4

The task seems immense, and one may freely admit to being daunted by it. Here are the few conjectures I have been able to arrive at.

When primitive man had discovered that he had it in his own hands–quite literally–to improve his earthly lot by working, it could no longer be a matter of indifference to him whether someone else was working with him or against him. This other person now acquired for him the value of a fellow-worker, and it was useful to him if they both lived together. Even earlier, in his ape-like prehistory, man had taken to forming families, and members of the family were probably his first helpers. Presumably the founding of the family was linked with the fact that the need for genital satisfaction no longer made its appearance like a guest who turns up suddenly one day, then leaves and is not heard of again for a long time, but moved in as a permanent lodger. Hence, the male acquired a motive for keeping the female or–to put it more generally–his sexual objects around him, while the females, not wanting to be separated from their helpless young, had for their sake to remain with the stronger male. * In this primitive family we note the absence of one essential feature of civilization: the arbitrary power of the father, the head of the family, was absolute. In Totem and Taboo I tried to trace the route that led from this family to the next stage of communal living, which took the form of bands of brothers. On overpowering their father, the sons found that the group could be stronger than the individual. Totemic culture rests upon the restrictions they had to impose on one another in order to sustain this new state of affairs. Taboo observances constituted the first system of 'law'. There were thus two reasons why human beings should live together: one was the compulsion to work, which was created by external hardship; the other was the power of love, which made the man loath to dispense with his sexual object, the woman, and the woman loath to surrender her child, which had once been part of her. Eros and Ananke (Love and Necessity) thus become the progenitors of human civilization too. The first consequence of civilization was that even fairly large numbers of people could now stay together in a community. And because these two powerful forces worked in concert, future developments could be expected to proceed smoothly towards better and better control of the external world and the extension of the community to take in more and more people. Moreover, it is not easy to see how this civilization could be anything but a source of happiness to its participants.

Before we go on to consider where a disturbance might arise, let us allow ourselves to be deflected by the recognition of love as a foundation for civilization; in this way we can ill a gap in our earlier discussion. We said that, since sexual (genital) love had afforded man the most potent experiences of satisfaction and had actually supplied him with the model for all happiness, this should have told him that he would do well to go on seeking his happiness in the sphere of sexual relations and place genital eroticism at the centre of his life. We went on to say that by doing this one made oneself dangerously dependent on part of the external world, the chosen love-object, that one was exposed to extreme suffering if one was spurned by it or lost it through infidelity or death. For this reason sages in every age have emphatically advised against this way of conducting one's life, but it has not yet lost its attraction for much of humankind.

A small minority of people are enabled by their constitution, in spite of everything, to find happiness through love, though this necessitates great psychical modifications of its function. These people make themselves independent of the concurrence of the object of their love by shifting the main emphasis from being loved to their own loving; they protect themselves against the loss of the love object by directing their love not to individuals, but to everyone in equal measure, and they avoid the uncertainties and disappointments of genital love by deviating from its sexual aim and transforming the drive into an aim-inhibited impulse. What they thereby create in themselves–a state of balanced, unwavering, affectionate feeling–no longer bears much outward resemblance to the turbulent genital love-life from which it none the less derives. Perhaps St Francis of Assisi went furthest in exploiting love in this way to gain a feeling of inner happiness; moreover, what we recognize as one of the techniques for fulfilling the pleasure principle has frequently been associated with religion, with which it may be connected in those remote regions where the differentiation of the ego from the objects or the objects from one another is neglected. One ethical view, whose deeper motivation will presently become obvious, sees this readiness to love mankind and the world in general as the highest attitude to which human beings can attain. Even at this early stage we will not withhold our two main reservations: first, an undiscriminating love seems to us to forfeit some of its intrinsic value by doing its object an injustice, and, secondly, not all human beings are worthy of love.

The love that founded the family remains effective in civilization, both in its original form, in which direct sexual satisfaction is not renounced, and in its modified form as aim-inhibited affection. In both it continues to perform the function of binding together fairly large numbers of people, and it does so more intensively than would be possible on the basis of a common interest in work. The careless way in which the language uses the word 'love' can be justified historically. The word denotes not only the relation between a man and a woman, whose genital needs have led them to found a family, but also the positive feelings that exist within the family between parents and children, and between siblings, though we are bound to describe the latter relation as aim-inhibited love or affection. This aim inhibited love was in fact once a fully sensual love, and it still is in the individual's unconscious. Both fully sensual and aim-inhibited love extend outside the family and create new bonds with people who were previously strangers. Genital love leads to the formation of new families, and aim-inhibited love to 'friendships', which become important for civilization because they avoid some of the restrictions of genital love, such as its exclusivity. But as it develops, the relation of love to civilization ceases to be unequivocal. On the one hand, love comes into conflict with the interests of civilization; on the other, civilization threatens love with substantial restrictions.

This rift seems unavoidable, but its cause is not at once discernible. It first manifests itself as a conflict between the family and the wider community to which the individual belongs. We have already noted that one of civilization's chief endeavours is to bring people together in large units. However, the family will not give up the individual. The closer the solidarity of the family, the more often its members tend to cut themselves of from other people and the harder it is for them to enter into the wider circle of life. The phylogenetically older mode of living together–the only one that exists in childhood–resists being superseded by the civilized one that was acquired later. Detaching oneself from the family is a task that faces every young person, and society often supports him in performing it with puberty and initiation rites. One has the impression that such difficulties attach to any psychical development, indeed to any organic development.

Moreover, women soon come into conflict with the cultural trend and exercise a retarding, restraining influence on it, even though it was they who first laid the foundations of civilization with the claims of their love. Women stand for the interests of the family and sexual life, whereas the work of civilization has become more and more the business of the menfolk, setting them increasingly difficult tasks and obliging them to sublimate their drives–a task for which women have little aptitude. No person has unlimited quantities of psychical energy at his disposal, and so he has to accomplish his tasks through an expedient distribution of the libido. Whatever energy he expends on cultural aims is largely denied to the opposite sex: his constant association with men and his dependency on this association even estrange him from his duties as a husband and father. The woman therefore sees herself forced into the back ground by the claims of civilization and adopts a hostile attitude to it.

Civilization's tendency to restrict sexual life is no less clear than its other tendency–to extend the cultural circle. The first phase of civilization, the totemic phase, already involves the prohibition of incest in the choice of one's sexual object; this is perhaps the most drastic mutilation that man's erotic life has experienced through out the ages. Taboo, law and custom create further restrictions, affecting both men and women. Not all civilizations go to the same lengths; and the economic structure of society influences the degree of sexual freedom that remains. We already know that in this respect civilization follows the dictates of economic necessity, because it deprives sexuality of much of the mental energy that it consumes. Civilization thus behaves towards sexuality like a tribe or a section of the population that has subjected another and started exploiting it. Fear that the victims may rebel necessitates strict precautionary measures. A high point in such a development can be seen in our western European civilization. It is psycho logically quite justified to begin by prohibiting expressions of infantile sexuality, for there is no prospect of curbing the sexual appetities of adults unless preparatory measures have been taken in childhood. Yet civilized society cannot in any way be justified in going further and actually denying these phenomena, which are easily demonstrable, indeed striking. The sexually mature individual finds that his choice of object is restricted to the opposite sex, and that most extra-genital gratifications are forbidden as perversions. The demand for a uniform sexual life for all, which is proclaimed in all these prohibitions, disregards all the disparities, innate and acquired, in the sexual constitution of human beings, thereby depriving fairly large numbers of sexual enjoyment and becoming a source of grave injustice. The result of such restrictions might be that in normal persons–those who are not constitutionally inhibited–all sexual interest would low, with no loss, into the channels still let open to it. But what is not outlawed–heterosexual genital love–is still limited by legitimacy and monogamy. Present-day civilization makes it clear that it will permit sexual relations only on the basis of a unique and indissoluble bond between a man and a woman, that it disapproves of sexuality as a source of pleasure in its own right and will tolerate it only as the device–for which a substitute has still to be found–for the increase of mankind.

This is of course an extreme view, and it is known to have proved impracticable, even for quite short periods. Only the weaklings have acquiesced in such a gross invasion of their sexual freedom; stronger spirits have insisted on a compensatory condition, which can be mentioned later. Civilized society has found itself obliged to turn a blind eye to many transgressions that by its own lights it should have punished. Yet one must not err in the opposite direction and assume that such a cultural attitude is altogether innocuous because it does not do all it sets out to do. After all, the sexual life of civilized man has been seriously damaged; at times one has the impression that as a function it is subject to a process of involution, such as our teeth and our hair seem to be undergoing as organs. One is probably entitled to suppose that its importance as a source of happiness–and therefore as a means to fulfil our purpose in life–has perceptibly diminished. Now and then one seems to realize that this is not just the pressure of civilization, but that something inherent in the function itself denies us total satisfaction and forces us on to other paths. This may be wrong–it is hard to decide. *



Sigmund Freud



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*  The organic periodicity of the sexual process had been retained, but its influence on psychical sexual excitation was reversed. This change was most probably connected with the decline of the olfactory stimuli by which the menstrual process affected the mate psyche. Their role was taken over by visual excitations, which differed from the intermittent olfactory stimuli in that they could remain permanently effective. The taboo on menstruation stems from this 'organic repression', as a defence against a phase of development that has been surmounted; all other motivations are probably of a secondary nature. (Cf. C. D. Daly, 'Hindumythologie und Kastrationskomplex', Imago XIII, 1927.) This process is replicated at a different level when the gods of a past cultural period become the demons of the next. However, the decline of the olfactory stimuli itself seems to have resulted from man's decision to adopt an upright gait, which meant that the genitals, previously hidden, became visible and in need of protection, thus giving rise to a sense of shame. The beginning of the fateful process of civilization, then, would have been marked by man's adopting of an erect posture. From then on the chain of events proceeded, by way of the devaluation of the olfactory stimuli and the isolation of the menstrual period, to the preponderance of the visual stimuli and the visibility of the genitals, then to the continuity of sexual excitation and the founding of the family, and so to the threshold of human civilization. This is merely theoretical speculation, but it is sufficiently important to deserve to be precisely tested against the conditions of life obtaining among those animals that are closely related to man.

There is an unmistakable social factor in the cultural striving for cleanliness too, which was later justified on grounds of hygiene, but manifested itself before this connection was appreciated. The urge for cleanliness arises from the wish to get rid of excrement, which has become repugnant to the senses. In the nursery, as we know, things are different. Excrement does not arouse any disgust in the child; it seems valuable to him as a part of his body that has become detached. Upbringing here insists on accelerating the future course of development, which will make excrement worthless, disgusting, revolting and abominable. Such a reversal of values would be scarcely possible if this material excreted by the body were not condemned by its strong smell to share the fate that overtook the olfactory stimuli after man adopted an erect posture. Hence, anal eroticism first yields to the 'organic repression' that paved the way for civilization. Evidence of the social factor, leading to the further transformation of anal eroticism, is found in the fact that, all evolutionary progress notwithstanding, human beings hardly find the smell of their own excrement offensive–only that of others. A person who lacks cleanliness–who does not hide his excrement–thereby offends others and shows them no consideration, and this is reflected in our strongest and commonest terms of abuse. It would also be incomprehensible that man should use the name of his most faithful friend in the animal world as a term of abuse, were it not for the fact that the dog incurs his contempt through two of its characteristics: as an animal that relies on smell it does not shun excrement, and it is not ashamed of its sexual functions.

*  The following observations are offered in support of the supposition made above. Man too is an animal with an unequivocally bisexual disposition. The individual represents a fusion of two symmetrical halves; one of these, in the opinion of some investigators, is purely male, the other female. It is equally possible that each half was originally hermaphrodite. Sexuality is a biological fact that is immensely important in our psychical life, but it is hard to compre hend psychologically. We are in the habit of saying that every human being exhibits both male and female impulses, needs and properties, but while anatomy can distinguish between male and female, psy chology cannot. In the latter discipline the contrast between 'male' and 'female' pales into one between 'active' and 'passive'. We do not hesitate to equate 'active' with 'male' and 'passive' with 'female', but these equations are by no means universally confirmed by the study of animals. The theory of bisexuality is still shrouded in obscurity, and the fact that it has not been connected with that of the drives is bound to strike us as a serious flaw in psychoanalysis. Be that as it may, if we take it to be a fact that every individual seeks to satisfy both male and female desires in his or her sexual life, we are prepared for the possibility that these are not fulfilled by the same object and that they interfere with one another unless they can be kept apart and each impulse can be guided into the proper channel. A further difficulty arises because erotic relations are so often associated with a degree of direct aggression, quite apart from the sadistic component that properly belongs to them. Faced with such complications, the love-object will not always be as understanding and tolerant as the farmer's wife who complained that her husband no longer loved her because he had not beaten her for a week.

The surmise that goes deepest, however, is one that arises from my remarks in the footnote [section IV, p. 46], to the effect that, with man's adoption of an upright posture and the devaluation of his sense of smell, the whole of his sexuality–not just his anal eroticism–was in danger of becoming subject to organic repression, so that the sexual function has since been accompanied by an unaccountable repugnance, which prevents total gratification and deflects it from the sexual aim towards sublimations and displacements of the libido. I know that some time ago Bleuler ('Der Sexualwiderstand', Jahrbuch für psychoanalytische und psy-chopathologische Forschungen V [1913]) pointed to the existence of an original aversion to sexual life. All neurotics, and many others, object to the fact that inter urinas et faeces nascimur ('we are born between urine and faeces'). The genitals give off strong smells that are intolerable to many and spoil their enjoyment of sexual intercourse. Hence, the ultimate root of the sexual repression that accompanies cultural progress would seem to be the organic defence of the new way of life, ushered in by man's adoption of an upright gait, against his earlier animal existence. This result of scientific research coincides in a curious way with a banal prejudice that is often voiced. However, these are at present merely unconfirmed possibilities that lack any scientific corroboration. And let us not forget that, in spite of the undoubted devaluation of olfactory stimuli, there are certain peoples, even in Europe, for whom the pungent genital odours we find offensive are valuable sexual stimuli, which they would be loath to forgo. (See the folkdoric findings of Iwan Bloch's questionnaire on 'the sense of smell in sexual life', published in various issues of the Anthropophyteia of Friedrich S. Krauss.)

5

Psychoanalytic work has taught us that it is precisely these frustrations of sexual life that those whom we call neurotics cannot endure. Neurotics create substitutive satisfactions for themselves in their symptoms, but these either create suffering in themselves or become sources of suffering by causing the subjects difficulties in their relations with their surroundings and society. The latter fact is easy to understand, but the former poses a fresh puzzle. However, civilization demands other sacrifices apart from that of sexual satisfaction.

We have viewed the difficulty of cultural development as a general difficulty of development by tracing it back to the inertia of the libido, to the latter's unwillingness to give up an old position for a new one. We are saying much the same thing when we derive the opposition between civilization and sexuality from the fact that sexual love is a relationship between two people, in which a third party can only be superfluous or trouble some, whereas civilization rests on relations between quite large numbers of people. When a love relationship is at its height, the lovers no longer have any interest in the world around them; they are self-sufficient as a pair, and in order to be happy they do not even need the child they have in common. In no other case does Eros so deafly reveal what is at the core of his being, the aim of making one out of more than one; however, having achieved this proverbial goal by making two people fall in love, he refuses to go any further.

Up to now we can well imagine a cultural community consisting of such double individuals, libidinally sated in themselves, but linked by the bonds of shared work and interests. If this were so it would not be necessary for civilization to rob sexuality of any of its energy. But this desirable state of affairs does not exist, and never has. Reality shows us that civilization is not satisfied with the bonds that have so far been conceded to it; it seeks also to bind the members of the community libidinally to one another, employing every available means to this end, favouring any path that leads to strong identifications among them, and summoning up the largest possible measure of aim-inhibited libido in order to reinforce the communal bonds with ties of friendship. For the fulfilment of these objectives the restriction of sexual life becomes inevitable. Yet we lack any understanding of the necessity that forces civilization along this path and can account for its opposition to sexuality. There must be a disturbing factor that we have not yet discovered.

One of what have been called the ideal demands of civilized society may put us on the fight track. It runs: 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself'. It is famous the world over, and certainly older than Christianity, which puts it forward as its proudest claim, but assuredly not very old, for in historical times it still struck people as strange. We will approach it naively, as if we were heating it for the first time. We shall then be unable to suppress a sense of surprise and bewilderment. Why should we behave in this way? What good will it do us? But above all, how shall we manage to act like this? How will it be possible? My love is something I value and must not throw away irresponsibly. It imposes duties on me, and in performing these duties I must be prepared to make sacrifices. If I love another person, he must in some way deserve it. (I will disregard whatever use he may be to me, and whatever importance he may have for me as a sexual object: these two kinds of relationship have no relevance to the injunction to love my neighbour.) He deserves it if, in certain important respects, he so much resembles me that in him I can love myself. He deserves it if he is so much more perfect than myself that I can love in him an ideal image of myself. I must love him if he is my friend's son, for the pain my friend would feel if any harm befell him would be my pain too; I should have to share it. But if he is a stranger to me and cannot attract me by any merit of his own or by any importance he has acquired in my emotional life, it becomes hard for me to love him. Indeed, it would be wrong of me to do so, for my love is prized by my family and friends as a sign of my preference for them; to put a stranger on a par with them would be to do them an injustice. Yet if I am to love him, with this universal love-just because he is a creature of this earth, like an insect, an earthworm or a grass-snake–then I fear that only a modicum of love will fall to his share, and certainly not as much as the judgement of my reason entitles me to reserve for myself. What is the point of such a portentous precept if its fulfilment cannot commend itself as reasonable?

On closer inspection I find still more difficulties. This stranger is not only altogether unlovable: I must honestly confess that he has a greater claim to my enmity, even to my hatred. He appears to have not the least love for me and shows me not the slightest consideration. If it is to his advantage, he has no hesitation in harming me, nor does he ask himself whether the magnitude of his advantage is commensurate with the harm he does me. Indeed, it need not bring him any advantage at all: if he can merely satisfy some desire by acting in this way, he will think nothing of mocking, insulting or slandering me, or using me as a foil to show off his power. The more secure he feels and the more helpless I am, the surer I can be of his behaving towards me like this. If he acts differently towards me, a stranger, and treats me with consideration and forbearance, I am in any case ready to repay him in like coin, without any injunction to do so. Indeed, if this grandiose commandment were to read: 'Love thy neighbour as thy neighbour loves thee', I should have no quarrel with it. There is another commandment that I find even more unintelligible and that causes me to rebel even more fiercely. It runs: 'Love thine enemies.' But on reflection I see that I am wrong to reject it as a still greater presumption. Essentially it is no different. *

But now I seem to hear a dignified voice admonishing me: 'It is precisely because your neighbour is not lovable, but on the contrary your enemy, that you must love him as yourself.' I then understand this to be another instance of Credo quia absurdum ('I believe it because it is absurd').

Now, it is quite likely that my neighbour, if enjoined to love me as himself, will react exactly as I do and reject me for the very same reasons. I hope he will not have the same objective justification, but he will be of the same mind. However, there are differences in human behaviour that ethics classify as 'good' and 'evil', disregarding the fact that such differences are conditioned. While these undeniable differences remain, the fulfilment of these high ethical demands is detrimental to the purposes of civilization in that it proposes direct rewards for wrongful conduct. In this connection one cannot help recalling an incident that occurred in the French Chamber when capital punishment was being debated. One speaker pleaded passionately for its abolition and received tumultuous applause, until a voice called out from the body of the hall: 'Que messieurs les assassins commencent!' ['Let the murderers make the first move!']

The reality behind all this, which many would deny, is that human beings are not gentle creatures in need of love, at most able to defend themselves if attacked; on the contrary, they can count a powerful share of aggression among their instinctual endowments. Hence, their neighbour is not only a potential helper or sexual object, but also someone who tempts them to take out their aggression on him, to exploit his labour without recompense, to use him sexually without his consent, to take possession of his goods, to humiliate him and cause him pain, to torture and kill him. Homo homini lupus [Man is a wolf to man]. Who, after all that he has learnt from life and history, would be so bold as to dispute this proposition? As a rule, this cruel aggression waits for some provocation or puts itself at the service of a different aim, which could be attained by milder means. If the circumstances favour it, if the psychical counter-forces that would otherwise inhibit it have ceased to operate, it manifests itself spontaneously and reveals man as a savage beast that has no thought of sparing its own kind. Whoever calls to mind the horrors of the migrations of the peoples, the incursions of the Huns, or of the people known as the Mongols under Genghiz Khan and Tamefiane, the conquest of Jerusalem by the pious Crusaders, or indeed the horrors of the Great War, will be obliged to acknowledge this as a fact.

It is the existence of this tendency to aggression, which we detect in ourselves and rightly presume in others, that vitiates our relations with our neighbour and obliges civilization to go to such lengths. Given this fundamental hostility of human beings to one another, civilized society is constantly threatened with disintegration. A common interest in work would not hold it together: passions that derive from the drives are stronger than reasonable interests. Civilization has to make every effort to limit man's aggressive drives and hold down their manifestations through the formation of psychical reactions. This leads to the use of methods that are meant to encourage people to identify themselves with others and enter into aim-inhibited erotic relationships, to the restriction of sexual life, and also to the ideal commandment to love one's neighbour as oneself, which is actually justified by the fact that nothing else runs so much counter to basic human nature. For all the effort invested in it, this cultural endeavour has so far not achieved very much. It hopes to prevent the crudest excesses of brutal violence by assuming the right to use violence against criminals, but the law cannot deal with the subtler manifestations of human aggression. There comes a point at which each of us abandons, as illusions, the expectations he pinned to his fellow men when he was young and can appreciate how difficult and painful his life is made by their ill will. At the same time it would be unjust to reproach civilization with wanting to exclude contention and competition from human activity. These are certainly indispensable, but opposition is not necessarily enmity: it is merely misused as an occasion for the latter.

