Second Objections
(a)So far,you acknowledge that you are a thinking thing but you do not know what this thinking thing is.What if it were a body,which,by its various movements and interactions,produces what we call thought? Although you think you have excluded every kind of body,you may have been mistaken because you hardly excluded yourself and you may be a body.How do you demonstrate that a body cannotthinkorthatbodilymovementsarenotthatthought? But the whole system of your body,which you think you have excluded,or some parts of it–for example,the brain–could cooperate to produce those movements that we call thought.I am a thinking thing,you say;but do you know that you are not a bodily movement or a body that is moved?
(b)Since you are not yet certain of the existence of God,and since you cannot say that you are certain of anything or that you know anything clearly and distinctly unless you first know certainly and clearly that God exists,it follows that you cannot yet know clearly and distinctly that you are a thinking thing since,according to you,such knowledge depends on a clear knowledge of God's existence,which you have not yet proved at the point where you conclude that you know clearly what you are.
Besides,an atheist knows clearly and distinctly that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles.However,they are so far from supposing God's existence that they openly deny it because,they argue,if God existed he would be the supreme being,the supreme good,that is,he would be in finite.But in every class,the in finite excludes every other perfection,that is,every entity and good and,even more,every nonentity and evil;since there are many things,beings,goods,nonbeings and evils,we think you should answer this objection properly so that the impious have nothing left to rely on.
(c)But how do you know you are certain that you are not deceived,and that you cannot be deceived,about things that you think you know clearly and distinctly? How often have we found someone deceived about things that they believed they knew more clearly than the sun? Thus this principle of clear and distinct knowledge ought to be so clearly and distinctly explained that no one of sound mind could ever be deceived about things that they believe they know clearly and distinctly.
(d)When you reply to the theologian,you seem to go astray in the conclusion,which you express as follows:‘Whatever we understand clearly and distinctly asbelonging to the true and immutable nature of something can be truly predicated of it.But when we have examined with enough care what God is,we understand clearly and distinctly that it belongs to his nature that he exists.’You should conclude:‘therefore when we have investigated carefully enough what God is,we can assert truthfully that it belongs to the nature of God that he exists.’It does not follow from this that God truly exists,but only that he must exist if his nature is possible or if it is not selfcontradictory.In other words,the nature or essence of God cannot be conceived without existence and therefore,given his essence,he truly exists.This is equivalent to the argument that others have expressed as follows:‘If it is consistent to claim that there is a God,then it is certain that he exists.But it is consistent to claim that he exists.’However,there is a question about the minor premise,which is:‘But it is consistent for him to exist.’Those who disagree claim either to doubt or to deny that.
(e)Besides,it does not seem to follow from the distinction of the mind from the body that the mind is incorruptible and immortal.What if its nature were limited by the duration of the life of the body,and if God granted it only enough strength and existence to coincide with the life of the body?
Replies
(a)You also ask:how do I demonstrate that a body cannot think? But forgive me if I reply that this question doesnot arise at that stage,for the first occasion on which I dealt with it was in the Sixth Meditation,in the following words:‘it is enough that I can understand one thing,clearly and distinctly,without another in order to be certain that one thing is distinct from the other’and so on.And a little later:
Although I have a body that is joined very closely to me,since I have on the one hand a clear and distinct idea of myself insofar as I am a thinking,nonextended thing and,on the other hand,I have a distinct idea of the body insofar as it is merely an extended,nonthinking thing,it is certain that I(that is,a mind)am really distinct from my body and that I can exist without it.
It is easy to add to this:‘Anything that can think is a mind or is called a mind;but since mind and body are really distinct,no body is a mind.Therefore it is impossible for a body to think.’
