inseparable,unless it also made me understand what those perfections were.
Finally,as regards parents,even if I assume that everything I ever believed about them is true,it would still not mean that they maintain me in existence;nor is there any way in which they have created me insofar as I am a thinking thing.They have only put certain dispositions in the matter in which I–that is,my mind,which is all I mean by‘I’at this point– find myself at present.Thus there can be no question about them in this context.Instead it must absolutely be concluded from the mere fact that I exist and that I have some idea of a most perfect being–that is,of God–that it is very clearly demonstrated that God also exists.
It only remains for me to examine how I received this idea from God.I did not derive it from the senses,nor did it ever arrive unexpectedly as the ideas of sensible things usually do when external objects impinge,or seem to impinge,on the sense organs.Nor was it fabricated by me,for it is clear that I can neither add to it nor subtract anything from it.Thus it follows that it is innate in me,just as the idea of myself is innate in me.
Evidently it is not surprising if God,in creating me,endowed me with this idea so that it would be,as it were,the artisan's trademark imprinted on his work.Nor is it necessary that the mark be distinct from the work itself.From the mere fact that God created me,however,it is very probable that I was made in some way in his image and likeness and that this likeness,in which the idea of God is contained,is perceived in me by means of the same faculty by which I perceive myself.In other words,when I turn my mind's eye towards myself I understand not only that I am an incomplete and dependent being and that I aspire inde finitely towards what is greater or better;I also understand,at the same time,that he on whom I depend is greater than all those things,not just inde finitely and potentially,but that he contains them all to an in finite degree in himself and is thus God.The whole force of this argument consists in the fact that I recognize that it is impossible for me to exist with the kind of nature I have,that is,having in myself the idea of God,if God did not truly exist.I mean the God of whom I have an idea,that is,who has all those perfections that I cannot comprehend but is such that I can reach him in some way through my thought and is clearly immune from all defects.It follows clearly enough that he cannot be a deceiver,since it is evident by the natural light of reason that every fraud and deception results from some defect.
But before I examine this last issue in greater detail and also inquire into other truths that can be derived from it,I should pause here for a brief while to contemplate God himself,to consider his attributes and to contemplate and adore the beauty of this immense lightinsofar as the eye of my darkened mind can tolerate it.Just as we believe by faith that the greatest happiness of the next life consists simply in the contemplation of this divine majesty,likewise we experience that we derive the greatest joy of which we are capable in this life from the same contemplation,even though it is much less perfect.
Fourth Meditation
Truth and Falsehood
In recent days I have become so used to leading my mind away from the senses and have noted carefully that so little is perceived reliably about physical things,and that much more is known about the human mind and even more again about God,that already I have no difficulty in turning my thoughts away from things that can be imagined to those that are purely intelligible and independent of all matter.Clearly I have a much more distinct idea of the human mind–insofar as it is a thinking thing,is not extended in length,breadth and depth,and includes in itself nothing that is physical–than of any physical thing.When I consider that I doubt or that I am an incomplete and dependent thing,a clear and distinct idea occurs to me of a complete and independent being,that is,of God.And from the fact alone that I have this idea or that I exist while having this idea,I conclude so clearly that God also exists and that each moment of my whole existence depends on him that I do not think that anythingcan be known by human intelligence more evidently or more clearly.I now seem to see a way by which knowledge of other things can be reached from this contemplation of the true God in whom are hidden all the treasures of the sciences and of wisdom.
First of all,I realize that it is impossible that God would ever deceive me.All deception or fraud involves some imperfection,and although being able to deceive seems to be some kind of evidence in favour of cleverness or power,it is undoubtedly true that the wish to deceive is evidence of malice or foolishness and therefore it cannot belong to God.
Next,I experience a certain faculty of judgement in myself,which,just like everything else that is in me,I received from God.Since God does not wish me to be mistaken he obviously did not give me a faculty such that,when I use it correctly,I could ever be mistaken.
There would be no further doubt about this,except that it seems to follow that I can never be mistaken;for if everything I possess comes from God and if he did not give me a faculty for making mistakes,it seems as if I could never be wrong about anything.And thus,as long as I think only about God and focus completely on him,I find no cause of error or falsehood in myself.But as soon as I turn back to myself,however,I find that I am subject to innumerable errors.When I look for a cause of these errors,I find that I have not only a real and positive idea of God or of a supremely perfect being but I also have,if I may so describe it,a certain negative idea of nothingness or of what is removed as far as possible from every perfection;and I am like some kind of intermediate beingbetween God and nothingness,or I am so constituted between the supreme being and nonbeing that,insofar as I was created by the supreme being,there is nothing in me by which I can be mistaken or led into error,but insofar as I also participate in some way in nothingness or in nonbeing–thatis,insofarasImyself amnotthesupreme being and I lack so many things–it is not surprising,then,if I make mistakes.Thus I certainly recognize that error as such is not something real that depends on God but is merely a defect;therefore,in order to be mistaken,I do not need some faculty that God gave me for that purpose but I happen to make mistakes by the mere fact that the faculty of judging truly,which I got from God,is not in finite.
However,that does not satisfy me completely.For error is not a pure negation;it is a privation or lack of some knowledge that somehow I should have.And when I consider the nature of God it does not seem possible that he gave me some faculty that is not perfect in its own right or that lacks some perfection that it should have.If it is true that artisans who are more skilled produce more perfect artifacts,what could have been made by the supreme creator of everything that would not be complete in every way? There is also no doubt that God could have created me so that I am not mistaken,nor is there any doubt either that he always wills what is best.Therefore,is it better for me to be mistaken rather than not mistaken?
As I think more about this,it occurs to me first that I should not be surprised if I do not understand the reason for some things that are done by God,and that I shouldnot doubt his existence because I happen to experience some things and do not comprehend why or how he does them.Since I already know that my nature is very weak and limited and that the nature of God is immense,incomprehensible and in finite,I also know from this that there are innumerable things of which I do not know the causes.For this reason alone,I think there is no role in physics for that whole class of causes which are usually sought in purposes,because I think that I cannot investigate God's purposes without temerity.
It also occurs to me that when we inquire whether God's works are perfect,we should not consider some particular creature on its own but the whole universe of things.For although something may perhaps rightly seem to be very imperfect when it is considered in isolation,it is very perfect when considered as part of the world.Since I decided to doubt everything,I have so far come to know with certainty only that I myself exist and that God exists;however,once I have recognized the immense power of God,I cannot deny that there are many other things created by him or which,at least,could be created by him,so that I acquire the status of a part in the universe of things.
When I come to look at myself more closely and investigate what kinds of mistake I make(which in themselves indicate some kind of imperfection in me),I notice that they depend on two causes acting simultaneously,namely on the faculty of knowing,which I have,and on the faculty of choosing or on freedom of the will–in other words,on the intellect and will together.By using the intellect I merely perceive the ideas about which I canmake a judgement,and this can contain no error in the strict sense when it is considered precisely from this point of view.There may exist innumerable things of which I have no idea,but I should be described simply as lacking them in a negative sense rather than as being deprived of them in any strict sense,because I cannot think of any reason to show that God ought to have given me a superior faculty of knowing than the one he gave me.And no matter how skilled I think an artisan may be,I do not think for that reason that they have to put all the perfections into each individual item of work that they are capable of putting into others.