The communists think they have found the way to redeem mankind from evil. Man is unequivocally good and well disposed to his neighbour, but his nature has been corrupted by the institution of private property. Ownership of property gives the individual the power, and so the temptation, to mistreat his neighbour; who ever is excluded from ownership is bound to be hostile to the oppressor and rebel against him. When private property is abolished, when goods are held in common and enjoyed by all, ill will and enmity among human beings will cease. Because all needs will be satisfied, no one will have any reason to see another person as his enemy; everyone will be glad to undertake whatever work is necessary. I am not concerned with economic criticisms of the communist system; I have no way of knowing whether the abolition of private property is expedient and beneficial. * But I can recognize the psychological presumption behind it as a baseless illusion. With the abolition of private property the human love of aggression is robbed of one of its tools, a strong one no doubt, but certainly not the strongest. No change has been made in the disparities of power and influence that aggression exploits in pursuit of its ends, or in its nature. Aggression was not created by property; it prevailed with almost no restriction in primitive times, when property was very scanty. It already manifests itself in the nursery, where property has hardly given up its original anal form. It forms the basis of all affectionate and loving relations among human beings, with perhaps the one exception of the relation between the mother and her male child. Even if we do away with the personal right to own material goods, the prerogative that resides in sexual relations still remains, and this is bound to become the source of the greatest animosity and the fiercest enmity among human beings who are equal in all other respects. If we remove this inequality too and allow total sexual freedom–thus doing away with the family, the germ-cell of civilization–it will admittedly be impossible to foresee on what new paths the development of civilization may strike out. But of one thing we can be certain: this indestructible feature of human nature will follow it wherever it leads.

It is clearly not easy for people to forgo the satisfaction of their tendency to aggression. To do so makes them feel uneasy. One should not belittle the advantage that is enjoyed by a fairly small cultural circle, which is that it allows the aggressive drive an outlet in the form of hostility to outsiders. It is always possible to bind quite large numbers of people together in love, provided that others are left out as targets for aggression. I once discussed this phenomenon, the fact that it is precisely those communities that occupy contiguous territories and are otherwise closely related to each other–like the Spaniards and the Portuguese, the North Germans and the South Germans, the English and the Scots, etc.–that indulge in feuding and mutual mockery. I called this phenomenon 'the narcissism of small differences'–not that the name does much to explain it. It can be seen as a convenient and relatively innocuous way of satisfying the tendency to aggression and facilitating solidarity within the community. The Jews of the diaspora have made valuable contributions to the cultures of the countries in which they have settled, but unfortunately all the massacres of Jews that took place in the Middle Ages failed to make the age safer and more peaceful for the Christians. After St Paul had made universal brotherly love the foundation of his Christian community, the extreme intolerance of Christianity towards those let outside it was an inevitable consequence. To the Romans, whose state was not founded on love, religious intolerance had been quite foreign, though religion was a state concern and the state was steeped in religion. Nor was it quite fortuitous and incomprehensible that the Germanic dream of world-dominion should invoke anti-semitism as its complement. And it is under standable that the attempt to establish a new, communist culture in Russia should find psychological support in the persecution of the bourgeois. One only wonders, with some anxiety, what the Soviets will turn to when they have exterminated their bourgeoisie.

If civilization imposes such great sacrifices not only on man's sexuality, but also on his aggressivity, we are in a better position to understand why it is so hard for him to feel happy in it. Primitive man was actually better off, because his drives were not restricted. Yet this was counterbalanced by the fact that he had little certainty of enjoying this good fortune for long. Civilized man has traded in a portion of his chances of happiness for a certain measure of security. But let us not forget that in the primeval family only its head could give full rein to his drives; its other members lived in slavish suppression. In that primordial era of civilization there was therefore an extreme contrast between a minority who enjoyed its benefits and the majority to whom they were denied. As for today's primitive peoples, more careful study has shown that we have no reason whatever to envy them their instinctual life by reason of the freedom attaching to it; it is subject to restrictions of a different kind, which are perhaps even more severe than those imposed on modem civilized man.

When we rightly reproach the present state of our civilization with its inadequate response to our demand for a form of life that will make us happy, and with allowing so much suffering, which could probably be avoided–and when we strive, with unsparing criticism, to expose the roots of this inadequacy–we are exercising a legitimate right and certainly not revealing ourselves as enemies of civilization. We may hope gradually to carry out such modifications in our civilization as will better satisfy our needs and escape this criticism. But perhaps we shall also become familiar with the idea that there are some difficulties that are inherent in the nature of civilization and will defy any attempt at reform. In addition to the tasks involved in restricting the drives–for which we are prepared–we are faced with the danger of a condition that we may call 'the psychological misery of the mass'. This danger is most threatening where social bonding is produced mainly by the participants' identification with one another, while individuals of leadership calibre do not acquire the importance that should be accorded to them in the formation of the mass. The present state of American civilization would provide a good opportunity to study the cultural damage that is to be feared. But I shall avoid the temptation to engage in a critique of American civilization; I do not wish to give the impression of wanting to employ American methods myself.



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*  A great writer can allow himself, at least in jest, to express psychologi cal truths that incur severe disapproval. Heine, for instance, confesses: 'I have the most peaceable disposition. My wishes are: a modest cottage with a thatched roof, but a good bed, good food, milk and butter, very fresh, flowers in front of the window, a few beautiful trees in front of the door; and if the good Lord wants to make me completely happy, he will grant me the pleasure of seeing six or seven of my enemies hanged from these trees. My heart will be moved, and before they die I will forgive them all the wrongs they did me in their lifetime. Yes, one must forgive one's enemies, but not before they are hanged.'

*  Anyone who has tasted the misery of poverty in his youth and experienced the indifference and arrogance of propertied people, should be safe from the suspicion that he has no sympathy with current efforts to combat inequalities of wealth and all that flows from them. Of course, if this struggle seeks to appeal to the abstract demand, made in the name of justice, for equality among all men, the objection is all too obvious: nature, by her highly unequal endowment of individuals with physical attributes and mental abilities, has introduced injustices that cannot be remedied.

6

With none of my writings have I had such a strong feeling as I have now that what I am describing is common knowledge, that I am using pen and paper, and shall soon be using the services of the compositor and the printer, to say things that are in fact self-evident. For this reason I shall be glad to take the matter up if it appears that the recognition of a special, independent aggressive drive entails a modification of psychoanalytic theory regarding the drives.

It will be seen that this is not so, that it is merely a matter of focusing more sharply on a change of direction that took place long ago, and of following up its consequences. Of all the elements of analytic theory that have taken so long to develop, the doctrine of the drives is the one that has edged its way forward most laboriously. And yet it was so indispensable to the whole that some thing had to be put in its place. After I had at first been totally at a loss, my first clue came from a proposition by the poet-philosopher Schiller, to the effect that the mechanism of the world was held together by 'hunger and love'. Hunger could be taken to represent those drives that seek to preserve the individual creature, whereas love strives after objects, and its chief function, favoured in every way by nature, is to preserve the species. Thus at first ego-drives and object-drives con fronted one another. To denote the energy of the latter–and them alone–I introduced the term 'libido'; there was thus a contrast between the ego-drives and the libidinal drives of love, in the widest sense of the word, which were directed towards an object. One of these latter, the sadistic drive, admittedly stood out from the rest because its aim was so utterly devoid of love. More over, in some respects it was obviously attached to the ego-drives; it could not conceal its close affinity to the drives that aim at domination and have no libidinal purpose. However, it proved possible to get over this discrepancy: after all, sadism was clearly part of sexual life, in which cruelty could replace tendemess. Neurosis appeared to be the result of a struggle between the interest of self-preservation and the demands of the libido, a struggle in which the ego had triumphed, but at the price of grave suffering and sacrifice.

Every analyst will admit that even today this does not sound like a long-discarded error. Yet a modification became indispensable when our research proceeded from what was repressed to the agent of repression, from the object-drives to the ego. The decisive step here was the introduction of the concept of narcissism–that is to say the recognition that the ego itself is occupied by libido, that it is in fact the libido's original home and remains to some extent its headquarters. This narcissistic libido turns towards objects, thus becoming object libido, and can change back again into narcissistic libido. The concept of narcissism made it possible to understand and analyse traumatic neurosis, together with many other conditions that are closely related to the psychoses, as well as the psychoses themselves. There was no need to abandon the interpretation of transference neuroses as attempts by the ego to fend of sexuality, but the concept of libido was endangered. Since the ego-drives too were libidinal, it seemed for a time inevitable that the libido should be allowed to merge with the energy of the drives generally, as C. G. Jung had earlier advocated. Yet there remained something like a certainty, as yet unexplained, that the drives could not all be of the same kind. My next step was taken in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), when I was first struck by the compulsion to repeat and the conservative nature of the drives. Starting from speculations about the beginning of life and from biological parallels, I reached the conclusion that, in addition to the drive to preserve the living substance and bring it together in ever larger units, * there must be another, opposed to it, which sought to break down these units and restore them to their primordial inorganic state. Beside Eros, then, there was a death drive, and the inter action and counteraction of these two could explain the phenomena of life. Now, it was not easy to demonstrate the activity of this supposed death drive. The manifestations of Eros were plain enough to see and hear; one might presume that the death drive operated silently inside the living being, working towards its dissolution, but this of course did not amount to a proof. A more fruitful idea was that a portion of the drive was directed against the external world and then appeared as a drive that aimed at aggression and destruction. In this way the drive was itself pressed into the service of Eros, inasmuch as the organism destroyed other things, both animate and inanimate, instead of itself. Conversely, any restriction of this outward-directed aggression would be bound to increase the degree of self-destruction, which in any case continued. At the same time one could surmise, on the basis of this example, that the two kinds of drive seldom–perhaps never–appeared in isolation, but alloyed with one another in different and highly varying proportions and so became unrecognizable to our judgement. In sadism, which has long been recognized as a partial drive of sexuality, one would be faced with a particularly strong alloy of the striving for love and the drive for destruction, just as its counterpart, masochism, would be a combination of inward-directed destruction and sexuality, through which the otherwise imperceptible striving became conspicuous and palpable.

The assumption of a death drive or a drive for destruction has met with resistance even in analytic circles; I am aware that there is a widespread tendency to ascribe anything that is thought to be dangerous or hostile about love to an original bipolarity in its own nature. The views I have developed here were at first put forward only tentatively, but in the course of time they have taken such a hold on me that I can no longer think in any other way. In my view they are theoretically far more serviceable than any others one might entertain; they produce what we strive for in scientific work–a simple answer that neither neglects nor does violence to the facts. I recognize that we have always seen sadism and masochism as manifestations of the destructive drive, directed outwards or inwards and strongly alloyed with eroticism, but I can no longer understand how we could have ignored the ubiquity of non-erotic aggression and destruction and failed to accord it its due place in the interpretation of life. (The inward-directed craving for destruction mostly eludes our perception, of course, unless it is tinged with eroticism.) I can remember how I myself resisted the idea ora destructive drive when it first appeared in psychoanalytic literature, and how long it took me to become receptive to it. That others rejected it too, and still do, I find less surprising. 'For the little children do not like it' when there is talk of man's inborn tendency to 'wickedness', to aggression and destruction, and there fore to cruelty. For God created them in his own perfect image; one does not wish to be reminded of how hard it is to reconcile the existence of evil, which cannot be denied–despite the protestations of Christian Science–with His infinite power and goodness. The Devil would be the best excuse for God; he would take on the same exculpatory role in this context as the Jew in the world of the Aryan ideal. But even so, one can still demand that God be held responsible for the existence of the Devil and the evil he embodies. In view of these difficulties, it is advisable for each of us, at an appropriate point, to make a profound obeisance to man's deeply moral nature; this will help to make us generally popular, and much will be forgiven us. *

The name 'libido' can once more be applied to manifestations of the power of Eros, in order to distinguish them from the energy of the death drive. It has to be admitted that the latter is much harder to grasp and can to some extent be discerned only as a residue left behind by Eros, and that it escapes our notice unless it is revealed through being alloyed with Eros. It is in sadism, where it perverts the erotic aim for its own purposes while fully satisfying the sexual striving, that we have the clearest insight into its nature and its relation to Eros. Yet even where it appears without any sexual purpose, in the blindest destructive fury, there is no mistaking the fact that its satisfaction is linked with an extraordinarily high degree of narcissistic enjoyment, in that this satisfaction shows the ego how its old wish for omnipotence can be fulfilled. Moderated and tamed–aim-inhibited, as it were–the destructive drive, when directed towards objects, must provide the ego with the satisfaction of its vital needs and with control over nature. As its existence is posited essentially on theoretical grounds, one must also admit that it is not wholly proof against theoretical objections. But this is how things appear to us now, in the present state of our knowledge; future research and reflection will undoubtedly bring the decisive clarification.

For the rest, I take the view that the tendency to aggression is an original, autonomous disposition in man, and I return to my earlier contention that it represents the greatest obstacle to civilization. At one point in this investigation we were faced with the realization that civilization was a special process undergone by humanity, and we are still under the spell of this idea. We will now add that it is a process in the service of Eros, whose purpose is to gather together individuals, then families and finally tribes, peoples and nations in one great unit–humanity. Why this has to happen we do not know: it is simply the work of Eros. These multitudes of human beings are to be libidinally bound to one another; necessity alone, the advantages of shared work, will not hold them together. However, this programme of civilization is opposed by man's natural aggressive drive, the hostility of each against all and all against each. This aggressive drive is the descendant and principal representative of the death drive, which we have found beside Eros and which rules the world jointly with him. And now, I think, the meaning of the development of civilization is no longer obscure to us. This development must show us the struggle between Eros and death, between the life drive and the drive for destruction, as it is played out in the human race. This struggle is the essential content of all life; hence, the development of civilization may be described simply as humanity's struggle for existence. * And this battle of the giants is what our nurse-maids seek to mitigate with their lullaby about heaven.



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*  The contrast that emerges here between the restless expansive tendency of Eros and the generally conservative nature of the drives is striking and could become the starting point for the study of further problems.

*  Especially convincing is the equation of the principle of evil with the destructive drive in the person of Goethe's Mephistopheles: 'For everything that comes into being /Is worthy of destruction /…/ So, then, everything you call sin, / Destruction–in short, evil- / Is my true element.'

As his adversary, the devil himself names not the holy and the good, but nature's power to procreate, to multiply life–in other words, Eros: 'From air, water and earth/A thousand germs break forth, / In dry, wet, warm and cold!/Had I not reserved the flame for myself, / I should have nothing to call my own.'

 Our present view can be roughly expressed in the proposition that libido is involved in the manifestation of every drive, but not everything in this manifestation is libido.

*  Probably we should add, to be more precise: 'in the shape it was bound to take on after a certain event that is still a matter for conjecture'.

7

Why do our relatives, the animals, show no sign of such a cultural struggle? We have no way of knowing. It is very likely that some of them–the bees, the ants, the termites–struggled for thousands of centuries until they evolved the state institutions, the distribution of functions, the restrictions on individuals, for which we admire them today. It is characteristic of our present condition that we feel we should not be happy in any of these animal states or the roles assigned in them to individuals. In the case of other animal species it may be that a temporary compromise was reached between the influences of their surroundings and the conflicting drives within them, so that any development was brought to a halt. It may be that in primitive man a fresh access of libido fanned fresh resistance on the part of the destructive drive. There are many questions to be asked, and as yet no answers.

Another question is closer to home. What means does civilization employ in order to inhibit the aggression it faces, to render it harmless and possibly eliminate it? We have already become acquainted with some of the methods, but not with the one that seems most important. We can study this in the development of the individual. What happens to him to render his aggressivity harmless? Something very curious, which we would not have suspected, but which is plain to see. The aggression is introjected, internalized, actually sent back to where it came from; in other words, it is directed against the individual's own ego. There it is taken over by a portion of the ego that sets itself up as the super-ego, in opposition to the rest, and is now prepared, as 'conscience', to exercise the same severe aggression against the ego that the latter would have liked to direct towards other individuals. The tension between the stem super-ego and the ego that is subject to it is what we call a 'sense of guilt'; this manifests itself as a need for punishment. In this way civilization overcomes the dangerous aggressivity of the individual, by weakening him, disarming him and setting up an internal authority to watch over him, like a garrison in a conquered town.

Regarding the origin of the sense of guilt, the analyst's view differs from that of other psychologists, and he too finds it difficult to account for. In the first place, if we ask how a person comes to have a sense of guilt, the answer we receive cannot be gainsaid: one feels guilty (pious people would say 'sinful') if one has done something one recognizes as 'evil'. Ten we realize how little this tells us. After some hesitation we may add that even a person who has done no wrong, but merely recognizes in himself an intention to do wrong, may consider him self guilty–which raises the question of why in this case the intention is equated with the deed. Both cases presuppose that we have already recognized evil as reprehensible, as something that should not be carried out. How do we arrive at this judgement? We may reject the notion of an original–as it were, natural–capacity to distinguish between good and evil. Evil is often far from harmful or dangerous to the ego; it may even be some thing it welcomes and takes pleasure in. Here, then, is a pointer to an outside influence, which determines what is to be called good or evil. As a person's own feelings would not have led him in this direction, he must have a motive for submitting to this outside influence. This is easily dicovered in his helplessness and dependency on others; it can best be described as a fear of loss of love. If he loses the love of a person he depends on, he is no longer protected against various dangers; above all, he is exposed to the risk that this more powerful person will demonstrate his superiority by punishing him. At first, then, evil is something for which one is threatened with loss of love; it must therefore be avoided. Hence, it hardly matters whether one has already done some thing wrong or merely intends to; in either case the danger arises only if the supervising authority finds out, and in either case the authority would behave in the same way.

This state of mind we call a 'bad conscience', but it really does not merit the name, for at this stage consciousness of guilt is clearly no more than a fear of loss of love, a 'social' anxiety. In a small child it can never be anything else, but for many adults too the only change is that the place once occupied by the father, or by both parents, has been taken over by the wider human community. Hence, adults regularly allow themselves to commit wrongful acts that hold out the promise of enjoyment, so long as they are sure that the authority will not learn of it or cannot hold it against them; their only fear is of being found out. This is the state of affairs that today's society generally has to reckon with.

Nothing much changes until the authority is internalized through the establishment of the super-ego. The phenomena of conscience are thereby raised to a new level; only now can one properly speak of conscience and a sense of guilt. * The fear of discovery is no longer an issue, nor is the difference between wrong-doing and the intention to do wrong, for nothing, not even one's thoughts, can be hidden from the super-ego. Of course, the real gravity of the situation has passed, for to the best of our belief the new authority, the superego, has no reason to ill-treat the ego, with which it is intimately linked. But the way it came into existence is still influential in ensuring the survival of what is past and has been surmounted, so that things remain essentially as they were at the beginning. The superego torments the sinful ego with the same anxieties and is on the look-out for opportunities to expose it to punishment by the external world.

At this second stage of development, the conscience exhibits a peculiarity that was absent at the first and is not easy to explain. The more virtuous a person is, the sterner and more distrustful is his conscience, so that the very people who have attained the highest degree of saintliness are in the end the ones who accuse themselves of being most sinful. Virtue thus forfeits part of its promised reward; the compliant and abstinent ego does not enjoy the trust of its mentor and seemingly strives in vain to earn it. Now, it will at once be objected that these are artifically contrived difficulties, that a stricter and more vigilant conscience is the hallmark of a moral nature, and that if saints call themselves sinners, this is not without justification, in view of the temptations they are under to satisfy their drives, temptations to which they are particularly exposed, as it is well known that temptations are only increased by constant frustration, but diminished, at least for a time, by the occasional satisfaction. Another fact in the highly problematic field of ethics is that ill luck–that is to say, external frustration–greatly enhances the force of conscience in the super-ego. So long as things go well for a person, his conscience is lenient and indulges the ego in all kinds of ways. When a misfortune has befallen him he searches his soul, recognizes his sinfulness, pitches the demands of his conscience higher, imposes privations on himself, and punishes himself by acts of penance. * Whole peoples have behaved like this and still do. However, this is easily explained by reference to the original infantile phase of the conscience, which is not abandoned after the introjection into the super-ego, but persists beside and behind it. Fate is seen as replacing parental authority; if one suffers misfortune, this is because one is no longer loved by this supreme power, and under the threat of such loss of love, one again bows to the virtual parental authority of the super-ego, which one was happy to ignore while one's luck held. This becomes especially clear if one takes a strictly religious view and sees fate only as the expression of the divine will. The people of Israel had thought of itself as God's favourite child, and when the great Father let one misfortune after another rain down upon His people, it never doubted this relationship with God or questioned His power and justice, but brought forth the prophets, who reproached it for its sinfulness, and created, from its consciousness of guilt, the exceedingly stem precepts of its priestly religion. It is curious how differently primitive man behaves. Having met with misfortune, he puts the blame not on himself, but on the fetish, which has clearly not done its duty, and whips it instead of punishing himself.

We thus know of two origins of the sense of guilt: one is fear of authority; the other, which came later, is fear of the super-ego. The former forces us to forgo the satisfaction of our drives; in addition to this, the latter insists on punishment, for the continuance of our for bidden desires cannot be hidden from the super-ego. We have also learnt how the severity of the super-ego–the requirements of conscience–can be understood. This severity simply perpetuates that of the external authority, which it supersedes and partly replaces. We now see how renunciation of the drives relates to consciousness of guilt. Initially this renunciation results from fear of the external authority; one renounces certain satisfactions in order to avoid losing its love. After renouncing them, one is, as it were, quits with the authority, and no sense of guilt should remain. Tings are different, however, when it comes to fear of the super-ego. To renounce the drives is no longer enough, for the desire persists and cannot be concealed from the super-ego. Despite one's renunciation, then, a sense of guilt will arise, and this is a great economic disadvantage in the institution of the super-ego, or, one might say, in the formation of conscience. Renunciation of the drives no longer has a fully liberating effect; virtuous abstention is no longer rewarded by the assurance of love; the threat of extemal unhappiness–loss of love, and punishment at the hands of the external authority–has been exchanged for an enduring inner unhappiness, the tension generated by the consciousness of guilt.

These interrelations are at once so complicated and so important that, at the risk of repeating myself, I should like to tackle them from a different angle. The chronological sequence, then, would be as follows: first, renunciation of the drives, resulting from fear of aggression from the external authority (for this is what fear of the loss of love amounts to, love being a protection against this punitive aggression), then the setting up of the internal authority and the renunciation of the drives, resulting from fear of this authority, fear of conscience. In this second situation an evil deed is on a par with an evil intention; hence the consciousness of guilt and the need for punishment. The aggression of the conscience continues the aggression of the external authority. This much is probably already clear, but what room is let for the influence of misfortune–renunciation imposed from without–which reinforces the conscience, for the extraordinary severity of conscience that is found in the best and most tractable persons? We have already explained both these peculiarities of conscience, but we probably still have the impression that our explanations fail to go to the heart of the matter and leave some things unexplained. And here at last an idea comes in that belongs entirely to psychoanalysis and is foreign to our ordinary way of thinking. This idea is such as to enable us to understand why the subject was bound to strike us as so confused and lacking in transparency. For it tells us that although it is at first the conscience (or, rather, the fear that later becomes the conscience) that causes us to renounce the drives, this causal relation is later reversed. Every renunciation of the drives now becomes a dynamic source of conscience; every fresh renunciation reinforces its severity and intolerance; and if we could only bring it more into harmony with what we know about the emergence of conscience, we should be tempted to endorse the paradoxical statement that conscience results from the renunciation of the drives, or that this renunciation (imposed on us from without) creates the conscience, which then demands further renunciation.