I do not see what you can deny in this.Is it that it is not enough that we understand one thing clearly without another in order to recognize that they are really distinct? In that case,you should provide some more certain criterion of a real distinction,for I am con fident that it is impossible to produce one.What will you say,then? Are two things really distinct if each can exist without the other? But I ask in reply:how do you know that one thing can exist without the other? If this is to be a criterion for a distinction,it must be knowable.Perhaps you will say that this can be known by using the senses because you can see or touch one thing when the other is absent,andso on.But the testimony of the senses is less reliable than that of the intellect,and it can happen in various ways that one and the same thing appears in different forms or in several places in different ways and,as a result,it is taken for two things.Also,if you remember what was said about the wax towards the end of the Second Meditation,you will realize that even bodies are not,strictly speaking,perceived by the senses but only by the intellect,so that to sense one thing without another is nothing other than to have an idea of one thing and to understand that that idea is not identical with the idea of the other thing.This can be understood only from the fact that one thing is perceived without the other,and it cannot be understood clearly unless the idea of each thing is clear and distinct.Thus,if your criterion for a real distinction provides any certainty,it is reducible to mine.
(b)When I said that we are unable to have knowledge that is certain unless we first know that God exists,I explicitly claimed that I was speaking only about knowledge of those conclusions that we can remember when we no longer consider the premises from which we deduced them.But knowledge of principles is not usually called‘scienti fic knowledge’by logicians.However,when we advert to the fact that we are thinking things,that is a primary notion,which is not deduced from a syllogism.Even if someone says,‘I think,therefore I am or I exist,’they do not deduce existence from thinking by using a syllogism,but they recognize it by means of a simple mental insight as something that is selfevident.This isevident from the fact that,if they deduced it by using a syllogism,they would first have to have known the major premise,‘that everything which thinks is or exists’.But they learn that much more from the fact that they experience,in themselves,that it is impossible to think without existing.The nature of our mind is such that it generates general propositions from its knowledge of particulars.
(c)Once we think that something is perceived correctly by us,we are spontaneously convinced that it is true.If this conviction is so strong that we could never have any reason to doubt what we are convinced of in this way,then there is nothing further to inquire about;we have everything that we could reasonably hope for.Why should we be concerned if someone happens to pretend that the very thing,about the truth of which we are so firmly convinced,appears false to God or to an angel and therefore that it is false,absolutely speaking? Why should we care about such an absolute falsehood,for we do not believe in it at all and have not the slightest evidence to support it? We are assuming a conviction that is so firm that it cannot be changed in any way,and such a conviction is evidently the same thing as the most perfect certainty.
But there may be a doubt whether anyone has such a degree of certainty,or such a firm and unchangeable conviction.
It is clear that such certainty is not available in the case of things that we perceive(even to the slightest extent)obscurely and confusedly;for such obscurity,of whatever kind,is a sufficient reason to doubt them.Nor is itavailable in the case of things which,however clear,are perceived only by sense;for we have often noticed that mistakes can arise in sensations–for example,when a person with dropsy drinks,or when snow appears yellow to someone with dropsy and they do not see it less clearly and distinctly than we do when it looks white to us.It follows then that this degree of certainty,if it is achieved at all,is realized only in the case of those things that are perceived clearly by the mind.
Among the latter,however,some are so clear and simple that we can never think about them without believing that they are true;for example,that while I am thinking,I exist;that those things which have once been done cannot be undone;and similar things about which it is manifestly possible to have such certainty.For we cannot have any doubt about them unless we think about them,but we cannot think about the very same things without believing that they are true,which is what was supposed.Therefore,we cannot doubt them without at the same time believing that they are true;in other words,we can never doubt them.
Nor is this an objection,that we have often found that others‘were deceived about things that they believed they knew more clearly than the sun’.For we have never seen this happen,nor could anyone see it happen,to those who derived the clarity of their perception from the intellect alone;we saw it happen only to those who derived their certainty either from the senses or from some false prejudice.
Likewise it is no objection if someone pretends that those things appear false to God or an angel,because theevidence of our perception does not allow us to believe whoever pretends such things.
There are other things that are perceived very clearly by our intellect when we consider adequately the reasons on which our knowledge of them depends and are such that we are consequently unable to doubt them at the time.However,we are capable of forgetting those reasons and,meanwhile,remembering the conclusions drawn from them and the question arises whether we still have a firm and unchangeable conviction about those conclusions when we remember that they were derived from evident principles;for we have to assume such a recollection in order for them to be called conclusions.I reply that such certainty is available only to those who know God in such a way that they understand that it is impossible for him to have given them a faculty of understanding that would not lead towards the truth.But it is not possible for others to have the same certainty.