At the same time,I cannot complain that I did not receive from God a sufficiently extensive and perfect will or freedom of choice,for I clearly experience that it is not con fined by any limits.What I think is very noteworthy is that there is nothing else in me that is so perfect and so great that I cannot think of it as being even greater still or more perfect.If,for example,I consider my faculty of understanding,I recognize immediately that it is very limited and finite and,at the same time,I form the idea of another similar faculty which is much greater–in fact,the greatest possible,and in finite–and from the mere fact that I can form this idea I perceive that it belongs to the nature of God.Likewise,if I examine the faculty of remembering or imagining,or any other faculty,it is clear to me that I understand all of them as limited and restricted in my own case but as unlimited in God.I experience the will alone,or freedom of choice,as being so extensive in my own case that I conceive the idea of none greater,so that it is principally because of thisfaculty that I understand myself as being in some sense the image and likeness of God.For although the will is incomparably greater in God than in me–both because of the knowledge and power that accompany it and make it stronger and more efficacious,and because of its object,insofar as it extends to many more things than my will–when it is considered formally and in a strict sense,however,it does not seem to be greater.For the will consists in this alone,that we can either do or not do something(that is,affirm or deny something,seek or avoid it);or rather,it consists in this alone that we bring ourselves to affirm or deny,to seek or avoid,whatever is proposed to us by our intellect in such a way that we feel that we are not determined by any external force.Nor is it true that,in order to be free,I must be capable of moving in either direction;on the contrary,the more I am inclined in one direction the more freely I choose it,either because I clearly recognize it as being true and good or because God so disposes my innermost thoughts.Surely neither divine grace nor natural knowledge ever diminishes freedom;instead,they increase and strengthen it.But the indifference I experience when I am not moved one way or another by any consideration is a lower degree of freedom,and it does not indicate a perfection in our freedom but merely some kind of defect or something lacking in our knowledge.For if I always saw clearly what is true and what is good,I would never deliberate about what judgement to make or what to choose and thus,although I would obviously be free,I could never be indifferent.
I see from these considerations that the cause of my errors is not the power of willing,which I receive fromGod,when considered on its own,because this power is as extensive as possible and is perfect in its kind.Nor is it the power of understanding because,whatever I understand,it is certain that I understand it correctly,for the ability to understand comes from God and it cannot contain the ability to be mistaken.Where do my errors originate,then? They result from this alone:since the will extends further than the understanding,I do not restrain it within the limits of the understanding but apply it even to things that I do not understand.Given that it is indifferent to those things,it is easily deflected from what is true or good and in that way I make mistaken judgements or bad choices.
For example,when I considered in recent days whether anything in the world exists and when I noticed that,from the fact that I thought about it,it follows clearly that I exist,I still was unable not to judge that whatever I understood so clearly was true.This was not because I was coerced into that conclusion by some external force,but because a strong inclination of the will followed from a great light in the understanding and,as a result,I believed it much more spontaneously and freely insofar as I was less indifferent to it.Now,however,I not only know that I exist,insofar as I am some kind of thinking thing,but I also notice an idea of physical nature;this makes me doubt whether the thinking nature which is in me,or rather which I myself am,is distinct from this physical nature or whether both are identical,and I think that my understanding has not yet any reason to persuade me one way or another.For that reason I am certainly indifferent with respect to affirming or denyingeither alternative or,indeed,with respect to making no judgement on the question.
This indifference extends not only to things that are not known at all by the understanding but generally to anything that is not understood clearly enough at precisely the time at which the will deliberates about it.Even when probable conjectures lead me in one direction,the mere knowledge that they are only conjectures,and that they are not reasons which are certain and indubitable,is enough to push my assent in the opposite direction.I have experienced enough of this in recent days,when I supposed that all the things were false that I had previously believed to be absolutely true,simply because I realized that it was possible for me somehow to doubt them.
However,when I do not perceive what is true with sufficient clarity and distinction,as long as I refrain from making a judgement it is clear that I act correctly and that I am not mistaken.But if I affirm or deny in those circumstances,then I do not use my freedom of choice correctly.If I opt for the side that is false,I am evidently mistaken;if,however,I choose the opposite,I land on the truth by chance but I do not thereby avoid fault because it is evident by the natural light of reason that the perception of the understanding should always precede the determination of the will.It is this incorrect use of freedom of choice that constitutes the privation which is the essence of error;this privation,I say,is in the use of the will itself insofar as it originates in me,but not in the faculty that I received from God nor even in the use of that faculty insofar as it depends on God.
Nor have I any reason to complain that God has not provided me with a greater power of understanding or that he did not give me a greater natural light than he did,because it is natural for a finite understanding that there are many things which it does not understand and it is natural for a created understanding to be finite.Instead I ought to be grateful to him who never owed me anything for having been so generous to me,rather than think that he failed to give me,or has taken away,those things that he never gave me.
Nor may I complain because he gave me a will that is wider in scope than my understanding.Since the will consists in a single thing that is,as it were,indivisible,it seems as if its nature is such that nothing could be taken away from it.And,clearly,the wider its scope,the more grateful I should be towards the donor.
Finally,I should not complain that God cooperates with me in making those acts of will,or those judgements,in which I am mistaken.Those actions are completely true and good insofar as they depend on God and,as far as I am concerned,it is a greater perfection to be able to perform those acts than not to be able to do so.But a privation,which alone is the essence of falsehood and fault,does not need God's cooperation because it is a nonentity;if it is referred to God as its cause,it should not be called a privation but merely a negation.It is clearly not an imperfection in God that he gave me the freedom to assent or not assent to certain things of which he did not put a clear and distinct perception in my understanding.But it is undoubtedly an imperfection in me that I do not use this freedom well and that I make judgements about things that I do not understand correctly.I see,however,that God could easily have arranged that I would be incapable of ever making a mistake,even though I remain free and have limited knowledge.He could have given my understanding a clear and distinct perception of everything that I would deliberate about,or else he could simply impress on my memory–so firmly that I could never forget it–that I should never make a judgement about anything that I had not understood clearly and distinctly.I readily recognize that,if I were some kind of totality [and if there were nothing else in the world apart from me],I would be more perfect than I am at present,had God made me in that way.But I cannot for that reason deny that,in the whole universe of things,it is in some sense a greater perfection that some of its parts are immune from error while others are not,than if all its parts were exactly similar.I have no right to complain that God chose to give me a role in the world that is not the principal and most perfect of all.
Besides,even if I cannot avoid error by the first strategy,which relies on the clear perception of everything about which I have to deliberate,I can at least do so by the other strategy,which presupposes only that I remember to abstain from making a judgement when the truth about something is not clear.For although I experience in myself the weakness of not being able always to concentrate on one and the same item of knowledge,I can still arrange,by an attentive and frequently repeated meditation,to remember this rule as often as I need it and in that way I could acquire a certain habit of not making mistakes.
Since that is the greatest and principal human perfection,I do not consider that I accomplished little in today's meditation in which I investigated the cause of error and falsehood.If it is clear that there cannot be any other cause than the one I explained,then as long as I restrict the will in such a way that,in making judgements,it extends only to those things that the understanding shows it clearly and distinctly,it is evidently impossible for me to be mistaken because every clear and distinct perception is certainly something and,consequently,cannot come from nothing but necessarily has God for its author–God,I say,the supremely perfect being for whom it is repugnant to be a deceiver–and hence the perception is undoubtedly true.Today I have learned not only what I must avoid in order never to be mistaken,but I have also learned what must be done to reach the truth.I will certainly reach it if I consider only the things that I understand perfectly enough and if I separate them from all other things which I apprehend in a confused and obscure way.I shall do this diligently in future.