The contradiction between this statement and what we have said about the genesis of the conscience is not so very great, and we can see a way of reducing it further. For greater ease of presentation let us take the example of the aggressive drive, and let us assume that we are dealing in every case with the renunciation of aggression. This is naturally to be taken only as a provisional assumption. The effect that the renunciation of the drives has on the conscience is such that any aggression whose satisfaction we forgo is taken over by the super-ego and increases the latter's aggression (towards the ego). This is not consistent with the view that the original aggression of the conscience continues the severity of the external authority and has therefore nothing to do with renunciation. The inconsistency is removed, however, if we assume a different origin for the super-ego's initial stock of aggression. A considerable measure of aggressivity must have developed in the child against the authority that deprives him of his first (and most significant) satisfactions, no matter what kind of deprivations were required. The child is obliged to forgo the satisfaction of this vengeful aggression. He helps himself out of this difficult economic situation by recourse to familiar mechanisms. By means of identification he incorporates this unassailable authority into himself; it now becomes the super-ego and takes over all the aggression that, as a child, one would have liked to exercise against it. The child's ego has to content itself with the sad role of the authority–the father–which has been so degraded. As so often happens, the original situation is reversed. 'If I were the father and you the child, I should treat you badly.' The relation between the super-ego and the ego amounts to the return, distorted by the subject's desire, of the real relations between the once undivided ego and an external object. This is typical too. The essential difference, however, is that the original severity of the super-ego is not–or not to such a great extent–the severity that one has experienced from him [the father] or attributes to him; it represents rather one's own aggression towards him. If this is correct, one can actually maintain that conscience initially arose through the suppression of an aggressive impulse and continues to be reinforced by similar suppressions.

Which of these two views is correct–the earlier one, which we found genetically incontestable, or the newer one, which rounds of the theory in such a welcome fashion? Clearly both are justified, as is shown by the evidence of direct observation. They do not contradict each other; they even coincide at one point, for the vengeful aggression of the child will be determined partly by the amount of punitive aggression he expects from his father. Experience teaches us, however, that the severity of the super-ego that is developed by a child in no way replicates the severity of the treatment he has himself experienced. It appears to be independent of this: even with a very lenient upbringing, a child may develop a very stern conscience. Yet it would also be wrong to exaggerate this independence; it is not difficult to convince oneself that a strict upbringing also has a strong influence on the formation of the child's super-ego. This amounts to saying that, in the formation of the super-ego and the emergence of conscience, innate constitutional factors act in concert with influences from the real environment. This is not at all surprising; indeed, it is the universal aetiological condition for all such processes. *

One can also say that if a child reacts to the first great frustrations of the drives with excessive aggression and a corresponding severity of the super-ego, it is following a phylogenetic model and going beyond the reaction that would be justified today; for the primeval father was certainly terrible and could be credited with the utmost aggression. The differences between the two views of the genesis of conscience are thus reduced still further if one shits one's attention from individual to phylogenetic development. On the other hand, we become aware of a new and significant difference between these two developmental processes. We cannot get away from the assumption that the sense of guilt stems from the Oedipus complex and was acquired when the brothers banded together and killed the father. On that occasion aggression was not suppressed, but acted out–the same aggression whose suppression in the child is supposed to be the source of his sense of guilt. At this point I should not be surprised if the exasperated reader were to exclaim, 'so it's immaterial whether one kills one's father or not–one acquires a sense of guilt in any case! Here one may take leave to voice a few doubts. Either it is not true that the sense of guilt derives from suppressed aggression, or else the whole story of the killing of the father is a fiction, and primeval children did not kill their fathers any more often than children do today. Besides, if it is not a fiction, but a plausible piece of history, it would be a case of something happening that everybody expects to happen–of someone feeling guilty because he really has done something that cannot be justified. And for such cases, which after all occur every day, psychoanalysis still owes us an explanation.'

This is true, and the matter must be remedied. Nor is there any great mystery about it. If one has a sense of guilt after committing a misdeed, and because one has committed it, this feeling ought rather to be called remorse. It relates only to a deed, although of course it presupposes that before the deed there was already a conscience, a readiness to feel guilty. Such remorse can therefore never help us to discover the origin of conscience and of the sense of guilt generally. What usually happens in these everyday cases is that a need generated by a drive acquires sufficient strength to prevail over a relatively weak conscience and achieve satisfaction; once satisfied, the need is naturally reduced, and the previous balance of forces is restored. Psychoanalysis is therefore right to exclude from the present discussion the case of a sense of guilt that stems from remorse, however common it is and however great its practical importance.

But if man's sense of guilt goes back to the killing of the primeval father, this too was a case of 'remorse'. So should we suppose that conscience and a sense of guilt did not exist before the deed was done? Where did the remorse come from in this case? Undoubtedly this case should clear up the mystery of the sense of guilt and put an end to our embarrassments. And I believe it does. This remorse was the result of the primordial emotional ambivalence towards the father: his sons hated him, but they also loved him. Once their hate was satisfied by this act of aggression, their love manifested itself in the remorse they felt for the deed. Through identification with the father, this love established the super-ego, endowed it with the power of the father–as though to punish the act of aggression committed against him–and invented restrictions that would prevent its repetition. And since aggressivity towards the father recurred in succeeding generations, the sense of guilt remained too, and was reinforced whenever aggression was suppressed and transferred to the super-ego. Now, I think, we can at last grasp two things quite clearly: the part played by love in the emergence of conscience and the fateful inevitability of the sense of guilt. Whether one has killed one's father or refrained from doing so is not really decisive; in either case one is bound to feel guilty, for the sense of guilt is the expression of the conflict of ambivalence, the unending struggle between Eros and the destructive drive, the death drive. This conflict is fanned as soon as people are faced with the task of living together. So long as the family is the only form of communal life, the conflict is bound to express itself in the Oedipus complex, to establish the conscience and to create the primordial sense of guilt. When an attempt is made to extend the community, the conflict is continued in forms that depend on the past; it is reinforced, and leads to an increased sense of guilt. Because civilization obeys an internal erotic impulse that requires it to unite human beings in a tightly knit mass, it can achieve this goal only by constantly reinforcing the sense of guilt. What began in relation to the father is brought to fruition in relation to the mass. If civilization is the necessary trend of development that leads from the family to humanity as a whole, it follows that the intensification of the sense of guilt, perhaps to a degree that the individual finds hard to endure, is indissolubly linked with it, as a consequence of the innate conflict of ambivalence, of the perpetual contention between love and the death-wish. One is reminded of the poet's poignant indictment of the 'heavenly powers':



Ihr führt ins Leben uns hinein,
Ihr lasst den Armen schuldig werden,
Dann überlasst iht ihn der Pein,
Denn jede Schuld r ächt sich auf Erden.

[You lead us into life, you let the poor man become guilty, then you deliver him to punishment, for all guilt is avenged on earth.]



And one may well breathe a sigh of relief when one recognizes that it is nevertheless given to a few human beings to produce the most profound insights, more or less effortlessly, from the maelstrom of their own feelings, while we others constantly have to grope our way forward through agonizing insecurity.



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*  Any perceptive person will understand and take into account the fact that the present synopsis makes sharp distinctions where the real transitions are more gradual, that it is not just a question of the existence of the super-ego, but of its relative strength and its sphere of influence. After all, what has so far been said about conscience and guilt is generally known and hardly disputed.

*  The part played by misfortune in the promotion of morality is the subject of a delightful short story by Mark Twain, The first melon I ever stole. This first melon chanced to be unripe. I heard Mark Twain read the story himself. After reading out the title he stopped and asked himself: 'Was it the first?' That said it all: the first was not the only one.

*  In Psychoanalyse der Gesamtpers8nlichkeit (1927) Franz Alexander has accurately assessed the two main types of pathogenic methods of upbringing, over-strictness and over-indulgence, in connection with Aichhorn's study of delinquency. The 'excessively soft and indulgent' father will cause a child to form an excessively severe super-ego, because the child, influenced by the love it receives, has no other way of dealing with its aggression than by turning it inwards. In the delinquent who has been brought up without love there is no tension between the ego and the super-ego: all his aggression can be directed outwards. Hence, if one disregards any constitutional factor that may be presumed to exist, one can say that a strict conscience arises from the interplay of two influences on a person's life: the frustration of the drives, which unleashes aggression, and the experience of being loved, which turns this aggression inwards and transfers it to the super-ego.

8

Having reached the end of a road like the present one, the author must beg his readers' forgiveness for not being a more skilful guide and for not sparing them a number of dreary stretches and tiresome detours. It can undoubtedly be done better. I will now try, rather late in the day, to make some amends.

In the first place, I suspect, the readers will have the impression that the discussions of the sense of guilt distort the framework of this essay, in that they take up too much space and push the rest of the content, with which they are not always closely related, to one side. This may have disturbed the structure of the study, but accords entirely with its intention, which is to present the sense of guilt as the most important problem in the development of civilization and to show how the price we pay for cultural progress is a loss of happiness, arising from a heightened sense of guilt. *

Whatever still seems strange about this proposition, the final conclusion of our study, can probably be traced back to the quite peculiar relationship, which still is far from understood, between the sense of guilt and our consciousness. In the common instances of remorse that we regard as normal, the sense of guilt makes itself clearly perceptible to the consciousness; indeed, we often speak of a 'consciousness of guilt' instead of a 'sense of guilt'. From the study of neuroses, to which, after all, we owe the most valuable pointers to an understanding of what is normal, a number of contradictions emerge. In one of these disorders, obsessional neurosis, the sense of guilt forces itself stridently on the consciousness, dominating both the clinical picture and the patient's life, and allowing hardly anything else to appear beside it. In most other forms of neurosis, however, it remains quite unconscious, though the effects it produces are not for that reason any less important. Patients do not believe us when we tell them they have an 'unconscious sense of guilt', and so, to make ourselves to some extent intelligible, we speak of an unconscious need for punishment, in which the sense of guilt expresses itself. How ever, its connection with one form of neurosis should not be overstated, for even in cases of obsessional neurosis there are some types of patient who are unaware of their sense of guilt, or who experience it only as a tormenting malaise, a kind of anxiety, when they are prevented from carrying out certain actions. One day we should be able to understand these things, but at present we cannot. At this point it might be useful to remark that the sense of guilt is fundamentally nothing other than a topical variety of anxiety; in its later phases it merges completely with fear of the super-ego. In the case of anxiety too we find the same extraordinary variations in its relation to consciousness. It is present in some way behind all the symptoms, though sometimes it seizes control of the whole of the consciousness, while at other times it is completely hidden, so that we have to speak of an unconscious anxiety or–if we wish to retain a clear psychological conscience, anxiety being initially only a feeling–of 'possibilities of anxiety'. Hence, it is quite conceivable that even the sense of guilt engendered by civilization is not recognized as such, but remains for the most part unconscious, or manifests itself as an unease, a discontent, for which other motivations are sought. The religions, at least, have never ignored the part that a sense of guilt plays in civilization. Moreover–a point I failed to appreciate earlier–they claim to redeem humanity from this sense of guilt, which they call sin. From the way in which this redemption is achieved in Christianity–through the sacrificial death of one man, who thereby takes upon himself the guilt shared by all–we drew an inference as to what may have been the original occasion for our acquiring this primordial guilt, which also marked the beginning of civilization.

It cannot be very important, though it may not be entirely superfluous, to elucidate the meanings of a few terms such as 'super-ego' , 'conscience' , 'sense of guilt' , 'need for punishment' and 'remorse' , which may often have been used too loosely and interchangeably. They all apply to the same relationship, while denoting different aspects of it. The super-ego is an authority that we postulate, and conscience a function that we ascribe to it, along with others–this function being to supervise and assess the actions and intentions of the ego, to exercise a kind of censorship. The sense of guilt, the harshness of the super-ego, is thus identical with the severity of the conscience; it is the ego's perception of being supervised in this way, its assessment of the tension between its own strivings and the claims of the super-ego. Fear of this critical authority–a fear that underlies the whole relationship and amounts to a need for punishment–is the manifestation of a drive on the part of the ego, which has become masochistic under the influence of the sadistic super-ego and devotes a portion of its inherent drive for internal destruction to establishing an erotic bond with the super-ego. One should not speak of conscience until the super-ego can be shown to exist. As for the sense of guilt, one has to admit that it predates the superego, and therefore the conscience. At this early stage it is a direct manifestation of the fear of external authority, an acknowledgement of the tension between the ego and this authority, a direct derivative of the conflict between the need for its love and the urge for the satisfaction of the drives, the inhibiting of which generates aggressivity. The superimposition of the two layers of the sense of guilt–the one due to fear of the external authority, the other to fear of the intemal authority–has greatly hampered our understanding of the relations that the conscience enters into. Remorse is a general term for the reaction of the ego in cases that involve a sense of guilt; it contains, in largely unaltered form, the emotional material of the anxiety that is at work behind the sense of guilt. It is itself a punishment and may involve the need for punishment. Thus it too may pre-date conscience.

Nor can there be any harm in reviewing the contradictions that have temporarily confused us in the course of our investigation. At one point it was said that the sense of guilt resulted from an act of aggression that had not been carried out, while at another–and precisely at its historical inception, the killing of the father–it was said to derive from one that had been. We managed to find a way out of this difficulty. With the institution of the internal authority, the super-ego, the situation changed radically. Before this, the sense of guilt had been identical with remorse, a term that should properly be reserved for the reaction that follows the acting out of aggression. After this, thanks to the omniscient super-ego, the distinction between intended and fulfilled aggression lost its force. A sense of guilt might now result not only from a violent deed that was actually performed–as everyone knows–but also from one that was merely intended–as psychoanalysis has discovered. Despite the new psychological situation, the conflict of ambivalence between the two primal drives still produces the same effect. There is an obvious temptation to seek here the solution of the problem posed by the varying relation of the sense of guilt to consciousness. A sense of guilt that arises from remorse for an evil deed should always be conscious, whereas one that is prompted by the perception of an evil impulse might remain unconscious. Yet it is not as simple as that: obsessional neurosis emphatically contradicts this view. The second contradiction was that, according to one view, the aggressive energy that we ascribe to the super-ego merely perpetuates the punitive energy of the external authority and preserves it in the mind, whereas according to another view it is one's own unused aggression, directed against this inhibiting authority. The former view seems to accord more with the history, the latter more with the theory of the sense of guilt. Detailed consideration has succeeded almost too well in resolving this apparently irreconcilable contradiction; what remains as the essential common factor is that both involve internalized aggression. Again, clinical observation actually allows us to distinguish between the two sources of aggression that we ascribe to the super-ego, but in any given case either the one or the other may produce the stronger effect, though as a rule they act in concert.

This is, I think, an appropriate place at which to enter a serious plea for a view whose provisional acceptance we recommended a short while back. In the latest analytic literature we find a predilection for the view that the sense of guilt is, or may be, intensified by any kind of frustration–if satisfaction of any drive is thwarted. I think we gain a substantial theoretical simplification if we take this to apply only to the aggressive drives. Little will be found to conflict with this assumption. For how are we to explain, dynamically and economically, a heightening of the sense of guilt that appears when there is an unsatisfied erotic demand? This seems possible, after all, only if we presume a circuitous route–if the prevention of erotic satisfaction provokes aggressivity towards whoever interferes with it, and if this aggressivity then has to be suppressed. But then only the aggression is converted into a sense of guilt by being suppressed and transferred to the super-ego. I am convinced that we shall be able to represent many processes more simply and transparently if the findings of psychoanalysis relating to the origin of the sense of guilt are restricted to the aggressive drives. In this case, examination of the clinical material does not yield an unambiguous answer: in accordance with our hypothesis, the two kinds of drive almost never appear in their pure form, mutually isolated. However, a study of extreme cases will no doubt point in the direction I anticipate. It is tempting to derive an initial advantage from this more restricted view by applying it to the process of repression. As we have discovered, the symptoms of neuroses are essentially substitutive satisfactions for unfulfilled sexual desires. In our analytic work we have been surprised to find that perhaps every neurosis conceals a certain measure of unconscious guilt, and this in turn intensifies the symptoms by using them as a punishment. It now seems plausible to formulate the following proposition: when a drive is repressed, its libidinal elements are converted into symptoms and its aggressive components into a sense of guilt. Even if this thesis only approximates to the truth, it still merits our interest.

Some readers may feel that they have heard the formula of the struggle between Eros and the death drive too often. It was meant to characterize both the cultural process undergone by humanity and the development undergone by the individual; moreover, it was said to have revealed the secret of organic life in general. It seems imperative to investigate how these three processes relate to one another. Now, the recurrence of the formula is justified as soon as one considers that the development of human civilization and the development of the individual are both vital processes and must there fore partake of the nature of life in the most general sense. On the other hand, the very universality of this feature means that proof of its presence is of no help in differentiating these processes, unless it is narrowed down by particular conditions. Hence, we can be content only with the statement that the process of civilization is a special modification of the life process that is under gone by the latter under the influence of a task that is set by Eros at the instigation of Ananke (the exigency of reality)–the task of uniting discrete individuals in a community bound together by libidinal ties. However, if we focus our attention on the relation between the civilization of mankind and the development or upbringing of the individual, we shall conclude, without much hesitation, that the two processes are very similar in kind, if not indeed one and the same process, as it affects different kinds of object. Human civilization naturally belongs to a higher order of abstraction than the development of the individual; it is therefore harder to apprehend in concrete terms, and the search for analogies should not be compulsively pursued to excess. Yet in view of the similarity of the aims–the one being to create a unified mass consisting of many individuals, the other to integrate the individual into such a mass–the similarity of the means used in the two processes and the similarity of the resultant phenomena will come as no surprise. There is one distinction between the two processes that is of such extraordinary significance that it must not remain unmentioned any longer. In the development of the individual, the programme of the pleasure principle, aimed at the attainment of happiness, remains paramount. Integration into a community, or adaptation to it, seems a scarcely avoidable condition; it has to be met if the goal of happiness is to be reached. Perhaps it would be better if this were possible without such a condition. In other words, the development of the individual seems to be a product of the interaction of two trends–the striving for happiness, which we commonly call 'egoistic', and the striving for fellowship within the community, which we call 'altruistic'. Neither term goes much below the surface. In the development of the individual, as we have said, the emphasis falls mostly on the egoistic striving for happiness, while the other process, which we may call 'cultural', is usually content with a restrictive role. In the process of civilization things are different: the aim of forming a unified whole out of individual human beings is all-important. True, the aim of happiness is still present, but it is pushed into the background; it is almost as though the creation of a great human community would be most successful if there were no need for concern with individual happiness. There may thus be particular features in the development of the individual that are not matched in the process of civilization; the former need coincide with the latter only in so far as its aim is to incorporate the individual into the community.

Just as the planet still circles round its sun, yet at the same time rotates on its own axis, so the individual partakes in the development of humanity while making his own way through life. To our dull gaze, however, the play of forces in the heavens seems frozen in a changeless order, while in the field of organic life we can still see how the forces contend with one another, and how the conflict yields ever-changing results. In the same way the two strivings–for individual happiness and for human fellowship–have to contend with each other in every individual; so too the processes of individual and cultural development are bound to come into conflict and dispute each other's territory. But this struggle between the individual and society does not derive from the no doubt irreconcilable antagonism of the primal drives, Eros and death; it indicates a conflict in the economy of the libido, which may be compared with the conflict regarding the distribution of the libido between the ego and its objects. It admits of an eventual accommodation within the individual, such as we may hope for in the future of civilization, however oppressive it may be at present in the life of the individual.

The analogy between the development of civilization and that of the individual can be significantly extended. One can justifiably maintain that the community too evolves a super-ego and that the development of civilization takes place under its influence. Anyone who is conversant with different civilizations may find it tempting to pursue this equation in detail. I will confine myself to drawing attention to a few striking points. The super-ego of a cultural epoch has an origin not unlike that of the individual; it rests upon the impression let behind by the personalities of great leaders, people who were endowed with immense spiritual or intellectual power or in whom some human striving found its strongest and purest, and hence often most one-sided, expression. In many cases the analogy goes even further, in that in their lifetime these figures were quite often, though not always, mocked and abused by others, or even cruelly done to death–just as indeed the primeval father did not attain divinity until long after he was done to death. The most poignant example of this fateful link is the figure of Jesus Christ–unless this figure is mythological and was called into being on the basis of an obscure memory of that primeval event. A further point of agreement is that both the cultural and the individual super-ego make stern ideal demands, and that failure to meet these demands is punished by 'fear of conscience'. Here, indeed, we encounter a curious phenomenon: the relevant mental processes, when seen in the mass, are more familiar, more accessible to our consciousness than they can ever be in the individual. In the individual only the aggression of the super-ego makes itself clearly heard, when tension arises, in the form of reproaches, while the demands themselves often remain unconscious in the background. When brought fully into consciousness, they are seen to coincide with the precepts of the current cultural super-ego. At this point there seems to be a regular cohesion, as it were, between the cultural development of the mass and the personal development of the individual. Some manifestations and properties of the super-ego can thus be recognized more easily by its behaviour in the cultural community than by its behaviour in the individual.