(d)You seem to make a mistake yourself when you criticize the conclusion of the syllogism that I constructed.In order to get the conclusion that you want,the major premise would have to be formulated as follows:‘Whatever we understand clearly as belonging to the nature of something can be affirmed truthfully to belong to its nature.’However,in this form it contains nothing more than a useless tautology.But my major premise was as follows:‘Whatever we understand clearly as belonging to the nature of something can be affirmed truthfully of that thing.’Thus if being an animal belongs to the nature of a human being,then a human being can be said to bean animal.If having three angles equal to two right angles belongs to the nature of a triangle,then it can be affirmed that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles.If existing belongs to the nature of God,then it can be affirmed that God exists,and so on.The minor premise,however,was as follows:‘But it belongs to the nature of God that he exists.’From which it follows evidently,‘Therefore,it can be affirmed truthfully of God that he exists’,and not,as you wished,‘Therefore,we can truthfully affirm that it belongs to the nature of God that he exists.’
Thus,in order to use the quali fication that you introduce,you would have to deny the major premise and say:‘Whatever we understand clearly as belonging to the nature of something may not therefore be affirmed of that thing unless its nature is possible or is not inconsistent.’But I suggest that you notice how weak this quali fication is.Either you understand the term‘possible’,as everyone commonly does,to mean‘what is not inconsistent with human conceptions’and,in that sense of the term,it is evident that the nature of God as I have described it is possible;for I assumed that there was nothing in it that we did not perceive clearly and distinctly should belong to it,and thus it could not be inconsistent withourconceptions.Alternatively,youmaywellimagine that there is some other kind of possibility on the part of the object itself;if that is not consistent with the previous meaning,it cannot in any way be known by the human intellect and therefore it is just as capable of overthrowing everything else that is known to human beings as of contradicting the nature or existence of God.If wecan deny that the nature of God is possible even though we find no impossibility on the part of the concepts–on the contrary,all the things that are contained in the concept of that divine nature are so interconnected that to deny that any of them belongs to God seems confused;if that were so,we could deny by a similar argument that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles or that someone who is actually thinking exists.And it would be even more justi fiable to deny that anything we have learned through the senses is true.Thus all human knowledge would be removed but without any justi fication.
(e)I confess that I cannot refute your supplementary objection,that the immortality of the soul does not follow from the distinction of the soul from the body,because one could say that the soul was made by God in such a way that its duration is terminated at the same time as that of the body.Nor do I assume so much that I could try to determine by the power of human reason any of those things that depend on the free will of God.Our natural knowledge teaches that the mind is distinct from the body and that it is itself a substance;that the human body,insofar as it differs from other bodies,is composed only of the con figuration of its parts and other similar nonessential features;and finally,that the death of the body depends merely on some division or change of shape.We have no reason or precedent to convince us that the death or annihilation of a substance,such as the mind,must follow such a trivial cause as a change of shape,which is nothing more than a mode;indeed,it is not a mode of a mind but of a body,which is really distinct from the mind.Nor have we any reason or precedent to convince us that any substance can perish.That is enough to conclude that the mind,insofar as it can be known by natural philosophy,is immortal.
But if you were asking about the absolute power of God,whether he may have decreed that human souls would be limited to the same length of time within which the bodies to which he united them are destroyed,God alone can reply to that.
There are two kinds of demonstration,namely,by analysis and by synthesis.
Analysis shows the true way by which a thing was discovered methodically and,as it were,a priori,so that if the reader wishes to follow it and to pay enough attention to everything,they will understand the thing as perfectly and will make it their own as if they had discovered it themselves.It includes nothing,however,by which a less attentive or resistant reader would be compelled to believe,for if they fail to pay attention to even the slightest detail of what is involved,the necessity of the conclusion will escape them.