Fifth Meditation
The Essence of Material Things.Another Discussion of God's Existence
There are still many things to consider about the attributes of God and about my own nature or my mind.But I will consider them some other time perhaps,because nothing seems more urgent(once I have recognized whatshould be avoided and what should be done to reach the truth),than to try to emerge from the doubts into which I fell in recent days and to see if I can have any certainty about material things.
In fact,before inquiring whether any such things exist outside me,I should consider their ideas insofar as they are in my thought and see which ideas are distinct and which are confused.
I have a distinct image of quantity,which philosophers usually call continuous quantity,or of its extension or,preferably,of the extension of a quanti fied thing in length,breadth and depth.I also pick out various parts in it and assign to these parts various magnitudes,shapes,positions and local motions,and I assign various durations to the local motions.All these things,considered in this general way,are not the only things that are clearly perceived and known;by paying attention,I also perceive innumerable particular things about shapes,number,motion and so on,the truth of which is so open and so accommodated to my nature that,when I first discover it,I seem not so much to learn something new as to remember things I already knew or to notice for the first time things that were in my mind for a long time even though I had not previously turned my attention to them.
I think that what deserves most consideration at this stage is that I find I have innumerable ideas of certain things which,even if they do not exist anywhere outside me,still cannot be said to be nothing.Although I think about them to some extent by choice,they are not,however,invented by me and they have their own true andimmutable natures.For example,when I imagine a triangle,even if it were true that no such figure exists or has ever existed anywhere outside my thought,it still clearly has some determinate nature or essence or form,immutable and eternal,which was not constructed by me and does not depend on me.This is clear from the fact that various properties of the triangle can be demonstrated;for example,that its three angles are equal to two right angles,that the longest side is subtended by the biggest angle,and similar properties.Even if I never thought of them previously when I imagined a triangle,I now know them clearly independently of whether I wish to or not and therefore they were not invented by me.
If I were to say that the idea of a triangle may have reached me through the sense organs,because I occasionally saw bodies with triangular shapes,that is beside the point.For I can think of innumerable other shapes about which there can be no suggestion that I ever got to know them through the senses and,despite that,I can demonstrate various properties about them just as in the case of the triangle.All these properties are obviously true since they are known clearly by me,and therefore they are something and not simply nothing–for it is obvious that everything that is true is something,and I have already demonstrated above that everything that I know clearly is true.And even had I not demonstrated it,the nature of my mind is certainly such that I still would be incapable of not assenting to them,at least as long as I perceive them clearly.I also remember that,even earlier,when I was completely immersed in the objects of the senses,I always held that the most certain of all werethe truths of this type,namely,whatever I knew clearly about shapes or numbers and other truths that pertain to arithmetic or geometry or,in general,to pure and abstract mathematics.
Now if it follows,from the fact alone that I can produce an idea of something from my thought,that everything that I perceive clearly and distinctly as belonging to it does really belong to it,could I not also derive an argument to demonstrate God's existence? Certainly I find in myself an idea of God–that is,of a supremely perfect being–just as much as I find an idea of any shape or number.I understand that it belongs to God's nature that he always exists,as clearly and distinctly as I understand that whatever I demonstrate about any shape or number belongs to the nature of that shape or number.Therefore,even if everything on which I meditated in recent days were not true,I should attribute to God's existence at least the same degree of certainty that I have attributed to mathematical truths until now.
However,it is clear that this is not completely perspicuous at first sight and it seems to be some kind of logical trick.Because I am used to distinguishing existence from essence in everything else,I easily believe that it is also possible to separate existence from the essence of God and,in that way,that one could think about God as not existing.But it is clear to whoever thinks about it more carefully that existence can no more be separated from God's essence than one can separate,from the essence of a triangle,that the three angles are equal to two right angles,or than one could separate the idea of a valley from the idea of a mountain.Thus to think of God(thatis,a supremely perfect being)as lacking existence(that is,lacking some perfection)is just as contradictory as to think of a mountain that lacks a valley.
However,even if I can think of God only as existing and of a mountain only with a valley,still the following must surely be true:just as it does not follow that there is any mountain in the world from the fact that I think of a mountain with a valley,likewise from the fact that I think of God as existing it does not seem to follow that God exists.My thought imposes no necessity on things and,since I can think of a horse with wings even though no horse has wings,perhaps I could likewise attribute existence to God even though no God exists.
There is a logical mistake concealed here.From the fact that I cannot think of a mountain without a valley it does not follow that a mountain and valley exist somewhere,but only that mountain and valley,whether they exist or not,cannot be separated from one another.Likewise,from the fact that I can think of God only as existing,it follows that existence is inseparable from God and therefore that he really does exist.It is not that my thought makes this happen or imposes any necessity on any thing;on the contrary,the necessity of the reality itself,namely of God's existence,makes me think this way.I am not free to think of God without existence(that is,of a supremely perfect being without the highest perfection)in the same way that I am free to imagine a horse either with or without wings.
Nor should it be objected at this point that I have to assume that God exists once I have supposed that he has all perfections,but that the first assumption was notnecessary,just as it is unnecessary for me to believe that all quadrilateral shapes can be inscribed in a circle;however,if I were to make the latter assumption,then I would have to concede that a rhombus can be inscribed in a circle–which is clearly false.Although it is not necessary that I ever get to thinking about God,whenever I choose to think about the first and highest being and,as it were,to draw out the idea of God from the treasury of my mind,I must necessarily attribute all perfections to him,even if I do not enumerate them all at the time or consider each one of them individually.This necessity is so clear that subsequently,when I realize that existence is a perfection,I must conclude correctly that the first and highest being exists.Likewise,it is not necessary that I ever imagine any triangle but,whenever I decide to think about a rectilinear figure which has only three angles,it is necessary that I attribute to it those properties from which it is correctly deduced that its three angles are not greater than two right angles–even if I do not advert to this at the time.But when I consider which figures are inscribed in a circle,it is not at all necessary to think that they include all quadrilaterals.In fact,I cannot even imagine that,as long as I wish to admit only what I understand clearly and distinctly.Therefore there is a big difference between false propositions like that and the true ideas that are innate in me,among which the idea of God is the primary and principal one.For I clearly understand in many ways that the idea of God is not something fictitious which depends on my thought,but that it is the image of a true and immutable nature.Firstly,for example,because there is nothing else that I can think of,apart from God alone,to the essence of which existence belongs.Secondly,because I cannot understand two or more similar Gods and I assume that one such God exists,I see clearly that it is necessary both that he existed from all eternity and will remain for eternity.Finally,I perceive many other things in God which are such that I cannot change them or take anything away from them.
But whatever argument I eventually use to prove something,I am always brought back to this:the only things that clearly convince me are those that I perceive clearly and distinctly.And even if,among the things that I perceive in this way,some are obvious to everyone while others are discovered only by those who look at them more closely and examine them more carefully,once they are discovered,however,the latter are considered no less certain than the former.For example,even if the fact that the square on the hypotenuse of a rightangled triangle is equal to the squares on the other two sides is not as apparent as the fact that the hypotenuse subtends the largest angle,once it is seen clearly it is not believed any less.In the case of God,however,I would surely know him prior to and more easily than anything else if I were not submergedinprejudicesandif theimagesof sensiblethings did not besiege my thought from every direction;for what is more clear than this,that the supreme being exists or that God–to whose essence alone existence belongs–exists? Besides,although I had to pay careful attention to perceive this,I am now not only as certain of this as of anything else that seems very certain to me,but I also notice that the certainty of other things depends on this in such a way that,without it,nothing can ever be known perfectly.