After developing its ideals, the cultural super-ego sets up its demands. Among these, the demands concerned with the mutual relations of human beings are collectively known as ethics. A high value has always been placed on ethics, as though it were expected to perform exceptionally important services. And indeed it does address itself to the subject that is easily recognized as the sorest point in any civilization. Ethics is thus to be viewed as an attempt at therapy, an endeavour to achieve, through a precept of the super-ego, what has not so far been achievable through other cultural activities. As we know, the problem is how to remove the greatest obstacle to civilization, the constitutional propensity of human beings to mutual aggression, and for this very reason we have a special interest in what is probably the most recent commandment of the cultural super-ego: 'Love thy neighbour as thyself'. The study and treatment of neuroses lead us to level two reproaches against the individual super-ego: in the severity of its precepts and prohibitions it shows too little concern for the happiness of the ego, in that it fails to take sufficient account of the forces that oppose compliance with them, the instinctual strength of the id, and the difficulties that prevail in the real environment. For therapeutic purposes we are therefore often obliged to oppose the super-ego and attempt to lower its demands. We can make quite similar objections to the ethical demands of the cultural super-ego. This too is insufficiently concerned with the facts of man's psychical constitution; it issues a commandment without asking whether it can be obeyed. It assumes that it is psychologically possible for the human ego to do whatever is required of it, that the ego has absolute control over the id. This is an error. Even in people who are called normal, control of the id cannot be increased beyond certain limits. To demand more is to provoke the individual to rebellion or neurosis, or to make him unhappy. The commandment 'Love thy neighbour as thyself' is the strongest defence against human aggression and an excellent example of the unpsychological manner in which the cultural super-ego proceeds. It is impossible to keep this commandment; such a huge inflation of love can only lower its value, not remove the problem. Civilization neglects all this; it reminds us only that the harder it is to comply with a precept, the more merit there is in compliance. Yet in today's civilization, whoever adheres to such a precept puts himself at a disadvantage in relation to all who lout it. How potent an obstacle to civilization aggression must be if the defence against it can cause as much unhappiness as the aggression itself! In this situation, what we call natural ethics has nothing to offer but the narcissistic satisfaction of being able to think one is better than others. This is where ethics based on religion enters the scene with its promises of a better life hereafter. I am inclined to think that, for as long as virtue goes unrewarded here below, ethics will preach in vain. I have no doubt, too, that a real change in people's relations to property will be of more help here than any ethical commandment; yet the recognition of this fact among socialists has been obscured and made impracticable by a new idealistic misreading of human nature.

An approach that tries to trace the role of a super-ego in the phenomena of cultural development seems to me to promise further discoveries. I must hasten to a close, but there is still one question I can hardly avoid. If the development of civilization so much resembles that of the individual and operates with the same means, is one not entitled to proffer the diagnosis that some civilizations or cultural epochs–possibly the whole of humanity–have become 'neurotic' under the influence of cultural strivings? The analytic dissection of these neuroses might be followed up by suggestions for therapy that would merit great interest. I could not say that such an attempt to apply psychoanalysis to the cultural community would be absurd or doomed to futility. But one would have to be very cautious, remembering that one was dealing only with analogies, and that with concepts, as with human beings, it is dangerous to wrench them out of the sphere in which they originated and have evolved. Moreover, the diagnosis of communal neuroses comes up against a special difficulty: in the individual neurosis the first clue we have is the contrast between the patient and his supposedly normal environment. When it comes to a mass of individuals, all affected by the same condition, no such background is present; it would have to be borrowed from elsewhere. And as for the therapeutic application of the knowledge one obtained, of what use would even the most apposite analysis orasocial neurosis be, if no one had the authority to force the mass to undergo treatment? Yet despite all these difficulties we may be fairly sure that one day somebody will venture upon such a pathological study of cultural communities.

For a variety of reasons I have no wish whatever to offer an evaluation of human civilization. I have been careful to refrain from the enthusiastic prejudice that sees our civilization as the most precious thing we possess or can acquire, and believes that its path will necessarily lead us to heights of perfection hitherto undreamt of. I can at least listen, without bridling, to the critic who thinks that, considering the goals of cultural endeavour and the means it employs, one is bound to conclude that the whole effort is not worth the trouble and can only result in a state of affairs that the individual is bound to find intolerable. My impartiality is facilitated by my scant knowledge of such matters. There is only one thing that I know for certain: the value judgements of human beings are undoubtedly guided by their desire for happiness and thus amount to an attempt to back up their illusions with arguments. I should understand perfectly if someone were to stress the inevitability of human civilization and maintain, for instance, that the tendency to restrict sexual life, or to promote the humanitarian ideal at the expense of natural selection, were trends that could not be averted or deflected and that it was best to yield to them as if they were naturally ordained. On the other hand, I am familiar with the objection that in the course of human history such strivings, which we consider insurmountable, have often been cast aside and replaced by others. I therefore dare not set myself up as a prophet vis-à-vis my fellow men, and I plead guilty to the reproach that I cannot bring them any consolation, which is fundamentally what they all demand, the wildest revolutionaries no less passionately than the most well-behaved and pious believers.

The fateful question for the human race seems to be whether, and to what extent, the development of its civilization will manage to overcome the disturbance of communal life caused by the human drive for aggression and self-destruction. Perhaps in this context the present age is worthy of special interest. Human beings have made such strides in controlling the forces of nature that, with the help of these forces, they will have no difficulty in exterminating one another, down to the last man. They know this, and it is this knowledge that accounts for much of their present disquiet, unhappiness and anxiety. And now it is to be expected that the other of the two 'heavenly powers', immortal Eros, will try to assert himself in the struggle with his equally immortal adversary. But who can foresee the outcome?



————————————————————

*  'Thus conscience doth make cowards of us all…' That a modem upbringing conceals from the young person the role that sexuality will play in his life is not the only criticism that must be levelled against it. Another of its sins is that it does not prepare him for the aggression of which he is destined to be the object. To send the young out into life with such a false psychological orientation is like equipping people who are setting out on a polar expedition with summer clothes and maps of the North Italian lakes. This reveals a certain misuse of ethical demands. The severity of these would do little harm if the educators said, 'This is how people ought to be if they are to be happy and make others happy, but one must reckon with their not being like this.' Instead, the young person is led to believe that everyone else complies with these ethical precepts and is therefore virtuous. This is the basis of the requirement that he too should become virtuous.

目录

观念——《伟大的思想》代序

《伟大的思想》中文版序

Introduction to the Chinese Editions of Great Ideas

通往契丹之路

忽必烈汗

从北京到孟加拉

The Road to Cathay

Kubilai Khan

From Peking to Bengal

返回总目录

图书在版编目(CIP)数据

马可·波罗游记:英汉双语/(意)马可·波罗(Polo, M.)著;苏桂梅译.—北京:中译出版社,2011.12

(企鹅口袋书系列·伟大的思想)

ISBN 978-7-5001-3325-4

Ⅰ.①马… Ⅱ.①马… ② 苏… Ⅲ.①英语—汉语—对照读物 ②游记—世界—中世纪 Ⅳ.①H319.4:K

中国版本图书馆CIP数据核字(2011)第247565号


(著作权合同登记:图字01-2012-1435号)

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The Travels first published in Penguin Classics 1958

This extract published in Penguin Books 2005

Translation copyright © Ronald Latham, 1958

Taken from the Penguin Classics edition The Travels ,

translated and edited by Ronald Latham

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观念

——《伟大的思想》代序

梁文道

每隔一段时间,媒体就喜欢评选一次“影响世界的X个人”或者“改变历史的X项发明”。然而,在我看来,几乎所有人类史上最重大的变革,首先都是一种观念的变革。

我们今天之所以会关注气候的暖化与生物多样性的保存,是因为我们看待地球的方式变了,我们比以前更加意识到人在自然中的位置,也更加了解自然其实是一个动态的系统。放弃了人类可以主宰地球的世界观,这就意味着我们接受了一个观念的变化。同样地,我们不再相信男人一出生就该主宰女人,甚至也不再认为男女之别是不可动摇的本质区分;这也是观念的变化。如果说环保运动和女权运动有任何影响的话,那些影响一定就是从大脑开始的。也不要只看好事,20世纪最惨绝人寰的浩劫最初也只不过是一些小小的观念,危险的观念。比如说一位德国人,他相信人类的进化必以“次等种族”的灭绝为代价……

这套丛书不叫“伟大的巨著”,是因为它们体积都不大,而且还有不少是抽取自某些名著的章节。可它们却全是伟大的观念,例如达尔文论天择,潘恩论常识,它们共同构成了人类的观念地图。从头看它们一遍,就是检视文明所走过的道路,从深处理解我们今天变成这个样子的原因。

也许你会发现其中有些陌生的名字,或者看起来没有那么“伟大”的篇章(譬如普鲁斯特追忆他的阅读时光),但你千万不要小看它们。因为真正重要、真正能够产生启蒙效果的观念往往具有跨界移动的能力,它会跨越时空,离开它原属的领域,在另一个世界产生意外的效果。就像马可·波罗在监狱里述说的异国图景,当时有谁料得到那些荒诞的故事会诱发出哥伦布的旅程呢?我也无法猜测,这套小书的读者里头会不会有下一个哥伦布,他将带着令人惊奇的观念航向自己的大海。

《伟大的思想》中文版序

企鹅《伟大的思想》丛书2004年开始出版。在英国,已付印80种,尚有20种计划出版。美国出版的丛书规模略小,德国的同类丛书规模更小一些。丛书销量已远远超过200万册,在全球很多人中间,尤其是学生当中,普及了哲学和政治学。中文版《伟大的思想》丛书的推出,迈出了新的一步,令人欢欣鼓舞。

推出这套丛书的目的是让读者再次与一些伟大的非小说类经典著作面对面地交流。太长时间以来,确定版本依据这样一个假设——读者在教室里学习这些著作,因此需要导读、详尽的注释、参考书目等。此类版本无疑非常有用,但我想,如果能够重建托马斯·潘恩《常识》或约翰·罗斯金《艺术与人生》初版时的环境,重新营造更具亲和力的氛围,那也是一件有意思的事。当时,读者除了原作者及其自身的理性思考外没有其他参照。

这样做有一定的缺点:每个作者的话难免有难解或不可解之处,一些重要的背景知识会缺失。例如,读者对亨利·梭罗创作时的情况毫无头绪,也不了解该书的接受情况及影响。不过,这样做的优点也很明显。最突出的优点是,作者的初衷又一次变得重要起来——托马斯·潘恩的愤怒、查尔斯·达尔文的灵光、塞内加的隐逸。这些作家在那么多国家影响了那么多人的生活,其影响不可估量,有的长达几个世纪,读他们书的乐趣罕有匹敌。没有亚当·斯密或阿图尔·叔本华,难以想象我们今天的世界。这些小书的创作年代已很久远,但其中的话已彻底改变了我们的政治学、经济学、智力生活、社会规划和宗教信仰。

《伟大的思想》丛书一直求新求变。地区不同,收录的作家也不同。在中国或美国,一些作家更受欢迎。英国《伟大的思想》收录的一些作家在其他地方则默默无闻。称其为“伟大的思想”,我们亦慎之又慎。思想之伟大,在于其影响之深远,而不意味着这些思想是“好”的,实际上一些书可列入“坏”思想之列。丛书中很多作家受到同一丛书其他作家的很大影响,例如,马塞尔·普鲁斯特承认受约翰·罗斯金影响很大,米歇尔·德·蒙田也承认深受塞内加影响,但其他作家彼此憎恨,如果发现他们被收入同一丛书,一定会气愤难平。不过,读者可自行决定这些思想是否合理。我们衷心希望,您能在阅读这些杰作中得到乐趣。

《伟大的思想》出版者

西蒙·温德尔

Introduction to the Chinese Editions of Great Ideas

Penguin's Great Ideas series began publication in 2004. In the UK we now have 80 copies in print with plans to publish a further 20. A somewhat smaller list is published in the USA and a related, even smaller series in Germany. The books have sold now well over two million copies and have popularized philosophy and politics for many people around the world — particularly students. The launch of a Chinese Great Ideas series is an extremely exciting new development.

The intention behind the series was to allow readers to be once more face to face with some of the great nonfiction classics. For too long the editions of these books were created on the assumption that you were studying them in the classroom and that the student needed an introduction, extensive notes, a bibliography and so on. While this sort of edition is of course extremely useful, I thought it would be interesting to recreate a more intimate feeling — to recreate the atmosphere in which, for example, Thomas Paine's Common Sense or John Ruskin's On Art and Life was first published — where the reader has no other guide than the original author and his or her own common sense.

This method has its severe disadvantages — there will inevitably be statements made by each author which are either hard or impossible to understand, some important context might be missing. For example the reader has no clue as to the conditions under which Henry Thoreau was writing his book and the reader cannot be aware of the book's reception or influence. The advantages however are very clear — most importantly the original intentions of the author become once more important. The sense of anger in Thomas Paine, of intellectual excitement in Charles Darwin, of resignation in Seneca — few things can be more thrilling than to read writers who have had such immeasurable influence on so many lives, sometimes for centuries, in many different countries. Our world would not make sense without Adam Smith or Arthur Schopenhauer — our politics, economics, intellectual lives, social planning, religious beliefs have all been fundamentally changed by the words in these little books, first written down long ago.

The Great Ideas series continues to change and evolve. In different parts of the world different writers would be included. In China or in the United States there are some writers who are liked much more than others. In the UK there are writers in the Great Ideas series who are ignored elsewhere. We have also been very careful to call the series Great Ideas — these ideas are great because they have been so enormously influential, but this does not mean that they are Good Ideas — indeed some of the books would probably qualify as Bad Ideas. Many of the writers in the series have been massively influenced by others in the series — for example Marcel Proust owned so much to John Ruskin, Michel de Montaigne to Seneca. But others hated each other and would be distressed to find themselves together in the same series! But readers can decide the validity of these ideas for themselves. We very much hope that you enjoy these remarkable books.

Simon Winder

Publisher

Great Ideas

通往契丹 [1] 之路

大家必须明白,继成吉思汗之后第二个统治者是窝阔台汗,第三个统治者是巴图汗,第四个是贵由汗,第五个是蒙哥汗,第六个就是忽必烈汗。忽必烈汗比以往任何一个可汗都更伟大、更有实力。事实上,将其他五个可汗的力量加在一起也没有忽必烈拥有的力量强大,我还可以稍微夸张一点:世界上所有的皇帝以及基督徒和撒拉森人 [2] 的国王加起来也不具备这样强大的实力,或者有能力取得像忽必烈汗这样多的成就。我将在这本书中清楚地向大家证明这点。

大家应该知道,所有具有成吉思汗血统的大贵族死后都要被埋葬在阿尔泰山 [3] 。即便他们驾崩的地方离阿尔泰山有一百天的路程,也必须埋葬于此。还有一个值得注意的事实是:在大汗的遗体被运送到阿尔泰山的途中(大概为四十天的路程),所有在路上偶然遇到大汗送葬队伍的人,都将被护送灵柩的护卫杀死,并对他们说“去阴间服侍你的主人吧”!因为护卫们确信被他们杀死的人一定会在阴间成为可汗的奴仆。同样,当可汗驾崩时,他们会杀死可汗最好的马,以便让可汗在阴间也能拥有那些马。事实上,在运送蒙哥汗遗体的途中,有不止两千人因为偶遇送葬的队伍而被护送的士兵杀死。

既然已经提到了鞑靼人 [4] ,我就向大家多介绍一些他们的情况。他们会在草原和温暖的地区过冬,因为这些地区适合放牧,可以为他们的牲口提供牧草。当夏天来临时,他们会迁往大山或峡谷中比较凉爽的地区,因为那儿有充足的水源和林地供他们放牧,在凉爽的地区放牧的另一个好处就是没有马蝇和其他虻虫一样的害虫来侵扰他们的牲口。通常他们在一个地方放牧两三个月后,就继续向山上迁徙,因为如果只在一个地方放牧,那么任何一个牧场都不足以养活如此多的牲口。

他们的屋子是圆形的,用木头建成,上面搭着毡布。这些用木棍支成的框架排列整齐、构造巧妙,并且十分轻巧,便于携带。迁移时,他们可以将这些材料放在他们的四轮车上一起带走。他们每次搭建房屋时,门总是朝向南面。他们还有一种极好的两轮车,这种车用黑色的毡布做顶,设计非常巧妙,就算车外一直下雨,车内的东西也不会被雨淋湿。通常由牛和骆驼拉车,车内载着鞑靼人的妻子、孩子以及他们所需要的各种器物。

我向大家保证,鞑靼妇女负责经营各种买卖,她们还要做好所有丈夫和家庭所需要的事情。而男人们除了狩猎、战争和放鹰捕猎以外,其他的活都不用干。鞑靼人以肉制品和乳制品为主食,靠狩猎和捕捉草原上随处可见的土拨鼠为生。他们也吃马肉和狗肉,也不介意喝马奶,事实上,任何肉类他们都不会拒绝。男人们绝不会接触其他男人的妻子,因为他们十分清楚这么做是错误的、可耻的。他们的妻子也十分忠于自己的丈夫,并且擅长操持家务,即使一个家庭中有十个甚至二十个妻子,她们也会和睦团结地生活在一起,更听不到她们互相谩骂,这点是十分值得称赞的。妻子们通常都全身投入在各种各样的家务和对孩子的照顾中。对鞑靼男人来说,只要他们愿意,就可以娶很多妻子,即便是娶一百个,只要这个男人负担得起,也是可以的。娶妻时,丈夫需要给他妻子的母亲礼金,而妻子不用给丈夫任何东西。大家要明白,男人的第一个妻子被视为最优秀的,她拥有着比其他妻子更高的地位。由于鞑靼男人娶妻不受限制,所以他们的子女也比其他民族的男人要多得多。他们可以与自己的表妹或表姐结婚,并且当家庭中的父亲去世后,长子可以娶他父亲遗留的妻子,只有他的生母除外。当他们的兄弟去世后,他们也可以娶兄弟的妻子。每次娶妻,他们都会举行盛大的庆典。

接下来让我们看看鞑靼人的宗教信仰。他们信奉一个品格高尚、无比神圣的天神,每天都会向他焚香祈祷,只为祈求得到知识和健康。同时,他们还信奉一个叫纳蒂盖的神,他们认为他是一个俗世的神,掌管着他们的子孙、牲口和作物。他们非常尊重这个神,用毡布为神做了衣服,将他供奉在家中。他们还为这个神塑造了妻子和孩子,并将他的妻子摆放在他的左手边,将他的孩子摆放在他的前面。他们对这个神十分尊敬,每次吃饭前,他们都会用一块肥肉去涂抹神的嘴巴,然后再涂抹在他的妻子和孩子嘴边。他们还将肉汤洒在门外,让其他的神一同享用。做完这一切后,他们认为他们的神和神的家人已经享用得差不多了,然后才开始吃自己的食物。大家应该知道他们喝马奶,但是他们会将马奶加工成白色的酒,这种酒味道很好,他们把这种饮品叫做马奶酒。

鞑靼富人的服装极其奢华,由金丝银线或者名贵的皮毛,如黑貂皮、白貂皮或者狐狸皮等做成,他们的饰物同样精美和昂贵。他们的武器有弓、剑和棍棒,但最常用的是弓,他们个个都是杰出的射手。他们将水牛皮或者其他坚硬的兽皮做成的盔甲披挂在身上。

鞑靼人都是勇敢的战士,拥有过人的勇气和胆识。让我来解释一下他们有着怎样超越其他民族的忍耐力,必要的时候,在没有其他干粮的情况下,他们经常可以只靠马奶和猎物来维持整整一个月的生活。同时,他们的马只需要吃草,这样也就不用为马准备大麦和稻草。鞑靼人对他们的长官绝对服从,在需要的时候,他们可以拿着武器在马背上度过整个夜晚,同时他们的马儿边吃草边前进。他们是世界上最能忍受艰难困苦,而又仅需要最少成本来维持生活的人,因此他们是最适合征服别国的战士。

他们的军队按照下面的方法进行编制。当一个鞑靼人的首领带着十万骑手的队伍去征战时,他会这样来组织他们:他作为最高统帅,下设万夫长、千夫长、百夫长、十夫长;万夫长听命于最高统帅,千夫长听命于万夫长,百夫长听命于千夫长,十夫长听命于百夫长,这样一来,统帅就只需要直接指挥不超过十个万夫长,同样,其他的长官也只需要直接面对十个下属,每个下属也只对自己的长官负责。当统帅需要派遣士兵去执行任务时,他会直接对他手下的万夫长下达命令,要求他派出一千个士兵,此时万夫长就会再下令给他手下的某个千夫长,让他带领手下一千士兵去完成任务。命令就这样传达下去,每个万夫长都会按要求完成统帅的命令,每一级长官都会迅速接到指令并执行。鞑靼人对于他们长官的服从,比其他任何民族都做得要好。他们把一支十万人的军队叫做图克,把一支一万人的军队叫做图孟安。同样,千人、百人、十人的军队也有相应的名称。

不管是在平原还是山地,当鞑靼人的军队被派出去执行某项任务时,他们都会提前两日派出由两百人组成的队伍进行侦查,军队的后方和侧面也部署队伍,即前后左右共有四支队伍来负责侦查,这样就可以使他们免遭敌人的偷袭。

当鞑靼人的军队长途远征时,他们不携带任何包裹,每人只带两个装奶的皮袋,一个煮肉的小锅,一顶能避雨的简单的帐篷。如果有必要,他们可以马不停蹄地行军十日,并且不需要预备任何粮食,也不用生火,只靠喝马血活命,每次骑兵都会切开马的一根血管,然后吮吸马血。他们还这样制作干燥乳制品:首先将奶煮开,并在适当的时候刮下浮在表面的乳脂,放在另一个容器里做成黄油,这样一来就可以保证奶水不会变干;然后他们会将这些乳制品放在太阳下晒干。在长途行军时,他们每人带十磅这样的乳制品,每天早上会拿出半磅来,将它们放在一个像葫芦一样的皮袋中,再加上适量的水。在骑行过程中,乳制品就会分解,融化在他们喝的水中,这就是他们的早餐。

当鞑靼人与敌人战斗时,他们有惯用的战术。他们从来不以示弱为耻,作战方法十分灵活,一会儿从这个方向打击敌人,一会儿又从其他方向攻打敌人。他们的战马训练有素,可以像狗一样快速改变行动方向。被敌人追击时,他们也可以像和敌人正面作战时那样有效率。在他们快速逃跑时,同样可以转过身来用弓箭射伤敌人的马和骑手。这样,当敌人自认为已经打垮鞑靼人的军队时,他们会发现自己军队中的马和战士大都已经被鞑靼人杀死。而鞑靼人一旦确定已杀死足够多的追兵和战马时,他们就会掉头攻击敌人,从而完全取得战斗胜利。他们已经运用这种战术赢得了无数的胜利,打败了无数民族和国家。

以上我告诉大家的都是纯正的鞑靼人的做法和传统。但是现在他们已经退化了,那些生活在契丹的鞑靼人已经适应了佛教徒的风俗礼仪,放弃了他们的信仰;而生活在黎凡特 [5] 的鞑靼人已经被撒拉森人同化了。

接下来我要告诉大家鞑靼人主持正义的方式。对于小额盗窃罪不至死的罪犯,根据犯罪的轻重程度,盗窃者会受到一定数目的杖责,如七下、十七下、二十七下、三十七下、四十七下或一百零七下,许多人死于这种鞭打。而当盗窃犯偷了一匹马或者其他应处以死刑的物品时,就会被劈成两段。当然,如果他可以承担所偷东西价值九倍的赔偿,就可以免遭惩罚。