In contrast,synthesis operates in the opposite and,as it were,an a posteriori manner(although the proof itself is often more a priori in this than in the former method),and demonstrates the conclusion clearly and uses a long series of de finitions,postulates,axioms,theorems and problems,so that if any one of the consequences is denied,it shows immediately that it was contained in the antecedents and in this way it compels assent fromthe reader no matter how resistant or stubborn they may be.But it is not as satisfactory as analysis,nor does it satisfy the minds of those who are anxious to learn because it does not teach the way in which something was discovered.
Reasons which prove the existence of God,and the distinction of the soul from the body,arranged in a geometrical format
I.By the term‘thought’,I mean everything which is in us in such a way that we are immediately conscious of it.Thus all operations of the will,intellect,imagination,and the senses are thoughts.But I added the word‘immediately’to exclude whatever follows from thoughts;for example,although a voluntary motion has some thought as its principle,it is not itself a thought.
II.By the word‘idea’,I understand the form of any thought by the immediate perception of which I am conscious of the thought itself.Hence I cannot express anything in words and understand what I am saying without,by that very fact,being certain that I have an idea of whatever is meant by those words.Thus I do not apply the term‘ideas’only to the images which are depicted in the imagination;in fact,I do not call them ideas at all here,insofar as they are depicted in the bodily imagination,that is,in some part of the brain,but only insofar as they inform the mind itself when it turns towards that part of the brain.
III.By‘the intentional reality of an idea’,I understand the reality of a thing that is represented by an idea insofaras it is in the idea.In the same way one can talk about an intentional perfection,or an intentional arti fice,and so on.For anything that we perceive in the objects of our ideas is in the ideas themselves intentionally.
IV.Things are said to be formally in the objects of our ideas when they occur there in the same way that they are perceived;and they are said to exist eminently in the objects when they do not occur there in the same way,but in a way which is so great that it can provide a substitute for the way in which we perceive them.
V.Something is called a substance if it is a subject in which resides,or by which exists,everything that we perceive,that is,every property,quality or attribute of which we have a real idea.Nor do we have any idea of the substance itself in a strict sense,except that it is the thing in which whatever we perceive exists either formally or eminently,or whatever is present intentionally in one of our ideas,for it is known by the natural light of reason that no real attribute can belong to nothing.
VI.The substance in which thought inheres immediately is called‘mind’;I speak here of a mind rather than a soul,because the term‘soul’is equivocal and is often used in reference to a physical thing.
VII.The substance that is the immediate subject of local extension and of the nonessential features that presuppose extension–such as shape,position,local motion,etc.–is called a‘body’.But whether it is one and the same substance that is called mind and body,or whether they are two different substances,will be investigated later.
VIII.The substance that we understand as supremelyperfect,andinwhichweconceiveof nothingthatinvolves any defect or limitation of perfection,is called God.
IX.When we say that something is contained in the nature of something or in its concept,that is the same as saying that it is true of that thing or that we can affirm it of that thing.
X.Two substances are said to be really distinct when each of them can exist without the other.
Third Objections
Objection
Now from the fact that I think or that I have an image,when I am either awake or dreaming,it follows that I am a thinking being;for‘I think’and‘I am thinking’mean the same thing.From the fact that I am a thinking thing it follows that I exist,because that which thinks is not nothing.But when the text goes on to add,‘that is,a mind,soul,intellect or reason’,a doubt arises.It does not seem to be sound reasoning to say,I am thinking,therefore I am a thought;nor,I am understanding,therefore I am an understanding.For in the same way I could say,I am walking,therefore I am the act of walking.Thus Mr Descartes is taking the thing that understands as if it were identical with understanding,which is an act of the intellect,or at least he is identifying the thing that understands with the understanding,which is a faculty of the intellect.But all philosophers distinguish a subject from its faculties and acts,that is,from its properties and itsessences;an entity is one thing,its essence is something else.It is possible therefore that a thinking thing is the subject of the mind,of reasoning,or of understanding,and therefore is something physical.The opposite is assumed but not proved.But this inference is the basis of the conclusion which,it seems,Mr Descartes wishes to establish.