Although my nature is such that,as long as I perceive something very clearly and distinctly,I am unable not to believe that it is true,my nature is also such that I cannot fix my mind's eye always on the same thing in order to perceive it clearly,and the memory of an earlier judgement often returns when I am no longer considering the reasons why I made that judgement.Thus other reasons could occur to me,if I were ignorant of God,which would easily make me change my mind and in that way I would never have true and certain knowledge about anything but merely unstable and changeable opinions.Thus,for example,when I think about the nature of a triangle,it seems most evident to me,as someone imbued with the principles of geometry,that its three angles are equal to two right angles,and I am unable not to believe that it is true as long as I think about its demonstration.But as soon as I have turned my mind's eye away,even though I still remember that I perceived it as clearly as possible,it easily happens that I doubt its truth–at least,if I am ignorant of God.For I can convince myself that I was so created by nature that I am sometimes mistaken about things that I think I perceive as clearly as possible,especially when I remember that I have often accepted many things as true and certain that I subsequently judged were false when new considerations were introduced.
But once I perceived that God exists and have also understood,at the same time,that everything else depends on him and that he is not a deceiver,I concluded that all those things that I clearly and distinctly perceive are necessarily true.And even if I no longer consider thereasons on account of which I made that judgement about its truth,no contrary reason can be found–as long as I remember having perceived it clearly and distinctly–that would make me doubt it.Instead,I have a true and certain knowledge of it.Nor does this apply to this one thing alone,but to all the other things that I remember having demonstrated at some time,for example,in geometry and so on.What counterarguments remain now? That I was made in such a way that I am often mistaken? But I already know that I cannot be mistaken in those things that I understand clearly.Perhaps I formerly accepted many things as true and certain that I subsequently discovered were false? But I did not perceive any of those things clearly and distinctly and,ignorant of this rule of truth,I may have believed them for other reasons that I later found were less reliable.What should be said,then? That I may be dreaming(as I objected to myself a while ago),or that all the things that I am thinking about now are no more true than what occurs to me when I am asleep? But even that does not change anything because surely,if I am dreaming,on condition that something is evident to my understanding it is entirely true.
Thus I see clearly that the certainty and truth of all knowledge depends only on the knowledge of the true God in such a way that,before I knew him,I was incapable of knowing anything else perfectly.But now countless things can be known and be certain for me,both about God and other intellectual things,and also about as much of physical nature as falls within the scope of pure mathematics.
Sixth Meditation
The Existence of Material Things,and the Real Distinction between Mind and Body
I still have to consider whether material things exist.Indeed,I already know that they are at least capable of existing insofar as they are the object of pure mathematics,because I perceive them clearly and distinctly.For there is no doubt that God is capable of producing everything that I am capable of perceiving in this way,and I never thought that there was anything he was incapable of producing unless it was incapable of being perceived distinctly by me.Besides,it seems to follow that they do exist,from the faculty of imagining that I am conscious of using when I turn to such material things.The reason is that,if one considers very carefully what the imagination is,it seems to be nothing but a certain application of the cognitive faculty to a body that is intimately present to that faculty and that therefore exists.
To clarify that,I will first consider the difference between imagination and pure understanding.When I imagine a triangle,for example,I do not merely understand that it is a figure bounded by three lines but,at the same time,I also see those three lines with my mind's eye as if they were present,and that is what I call imagining.However,if I wish to think about a chiliagon,I understand equally well that it is a figure that consists of one thousand sides,just as I understand that a triangle is a figure that consists of three sides;but I cannot imagine athousand sides in the same way,that is,I cannot see them as if they were present.Even if I represent to myself some very confused figure on that occasion,because of my habit of always imagining something whenever I think of a physical thing,it is clear nevertheless that it is not a chiliagon,because it is not in any way different from what I would also represent to myself if I were to think about a myriagon or any other figure with many sides,and it is useless for knowing the properties by which a chiliagon differs from other polygons.However,if we were discussing a pentagon,I could understand its shape too,just like that of a chiliagon,without the aid of the imagination.But by applying my mind's eye simultaneously to its five sides and to the area they enclose,I am also able to imagine it.I notice clearly in this example that,in order to imagine,I need a characteristic effort of the mind that I do not use in order to understand.This new effort of the mind shows clearly the difference between the imagination and pure understanding.
I also think that the power of imagining which I have,insofar as it differs from the power of understanding,is not required for my essence,that is,for the essence of my mind because,even if I did not have it,I would undoubtedly remain who I am now.It seems to follow that the imagination depends on something that is distinct from me.I understand easily that,if some body existed to which my mind were so united that it could apply itself to it at will as if it were inspecting it,it would be possible to imagine things through that physical body.Thus this way of thinking differs from pure understanding only in the sense that the mind,when it understands,turns back on itself in some way and reflects on one of the ideas that are inside itself;however,when it imagines,it turns towards a body and sees something in it that resembles the idea that had been understood by itself or perceived by sensation.I can easily understand,I say,that the imagination can take place in that way if such a body exists.Since no other equally satisfactory way of explaining it occurs to me,I hypothesize that such a body probably exists.However,it exists only probably and,despite my careful examination,I still do not see how,from the distinct idea of a physical nature which I find in my imagination,I can derive an argument that concludes necessarily that some body exists.
However,I am used to imagining,besides the physical nature which is the object of pure mathematics,many other things,such as colours,sounds,tastes,pain and the like,although none of them distinctly.Since I perceive them better by sensation–from which they seem to come to the imagination with the aid of memory–if I wish to discuss them properly,I have to discuss sensation too and see if,from those things which are perceived in the type of thinking that I call sensation,I can derive an argument for the existence of physical things that is certain.
I shall first remind myself at this point of those things which,having been perceived by sensation,I formerly thought were true,and of the reasons why I thought they were true.I shall then review the reasons why I subsequently raised doubts about them.And finally,I shall consider what I should believe about them now.
First of all,I sensed that I had a head,hands,feet andthe other members which compose the body that I considered as a part of myself or,perhaps,as myself in its entirety.I sensed that this body was surrounded by many other bodies by which it could be affected in various bene ficial or harmful ways,and I judged the bene ficial things by a certain sensation of pleasure and the harmful things by a sensation of pain.Besides pain and pleasure,I also sensed in myself hunger,thirst and other such appetites,and certain bodily inclinations towards happiness,sadness,anger and other similar passions.Outside myself,apart from the extension of bodies,their shapes and motions,I also sensed in them hardness,heat and other tactile qualities.In addition,I had sensations of light,colours,sounds,odours and tastes,by the variety of which I distinguished from one another the sky,the earth,the seas and other bodies.
Given the ideas of all those qualities which were presented to my thought and which were the only things that,strictly speaking,I sensed immediately,it was evidently reasonable to believe that I sensed various things which were clearly distinct from my thought,namely the bodies from which those ideas originated.For I experienced that those ideas would come to me without any consent on my part,so that I was both unable to sense any object,even if I wished to,unless it was present to my sensory organs and I was incapable of not sensing it when it was present.Since the ideas perceived by sensation were much stronger and more vivid and,in their own way,more distinct than any of those that I formed myself,it seemed impossible–when meditating carefully and intentionally on those that I noticed were impressedon my memory–that they originated from myself.Therefore,the only remaining option was that they originated from other things.Because I had no knowledge of those things apart from the very ideas that I got from them,nothing else could have occurred to me except that the ideas resembled the things.And because I also recall that I began using my senses before my reason,and since I saw that the ideas that I formed were not as vivid as those that I perceived by sensation and that,in most cases,they were composed of parts of the latter,I easily convinced myself that I had absolutely nothing in my mind which did not originate in sensation.