鞑靼人的大贵族和其他人都会拥有很多牲畜,包括战马、母马、骆驼、公牛、母牛和其他牲畜,主人都会在这些牲畜身上烙上自己的标记,然后将它们放至平原和山坡上吃草,而不需要任何牧人看管。如果这些牲畜混在一起,他们也可以通过牲口身上的标记分辨出它们的主人是谁,然后物归原主。他们的绵羊和公羊是托给牧人看管的。鞑靼人所有的牲口都体型健硕、高大肥壮。

鞑靼人还有一个和其他民族不一样的习俗:当一个鞑靼男人有一个已经死去的儿子(有可能在四岁时就死亡),而另一个男人有一个已经死去的女儿时,他们可以给死去的男孩、女孩安排一段婚姻,并会起草婚约。然后他们烧掉这份婚约,并坚信烧掉婚约时燃起的烟雾会在另一个世界里找到他们的孩子,孩子们会从风中得到他们已经结为夫妇的消息。他们还会举行盛大的婚宴,到处分发食物,宣告他们的孩子已经在另一个世界里结成夫妇。此外,他们还要将一些奴隶、马、衣服、钱币和家居用品画在纸上,然后烧给他们死去的儿女,他们认为,这些东西都将在另一个世界里成为他们儿女的财产。当做完这些事情以后,他们就认为彼此已经结成亲家,和儿女在世时结成的亲家一样。

到现在为止,我向大家描述了鞑靼人最质朴的风俗习惯。我还没讲的是鞑靼人的伟大领袖大汗建立的光辉业绩和他的王朝,这些我将在书中根据时间和地点慢慢告诉大家,这的确是值得好好来描述的奇妙事情。在这里,让我们顺着刚才的线索,重新回到那辽阔的平原,讲述鞑靼人所留下的历史。

旅行者离开哈喇昆仑和前面所说的埋葬鞑靼人可汗的阿尔泰山,继续北行,将横穿过一个叫做巴尔古平原的地方,这大概要走上四十天。这里的居民被称为墨斯克力蒲特人,这是一个野蛮的种族,靠兽类维持生活,主要是他们用来乘骑的驯鹿。他们的风俗习惯和鞑靼人很相似,也同样臣服于大汗。他们不生产农作物,也没有酒。在夏季,有许多鸟兽供他们猎食,但是在冬季,由于极其严寒,鸟兽都不能在此生存。在夏天鸟类换毛的季节,这些鸟尤其喜欢聚集在湖、池塘、沼泽等有水源的地方,当它们换下所有羽毛时是不能飞行的,所以此时捕猎者可以捕捉到很多鸟。同样,这个族群也靠捕鱼为生。

在经过四十天的跋涉后,旅行者就可以到达海边。游隼会在这里的山中筑巢。大家要知道,这儿既无人烟,也无鸟兽,只有一种叫做巴格拉克的鸟供猎鹰捕食。这种鸟的体型和鹧鸪相似,有着和鹦鹉一样的爪子,燕子一样的尾巴,还有着超强的飞行能力。当大汗想要得到雏鹰时,就会派人来这里寻找。海洋中的岛屿生长着这些矛隼。我肯定这个地区非常靠北,以至于北极星都朝向了南面。在这个地方,栖息着大量矛隼,因此大汗想要多少就能捉到多少。大家不要以为一些基督教国家的人给鞑靼人的矛隼最后被送给了大汗,实际上,他们将这些矛隼送给了地中海沿岸诸国的可汗,或者像阿鲁浑 [6] 大汗这样的人。

……

离开这些省市,继续向前走三天,我们就会到达一个叫做张加诺 [7] 的城市,那儿有一座很大的大汗行宫。由于这里河湖密布,并有许多天鹅栖息于此,因此大汗十分喜欢在此居住。这儿还有肥沃的平原,栖息着许多鹤、野鸡、鹧鸪和其他野生禽类。大汗是一个热衷于运动并且十分喜欢放鹰行猎的人,所以这个地方对大汗就更有吸引力了。这里的鹤有五种:第一种有着像乌鸦一样纯黑的羽毛,体型十分庞大;第二种羽毛是纯白的,翅膀十分优美,上面点缀着圆圆的斑点,就像孔雀一样,只是斑点是亮亮的金色,它们还有着红黑相间的头和黑白相间的长长的脖子;第三种和我们最常见的鹤一样;第四种鹤体型很小,耳边上有着长长的羽毛,红黑相间,十分美丽;最后一种羽毛大都是灰色的,只是头部为红黑两色,体型较大。

这个城市的附近有一个山谷,大汗在这里饲养了不计其数的鹧鸪。为了喂养它们,大汗下令每年夏天都定期在山坡上种植粟子和这些鸟类喜欢的其他谷物,并且不容许任何人收获这些作物,以保证这些鸟类有足够的食物。大汗还派看守照看这些鸟,保护它们不被其他人或动物捕捉;冬天,看护者还会撒布粟子喂鸟。由于这些鸟习惯了被饲养,当饲养者把谷物撒在地上后,只要吹哨子,它们就会从四面八方向他飞来。大汗还下令修建许多小屋,供这些鸟类夜间栖息。这样一来,每次大汗游历到此地,都会有许多鸟禽供大汗玩乐。由于这里冬季严寒,大汗不会在此过冬,而此时正是鸟禽漂亮丰满的季节,于是,大汗就会用骆驼将这些鸟禽带去他所在的地方。

当旅行者离开这个城市,继续向东北走上三天后,就会到达上都 [8] ,它是忽必烈统治时建造的都城。在这里,忽必烈用大理石和其他美丽的石头建成了一座巨大的宫殿,殿堂和房间都是镀金的,装饰得富丽堂皇。宫殿的一面延伸到城市的中心,另一面紧靠城墙,在城墙的背面,也就是宫殿的反方向,延伸出另一面城墙,围出了一片近十六英里的公园,公园被清泉和溪流环绕,使这片美丽的草地得到了充分的灌溉。除了宫殿,再没有其他的路可以到达这个公园。在这里,大汗饲养了各种动物,如雄鹿、雄獐等,用来给他的猎鹰捕猎。在这里,光矛隼就有两百多只,大汗每周都会视察这些鹰笼里的猎鹰,也会经常带上一只豹子,骑着马,当觉得时机已到,就把豹子放出去,让它去捉雄鹿或者雄獐,然后把它捕到的猎物拿去喂鹰,这就是他的休闲和运动。

在这个封闭的公园中间,有一个风景优美的小树林,大汗在这儿也修建了一个大行宫,这个行宫完全由竹子建成,但是宫殿内部都是镀金的,并且用精美的鸟兽图案作为装饰。行宫由镀金的柱子支撑,每个柱子上都画有一只龙,龙尾朝下,龙身向上盘绕在柱子上,龙足支撑着宫殿顶部。顶部也是由竹子编成,被涂上了漆,因此能够防水。我来解释一下这座行宫是如何建成的。大家要知道,这些竹子的周长大概有三个手长,高度大概十到十五步那么高,它们被从中间劈开,这样就有了两个用来做屋顶的竹板,这些竹板又厚又长,不仅可以用来做屋顶,还可以用来建造行宫的任何部位。就这样,整个行宫都是由这些竹子建造的。为了防风,每个竹条都用钉子固定。这种行宫由两百多根坚韧的细绳拴住,由于它被设计得如此巧妙,所以可以随时分拆,在大汗需要的时候搭建。

每年的六、七、八月,大汗都会停留在上都,一方面为了避暑,另一方面也为了休养娱乐。在这三个月中,大汗都住在由竹子搭建的行宫里,其他时候,这座行宫就会被拆除,需要时再搭建起来。

每年八月二十八日,大汗就会离开这个城市,离开这所行宫,我会告诉大家,大汗为什么每年都会选择这个特定的日子离开。事实上大汗有一群纯白的无杂色的马群,马群的规模十分大,仅母马就不下一万只。没有皇族血统的人没有权利喝这些白色的母马所产的奶,只有一个例外,就是一个叫霍里阿德的家族。因为他们在过去的战争中立下了汗马功劳,所以成吉思汗授予他们家族特权,允许他们饮用这种马奶。当这种白马在吃草时,任何人都不敢去打扰它们,即使是一个大贵族要经过这条路,也绝不会从马群中间穿过,而是等到马群吃完后或者绕过马群再继续前进。一些占星家和信奉神灵的人们告诉大汗每年的八月二十八日,他都必须用这种白马的奶酿成的酒来进行祭奠,将这种酒洒在天空中,洒在大地上,以祭奉他们崇拜的神灵。他们认为大汗必须通过这样的祭奉,来保卫他所有的财产、臣民、鸟兽、作物等。

出于以上原因,大汗每年都会在这个时候离开上都,前往别的地方。在我们跟随他离开之前,让我再向大家讲述一件奇怪的事情。当大汗所在的行宫下雨或者乌云密布时,占星家和巫师们会施展他们的技能和巫术来驱散行宫上方的乌云和大雨,这样即使行宫周围的天气十分恶劣,行宫上方的天气也很好。这些法师被叫做特贝斯 [9] 和克施密特,这是信奉神灵的民族。他们比普通人知道更多魔法和巫术。他们所做的事情似乎是魔鬼的行为,但让别人认为他们所做的一切都是圣洁的,都是上帝的旨意。他们肮脏污秽,不注重自己的容貌,也不在意别人对他们的看法,他们经常不洗脸,不梳头,总是生活在肮脏之中。我还要告诉大家这些人的一个独特风俗,当一个人被处以死刑后,这些人会将尸体取走,煮熟尸体,然后吃掉,但是正常死亡的人他们是不会吃的。

这些巫师也被叫做巴克斯 [10] 。还有一件不可思议的事情。一次,大汗坐在高高的大殿上用膳,他位置高于大殿地面约八腕尺 [11] ,而杯子放在大殿的地板上,盛满了酒、奶和其他美味的饮品,这些巴克斯运用他们的巫术和技巧,让这些盛满各种饮品的杯子在没有任何人接触的情况下,自动从大殿的地面升起,并移动到大汗面前。这些行为是在一万多人的注视下完成的,我向大家保证我所说的都千真万确,没有半点谎言。并且那些精通巫术的人证实,这是行得通的。

还有一件关于巴克斯的事情,每当祭祀神明的日子来临时,他们都会向大汗禀报:“陛下,祭祀我们神明的日子就要临近了”,然后他们随便报出几个神灵的名字,然后接着说:“您知道,如果这些神明不享受到祭典,他们就会让我们的天气变糟,损害我们的财产、牲口和谷物。因此我们恳求陛下赐予我们足够的黑头羊、香料和燃料,多多益善,让我们来举行庄严的祭祀,以求得神明的保佑。”他们将这些奏报给大汗手下的官员,再由这些官员向大汗请奏,等到大汗准奏,这些巴克斯就能得到他们要求的祭品了。然后他们就开始载歌载舞进行祭祀仪式。他们会使用大量香料;会将肉煮熟后摆放在神明面前,并将肉汤洒在地上,通知神明来享用。这就是巴克斯在祭祀典礼上向他们的神明表达尊敬的方式。

大家要知道,就和我们的圣人一样,所有的神明都有他们自己特定的节日。他们拥有极多的僧侣和寺院,寺中住着两千多名僧侣,像一个小城市一样,由于身份特殊,僧侣穿的通常要比其他人好。他们的头发和胡子也都要被剃掉。这些僧侣们为他们信奉的神明举行我们所未见过的盛大的祭祀,念经祈福。

此外,这些巴克斯还享有特权,其中之一就是他们可以根据需要娶妻,并生育很多后代。

除了巴克斯以外,还有一类叫做笙新的教徒。他们教规极其严格,生活也十分简朴,除了糠,不吃任何食物。他们将小麦制成的谷物放进热水里,使谷粒和谷壳分离,然后将谷壳磨成面粉,做成他们所吃的糠。他们也从来不在食物中加入任何作料。他们也信奉很多神明,他们中的很多人都拜火为神。其他教派的教徒都视这些禁欲者为异教徒,因为笙新教徒崇拜神明的方式与其他教徒很不相同。在两个教派之间,还有一个很大的不同之处:那些遵守严格教规的教徒是不允许娶妻的。他们同样会剃光头发和胡子,通常穿着麻布做成的黑色或蓝色的长袍,即使长袍是用丝绸做的,也仍然会是黑色或蓝色。他们睡在柳条编成的草席上,过着比世界上大多数人都简朴的生活。

由于他们崇拜的神明都是女性,他们都继承着女性的姓氏。

关于这些我们就讲到这里,接下来的故事更有趣,下面我将向大家讲述所有鞑靼人主人的主人——最高贵的大汗——忽必烈汗的伟大功绩。

注释


[1] 契丹(Cathay):我国古代民族,是东胡的一支,在今辽河上游西剌木伦河一带,过着游牧生活。10世纪初耶律阿保机统一各族,建立契丹国。——译者注

[2] 撒拉森人(Saracens):在早期的罗马帝国时代,撒拉森只用以指称西奈半岛上的阿拉伯游牧民族。后来的东罗马帝国则将这个名字套用在所有阿拉伯民族上。伊斯兰教兴起于西亚,特别在11世纪末期的十字军东征后,以基督教信仰为主的欧洲人,普遍用“撒拉森”来称呼所有位于亚洲与北非的穆斯林。在西方的历史文献中,撒拉森最常用来笼统地泛称伊斯兰的阿拉伯帝国。——译者注

[3] 阿尔泰山(Altai):亚洲宏伟山系之一,北西—南东走向,斜跨中国、哈萨克斯坦、俄罗斯、蒙古国境,绵延2000余公里。——译者注

[4] 鞑靼人(Tartar):操突厥语的民族之一,13世纪初,这些蒙古突厥游牧民族的不同群体成为蒙古征服者成吉思汗部队的一部分,其后蒙古人与突厥人混杂在一起,因而入侵俄罗斯和匈牙利的蒙古军队,就被欧洲人统称为鞑靼人。——译者注

[5] 黎凡特(Levant):指中东托罗斯山脉以南、地中海东岸、阿拉伯沙漠以北和美索不达米亚以东的一大片地区。——译者注

[6] 阿鲁浑(Arghun,约1258—1291):第四代蒙古族伊儿汗。——译者注

[7] 张加诺(Chagan-nor):今白城子。——译者注

[8] 上都(Shang-tu):位于今内蒙古自治区锡林郭勒盟正蓝旗境内,多伦县西北闪电河畔。——译者注

[9] 特贝斯(Tibetans):即西藏人,藏族信仰大乘佛教。大乘佛教吸收了藏族土著信仰本教的某些仪式和内容,形成具有藏族色彩的“藏传佛教”。藏族对活佛高僧尊为上人,藏语称为喇嘛,故藏传佛教又被称为喇嘛教。——译者注

[10] 巴克斯(Bakhshi):一种特殊的宗教人群,像多米尼加人或者济修士。——译者注

[11] 一腕尺约十八英寸。——译者注

忽必烈汗

下面我就将为大家讲述忽必烈汗的伟大功绩。“可汗”用我们的语言来说就是“伟大的众王之王”的意思,而忽必烈汗完全无愧于这个称号。大家要知道,不管是从隶属于他的国家,还是从他控制的疆土,甚至是他拥有的财富方面来说,从古至今,没有任何国王能超越忽必烈汗,他可以说是世界上拥有最大权力的人。在这本书中我将给大家一个真实清晰的描述,让大家相信忽必烈汗的确是世界上最伟大的国王。

首先,大家要知道,忽必烈汗是成吉思汗的直系后代,是所有鞑靼人公认的首领。他是继成吉思汗后,鞑靼人的第六位大汗,于公元1256年继位 [1] 并开始他的统治。尽管他的亲属和兄弟从中阻挠,忽必烈汗还是凭借自己的勇气与智慧赢得了王位。从他继位到现在(公元1298年)已经有四十二年的时间了,他也有八十五岁了。成为可汗以前,忽必烈经常参加军事征战,在战争中他证明了自己不仅是一个英勇的战士,同时也是一个伟大的统帅。但在继承王位后,除了在1286年的那次亲自出征外,就没有再亲自参加过战斗,我将向大家描述那次出征的情况。

忽必烈有个叫做那彦的叔叔。他很年轻,拥有许多领土,统治着很多城市,并且有一支由四十万骑兵组成的军队。那彦和他的祖先一样,都臣服于大汗,但是由于他只有三十多岁,年轻气盛,手下又有很多士兵,所以决定不再听命于大汗,而是去夺取大汗的皇位。那彦派出使者去勾结另一个实力强大的首领海都,海都是忽必烈的侄子,由于反对过忽必烈,忽必烈一直对他怀恨在心。那彦建议海都从一侧攻击大汗的军队,而他自己则从另一侧发起攻击,两侧夹击,打败大汗。海都欣然接受了那彦的建议,并且向那彦保证,一定会在指定的日期调集好十万大军来对抗大汗。这样,那彦和海都这两位亲王就做好了准备,召集好人马,准备对大汗宣战。

当大汗得到这个消息时,并没有手忙脚乱,而是英明果断地召集自己的军队,并且宣称,叛乱不平,他就不会再当大汗。他用了二十二天的时间秘密完成了战斗的准备工作,除了他的智囊团之外没有任何人知道。他集合了二十六万骑兵和十万步兵,这些士兵都是从离他较近的地区调集而来的。虽然大汗还有许多军队,但是离他较远,来不及调集。如果大汗调集了他全部的军队,那么他军队的数量将是不可估计的。此时的三十六万大军,大都由大汗的养鹰者和他的自卫队组成。

如果大汗要召集在契丹各省所有的军队,需要三十到四十天的时间,海都和那彦就一定会得到消息,这样一来,他们就会调集军队,抢占要害关口。而大汗打算以速度取胜,先单独攻打那彦,破坏他的准备活动,这样比攻击他和海都的联军要容易得多。

大家要知道在契丹和蛮子各省及大汗统治的其他地区,有很多人对大汗不满、不忠于大汗,只要他们有机会,他们就会起来反抗大汗。因此,在每个规模较大的城市和人口较多的省份,大汗都要派兵驻守。这些驻兵驻守在离城市四到五英里的乡村里,这些开放的乡村不允许有城墙,并且允许人们自由进出。这些驻军和他们的首领都是两年一换。有了这些控制措施,大汗的臣民才得以安分守己,不敢制造任何骚动和叛乱。这些军队除了依靠大汗每年从全国收入中拨出的军费生活外,还会把他们的牛群送到城镇卖掉,换钱以维持军需。这种军队有很多驻点,相隔距离各不相同,有的相距三四十天的距离,有的相隔六十天的距离。

大汗仅仅召集了上述军队中的一小部分后,他就去询问占星家,想知道他是否能打败敌人,取得战斗的胜利。占星师向他保证,他可以轻松打败敌人。这样,大汗就派出了军队,日夜兼程,经过二十天的行军到达了那彦驻军的大草原,那彦在这儿聚集了四十多万骑兵。由于大汗派人一路看守行军的道路,任何经过的人都会被拦截,因此当大汗的军队在一个清晨到达这个大草原时,那彦的军队对此一无所知。事实上,当大汗的军队到达时,那彦正和他最心爱的妻子躺在军营里。

第二天黎明,大汗的军队突然出现在平原的一个小山坡上,而那彦的军队还十分自由散漫,丝毫没有意识到大汗的军队正在临近。事实上,他们认为自己非常安全,既没有派遣哨兵驻守他们的兵营,也没有士兵在大营的前后方巡逻。大汗站在一个木制的塔上,周围有许多弓弩手,木塔由四头大象驮着,每头大象都穿着用结实的皮革做成的盔甲,盔甲上又覆盖上一层用金子和丝做成的织品。木塔顶上高高飘扬着象征日月的皇旗,这样双方都能清楚看到。大汗的军队由三十个骑兵大队组成,每队都有一万个弓箭手。他们分为三组,分别从前方和两侧包围那彦的军队。每队骑兵的前面都有五百名拿着短矛和刀剑的步兵。每当骑兵撤退时,他们就会跳上马背,和他们一起撤退;当撤退被敌军阻挠时,他们就下马,挥矛杀死敌人的马。这就是双方军队靠近时,大汗设计的战斗阵型。

当那彦和他的军队发现大汗时,他们立即组织起来,匆忙拿起武器,整编军队,排列好阵型。

鞑靼人有这样的习俗,当双方军队面对敌人,排列好作战队形后,并不急于展开战斗,而是开始鸣唱,直到鼓声作响时才开始战斗。而在鼓声作响前,所有鞑靼人都跟着乐器合唱,继而可以听到很多乐器混合的声音和士兵刺耳的歌声。

当双方军队都准备就绪后,大汗的军队首先敲响战鼓,双方骑兵立刻展开激战,兵戎相见。他们的武器有弓、剑、木棍和长矛。步兵也手持横弓和其他武器参与战斗。而这只是这场残酷血腥战争的开始,不久,战场中就箭如雨下,尸横遍地,声盖雷鸣。大家要知道那彦是一个受过洗礼的基督徒,在这场战争中,他用十字架作为自己军队的旗帜。

这是一场前所未有的残酷的战斗。在我们的历史上,从未有过这么多骑兵投入一场战斗中。双方死伤不计其数。战斗从拂晓打到中午,很长时间里双方都相持不下。由于那彦是一位慷慨的首领,他的追随者对他都十分忠诚,宁可战死沙场也不愿背叛自己的主人。可是,最后的胜利属于忽必烈。当那彦和他的手下觉得军队支持不了太久时,他们企图逃跑,但是最终还是被擒拿,他的官员和军队也都向大汗投降了。

大汗得知那彦被囚后,下令处死他。那彦被紧紧裹在一条毯子里,然后被系在马后,在地上拖拽至死。选择这种方法处死那彦,是因为这样一来皇室的血就不会洒溅到大地上,暴露在太阳和空气之中。

在大汗取得战争的胜利后,那彦的残余势力也都誓死效忠于大汗,他们大都是女真、卡利、巴斯克尔、西亭基四省的居民。

大汗的士兵来自很多民族,比如撒拉森人、犹太人和佛教徒,他们都不信仰上帝,战争胜利后他们就嘲笑那彦军旗上的十字架。他们嘲讽基督徒:“瞧瞧你们上帝的十字架是怎么保护基督徒那彦的!”这些话传到大汗耳朵里后,大汗当面斥责那些嘲笑者,然后他召集了很多基督徒,安抚他们:“你们的上帝没有保护那彦,是因为上帝只站在善良和正义的一边。那彦是背叛君主的叛徒,是非正义的,而你们的上帝不会保佑对抗正义的人。”基督徒们回应道:“吾主圣明,陛下所言极是。上帝是不会像那彦一样犯下滔天大错的,那彦实在罪有应得。”这就是大汗和基督徒关于那彦的十字旗的对话。