It was also reasonable for me to judge that the body which,by some special right,I called my own belongs to me more than any other body.For I was unable ever to be separated from it,as I could be from other bodies;I sensed all my appetites and passions in it and for it;and finally,I was aware of pain and the titillation of pleasure in its parts,but not in other bodies that were situated outside me.Why does a certain sadness of the mind follow from some unknown sensation of pain,and a certain happiness from a sensation of pleasure? Or why does the unknown tightening of the stomach that I call hunger advise me to eat food and a dryness of the throat advise me to take a drink,and so on for all the others? I clearly had no explanation except that I was taught this by nature.There is obviously no other connection(at least,none that I can understand)between the stomach tightening and the decision to take food,or between the sensation of something that causes pain and the thought of sadness that results from it.All the other things that Ijudged about the objects of the senses seemed to be taught by nature.I was convinced of this before I weighed up any of the reasons that could prove it.
Later,however,many experiences undermined little by little all my faith in the senses.For in some cases towers that seemed round from a distance appeared,close up,to be square,and very high statues standing on top of the towers did not seem tall to an observer on the ground.In countless other similar things I discovered that the judgements of the external senses were mistaken.And not only the judgements of the external senses,but also those of the internal senses.For what can be closer to me than pain? But I once heard,from those who had had a leg or arm amputated,that they still seemed to feel pain in the part of their body that was missing.Likewise,it did not seem certain in my own case that I had a pain in some limb even if I felt a pain in it.I recently added to these reasons for doubting two other much more general ones.The first was that I never believed I sensed anything while awake that I was not also able to think I sensed occasionally while I was asleep;and since I do not believe that the things I seem to sense while asleep come to me from external things,I did not see why I should give any more credence to things that I seem to sense while awake.The second reason was that,as long as I did not know or,at least,as long as I pretended not to know the author of my origin,I saw nothing to prevent me from being so constituted by nature that I was mistaken even about those things that seemed most true to me.As regards the reasons by which I was formerly convinced of the truth of sensible things,it was not difficult for me to reply tothem.It seemed as if nature pushed me towards many things from which reason dissuaded me,and therefore I did not think that I should put much faith in what nature taught me.And despite the fact that the perceptions of the senses do not depend on my will,I did not think that I should conclude,for that reason,that they derived from things that are distinct from me;there may perhaps be some faculty in me,even if it is unknown to me,by which they are produced.
However,now that I begin to know better both myself and the author of my origin,I do not think that all the things that I seem to acquire from the senses must be accepted with temerity;but at the same time,it is not necessary that all of them be called into doubt.
Firstly,I know that everything that I understand clearly and distinctly can be made by God in the same way that I understand them;therefore it is enough that I can understand one thing,clearly and distinctly,without another in order to be certain that one thing is distinct from the other,because it is possible for them to be separated,at least by God.It is irrelevant by what power the separation is realized in order for them to be considered distinct.Therefore from the fact alone that I know that I exist and that,at the same time,I notice absolutely nothing else that belongs to my nature apart from the single fact that I am a thinking thing,I correctly conclude that my essence consists in this alone,that I am a thinking thing.And although I may(rather,as I shall say soon:I certainly)have a body that is joined very closely to me,since I have on the one hand a clear and distinct idea of myself insofar as I am a thinking,nonextended thingand,on the other hand,I have a distinct idea of the body insofar as it is merely an extended,nonthinking thing,it is certain that I am really distinct from my body and that I can exist without it.
Besides,I find in myself faculties for thinking in certain special ways,such as faculties for imagining and sensing;I can understand my whole self clearly and distinctly without them but cannot,conversely,understand them without myself,that is,without the intellectual substance in which they inhere,for they include in their formal concept some kind of understanding.I conclude from this that they are distinguishable from me as modes are from a thing.I also acknowledge some other faculties,such as the ability to change place,to assume various shapes,and the like,which cannot be really understood,any more than the previous faculties,without some substance in which they inhere and without which they likewise cannot exist.But it is evident that if they do indeed exist,thenthesefacultiesmustbeinaphysicalorextended substance and not in an intellectual substance,because the clear and distinct concept of these faculties clearly includes some extension but no intellection.
There is also in me a certain passive faculty for sensing,or for receiving and knowing the ideas of sensible things,but I would not be able to use it in any way unless there also existed an active faculty,either in me or in something else,for producing or causing those ideas.Now it is clear that this cannot be located in me because it evidently presupposes no understanding,whereas those ideas are produced when I am not cooperating and even in spite of me.It follows,therefore,that thisfaculty must be in some substance which is distinct from me;and since it must contain as much reality,formally or eminently,as is found intentionally in the ideas produced by that faculty(as I mentioned above),this substance is either a body or a physical nature which formally contains everything that the ideas contain intentionally,or else it obviously must be God or some other creature more noble than a body which contains them eminently.But God is not a deceiver;it is perfectly obvious,therefore,that he does not send these ideas to me directly from himself.Nor does he send them indirectly by means of some creature which contains the intentional reality of the ideas,not formally but only eminently.He obviously gave me no faculty to recognize such an arrangement;on the contrary,he gave me a strong tendency to believe that these ideas are emitted by physical things,and therefore I cannot see how he can be understood as not being a deceiver if they originated from anything except physical things.Therefore,physical things exist.They may not all exist,however,in exactly the same way that I perceive them in sensation,since sensory perception is very obscure and confused in many cases.But at least they include all those things that I understand clearly and distinctly–in other words,all those things that,conceived in a general way,are included in the subject matter of pure mathematics.
As regards other things,which are either only particular things(for example,that the sun has a certain size or shape,etc.)or which are less clearly understood(for example,light,sound,pain and similar things),although they are very doubtful and uncertain,the very fact thatGod is not a deceiver and therefore that there can be no falsehood in my beliefs,unless I have another faculty provided by God to correct it,provides me with a secure hope of finding the truth even about those things.There is evidently no doubt that everything that I am taught by nature has some truth in it–for by‘nature’in this context,understood in a general way,I understand nothing but God himself or the coordinated system of created things that was established by God.Nor do I understand my own nature in particular as anything other than the complex of all those things that were given me by God.
However,there is nothing that my nature teaches me more persuasively than that I have a body that is being harmed when I feel pain,that needs food or drink when I suffer hunger or thirst,and so on.Therefore,I should not doubt that there is some truth in this.
Nature also teaches by means of the sensations of pain,hunger,thirst,etc.,that I am not present to my body only in the way that a pilot is present to a ship,but that I am very closely joined to it and almost merged with it to such an extent that,together with it,I compose a single entity.Otherwise,when my body is injured I(who am nothing but a thinking thing)would not feel pain as a result;instead I would perceive such an injury as a pilot perceives by sight if some part of the ship is damaged.Likewise,when my body needs food or drink,I would understand this more clearly and would not have confused sensations of hunger and thirst.For these sensations of thirst,hunger,pain,etc.,are undoubtedly mere confused ways of thinking that result from the union and,as it were,the thorough mixing together of mind and body.
Moreover,I am also taught by nature that various other bodies exist in the vicinity of my body,and that I should seek some of them and avoid others.Certainly,from the fact that I perceive very different colours,sounds,odours,tastes,heat,hardness and the like,I conclude correctly that there are some differences between the bodies from which those various sensory perceptions arise that correspond to them,even if they do not,perhaps,resemble them.Besides,from the fact that some of those perceptions are agreeable to me while others are disagreeable it is obviously certain that my body,or preferably,my entire self insofar as I am composed of a body and mind,can be affected by various bene ficial or harmful bodies in my environment.
But there are many other things such that,although I seemed to be taught them by nature,I learned them not really from nature but from a certain habit of judging carelessly,and it can easily happen therefore that they are false:for example,that every space is empty,if there is nothing obviously there that would affect my senses;that,for example,there is something in a warm body that resembles exactly the idea of heat that I have;that in something white or green there exists the same whiteness or greenness that I perceive,in something bitter or sweet the same taste,and so on for the others;that stars and towers and all other remote bodies have exactly the same size and shape that they present to my senses,and other similar things.
But in order not to perceive anything here that is not sufficiently distinct,I should de fine more carefully what exactly I understand when I say that I am taughtsomething by nature.For here I mean nature in a narrower sense than the complexity of everything that I was given by God,for this complexity includes many things that belong only to the mind;for example,I perceive that it is impossible for what was done to be undone,and all the other things that are known by the natural light of reason,and I am not concerned with them at this point.
There are also many things that belong only to the body,for example that it tends downwards and similar things,and I am not concerned with them either.I am concerned here only with those things that were given me by God insofar as I am composed of a mind and body.
Nature in this sense,therefore,teaches me toflee from things that cause a sensation of pain and to seek those that cause a sensation of pleasure,and so on.But it does not seem to teach us to draw any conclusion from these sensory perceptions,without a prior examination by the understanding of the things that are external to us,because it seems that we can learn the truth about them by using the mind alone and not by using the composite of mind and body.Thus although a star does not affect my eye any more than theflame of a small fire,nevertheless that does not provide any real or positive inclination to believe that it is not greater,despite the fact that I have unreasonably judged in this way from my youth.And although I feel heat when I approach the fire,and I also feel pain when I go too near it,there is really no reason to convince me that there is something in the fire that resembles that heat any more than there is something in it that resembles the pain;but there is reason to believeonly that there is something in it,whatever it turns out to be,which causes those sensations of heat and pain in us.And although there may be nothing in a given space that affects our senses,it does not follow that there is no body there.But I see in these and many other cases that I have got used to perverting the order of nature.For sensory perceptions,strictly speaking,were given by nature only to signify to the mind what is bene ficial or harmful for the composite of which it is a part and,to that extent,they are sufficiently clear and distinct;but I use them as if they were guaranteed rules for the immediate discovery of the essence of external bodies,whereas they provide only very obscure and confused perceptions of them.
However,I have already adequately examined above how,despite God's goodness,it can happen that my judgements are false.But a new difficulty arises at this point about the very things that nature presents as things to be sought or avoided,and even about the internal sensations in which I seem to have detected mistakes–for example,when someone is deluded by the agreeable taste of some food and swallows poison which is concealed in it.But in that case one is urged by nature only to seek whatever has the agreeable taste and not the poison about which nature is completely ignorant.One can draw no conclusion from this,except that this nature is not omniscient.That is not surprising because,since a human being is limited,it deserves only limited perfections.
Still,it is not unusual for us to be mistaken about things to which nature inclines us,for example,in the case of those who are ill and who desire food or drink that very soon afterwards is harmful for them.One couldsay perhaps,in this case,that they are mistaken because their nature is disordered.But this does not resolve the problem,because someone who is sick is one of God's creatures just as much as someone who is healthy;therefore it seems to be just as objectionable if those who are sick were given a deceptive nature by God.A clock made with wheels and weights observes all the laws of nature just as precisely when it is made poorly and fails to show the correct time as when it satis fies the artisan's intentions in every respect.Likewise,I think of a human body as somekindof machinemadefrombones,nerves,muscles,veins,blood and skin so that,even if there were no mind in it,it would still have all the motions which it has at present and which do not result from the control of the will and,therefore,from the mind.Consequently,I can easily acknowledge that it would be equally natural for it(if it suffered from dropsy,for example)to experience the same dryness of the throat that the sensation of thirst usually brings to the mind,and for its nerves and other parts of the body to be so affected that it would take a drink which would aggravate its sickness,as to be moved by a similar dryness of the throat to take a drink which is bene ficial for it when it is not affected by such a sickness.When I consider the anticipated use of the clock,however,I could say that it deviates from its nature when it does not show the correct time;likewise,considering the machine of the human body as being adapted to the motions that usually occur in it,I could think that it also deviates from its nature if its throat is dry when a drink is not conducive to its conservation.But I am sufficiently aware that this last way of understanding natureis very different from the other one.This latter understanding is simply a name,which results from my thought when I compare someone who is sick and a badly made clock with the idea of someone who is healthy and a clock that is well made,and it is completely extrinsic to the things to which it is applied.But by the former concept of nature I understand something which is really found in things and which,therefore,has some truth in it.
When the nature of a body suffering from dropsy is described as‘corrupted’,because it has a dry throat but does not need a drink,this is certainly a case of arbitrarily attaching a name to it.But when it is a question of the composite,or of a mind united with such a body,it is not simply a case of arbitrarily naming something;it is a genuine mistake of nature that it is thirsty when a drink is harmful to it.Therefore,we need to ask here how God's goodness fails to prevent nature,understood in the latter sense,from being deceitful.
First of all,I perceive that there is a big difference between the mind and the body insofar as the body,by its nature,is always divisible whereas the mind is evidently indivisible.When I reflect on the mind(or on myself insofar as I am simply a thinking thing),I certainly cannot distinguish any parts in myself;instead I understand myself to be a completely uni fied and integral thing.And even though the whole mind seems to be united with the whole body,if however a foot,an arm,or any other part of the body is cut off,I know that nothing is thereby taken away from the mind.Nor can the faculties of willing,sensing,understanding,etc.,be said to be parts of the mind,because it is one and the same mind thatwills,senses and understands.In contrast,I cannot think of any physical or extended body that I cannot divide easily in my thought;for that reason alone,I understand that it is divisible.That would be enough to teach me that the mind is completely different from the body if I did not already know it adequately from other considerations.
Secondly,I perceive that the mind is not affected immediately by all the parts of the body but only by the brain or,perhaps,only by one small part of the brain,namely the part in which the common sense is said to be.Whenever this part is in the same state,it presents the same thing to the mind even though the other parts of the body may be in different states.This is proved by many experiences that need not be reviewed here.
I also perceive that the nature of the body is such that no part of it can be moved by another part at a certain distance from it,unless it can also be moved in the same way by any of the parts in between,even when the more remote part does nothing.For example,in a cord A B C D,if one end of it D is pulled,the other end A will be moved in the same way as if one of the intermediate parts,B or C,had been pulled and the end D had remained unmoved.In a similar way,when I feel a pain in my foot,physics teaches me that that sensation occurs by means of the nerves that are spread through the foot and are stretched from the foot to the brain like cords;when they are pulled in the foot,they also pull the inner parts of the brain where they terminate,and they stimulate a certain motion there,which was established by nature to affect the mind with a feeling of what seems like a pain in the foot.Since these nerves have to pass through the leg,thethigh,the loins,the back and the neck to reach from the foot to the brain,it can happen that,even if that section of the nerves which is in the foot is not affected but only some other intermediate section,evidently the very same motion occurs in the brain as when the foot is hurt,from which it will necessarily follow that the mind feels the same pain.The same thing must occur in the case of other sensations.