战争胜利后,大汗凯旋,回到了他的首都汗八里 [2] ,那里被喜悦和快乐的气氛包围着。

当另一个造反的亲王——海都听说那彦战败并被处死的消息后,心慌意乱,生怕自己会有同样的下场,立刻取消了叛乱的计划。

大汗回到汗八里时正值十一月,大汗将在这儿一直住到第二年的二三月,也就是我们的复活节时期。大汗得知复活节是我们最重要的节日之一,就将所有的基督徒都召集来,并要他们将四大福音书献给他。在举行了盛大的仪式,反复香熏四大福音书后,大汗虔诚地亲吻了这部书,并且要求他的亲王和首领们也亲吻此书。他在基督徒的重大节日,如复活节、圣诞节时,总会这么做。而在撒拉森人、犹太人和佛教徒的重大节日时,他也会做相似的事情。当被问及原因时,大汗总是说:“有四位被人崇拜和被世界尊敬的先知:基督徒信仰上帝耶稣,撒拉森人崇拜真主穆罕默德,犹太人信奉摩西,而佛教徒信奉释迦牟尼大佛。我尊重他们所信奉的神,并向他们中最伟大的神祈求帮助。”但是从大汗自己的表现来看,他认为基督徒是最好的,因为基督徒所做的一切都是仁慈和圣洁的。他不允许基督徒手持十字架,因为这让他想到伟大的耶稣所遭受的苦难。

大家也许会问,既然大汗认为基督教是最好的宗教,那他自己为什么不去信仰基督教呢?这也许可以从大汗对波罗兄弟 [3] 所说的话中找到答案。当大汗将他们作为使者派去教皇那儿时,他们不时地向大汗提到这个问题,大汗回答说:“你们是站在谁的立场上想让我成为基督徒呢?你们知道这个国家的基督徒都是如此的无知,既没有任何成就,也没有任何权力。而佛教徒却可以做任何他们想做的事情:当我坐在大殿上时,他们可以在没有任何人接触的情况下,把各种酒和饮品从大殿中间送到我的面前。他们可以驱逐坏的天气并且拥有许多神奇的功能。当他们向佛祖祈求帮助时,佛祖还会给予他们指引。但是,如果我信仰基督教,成为一个基督徒,那么我的亲王和其他不信仰耶稣的人就会对我说:‘是什么促使您接受洗礼,信仰基督教的呢?’这些佛教徒就会说他们所做的各种事情,并说他们的佛祖是最圣洁高尚的。这样一来我就无法回答了,而这些在艺术上和科学上都有如此多成就的佛教徒就可以轻易谋害我。如果你们见到教皇,请求他派来一些有学识的基督徒,当这些基督徒面对那些佛教徒时,可以当面斥责他们的巫术,并且告诉那些佛教徒,他们所做的基督徒一样可以做到,只是因为那些都是邪恶的行为,所以不会去做,然后向佛教徒展示你们基督徒的法力。这时我就会废除他们的宗教,接受洗礼,我所有的亲王、贵族以及他们的部下也都会和我一样接受洗礼。这样一来,这里的基督徒将会比你们国家的基督徒还要多。”如果真如上所说,教皇派出有能力的教徒来向大汗传教,大汗一定会成为一个基督徒,因为这才是大汗真正想信仰的宗教。

大家已经从这次战役中知道了大汗是如何打仗的,在其他战役中,大汗通常是将他的儿子或亲王们派上战场,但是这次,他却亲自指挥,可以看出他对亲王叛乱的重视和愤怒。让我们先把这个话题放下,再来详述大汗的丰功伟绩。

我已经向大家讲述了大汗的血脉和年龄。现在我们来讲讲大汗是如何奖罚在战斗中表现勇敢或胆怯的官兵的。对于前者,大汗将他们中的百夫长提升到千夫长,将千夫长提升到万夫长,还根据他们的级别,慷慨赏赐给他们银质的象征权力的奖牌。百夫长会得到一个银牌;千夫长得到一个镀金的奖牌;而万夫长则得到一个刻有狮子头的金牌。百夫长、千夫长的奖牌每个重一百二十萨吉;万夫长的奖牌重二百二十萨吉。每个奖牌后都刻有这样的文字:“借伟大的神赐予的力量,以及他对我们皇帝的无限慈悲,保佑我们的大汗,逆命者斩。”所有拥有这些奖牌的人也被授予各种权力,由官员记载下来。

对于十万军队的首领,大汗赐予他们重三百萨吉的金质奖牌,奖牌后也刻着上面所提到的文字。在奖牌下端,刻着一只位于日月之上的狮子。同时十万军队的首领还能享受到极大的特权,当他骑马出门时,头顶可以撑伞,以象征他高贵的地位;当他就坐时,他必须坐在银质的椅子上。对另外一些地位高贵的人,大汗同样赐予刻有白隼的奖牌,这些奖牌通常赐予亲王们,他们可以动用所有的力量,当他们想要发送快信或是派送使者时,他们甚至可以使用大汗的马匹,这实际上也就意味着,他们可以使用任何人的马匹。

下面我们来看看忽必烈汗的外表。他中等身材,不高不矮,四肢匀称,面色红润,有着乌黑俊亮的眼睛和端正高挺的鼻子。

大汗有四个合法的妻子,这四个妻子中任何一人所生的长子在可汗驾崩后都有权继承皇位。她们都是皇后,并且各有一座宫殿。她们每人都有不下三百名的美丽侍女,还有许多宦官和其他男女侍从,这样一来,每位皇后都有近万人服侍。当大汗想要和她们中的一位共寝时,他就会召皇后进宫,或者是亲自前往皇后的宫殿。

除了四位皇后,大汗还有许多妃子。大汗领土中有个省,在那儿居住的鞑靼人被叫做翁古特,这个省也同样叫做翁古特。翁古特的居民都十分美丽,皮肤光滑。根据大汗的旨意,大概每隔两年,大汗都会派人去翁古特,按照他的要求为他挑选美丽的未婚女子。有时候会挑选四五百人,人数的多少都由大汗决定。选拔是这样进行的:当使者到达时,他们集中翁古特的所有未婚少女,然后派人前去考察。在仔细检查她们的头发、容貌、眉毛、口齿、嘴唇和其他部位,并观察身体是否协调、匀称后,挑选的使者会根据她们的美丽程度给她们打分,从十六分、十七分、十八分到二十几分不等。若大汗要求他们将得到二十分或者二十一分的女子带到宫中,她们的数量达到时,这些使者的使命也就完成了。当她们被带到宫中后,大汗会派另外一组评价者继续来考察她们,然后选出三十到四十个得分最高的女子,带到他的寝宫侍奉。大汗派亲王的妻子们夜间在这些女子的房间里仔细观察她们,以确保她们的处女之身不被任何人玷污和侵犯,确认她们睡觉时没有鼾声,并且呼吸轻柔,身体没有任何异味。通过的少女被分为六组,每组在可汗的寝宫和床上侍奉三天三夜,满足大汗所有的要求。而大汗可以随意支配她们。三天三夜之后,就由另一组少女来侍奉大汗,这样一直轮换一年。当其中一组少女在大汗的寝宫内侍奉大汗时,其他的几组少女就在寝宫外面守候。如果大汗需要任何东西,比如食物或酒,这些在寝宫里面侍奉的少女就会传话给外面的人,而屋外的少女就会马上去准备。这样一来,侍奉大汗的责任就全由这些少女担当。对于剩下的得分较低的少女,她们仍然会留在皇宫中,被分派去做针线、剪裁等其他体面的工作。当一些贵族要娶妻时,大汗就将她们赐予这些贵族,并给她们配上丰厚的嫁妆。这样,大汗就将她们都体面地嫁给了贵族。

大家可能会问:“翁古特的男人们不会认为大汗这样抢走他们的女儿是不公平的吗?”大部分人当然不会这么认为。他们将这视为大汗对他们的偏爱和恩宠。那些有着漂亮女儿的人会很高兴大汗会屈尊接受他们的女儿。他们这样说到:“如果我的女儿命好,大汗会赐予她一个高贵的丈夫,这将会比我能给她的好得多。”如果他们的女儿表现得不好,没有得到很好的归宿,她们的父亲会说:“这是因为她的命不好才会这样。”

大家要知道,大汗的四个妻子一共为大汗生下了二十二个儿子。长子叫做真金,是为了纪念成吉思汗而取的名字。他被指定为皇位继承人,但是他不幸去世了,留下一个儿子叫做铁穆耳,由于铁穆耳是皇太孙,所以他将继承皇位。就像他在多次战斗中表现出来的一样,铁穆耳是个智勇双全的人。

除了大汗妻子所生的儿子以外,大汗的妃子还为他生下了二十五个儿子,他们都是勇敢的战士,伟大的亲王。

大汗妻子所生的儿子中,有七个都当上了广大省区和王国的国王。他们都将王国统治得很好,审慎而又英勇。而这都是有原因的,因为他们的父亲忽必烈汗在各个方面都是最英明能干的,是鞑靼人历史上最优秀的统治者和品德最高尚的人。

大家要知道每年十二月、一月和二月这三个月,大汗都住在契丹国的首都——汗八里。大汗在这座城里有座雄伟的宫殿,我将向大家描述这座宫殿。

这座宫殿完全被正方形的城墙围绕,每面城墙长一英里,这样所有的城墙就共有四英里长。城墙很厚,并且有十步长那么高,被刷成白色,上面有城垛。在城墙的每个角上都有一个美丽壮观的城堡,是大汗储藏军备的地方。在每面城墙的中间也都有和四个角上一样的城堡,这样整个城墙上就共有八座这样的城堡,均作为军械库使用。每个城堡里都存放着一种特定的兵器,因此,当一个城堡里储存着马鞍、马缰、马镫和其他马具时,另一个城堡里就放着弓、弓弦、箭袋、箭和其他射箭所需要的物品,而第三个城堡就保存着胸甲、甲胄和其他坚硬的皮制盔甲。其他城堡储存的东西依次类推。

南面的城墙上有五扇门,最大的一扇门在中间,只供大汗进出;大门的两边各有两扇小门,供其他人进出。南面城墙的两个角上也各有一扇更大的门,也供其他人进出。

外墙的里面还有一层城墙,比外墙要宽一些。它和外墙一样有八个用于储存军备的城堡,朝南开的五扇门和外墙的五扇门相对应,两侧也各有一扇门。

这个城墙里面就是我将向大家描述的大汗的宫殿。这座宫殿比我所见过的任何宫殿都要宏大。宫殿只有一层,但是地基高出地面有十掌高;周围被一圈和地基一样高并且大概两步宽的大理石包围。这样就在宫殿外形成了一个平台,方便士兵巡逻和视察宫殿外面的情况。平台的外侧是由圆柱装饰成的精美的走廊,人们可以在此交谈。宫殿的每面都有一个大理石做的楼梯,从地面通向大理石城墙的平台,供进入宫殿的人们使用。

宫殿非常高,大殿和房间的墙上都覆盖着由金银装饰成的龙、凤、骑兵、各种鸟兽和战争场景的图案。天花板也同样被装饰了,因此整个大殿显得富丽堂皇。大殿十分宽敞,可容纳六千人同时进餐。同时宫殿还有不计其数的房间。整个建筑能立刻给人极好的感觉,布局精良,世界上再无人敢认为自己有能力建造出这样的建筑,也没有人能对这个建筑提出任何设计上的改进。屋顶外部被红黄蓝绿各种颜色装饰着,并像水晶一样闪耀着五颜六色的光芒,在很远的地方就能看到。屋顶也十分坚固,久经岁月洗礼。

皇宫的后面还有一些宫殿,也有许多房间和走廊,是大汗存放私人财产的地方。这儿存放着大汗的金银珠宝,同样也是大汗的皇后和妃子居住的地方,这些宫殿里所有的布置安排都是为了大汗的舒适和方便,外人是不允许进入的。

两层城墙的中间是宽敞的公园用地,种着笔直的树木。这儿的草都长得极其茂盛,由于所有小路的铺建都整整高于地面两腕尺,这样一来草地上就没有污泥和积水,雨水涓涓地流过草坪,流向两侧,滋润着土壤,滋养着小草,让它们繁茂生长。在这些公园里饲养着各种各样美丽的动物,如白鹿、麝鹿、雄獐、雄鹿、松鼠等。总之,在两墙中间的这片公园里,除了供人行走的小路外,满是这些可爱的生物。

在这片土地的西北角,有个大而深的凹坑,设计得十分巧妙,从凹坑中挖走的土都被用来建造小山,一条小溪的水流入凹坑中形成了一个池塘,池塘里的水可供动物们饮用。同时,小溪里的水还顺着小山旁的水渠流出,注满了另一个相似的凹坑,这个凹坑位于大汗的宫殿和他儿子真金的宫殿中间,凹坑里的土同样被挖出来修建成小山。大汗在池塘里养了很多种类的鱼,当他想吃鱼时,就可以从池塘中选择。池塘更远处是小溪的出口,在小溪的出口和入口都装着铜铁制成的栅栏,可以防止鱼儿逃走。池塘中还有天鹅和其他水禽。小溪上有一座桥,方便从一座宫殿通向另一座宫殿。

皇宫北面大约一箭尺的距离,大汗大兴土木,建造了一座一百步高的山,山脚周长有一英里。这座山上栽满了茂密的常青树,大汗只要听说哪儿有独特的树木,不管树有多大,他都会派人将树连着根和周围的土壤一起挖出,然后用大象把它运到这座山上来。这样他就把整个国家最好的树木都集中到了这儿。同时,他在山上铺上了天青石(一种绿色的石头),使得树和石头都是绿色的,整座山除了绿色没有其他的颜色,由此得名为青山。在山顶上,大汗还建造了一座精美的宫殿,整座宫殿也同样是绿色的,和青山绿树相映衬,形成了一幅赏心悦目的图画。大汗建造这座宫殿既是为了美观,也是为了在此休闲娱乐。

在大汗皇宫的边上,还修建了一座和皇宫一样的宫殿,这是太子的宫殿。由于太子是要继承皇位的,所以他的宫殿和皇宫的风格、规模、大小都一样。皇位的继承人铁穆耳——真金的儿子,居住在这里。由于他被选作忽必烈汗的继承人,所以他和大汗享用着同等规模的礼仪。虽然皇帝的公文和大印已经归他所有,但是只要忽必烈汗还健在,他就不能随心所欲地使用他的权力。

我已经描述完了这些宫殿,下面我将向大家介绍它们所在的城市大都,及其建立的原因和方法。

汗八里位于契丹的一条大河旁边,是一座古老壮观的城市,这个名字在我们的语言中就是“帝都”的意思。大汗通过占星师们的预测,认为这座城市将会发生反叛,对抗皇权。因此大汗在河的对岸又修建了一座新城,并给这座新城取名为大都。他命令旧城中的居民都搬到新城,只留下那些他认为没有任何反叛迹象的人,因为新都中没有足够多的房子容纳旧都所有的居民。

新都呈正方形,周长有二十四英里。它被土筑的城墙围绕,有二十步高。城墙底部宽十步,从底部向顶部逐渐变窄,到了顶部大概就只有三步宽了。城墙上有城垛并被涂成白色。城墙一共有十二扇门,每扇门旁边都有一座漂亮宏伟的建筑物守卫,算上每个角上的建筑物,城墙的四面每面都有三扇门和五个守卫的建筑物。每座建筑物里都有很大的大厅,用来贮藏守城士兵的武器。

城里的街道又宽又直,从城墙的顶部一眼看去,就能看到整条道路一直延伸到对面的城门。城里到处都是官邸、客栈和平民居住的房屋。主要街道的两旁有着各式各样的货摊和商店。城中所有建筑用地都按照规定被划成四方形,每块地都有充足的空间来修建带有后院和花园的宽敞住宅。这些地皮被分给每户的户主,这样一块地属于一位户主,另一块地属于另一位户主,所有土地都这样分配。每块地和街区都被一条条马路包围,这样整个城市就被一块块方形的土地编排得像一个棋盘,如此巧妙精致,以至于无法用语言描述。

城里、城外都有着不计其数的居民和房屋,事实上城郊外的居民要比城里的居民还多。每个城门外都有一片城郊,一片连一片,长度大概有三四英里。城郊离城内一英里的地方,有很多为各地商人提供住所的客栈。每个国家的人都被指定住在一种客栈,比如一种客栈专门供巴伦人居住,另一种指定给德意志人,还有一种供法兰西人使用。来这儿做生意的商人很多,一方面因为可汗提供了住所,另一方面是可汗为大家提供了一个有利可图的市场。除了可汗的宫殿外,城郊也有着和城里一样华丽的房屋和住宅。

大家要知道,人们去世后都不能被埋葬在城里。如果佛教徒归天,他的遗体将会被带到城郊外的一个地方火葬;其他人去世后也一样,他们的遗体会被带到城郊外的地方埋葬。同样地,任何暴力行动都会被带到城外执行。

城内的妓女都是非法的,而城郊则有近两万名妓女。她们有一个总管,下面又有管百人、千人的官员。每当有大使为了大汗的利益来时,大汗对他们都十分慷慨,会吩咐妓女总管,让他每天晚上给大使和他的随从们各派一名妓女。这些妓女每天都换,并且她们不收取任何费用,只把这当做向大汗纳的税。从这些妓女的人数大家就能大概推断出每日往返于他们业务的商人和访客的数量了。

被运往汗八里的珍贵奢华的物品比被送往其他城市的都多,宝物主要是从印度运来的,有宝石、珍珠和其他罕有的宝物。它们都是契丹和其他各省最珍贵,最昂贵的珍宝。这些宝物被大汗自己、贵族、贵妇、众多的客栈主人和其他居民以及被大汗盛情接待的访客所买走。这就是这些进口货物和国内生产的货物在城里的交易在总量上和价值上都能超过其他城市的原因。每天都有不下千担的丝被运到城里,城中还有各种用金银线制成的织物。不仅如此,汗八里旁,远近还有两百多个其他的城市,那儿的商人也会来到城里进行买卖交易。所以,城中有这么多来来往往的人也就不足为奇了。

城市的中央有一座高大钟楼,上面有一口大钟,每天晚上钟声敲响三次后,人们就不能在城中闲逛了。除了一些紧急情况,比如孕妇分娩和有人生病以外,任何人都不敢随意走动。那些有急事要出行的人也必须点着灯笼。每晚都有三十或四十人一组的士兵在城中巡逻,查找那些在三声钟响后还在外面的人。如果发现有人在街上,他就会立刻被逮捕,关进监狱。第二天,会有长官了解他外出的原因,如果他被认为有罪,就会根据情节的轻重处以杖责,而这些杖刑有时候是会致命的。采取这种处罚方式,可以避免受刑人流血,因为根据他们专于星象的巴克斯的说法,让人流血是罪恶的行为。

每一个城门有不下千人守卫,大家不要以为这是对城内居民的不信任。事实上,这一部分出于对大汗的尊重,另一方面也是为了防止有人叛乱。由于占星家们的预言,大汗对契丹旧城中的居民一直心存怀疑。

下面让我向大家描述一次城中契丹人的叛乱。这是一次有计划的行动。大汗曾经任命过十二个人,给予他们处置土地和任命官吏的大权,其中有一个撒拉森人,叫做艾哈迈德。他的精力和才能都很出众,比其他十一个人权力更大,并且深得大汗的信任,可以为所欲为。从他死了之后的事情可以看出,他是用邪恶的巫术蛊惑了皇帝,以至于让大汗对他言听计从,得以肆意妄行。他曾经掌管了一切任命官吏和惩治罪犯的权力。每次他想铲除不喜欢的人,不管是公正还是不公正,他都会向大汗禀报:“某人应该被处死,因为他做了一些事情触犯了您的王权。”而大汗则会说:“按你说的去做吧。”于是艾哈迈德就会处死此人。其他人看到大汗对他如此信任,给他如此大的权力,即使自己有再大的本事,也都不敢冒犯他。如果有被他诬告的人想为自己辩护,他也没有机会反驳或者澄清案情,因为他无法给出证据——所有的人都害怕得罪艾哈迈德。这样,艾哈迈德处死了许多无辜的人。

此外,被他看上的美丽女子,若是未婚的,就会被他强娶过来,若是已婚,他也会想方设法要她顺从。当他得知哪家的女儿容貌美丽时,他就会派手下的地痞流氓去找到她的父亲,然后说:“你有什么想法?不如把你的女儿给了艾哈迈德,我们可以帮你回禀一声,赏你一个三年的官做。”这样父亲就只有将他的女儿送给艾哈迈德。然后艾哈迈德就会向大汗禀报:“有某个职位空缺,或者将要于某时空缺,有谁正适合这份工作。”而大汗总会说:“按照你的意思办吧。”于是艾哈迈德就会把这个人安置做官。这样一来,部分由于父亲们的野心,部分由于他们的恐惧,这些漂亮的女子要不就被艾哈迈德娶走,要不就成了他的情人。艾哈迈德还有二十五个儿子,因为他而身居高官,他们中的有些人借着父亲的名义,像他们父亲一样强抢民女,还犯下了很多其他罪行。艾哈迈德还大肆收敛财物,因为每个想得到职位和官职的人都会向他进贡丰厚的财物。

艾哈迈德拥有和统治者一样的权力长达二十二年。在他统治下的契丹人,发现他不停地做着不正当和令人厌恶的事情,想尽办法蹂躏妇女,终于忍无可忍。他们决心刺杀艾哈迈德,并反对政府的统治。有一个叫张易的契丹人,是一个千夫长,他的母亲、女儿、妻子都曾经被艾哈迈德凌辱过。被强烈的仇恨所驱使,张易和一个叫王著的万夫长联合起来密谋反叛。他们打算在大汗结束在汗八里三个月的逗留前往上都后再采取行动,大汗通常在大都也要停留三个月,这时皇太子真金照例也会离开汗八里。而艾哈迈德就会留下来守城,只有在出现紧急情况时,才会派人传话给在上都的大汗。这两个密谋者决定将他们的计划告诉国家中契丹人的领导者,等到大家一致同意后,就告诉其他城中的朋友。他们的计划是在指定的一天采取行动,以烽火为信号,所有谋反者收到信号后,就立刻行动,杀死所有有胡须的人,然后通过烽火台将信号传递给其他城中的人,大家就会采取同样的行动。他们杀死所有有胡须的人,因为契丹人不留胡须,而鞑靼人、撒拉森人和基督徒则留有胡须。大家必须知道所有的契丹人都憎恨大汗的统治,因为大汗所任命的统治者都是鞑靼人或者撒拉森人,他们对待契丹人就像对待奴隶一样,让契丹人无法忍受。再加上大汗征服契丹是靠武力,而不是通过合法的方式。所以,大汗也没有得到契丹人的信任和尊重,并且他把统治的权力都交给鞑靼人、撒拉森人和基督徒,这些人依附皇族,忠于大汗,并视契丹人为异族。