Finally,I perceive that any of the motions that occur in the part of the brain that affects the mind immediately trigger only one particular sensation in it;therefore the best arrangement that could be imagined here would be for it to trigger the speci fic sensation which,among all the sensations that it could possibly trigger,is conducive most often and to the greatest extent to the conservation of human health.Experience shows,however,that all the sensations with which we are endowed by nature are of this kind;therefore nothing can be found in them that does not bear witness to the power and goodness of God.Thus,for example,when the nerves in the foot are moved violently and more than usual,their motion,passing through the spinal cord to the inner parts of the brain,gives a signal to the mind to sense something,namely a pain that seems to be in the foot,by which it is stimulated to remove its cause,insofar as that is possible,as something harmful to the foot.Human nature could have been so constituted by God that the very same motion in the brain would make the mind aware of something else–for example,the motion itself as it occurs in the brain,in the foot,or in any of the intermediate places between the foot and the brain,or of somethingcompletely different.But nothing else would have been as conducive to the conservation of the body.Likewise,when we need a drink,that gives rise to a certain dryness in the throat,which moves its nerves and,as a result,the interior of the brain.This motion affects the mind with a sensation of thirst,because there is nothing in this whole interaction that is more useful for us to know than that we need a drink for the conservation of our health,and likewise for other cases.
It is perfectly clear from these considerations that,despite the immense goodness of God,human nature,insofar as it is composed of a mind and body,cannot avoid being deceptive occasionally.For if some cause that is not in the foot,but in some other part of the body through which the nerves are stretched from the foot to the brain or even in the brain itself,causes the very same motion which is usually caused by a damaged foot,pain will be felt as if it were in the foot.Thus the sense is naturally deceived because,since the same motion in the brain must always trigger the same sensation in the mind and since it results much more frequently from some cause that harms the foot rather than from anything else,it is reasonable that it would always signal to the mind a pain in the foot rather than in any other part of the body.If it happens occasionally that dryness of the throat arises,not as it usually does because a drink is conducive to the health of the body but from some other contrary cause(as happens in the case of dropsy),it is much better that it would mislead in that case rather than always mislead when the body is healthy,and likewise for other examples.
This consideration is extremely helpful,not only for me to notice all the errors to which my nature is subject,but also to enable me to avoid them easily or to correct them.Clearly,I know that all the senses tell me much more frequently what is true rather than false about those things that pertain to the welfare of the body,and I can almost always use more than one of the senses to examine the same thing.I can also use my memory,which links present sensations with previous sensations,as well as my understanding,which has already looked into all the causes of error.Therefore,I should no longer fear that those things are false which my senses reveal to me on a daily basis.The hyperbolic doubts of recent days should be rejected as ridiculous,especially the extreme doubt that arose from my failure to distinguish between being asleep and being awake.I realize now that there is a very big difference between them,because dreams are never joined by memory with all the other activities of life,as happens with those that occur while we are awake.Evidently if,while I am awake,someone appeared to me suddenly and then immediately disappeared,as happens in dreams,in such a way that I did not see either where they came from or where they went to,I would reasonably judge that they were a ghost or an image depicted on my brain and not a genuine human being.But when things occur in such a way that I see distinctly where they come from,where and when they occur,and when the perception of them is linked with the rest of my life without any interruption,then I am perfectly certain that they occur to me while I am awake and not while asleep.Nor should I have even the slightest doubt about theirtruth if,having called upon all my senses,my memory and my understanding to examine them,I get no report from any of them which conflicts with the others.For from the fact that God is not a deceiver it follows that,in such cases,I am completely free from error.But the urgency of things to be done does not always allow us time for such a careful examination;it must be granted,therefore,that human life is often subject to mistakes about particular things,and the weakness of our nature must be acknowledged.
Objections and Replies(Selections)
First Objections
(a)What cause,I ask,does an idea require? Or what is an idea? Is it the thing itself which is thought about,insofar as it is in the intellect intentionally? What does it mean to be in the intellect intentionally? One time I learned that it means:to determine an intellectual act itself by means of an object.That is evidently nothing in the thing itself but involves naming it by reference to something outside it.Just as for something to be seen is nothing more than an act of seeing,which is located in me,so likewise being thought or being in the intellect intentionally is having a thought of the mind that remains in and terminates in itself.This can occur even if the thing in question is not changed or moved,and even if it does not exist.I am asking,then:what is the cause of something which does not actually exist and which is nothing but a mere name?
However,our great author says:‘When an idea contains one particular intentional reality rather than another,it must surely get this from some cause.’On the contrary,from no cause!For intentional reality is merely a name,and does not actually exist.A cause has a real and actual influence on something:but that which does not actually exist does not receive that influence,and therefore it neither receives nor needs the real influence of acause.Thus I have ideas,but not their cause–much less one that is greater than me and is in finite.
(b)Even if it is granted that a supremely perfect being,by its very nature,implies existence,it still does not follow that such an existence is something that is actually present in the nature of things,but only that the concept of existence is inseparably linked with the concept of a supreme being.You cannot deduce from this that the existence of God is something actual,unless you presuppose that God is a supreme being who actually exists.If that were true,it would actually include all perfections,including the perfection of real existence.
Replies
(a)What I wrote,however,was:an idea is the thing itself which is thought,insofar as it is in the intellect intentionally.He pretends to understand these words in a way that is obviously different from the way I understand them,in order to give me an opportunity of explaining them more clearly.He says:‘To be in the intellect intentionally is to determine an intellectual act itself by means of an object,which is nothing in the thing itself but involves naming it by reference to something outside it.’One should notice that he refers here to the thing itself as if it were located outside the intellect;that is why saying that it is in the intellect intentionally merely involves naming an object by reference to something outside it.But I was speaking about an idea that is never outside the intellect and,consequently,‘intentional being’means simply to bein the intellect in the way in which objects are usually there.Thus,for example,if anyone asks what happens to the sun as a result of being in my intellect intentionally,it is best to reply that nothing happens to it apart from its being named by reference to something outside itself,that is,that,as an object,it directs an operation of the intellect.But if someone asks about the idea of the sun,what is it? and if the reply is that it is the thing thought about insofar as it is in the intellect intentionally,no one will understand that to be the sun itself insofar as it is named after something outside itself.‘To be in the intellect intentionally’will not mean,in that case,to direct the intellect's operations as an object,but to be in it in the way in which objects of the intellect usually are there,so that the idea of the sun is the sun itself existing in the intellect–not,however,formally,asitdoesintheheavens,but intentionally,that is,in the way in which objects are usually in the intellect.This mode of existing is evidently much less perfect than that by which things exist outside the intellect but,clearly,it is not nothing as a result,as I have already written.
When the very learned theologian says that these words involve an equivocation,it seems as if he wants to warn me about something that I have just noted,lest I happen to forget it.He says,in the first place,that a thing existing in this way in the intellect by means of an idea is not an actual entity,that is,it is not something which is located outside the intellect.And that is true.Then he also says that it is‘not something fictitious,or a being of reason,but something real which is understood distinctly’.In these words he concedes everything that Iassumed.He adds,however,‘that it is only conceived and does not actually exist(that is,because it is only an idea,and not something located outside the intellect);it can be conceived but cannot in any way be caused.’In other words,it does not require a cause in order to exist outside the intellect.I agree with that,but it obviously requires a cause in order to be conceived and that is the only issue at stake here.
For example,if someone had in their intellect the idea of some machine that had been thought with great arti fice,it would be appropriate to ask right away:what is the cause of this idea? It would not be enough to say that the machine does not exist outside the intellect and,therefore,that it cannot be caused and can only be conceived.For the only question being asked is:what is the cause of its being conceived? Nor would it be enough to answer that the intellect itself is its cause,namely as the cause of its own operation.There is no disagreement about that here;the only point in contention concerns the cause of the intentional arti fice which the idea contains because,in order for this idea of a machine to contain one intentional arti fice rather than another,it must derive it from some cause.The same issue arises with respect to the intentional arti fice of this idea and the intentional reality of the idea of God.There are various possible causes of the intentional arti fice of this machine.The cause may be some actual machine,similar to this one,which was previously seen,as a result of which the idea resembling it was formed;or it may be an extensive knowledge of mechanics that is present in the intellect;or it may be a great intellectual creativity by which theintellect can invent such an idea even without prior knowledge of mechanics.It should also be noted that all the arti fice,which is merely intentional in the idea,must necessarily be in its cause,whatever that turns out to be,either formally or eminently.The intentional reality which is in the idea of God should be understood in the same way.But where will this be,except in a really existing God?
But my acute reader sees all this and therefore concedes that it is legitimate to ask:why does this idea contain this particular intentional reality rather than some other? And he replies to this question,firstly:‘What I wrote about the idea of a triangle applies in the same way to all ideas;that is,even if a triangle did not exist anywhere,it still has some determinate nature or essence,or an immutable and eternal form.’But,he says,‘that is not to postulate a cause.’However,he well realizes that this is unsatisfactory;for if the nature of a triangle is also immutable and eternal,we are still just as entitled to ask the question why we have the idea of a triangle.For that reason,he added:‘if you persist in demanding an explanation,it is located in the imperfection of our intellect,etc..’In answering in that way he seems to mean only that those who choose to disagree with me have no plausible answer to the question.For it is obviously no more probable that the imperfection of our intellect is the cause of our having an idea of God,than that a lack of expert knowledge of mechanics is the cause of our imagining some very complicated machine rather than some other machinewhichislessperfect.Onthecontrary,itisobvious that if someone has an idea of a machine that contains every conceivable arti fice,one can conclude much morereasonably that the idea derives from some cause in which every conceivable arti fice really existed,even if it exists only intentionally in the idea.For the same reason,since we have an idea of God that contains every conceivable perfection,one can conclude very evidently that the idea depends on some cause in which all that perfection is also found,namely,in God who really exists.
(b)My argument was as follows:whatever we understand clearly and distinctly as belonging to the true and immutable nature,essence,or form of something,can be truly predicated of it.But when we have examined with sufficient care what God is,we understand clearly and distinctly that it belongs to his true and immutable nature that he exists.Therefore,we can then truly predicate of him that he exists.The conclusion at least follows correctly,in this case,from the premises.Now the major premise cannot be denied either,since it was already agreed earlier that‘everything that we understand clearly and distinctly is true.’Only the minor premise remains,and I agree that there is a signi ficant difficulty in this.In the first place,we are so used to making a distinction in everything else between existence and essence that we do not realize adequately the extent to which existence belongs to the essence of God more than in the case of other things.Secondly,if we do not distinguish what belongs to the true and immutable essence of something from what can be predicated of it only by a figment of the intellect,then even if we realize adequately that existence belongs to the essence of God,we fail to draw the conclusion that God exists because we do not knowwhether his essence is immutable and true or merely one of our figments.
But in order to remove the first part of this difficulty,we need to distinguish between possible existence and necessary existence,and we should note that possible existence is contained in the concept or idea of everything that is clearly and distinctly understood.However,necessary existence is contained only in the idea of God.Whoever is careful in paying attention to this difference between the idea of God and all other ideas will undoubtedly realize that,although we understand all other things only as if they existed,it does not follow that they exist but simply that they are capable of existing.For we understand that it is not necessary for actual existence to be combined with their other properties.But from the fact that we understand actual existence to be combined necessarily and always with the other attributes of God,it certainly does follow that God exists.
To remove the second part of the difficulty,it should be noted that ideas that do not contain true and immutable natures–but are merely fictitious natures which are invented by the intellect–are capable of being divided by that same intellect,not only by abstraction but by a clear and distinct mental operation.Thus any idea that cannot be divided in this way by the intellect was certainly not composed by it in the first place.For example,when I think about a winged horse,an actually existing lion or a triangle drawn inside a square,I easily understand that I can also think,conversely,about a horse without wings,a nonexisting lion,or a triangle without a square,and so on,and therefore these ideas do not have true andimmutable natures.However,if I think about a triangle or a square(I will not use the examples of a lion or a horse,because their natures are not completely clear to us),then certainly I can assert truthfully of the triangle whatever I understand as being contained in the idea of a triangle–for example,that its three angles are equal to two right angles,etc.Likewise,I can claim that whatever I find contained in the idea of a square is true.And even though I am able to understand a triangle while abstracting from the fact that its three angles are equal to two right angles,I still cannot deny,by means of a clear and distinct operation,that it has that property–that is,if I understand correctly what I am saying.Besides,if I think about a triangle drawn inside a square and avoid attributing to the square what belongs only to the triangle,or tothetrianglewhatbelongstothesquare,andif Iexamine only those properties which result from the combination of the two figures,its nature would not be any less true and immutable than the nature of a triangle or a square considered separately.Thus it would be appropriate to claim that the square is not less than twice the area of the triangle drawn inside it,and other similar things,which belong to the nature of this composite figure.
However,if I thought that existence is contained in the idea of a supremely perfect body,because to exist both in reality and in the intellect is a greater perfection than to exist only in the intellect,I could not thereby conclude that such a supremely perfect body exists but only that it is capable of existing.For I am well able to recognize that such an idea was constructed by my own intellect,by combining together all physical perfections at thesame time,and that existence does not result from those other perfections;on the contrary,one can just as easily affirm or deny the existence of them.Indeed,while examining the idea of a body I perceive no power in it by which it can produce itself or conserve itself in existence;from this I conclude validly that necessary existence,about which alone there is a question here,no more belongs to the nature of a body,no matter how perfect it is,than it belongs to the nature of a mountain that it does not have a valley or to the nature of a triangle that it has angles which together are greater than two right angles.
However,if we now ask not about a body but about something else(whatever it happens to be)that possesses all possible perfections at the same time,whether existence should be included among them,we shall initially have doubts about it.Our mind,which is finite,is used to thinking about those perfections only separately and therefore it may not notice immediately how they are necessarily combined together.But if we examine carefully whether existence–and what kind of existence–belongs to a supremely perfect being,we shall be able to perceive the following clearly and distinctly.Firstly,that at least possible existence belongs to it just as it belongs to all other things of which we have distinct ideas,even to those which are invented by a figment of our intellect.Then if we acknowledge its immense power,we cannot think that its existence is possible unless,at the same time,we acknowledge that it can exist by its own power,and we shall conclude from this that it really exists and that it existed from eternity.For it is very well known by the natural light of reason that anything which is capableof existing by its own power always exists.We shall thus understand that necessary existence is contained in the idea of a supremely powerful being,not by a figment of our intellect,but because it belongs to the true and immutable nature of such a being that it exists.We shall also easily perceive that such a supremely powerful being is incapable of not having in itself all the other perfections that are contained in the idea of God and,therefore,without any figment of our intellect and by their own nature,they are combined together and they exist in God.