当王著和张易在约定的一天夜间潜入皇宫后,王著就坐在王座上,在他面前点起许多灯火,然后派人去告诉艾哈迈德,太子真金在夜里突然返京,要他立刻前来觐见。当艾哈迈德听到这个消息后,虽然十分疑惑,但还是立刻前往。在他去面见太子的路上,他遇见一个叫科甲台的鞑靼人,他手下有一万二千士兵,负责城内日常的巡逻,他问艾哈迈德:“这么晚了,您还要去哪儿啊?”艾哈迈德回答道:“去面见太子真金,他刚到。”科甲台说:“怎么可能?难道他行动如此隐蔽,以至于我都没有听到任何消息?”于是他带着他手下的一小队人跟着艾哈迈德一同进宫。而此时谋反者对自己说道:“只要我们杀死艾哈迈德,就再没有什么好惧怕的了。”这时艾哈迈德进入了皇宫,看见宫中灯壁辉煌,误以为王著是真金,跪在了他的面前,一旁的张易立刻用手中的剑砍下了他的脑袋。

当在宫殿外守候的科甲台看到这种情况后,大叫一声:“叛乱!”然后用箭射向坐在王座上的王著,杀死了他。然后他吩咐手下抓住了张易,并立刻向全城宣告,城中任何人都不得出门,只要被发现,就地处死。契丹人见鞑靼人已经发现了他们的密谋,并且他们的首领一个被杀、一个被抓,就放弃了叛乱,都留在屋里,也就没有向其他城中准备反叛的人发出叛乱信号。科甲台立刻派人向大汗详细汇报所发生的事情,大汗即刻吩咐进行彻底调查,并且根据情节轻重惩罚叛乱者。第二天清晨,科甲台就审问所有契丹人,处死了许多同谋者,当发现城中的其他人也有叛乱意图时,也采取了同样的搜捕行动。

大汗回到汗八里后,想知道这次叛乱的原因,随后他得知了艾哈迈德父子的恶劣行径。大汗发现艾哈迈德和他的七个儿子娶了不计其数的妻妾,更不用说那些被强暴的妇女。于是大汗下令没收艾哈迈德搜刮的财物,并把它们从旧城运往新城,成为大汗的财产。这些财物之多令人难以想象。他还下令将艾哈迈德的尸体从坟墓中挖出来,扔到大街上让野狗撕咬,那些和艾哈迈德一样犯下滔天罪行的儿子们都被处以剥皮的刑罚。大汗还注意到了撒拉森人邪恶的教义,他们认为只要不是针对与他们同宗教的人,一切恶行,包括杀人都被看做合法的行为。出于此因,罪大恶极的艾哈迈德和他的儿子们根本没有意识到自己犯下的罪行,大汗对此深恶痛绝。他召集所有的撒拉森人到他面前,禁止他们按照自己的法律去行事。大汗还特别命令他们采取鞑靼人的婚姻制度;在猎杀动物时,不能像以前那样割断动物的喉咙,而是要剥开肚子。当这一切发生时,马可·波罗正好待在那儿。

至于那一万两千保卫大汗的士兵,他们被叫做卡西坦,也就是“大汗的骑士与臣子”。大汗拥有这支军队不是因为惧怕任何人,而是把这作为皇权的标志。这一万二千人被分为三组,每组三千人。每组士兵都要在大汗的宫殿驻守三天三夜,然后再轮换下一组驻守,整年就如此轮换。白天时,剩下的九千士兵不能离开皇宫,除非是受到大汗的指派或者是有很重要的私事,比如有很严重的事情发生,如父亲、兄弟、其他亲近的亲属即将去世,或者如果不立刻回去就会遭到巨大损失时,在经长官同意后,他才可以离开皇宫。而在晚上,这九千人是可以回家的。

大汗设宴的座次要这样安排:大汗坐北朝南,高高在上,皇后坐在他的左侧。右侧低一些的地方,按年龄大小坐着皇子、皇孙和其他皇室成员,太子真金的座位要高于其他皇子,并且他们的头和大汗的脚刚好在同一高度,而在他们旁边更低一些的地方是其他贵族的座位。妇女们也按同样的方式安排座次,皇媳、皇孙媳和其他亲王的妻子坐在大汗的左侧低一些的地方,贵族夫人和武官夫人的座位则被安排在她们左侧更低的地方。所有人都按照大汗的安排,坐在自己的位置上。这样的安排使得大汗可以看到大殿中所有的人。但是大家不要以为所有的人都有座位,大部分武官和贵族都要坐在地毯上就餐。而在大殿外参加宴会的人有四万之多,他们中有许多带着贵重礼物前来参拜的使者,有带来新鲜玩意的外国人,还有一些想加官进爵的人们。这些就是参加大汗恩赐的宴会,或者庆祝婚礼的人们和场景。

在大汗御案所在的大殿中央,摆放着一件方形器具,每边长约十步,十分精美大气。四面雕刻着栩栩如生的动物形象,并且都是镀金的,中间是空心的,放着盛满美酒的金质带把瓶装器皿。在每个角上各有一个小瓶,分别盛着马奶、骆驼奶等其他饮品。御案旁边摆放着盛放大汗饮品的各种容器。每个容器都用纯金制成,里面的美酒和珍贵的饮品倒进纯金的大酒壶中,足够八到十个人饮用。其中每两人中间都会放置一个酒壶,每人都有一个带把的金杯,用来盛放酒壶中的酒。对于妇女也是同样安排。这些酒壶和器皿都十分珍贵。大汗有如此之多的金银器皿,没有亲眼见到的人是无法想象的。在一旁服侍大汗进餐和饮酒的人都是大汗指定的男爵。他们用金丝制成的面纱遮住自己的嘴和鼻子,这样他们的气息和体液就不会污染大汗的食物和饮品。

还有一些男爵被派去照看那些新来的不了解大殿里规矩的客人,告诉他们应该坐在什么位置上。这些男爵一直在大殿中走动,询问客人们有什么需要,如果有谁需要酒、奶,或者其他东西,他们就立刻让侍者送来。大殿所有入口处都有两个身材魁梧、手持长棍的侍卫站在两边,因为进入大殿的人不允许踩到大殿的门槛,而只能跨过去。如果有人不小心踩到了门槛,两旁的侍卫就会拿走他的衣服,然后让他拿赎金来取;如果不拿衣服,他们就会给他一顿毒打。新来的宾客不知道这些规矩,那些指定的男爵就会被派去提醒他们注意。这样做是因为他们认为踩到门槛是不祥之兆。在大家离开大殿的时候,由于客人喝醉了酒,不那么注意,这时就没有这些规矩了。

大殿里有各种各样的乐器,当大汗要饮酒时,他们就开始演奏,拿着酒杯的侍从将酒奉上后,就后退三步,然后跪下,这时所有的男爵和宾客也都跪下,表现出对大汗的谦卑,直到大汗喝完酒。每次大汗要喝酒时,都会有这样的礼仪。至于食物,我不用多说,大家一定能够想象食物的充足。还要告诉大家,男爵和武官是不能在宴会上就餐的,但是可以带来他们的妻子同其他的妇人一起就餐。当所有人都就餐完毕后,桌子就被撤掉,魔术、杂技和其他项目的表演者就会进入大殿,带来丰富多彩的节目。他们在大汗面前竭尽全力表演,得到宾客们的阵阵掌声。当表演结束后,宾客们就离开大殿回住所了。

大家要知道,鞑靼人将自己的生日当做节日来庆祝。大汗的生日是农历九月二十八日。每年大汗都要在这一天举办除新年之外的最盛大的庆祝活动。在这一天,大汗会披上金袍,另外,还有一万二千名男爵和武官也会披上大汗赐予的长袍,这些长袍与大汗的金袍颜色款式相同——都是用金线银线织成,并且腰间有金质的束带,只是不如大汗的贵重。这些长袍,就像他们经常佩戴的宝石和珍珠一样珍贵,大概价值一万金币——这可不是小数目。而大汗每年要赐给这一万两千名男爵和武官十三次长袍,这样一来他们就能穿得和他一样,显得富丽华贵。大家可以看出这不是轻而易举就能做到的事情,也再无其他皇帝能够承担这样的花销了。

在这个盛大的节日里,所有的鞑靼人和大汗统治下的省份和地区的贵族地主,都要向大汗献上与他们身份相符的珍贵礼物。此外还有很多向大汗讨要官位的人也会向大汗奉上贵重礼物,然后大汗就让掌管此事的十二名总管按照申请人的功绩进行奖赏。在这一天,所有的佛教徒、基督教徒、撒拉森人和其他种族的臣民都要唱赞美诗,点长明灯,焚香祈祷,虔诚地恳求他们所信奉的神明,让他们保佑大汗长命百岁,幸福安康。这一天就在祝福祈祷、愉快欢庆中度过。在描述完这个节日后,就让我向大家介绍另一个重大的节日——庆祝新年的白色节。

他们的新年开始于每年二月,根据习俗,大汗和他的臣民,无论男女,都穿上白色的衣服,因为他们认为白色的装束代表着吉利祥和,在新年里穿上它就能保佑他们在整年中富贵幸福。在新年这一天,大汗统治下的所有首领,和各个省份和地区的贵族地主都要向大汗献上真金白银、珍珠宝石和大量高档白衣,祝福大汗在全年中锦衣玉食、幸福快乐。贵族、官员和平民百姓在这一天也互赠礼物,并且相互祝贺道:“万事如意,心想事成。”这样一来,他们就能在新的一年里诸事顺利了。

在这一天里,大汗还会收到十万匹价值连城的白色骏马,大汗的五千头大象也会披上画有鸟兽的衣服,每头大象的背上都驮有两个大箱子,里面装满了精美贵重的器皿和白色的长袍。大象后面跟着不计其数的骆驼,也穿着衣服,驮着节日所需的物品。它们排成纵列,从大汗面前走过,极其壮观。

在节日的早晨,宴席摆好之前,所有的国王、公爵、伯爵、子爵、男爵、武官、占星家、医师、养鹰人和其他官员都要来到大殿拜见大汗。不能进入大殿的人,就在大殿外大汗可以看见的地方叩拜。让我向大家介绍一下他们位置的安排。在最前面的是皇子、皇孙和其他皇室成员;后面是大王、公爵和其他官员,按照官位大小,有秩序地排列。当他们各就各位后,一位高官就站起来,用洪亮的声音说到:“致敬叩首。”话音未落,所有的人都下跪叩首,像祝福上帝一样高声祝福大汗。然后高官说到:“保佑大汗永远幸福快乐!”众人便齐声应道:“天佑吾皇!”高官又道:“保佑大汗国富民强,国泰民安!”众人再次应道:“天佑吾皇!”这样的礼仪要重复四次。然后他们就走向装饰得极其华丽的祭坛,上面摆放着刻有历任大汗名字的红色牌位,前面摆有制作精美华丽的香炉。官员们毕恭毕敬地向着牌位焚香叩首。随后他们就退回到自己的位置上,当所有人礼毕后,他们就呈上前面所提到的各种珍贵礼物。等大汗过目后,宴会就正式开始,皇亲国戚、文武百官就按照上文中所提到的次序依次入座。宴会完毕后是各种表演。表演结束后,赴宴的人们就回各自住所了。

大汗指定了十三个节日,每个农历月份中都有一个。每个节日都有一万两千名被叫做卡西坦的男爵参加。他们是最忠于大汗并且离大汗最近的人。大汗赏赐他们每人十三件不同颜色的长袍,每件都有珍珠宝石镶嵌,价值连城。大汗还赏赐他们每人一条美丽贵重的金腰带和一双用银线镶边的皮质靴子,也是同样的精美珍贵。他们的服装是如此华丽庄重,以至于每个人都像是国王一样。大汗自己也有十三套颜色类似的长袍,装饰得更加奢华名贵。并且,大汗与他的男爵们总是穿一样颜色的长袍。

这些长袍共有十五万六千件,它们的价值难以估计,更不用说那些昂贵的腰带与靴子了。大汗准备这些只是为了增加节日气氛。

让我再用一个值得大家注意的事实总结一下。有一头大狮子被带到大汗面前,狮子是没被锁住的,当它见到大汗时,立刻趴在大汗面前,表现出深深的敬意,似乎它知道大汗的地位一样,这的确是一件让人惊叹的事情。

下面,让我们来谈谈大汗的狩猎活动。

大家应该知道大汗停留在汗八里的三个月(十二月、一月、二月)中,都会下令进行狩猎和捕鹰活动,距离汗八里六十天路程以内地区的所有人都要参与。各地的长官必须将较大的猎物,比如野猪、雄鹿、雄獐、熊或者其他类似的大型猎物进贡给大汗。所以每个长官都聚集其统治地区中所有的猎人,派他们去野兽出没的地方,轮流射杀猎物。他们有时候会放出猎犬咬死猎物,但是大多数时候是用箭射死它们。然后他们挖去猎物的内脏,放在两轮推车上运送给大汗。这些猎物,都能够在三十天之内被送给大汗,总数很多。那些离大汗三十天到六十天路程的地区,由于距离太远,不适合向大汗运送猎物,但是他们要向大汗运送适当装饰过和硝过的兽皮,这样大汗就可以用它们来制作军需品。

大家要知道,大汗还饲养了许多善于捕猎的豹子和山猫。大汗还拥有一些大狮子,比埃及的狮子还要大一些,这些狮子的皮毛十分光亮,身上还有黑色、橙色、白色的条纹。它们被训练捕捉野猪、公牛、熊、野驴、雄鹿和雄獐等其他猎物。这些狮子猎食这些高贵动物的场景是十分壮观的。当狮子被带出来捕捉猎物时,它们被关在笼子里,笼子放在车上,每只狮子旁边都有一只小狗做伴。由于它们见到猎物后会十分凶残和冲动,人们无法控制,所以这些狮子都要被关在笼子里。它们都要被放在上风的位置,因为一旦那些猎物嗅到狮子的气味,就会立刻逃窜得不见踪影。大汗还训练了许多鹰,用来捕捉狼、狐狸和棕色的鹿。那些被用来猎狼的鹰,体型巨大,强壮有力,再大的狼也逃不出这些鹰的鹰爪。

下面我将向大家介绍一下大汗拥有的众多优秀猎犬。大家要知道在大汗的男爵中,有两兄弟叫做伯颜和明安,他们又被叫做钦纽奇,意思是“大型猎犬的饲养者”。他们两人分别有一万名随从,一万人穿着红色制服,另一万人穿着蓝色制服。无论什么时候陪伴大汗出猎,他们都穿着这样的制服。不管是有两千人还是一万人,他们每人都领着至少一只大型猎犬,有时候也会带着两只或者更多,这样,猎犬的总数是极多的。当大汗打猎时,这两兄弟中的一人带着他的一万手下和五千猎犬,跟在大汗的一侧,而另一个兄弟则带着他的手下和猎犬,跟在另一侧。两队的配合十分默契,队伍有一天的路程那么长。这样,只要被他们发现的野生动物都能被猎杀。这样一场猎人和猎犬的狩猎活动是多么壮观啊!大家可以想象,大汗和他的男爵们带着猎鹰在猎场上行猎,猎犬跟在两边,捕捉熊、雄鹿和其他野兽,的确是一幕壮观的场景。从十月初一直到次年的三月底,这两兄弟每天都要负责向大汗和他的随从提供数以千计的猎物,包括各种鸟兽,鹌鹑还不计在内,同时还要尽全力为大汗提供鱼类,提供足够三人食用的鱼被视为猎杀了一头野兽。

当大汗在这儿度过十二月、一月、二月这三个月后,在三月份,大汗会继续向南前进,到达一个离海仅有两天路程的地方。陪同他的有一万名养鹰者,五千只矛隼、游隼和猎隼,此外还有大量的苍鹰沿河捕猎。大家要知道,大汗并不把所有的随从集中在一个地方,而是将他们分成不同的小队,每队一两百人或者更多,将他们分派到不同的地方。他们各自进行捕猎,大部分猎物都被进贡给大汗。大汗手下的一万人被分为两人一组,他们被叫作塔斯克尔,意思是“看守人”。这些人两人一组,被分配到各个地方,这样就能观察到一片广阔的领域。他们每人都有一个哨子和一块头巾,用这些来控制猎鹰。当大汗命令猎鹰去行猎时,这些养鹰者没有必要紧跟在猎鹰后面,因为这些看守人会仔细关注猎鹰的去向,当有人需要帮助时,其他人立刻就会给予援助。

所有大汗和男爵的猎鹰爪子上都系有银牌,上面刻着它们主人和看守人的名字,便于看管。这样一来,当猎鹰被收回时,就能辨认出它的主人,然后物归原主。如果辨认不出主人,就将它送到叫巴尔盖奇的男爵那儿,巴尔盖奇是专门负责失物招领的官员。任何人如果发现不能辨认出主人的马、剑或者猎鹰等,都会送到这个男爵那儿,由他来保管。如果发现物件的人没有及时地将别人的遗失物交给巴尔盖奇,他就会被看做贼。而遗失东西的人到官员那儿登记后,只要官员收到他们的遗失物,就会立刻归还给他们。这些官员有专门办公的地方,通常在大营的最高处,顶上还插着高高飘扬的旗帜,这样那些遗失东西的人很容易就能找得到,所遗失的东西也能被找到并归还给他们。

当大汗继续向海边前进时,旅途中会出现许多精彩的狩猎活动,世界上没有任何运动能和这种狩猎活动相媲美。大汗一般都会坐在一个精致的小木亭里,木亭由四头大象驮着,亭子内部用金子装饰,外部则用狮子皮装饰。大汗身边总有十二只最好的矛隼供他娱乐,还有一些男爵在他身边侍奉陪伴。当骑着马的男爵向大汗报道:“陛下,有鹤经过”时,大汗就下令将木亭的顶部打开,这样他就能看到鹤群,然后他就吩咐他的随从将那些矛隼带来,大汗会从中选取几只,放飞它们。这样,大汗躺在亭中就能看到这些矛隼捕食鹤群的全过程,这给大汗带来了极大的娱乐和享受。同时,男爵和骑士们也骑着马,陪伴在大汗周围。世界上再也没有人能够享受到这样的运动和娱乐。

当大汗前行至一个叫做卡察摩都的地方时,就会在这儿安营扎寨,他的儿子、男爵和妃子等不下一万人都会在此停留,场面十分壮观。让我来向大家形容一下大汗所在的帐篷:帐篷中设有大汗会见大臣的宫室,十分宽敞,能够容纳一千名骑兵。帐篷的入口朝南开,还有供男爵和其他大臣休息的厅堂。和宫室相连的是另外一个朝西的帐篷,是大汗私下与大臣会面的地方。在一个大厅堂的后面有一个漂亮的大房间,大汗在这儿就寝。除此之外,还有很多的房间和帐篷,只是不和这个大帐篷相连。让我来告诉大家这两个厅堂和房间的构造。每个厅堂都由精心雕刻过的腊梅木做支撑,厅堂外部都铺着一层十分美丽的狮子皮,有黑、白、橙三色并呈条纹状,能够防风挡雨。里侧还有一层白貂和黑貂的皮毛,是两种最昂贵的皮毛。最上乘的黑貂皮做成外衣,价值两千金币,制成一件普通的衣服也要一千金币。鞑靼人将黑貂皮称为“毛皮之王”。黑貂的体型和貂鼠差不多。这两个厅堂就是用这些貂皮连接起来,极有艺术感地拼凑成一幅壮观场景。大汗的房间与两个厅堂相连,外面同样是狮子皮,内部是黑貂和白貂的皮毛,手艺精巧,设计独特。固定两个厅堂和大汗房间的绳子都是丝做的。这三个帐篷如此精细贵重,其他小国国王是承受不起的。

在这三个帐篷周围还搭有其他帐篷,也十分精美,供大汗的妃子居住。还有大量的帐篷用来放置矛隼、猎鹰和其他鸟兽。在这里宿营的人数几乎超出了想象,大家可以想象一下大汗就像居住在他富庶的城市里一样,因为各种人都聚集在这儿,大汗的家眷、医师、占星家、养鹰人和其他不计其数的官员,一切都像在他的都城里一样井然有序。

大汗在此处停留直到春季,不久之后便是我们的复活节。在他停留期间,大汗也从不停止在湖边或者河边行猎,并且猎取了大量的鹤、天鹅和其他鸟类。大汗的随从也被派到周围其他地方,为大汗捕猎大量的野兽和鸟类。在此期间,大汗享受着世界上最好的休闲运动,没有亲眼见到的人,是难以相信的。到目前为止,大汗的伟大,他的状态,他的享乐都超出了我的描述。

让我再告诉大家一个事实。在大汗居住的地方方圆二十天路程的地区,不管是商人、工匠,还是农民都不允许饲养任何猎鹰、捕食猎物的鸟类和其他追逐猎物的猎犬。但是在大汗统治的其他地区,居民是可以随意用猎鹰和猎犬捕捉猎物的。大家还要知道,每年的三月到十月,在大汗统治的领域中,任何亲王、男爵和其他人都不允许猎杀野兔、雄鹿、羚羊或者其他野兽,这样这些动物就能够更好地繁衍生息。任何违反规定的人都会受到严厉的惩罚,因为这是由大汗亲自制定的规矩。人们都严格遵守大汗的命令,即使野兔、雄鹿和其他兽类出现在一个人面前,他也不会捕捉或者伤害它们。

当狩猎季节结束,复活节快来临时,大汗和他的随从们就出发,按原路返回汗八里,一路上也和来时一样行猎,享受着运动娱乐。

大汗在汗八里铸造他的货币,铸造过程是如此的系统,大家甚至可能认为大汗掌握了炼金术。下面让我在这里向大家描述一下。

大汗是按如下程序铸造货币的:将树皮从桑树(叶子可以用来养蚕)上剥下来,剥出树干和树皮之间的内皮,然后将它捣碎弄平,用浆糊粘成薄片,就像棉花制成的纸一样,不过是黑色的。随后,将它裁成大小不一的长方形,最小的薄片价值半个图洛,稍大一些的价值一个图洛,再大一些的价值一个威尼斯银币,还有的价值两个、五个和十个银币,或者一个、三个、十个金币。所有的薄片都要加印大汗的图章。整个制造过程都十分正式严肃,就像在铸造真金白银一样。每张货币上都有专门的官员签名,加印图章。当这些程序都完成后,由大汗指定的一个总管就将大汗的印章蘸上朱砂,盖到每张纸币上,这样印章的图案就保留在了纸币上。这时候纸币才成为真正的货币,任何人伪造钱币都会受到极其严厉的惩罚。

大汗制造了大量的这种货币,可以买到世界上所有的奇珍异宝。所有在大汗统治领域内的交易都要使用这种货币,没有人敢冒生命危险拒绝使用。并且,大汗统治下的臣民也都欣然接受了这种纸币,因为不管是货物、珍珠、宝石还是金银,都可以用同样的货币来支付。他们可以用这些纸币买到任何东西。

每年都有几次,许多商人带上珍珠、宝石、金银和其他贵重物品,比如金银线织成的衣物,进贡给大汗。大汗就会召集挑选各种货物的专家,让他们检查商人们带来的货物,并且给出合适的价钱。这些专家们仔细检查货物后,就付给商人上面所提到的纸币。而商人们会欣然接受纸币,因为他们以后可以用这些纸币在大汗统治的疆域内买到各种货物。全年中,这些被送来的不同货物价值四十万金币,都是用纸币支付的。

大汗每年都会几次下令臣民们将他们所拥有的宝石、珍珠、金银送到铸币厂,数量之多是难以估计的,然后大汗会付给他们纸币。通过这种方法,大汗就拥有了他统治领土内所有的金银珠宝。

当这些纸币流通太久,被撕坏或者磨损时,可以将它们送回铸币厂,扣除百分之三的价格后换成新的纸币。如果有谁需要购买金银来制造金银器,比如盘子、腰带或者其他装饰品,他可以拿这些纸币向铸币厂的官员购买金银。同样,大汗的军队也是用这种纸币来发放军饷的。

我已经向大家提到过大汗拥有比任何人都多的财富。我可以进一步地说,世界上所有其他统治者拥有的财富加起来也比不上大汗一人所拥有的财富。

大家已经知道大汗任命过十二位权力极大的男爵,负责审查所有的军事决定,包括军队的行动、高级军官的更换、兵力的配置,以及根据战争情况派送军队的数量等。同时,他们还负责区分强壮勇敢的战士与胆怯懦弱的士兵,提升那些勇敢的士兵,对无能胆小的士兵则给予降职处分。如果一个千夫长在行动中没有良好表现,男爵们认定他不配留在现在的职位,就会将他降职为百夫长;相反,如果千夫长的行为证明他是可信而优秀的,就会被认为适合更高级的职位,男爵们会任命他为万夫长。不过,官员的升降都是要经过大汗同意的,他们会向大汗禀报:“某人不配在某个职位上。”大汗命令道:“那让他降级吧!”这样,官员就会被降职。当他们认为某人的功绩值得使他升职时,他们就向大汗禀报:“某人是千夫长,但是完全有能力成为一个万夫长。”如果得到大汗的认可,大汗就会授予他适合的奖牌,然后立刻给予他物质奖励,以激励其他的官员。这十二名男爵组成的议会被叫做枢密院——也就是“军事委员会”,是除了大汗以外的最高权力机构。

除此之外,大汗还任命了另外十二个男爵负责处理三十四个省份的事务。他们都住在汗八里的一座宫殿内,这座宫殿有许多厅室,每个省份都有一个主要官员和其他办事员,他们都居住在宫殿内。这些官员和办事员掌管他们负责省份的所有事务,直接服从于十二名男爵。这十二名男爵被赋予任命各个省份官员的权力,当他们认为某人有能力并且适合某个职位时,他们就向大汗禀报,当大汗认可他们的任命后,就授予此人奖牌。他们还负责监督各省的税收和经费的使用以及除军事活动外的一切事务。这个议会被叫做中书省,他们办公的地方叫做中书院。

枢密院和中书省都是最高国家机关,除了大汗外,没人拥有比他们更高的权力。但是枢密院,也可以叫做军事委员会,被认为拥有更高的等级和尊严。

在这里,我还不打算向大家介绍那些不计其数的省份,在后面我再向大家介绍。现在让我们了解一下大汗用于寄送信件的邮递系统。

以汗八里为中心,有许多条路通向各个省份,这些路都以各个省的名字命名。整个系统的设计十分精巧。当大汗派出信使时,他每走二十五英里就会发现一个驿站。每个驿站都有宽敞明亮的房间供他们休息。这些房间里有着舒适的床铺,上面铺有厚厚的丝质床单,供高级别的使者使用。即使一个国王来到这儿,也会觉得居住得十分舒适。在这里,按照大汗的要求,饲养了不下四百匹马,随时准备着供大汗的信使骑乘。大家要知道,每条通往各个省份的大路上,每隔二十五英里或者三十英里都有一个这样的驿站,每个驿站也都有三四百匹马供信使骑乘,这在大汗所统治的所有省份和王国都是一样的。

在一些偏僻的乡村,没有多少房屋和居民,大汗仍然建造了驿站,和大路上的驿站有着相同的居住环境,配备了相同的马匹和其他物品。只是各个驿站间的距离要稍远一些,大概相隔三十五英里,在有些地方还超过了四十英里。

通过这样的安排,大汗的信使在全国送递信件时都能有住处和充足的马匹。毫无疑问,这使大汗享有高于任何人的特权和最丰富的资源。大家要知道,有超过二十万的马匹被饲养在这些驿站,供信使使用。单是驿站的数目就超过了一万座,并且每个驿站都配备精良。整个系统是如此的惊人和昂贵,任何言语都难以描述。

如果有人问,他们怎么能有如此多的人力来完成这项工作,他们靠什么生活,我的回答是这样的:所有的佛教徒和撒拉森人一样,每人都有六个、八个或者十个妻子,只要他们能够供养,便可以随便娶妻。这样他们也就有了许多孩子,有很多男人都有三十多个儿子,可以跟随他一起从军。这是由于他们有众多妻子的缘故。而我们实行一夫一妻制,如果妻子不能生育,丈夫也要和她共同生活,也就不能拥有孩子,因此我们的人口要远远少于他们。而且他们的食物也不会短缺,因为他们的主要食物是米、粟等,尤其是鞑靼人、契丹人和蛮子,而这些作物在他们国家产量十分丰富。他们不吃面包,而是将米、粟和牛奶或者肉煮熟后食用。小麦在他们国家的产量不是很高,他们通常将收获的小麦做成面条或者面饼食用。在他们的国家,没有闲置土地,家禽繁殖也十分迅速。当他们服兵役时,每人都有六匹、八匹或者更多的马匹供他自己使用。这样也就不难理解为什么这个国家有如此多人口和如此多谋生手段。

现在让我向大家描述另外一件和驿站密切相关的事情。在各个驿站之间,每隔三英里就有一个站点,每个站点大概有四十户徒步为大汗送信的信使。他们系着长长的腰带,身上挂着铃铛,这样当他们送信时,离着很远的距离就能听到他们的声音。他们总是快速跑步送信,但是从来不超过三英里,在三英里外的另一个站点的信使听到铃声后,就会准备好收信,当第一个送信人到达时,新的信使就接过他要送达的物品和书记员给他的小条,然后就开始跑步送信。当他跑完三英里后,又有另一个信使接替,如此反复。通过这些徒步的信使,大汗在一天一夜就能收到原本需要十天才能收到的消息。因为这些徒步信使可以不到一天一夜走完十天的路程,或者用两天两夜的时间走完二十天的路程。在果实成熟的季节,通过这种方法,白天在汗八里采摘的水果,在第二天晚上就能送到大汗所在的城市——上都,而两个城市原本需要十天的路程。

在每隔三英里的站点都有一个书记员,负责记录每个信使到达和离开的时间和日期,每个站点都要执行这样的记录。同时,每月还有官吏来巡查,检查每一个站点,这是为了找出粗心大意的信使并惩罚他们。大汗对这些信使和站点的工作人员免除赋税,并且向他们提供充足的粮食来维持生活。

对于上文中提到的那些驿站中供皇家信使使用的马匹,我将向大家详细描述大汗是如何安排的。首先,大汗会询问:“离某个驿站最近的城市是哪座?”然后问:“它能为信使提供多少马匹?”接下来通过专门的官员进行调查,查出驿站周围的居民以及附近的城镇和村庄能够提供多少马匹,然后根据实际情况,让居民提供相应数目的马匹。所有的城市都一样,考虑到两个驿站之间有时候会穿过另一个城市,那么这个城市也要提供相应的马匹。他们提供马匹的费用可以从他们的赋税中扣除,因此,如果一个人需要交纳的税费总共价值一匹半马,那么他就要向邻近的驿站提供相应的马匹。但是大家要知道,不是任何时候驿站都有四百匹马。实际上,他们将二百匹马留在驿站一个月,供信使使用,另外两百匹则在草原上喂养。在月末的时候,再将喂养的两百匹马与留在驿站的马匹交换,这样就可以不断地轮流使用。

信使送信时,如果遇到必须经过的河流或者湖泊,邻近的城市就要准备三到四条渡船,随时供信使使用;如果遇到需要很多天才能穿越的沙漠,而且沙漠中没有其他常住居民,那么沙漠边缘的城市就要向大汗的特使提供充足的马匹和食物,以满足特使及其随从的需要。但是对这样的城市,大汗会给予特殊的补助。对于距离主路较远的驿站,那儿的马匹一部分由大汗自己提供,一部分由附近的城镇、村庄提供。

当遇到大汗急需的消息,比如发生叛乱或者其他引起大汗深思的事情时,信使可以每天行驶两百英里,有时候甚至是两百五十英里。让我来告诉大家这是如何做到的:当信使收到急需传递的信件时,就会持有一个刻有矛隼的牌子,作为传送急件的信号。如果有两个信使,他们出发时就骑上两匹强壮的马,系紧他们的腰带,用布包住头,以最快的速度前进,直到下一个驿站。当他们接近驿站时,他们会用牛角吹出声响,这种声音在很远的地方也能听到,这样,驿站就能为他们备好马匹。当他们到达时,就会换乘两匹已经套好马具、状态极佳的马,然后立刻出发,马不停蹄地赶往下一个驿站,再换马前进。这样,信使就能在一天内跑完两百五十英里,将消息送到大汗手中。事实上,如果是极其紧要的消息,他们每天可以奔驰三百英里。在这种情况下,他们晚上也不休息,如果没有月光,就由各个驿站的人持灯跑步,为他们照明。在夜间骑马的速度不如白天快,因为他们会受到跑步照明者速度的影响。能够如此劳累送信的使者,都会得到丰厚的奖励。

现在,让我向大家讲述一下大汗对臣民的恩赐。大汗总是希望能给予他的臣民直接的帮助,使他们能正常生活劳作,积累财富。每年他都要派出使者和巡查员,去全国各地了解臣民们是否因为天气原因、蝗灾或其他虫灾而导致收成不足。当他发现有些地区的百姓收成不足时,不但免去当年的赋税,还会赐予他们国库中的粮食,供他们播种和食用,这是一项重要的恩惠制度。大汗通常在夏天的时候给予百姓这种恩惠,而在冬天,灾难通常发生在牲畜身上。当大汗了解到某一地区居民的牲畜由于瘟疫而死亡时,他就将从其他省份通过什一税收上来的牲畜分给受灾的百姓,为了更进一步地帮助这些百姓,大汗还会免除他们当年的赋税。

当百姓的羊群、牛群或者其他畜群被雷电击中时,不管这些牲畜是属于一个人还是更多人,也不管畜群的数目有多大,大汗都会免去他们三年的赋税。同样地,当一艘装满货物的商船被雷电击中时,大汗也不会向那些货物征税,因为大汗认为,雷击是不祥之兆。他说:“老天爷一定是厌恶此人,才会用雷电袭击他。”所以,他并不希望那些惹老天爷愤怒的货品成为他的财物。

大汗还给予他的百姓另一项恩赐:在各条供信使送信或商人通商的大路上,大汗都令人在道路的两边种植树木,每两步的距离就种植一棵。这些树木长得十分茂盛,在很远的地方就能看到,这使得旅行者很容易就能辨认出路的方向,而不至于迷路。大家会发现,即使在荒无人烟的地方,道路两旁也会种植树木,这给旅行者和商人带来了极大便利。全国各地都如此。当道路穿过沙漠或者石山而无法种植树木时,大汗就下令用石头或者柱子作为路标,指明道路。还有专门的官员负责检查这些规定是否顺利执行。大汗种植树木的另一个原因,是因为算命者和占星家告诉他,种植树木可以延年益寿。

大家要知道,契丹省的居民大都饮用一种酒,我将向大家描述。他们用米和香料制成酒,因而比其他的酒类都要可口。酒水清澈香醇,通常加热后饮用,比其他酒品更容易醉人。

在契丹省的各个地方,都有一种黑色的石头,它们埋藏在山体中,可以像圆木一样燃烧。它们的火焰比木头更好,可以整夜不灭。要想点燃这种石头,需要先点燃它们中的一小块,然后其他的才会被点着,就像煤炭一样,一旦点着,就会散发出很高的热度。这种可以燃烧的石头遍布契丹全省。他们同样还拥有充足的可供燃烧的木柴,但是由于人口众多,有如此多的澡堂和浴室,水要不断地加热,木柴也就供不应求了。因为每个人每周都要至少洗三次澡,即使在冬季,每周也要洗一次。一些官员或富人在自己的家中就设有浴室供他们沐浴。因此,根本没有足够的木柴来满足如此大量的需求,而这些石头数量多,又便宜,很大程度上减少了木柴的使用。

让我们回到谷物的供应上。当大汗发现某年获得大丰收,并且粮食的价格很便宜时,就下令购买许多粮食,并储藏在一个大粮仓内,在这里,粮食被精心保管,即使放上三四年也不会腐烂。这样,大汗就储藏了大量各种粮食——小麦、大麦、粟、大米等。当作物收成不好,发生饥荒时,大汗就动用这些储备,仅以四分之一的价格卖出这些储备的粮食。大汗会发放足够多的粮食,这样就能满足所有人的需要。在大汗统治的地区都实行这样的政策,因而臣民的需求都能得到满足。

下面让我向大家讲述大汗是如何给予汗八里的贫困百姓慷慨施舍的。当大汗得知一些正直的家庭和一些有声望的人,由于遭遇不幸或者由于生病无法劳作,因而变得穷困,无法维持生计时,他就会给予这些家庭(通常由六到十个人或者更多人组成)可供他们使用一年的必需品。这些贫民在指定的日期就可以去专门掌管大汗花费的官员那儿,每人都要提供一个证明书,上面记载着上一年他获得的救济总数,这样今年也可以照前一年度那样发放救济。发放的物品中还包括衣物,这些衣物是大汗从用于制造衣物的羊皮、丝绸和大麻收取的什一税中提取的一部分。大汗将这些材料在指定的地点织成布匹并且贮存在那儿。由于所有的工匠每周都要为大汗工作一天,大汗就令他们将这些布匹做成衣服,供贫穷的家庭冬夏使用。大汗还为他的军队提供衣物,每个城市都要纺织羊毛布,作为向大汗上缴的什一税的一部分。

大家要知道,根据鞑靼人的习俗,在成为佛教徒之前,他们是从来不向他人施舍的。事实上,当有穷人向他们行乞时,他们会赶走这些人,并诅咒道:“让老天爷惩罚你吧,如果老天爷像爱护我一样的爱护你,就会保佑你生活无忧!”但是自从佛教徒中的圣人,尤其是巴克斯向大汗讲到乐善好施是一件功德无量的事情,他们的佛祖会因此而高兴之后,大汗才开始提供上文中提到的救济。向朝廷乞求食物的百姓都不会空手而归,每人都会得到一部分粮食。每天都有官员在指定的地点分发两万到三万碗米、粟。由于大汗对待贫苦百姓是如此的宽宏大量,慷慨救济,因此所有的百姓都对他十分尊敬,把他当做神明一样看待。

在汗八里还居住着许多基督徒、撒拉森人、契丹人和大概五千名占星家和算命者。大汗同样向他们提供衣物和食物,就像提供给那些穷人一样。这样他们就可以正常的在城里研究法术。他们有一种年鉴,上面记载了整年中每时每刻行星通过星群的运动。每年这些占星家、基督徒、撒拉森人和契丹人都要根据他们自己的记载,检查年鉴中每年每月天体运行的轨道和行星的位置。因为他们研究发现,每年每月在一些条件下,行星和星群运行的轨迹和所处的位置,与某些自然现象的发生有着一定联系。比如,某月会有雷雨天气,某月会有地震,某月又会有闪电和暴雨,还有一些月份会爆发瘟疫、战争和冲突等。根据逐月的发现,他们就会根据规律宣称将要发生什么事情,但是他们又说到老天爷可以随意改动他们所预言的事情。因此,他们将可能发生的事情逐月写在一个小册子上,以每册一个银币的价格卖给那些想知道全年中会发生什么事情的人。那些能够给出最准确预言的人被认为是他们法术中的佼佼者,受到极大尊重。

当有人需要从事某项重要的商业活动,或者要去某处经商,或从事其他事业,或者想知道某项计划的结果时,他就会去询问占星家,告诉他们自己的生辰八字。根据习俗,每个人都从小被告知自己的生辰八字,父母会仔细地将孩子的生辰八字记在一个本子里,所以每个人都可以说出自己的生辰八字。他们认为十二年为一个周期,每年都有一个符号:第一年的符号为狮子,第二年是牛年,第三年是龙年,第四年是狗年,以此类推,直到十二年都被安排。所以,当有人被问及他是何时出生时,他就会回答:“狮年的某月某时某刻。”当十二年的周期完成后,他们就以同样的顺序开始一个新的十二年。所以当一个人向占星家或者算命者询问他们的冒险会有什么样的结果时,首先要说出他的生辰八字,算命者就可以确定他属于哪个星座和行星,然后预测他这次远行或者冒险的结果是好还是坏。同样地,如果询问者是一个商人,他就会被告知,他的行星正处于上升的通道,这会对他的冒险产生不利的影响,他需要等待一个更好的时机;如果他的星座刚好直接面向他准备离开的城门,则不利于他的出行,这样他就需要换一个城门离开,或者等到星座离开现在的位置;或者在某时某地,他会遇到强盗,在另外一些时候他会遭遇狂风暴雨,其他一些时候他的马匹会有一条腿骨折,在这儿他的一些非法交易会给他带来损失,在那儿又能给他带来一些利润等。这样算命者就会根据星象来预测他的整个旅程的运气变化,是顺利还是损失惨重。

我已经告诉大家,契丹百姓都是佛教徒,每人房间的墙壁上里都会挂有一个图像,代表高高在上的天神,并且图像上还写有神明的名字。每天他们都要面对神明焚香叩拜,双手合十,叩头三次,祈求天神保佑他们长命百岁、智慧健康。除此之外,别无所求。在地上,他们还有一个叫做纳蒂盖的地神。他们给纳蒂盖配有妻子儿女,并以同样的方式对他焚香礼拜、合掌叩首。他们向他祈求风调雨顺、五谷丰登、儿孙满堂。

由于投入了很多时间去学习知识,因此他们在言行举止和许多方面的学识都超过了其他民族。他们谈吐高雅,讲究礼貌,总是相互问候,面目和善,举止高贵,吃饭时也十分讲究卫生。但是他们并不注重他们的灵魂,只关心他们现在的身体和自己的快乐。关于灵魂,他们相信灵魂不灭,认为当一个人死去后他的灵魂会进入另外一个身体,根据此人生前的善恶来决定投胎的好坏。也就是说:如果一个人生前是等级低下的人,但是他行为高尚,那么他死后第一次就会投胎于一位体面的妇人,然后成为一个体面的人;第二次就会投胎于一个贵妇,成为一个贵族。这样就会一次次越来越好,直到与神合为一体。但是,如果一个出身高贵的人,行为举止却十分恶劣,死后他就会投胎为一个农夫的儿子,然后再成为一只狗,越降越低。

他们对父母十分尊敬,如果有哪个孩子做出让父母生气的事情或者忽视了父母的需求,那么国家就有一个部门专门来惩罚这些忘恩负义的不孝子孙。

各种罪犯被抓住后都被关进监狱。如果没有被判处死刑,大汗规定,普通罪犯都要坐三年大牢,然后才被释放,但是在他们的脸颊上会烙有印记,以便于分辨。

赌博和行骗在这个国家曾经十分普遍,因此大汗下令禁止赌博和行骗。为了改变他们这种习惯,大汗说道:“我已经用武力征服了你们,你们所有的财产都属于我,所以,如果你们赌博,就是在用我的财产赌博。”但是,大汗并没有用这个理由从百姓那儿巧取豪夺。

我不会忘记向大家描述大汗的臣民和贵族觐见大汗时的举止。首先,不管是谁,在离大汗半英里的地方,就会表现出对大汗的尊敬,他们行为恭谦温顺,从不大声喧哗,也从不大声交谈。每位男爵或者贵族都会随身带有一个设计精巧的小容器,供他们吐痰时使用。而在大汗的大殿中,没有人敢随地吐痰。同样地,他们还随身携带一双白色皮革制成的鞋子,当他们来到朝廷,即将受到大汗的接见时,就会换上这双白鞋,把原来穿的鞋子交给随从,这样就不会弄脏那些用金线织成的美丽多彩的丝质地毯。

注释


[1] 史料记载蒙哥汗在1259年去世后,次年其弟阿里不哥在哈拉和林被选作蒙古帝国大汗,而忽必烈则在中原开平自立为大汗。大蒙古国第四任大汗蒙哥去世后,大蒙古国一分为五个国家,不复存在。这五个国家分别是拔都的金帐汗国,忽必烈的大元国(中国元朝),西亚的伊尔汗国,南亚的察合台汗国,以及中亚的窝阔台汗国。——译者注

[2] 汗八里(Khan-balik):元代都城大都(北京)的别称。——译者注

[3] 指马可·波罗的父亲和叔叔,尼科洛·波罗及马费奥·波罗。——译者注