In the same place he says,I know that I exist,and asks what is this‘I’whom I know? It is very certain that knowledge of this,understood in this precise way,does not depend on things that I do not yet know.
It is very certain that knowledge of this proposition,‘I exist’,depends on this one,‘I think’,as he correctly taught us.But what is the source of our knowledge of the proposition‘I think’? Certainly not anything other than this,that we are incapable of thinking of any act whatsoever without its subject;for example,of dancing without a dancer,or knowing without a knower,of thinking without a thinker…
Reply
When I said,‘that is,a mind,soul,intellect or reason,etc.’,I did not understand those words as referring to mere faculties but to the things that were endowed with a faculty of thinking.This is what everyone understands by the first two terms and what is often understood by the second two.I explained this so explicitly,in so many places,that it seemed as if there was no room for doubt.
Nor is there any equivalence here between walkingand thinking.For walking is usually taken to be only the action itself,whereas thought is sometimes understood as an action,sometimes as a faculty and sometimes as the thing in which it is a faculty.
Besides,I do not claim that the understanding and the thing that understands are identical or indeed that the thing that understands is the same as the intellect,if the word‘intellect’is used to refer to the faculty,but only if it refers to the thing itself that understands.I admit that I used the most abstract words I could find in order to signify the thing or substance that I wanted to strip of everything that does not belong to it,in the same way as,in contrast with me,this philosopher uses the most concrete words possible,‘subject’,‘matter’and‘body’,to signify the thinking thing itself so that it is not separated from the body.
I am not afraid that his method of combining many things together may appear to many people to be more appropriate for discovering the truth than mine,in which I distinguish particular things as much as I can.But let us stop talking about words and concentrate on the reality.
‘It may be,’he says,‘that the thinking thing is something physical;the opposite is assumed,not proved.’But I did not assume the opposite nor did I use it in any way as a premise;instead I explicitly left it undecided until the Sixth Meditation,where it was proved.
He then says,correctly,that we cannot conceive of any act without its subject;for example,we cannot conceive of thought without a thinking thing because whatever thinks is not nothing.But then,without any reason and contrary to all logic and the standard use of language,he adds:it seems to follow from this that the thinking thing is physical.The subjects of all actions are indeed understood under the category of substance(or even,if he wishes,under the category of‘matter’,that is,metaphysical matter),but they are not therefore understood under the category of‘body’.
Objection
Besides,when Descartes says that the ideas of God and of our soul are innate in us,I want to know if the souls of those who are fast asleep and not dreaming are thinking.If they are not,then they have no ideas during that time.Therefore no idea is innate because whatever is innate is always present.
Reply
When we say that some idea is innate in us,we do not think that it is always present to us;in that sense no idea would be innate.We mean only that we have within us a power to produce the idea in question.
Fourth Objections
(a)If someone is certain that they know that the angle in a semicircle is a right angle and therefore that the triangle formed by this angle and the diameter of a semicircle is a rightangled triangle,they may,nonetheless,doubt or may not have grasped with certainty that the square onthe base of the triangle is equal to the squares on the sides,and they may even deny it because they are misled by some fallacy.If they use the same reasoning as that proposed by our illustrious author,it seems as if they are con firmed in their false conviction.For example,someone says:I clearly and distinctly perceive that this triangle is rightangled,but I still doubt whether the square on the base is equal to the squares on the sides.Therefore it is not essential to the triangle that the square on the base is equal to the squares on the sides.
Besides,even if I deny that the square on the base is equal to the squares on the sides,I am still certain that it is a rightangled triangle,and the knowledge that one of its angles is a right angle remains clear and distinct in my mind.Since that is the case,even God cannot bring it about that it is not rightangled.
Therefore anything that I can doubt,and that can even be removed while I retain the idea of the triangle,does not belong to its essence.
Moreover,since I know that everything that I understand clearly and distinctly can be made by God in the way in which I understand it,it is enough for me to be able to understand clearly and distinctly one thing without another to be certain that one is distinct from the other,because they could be separated by God.But I understand clearly and distinctly that this triangle is rightangled,without understanding that the square on the base is equal to the squares on the sides.Therefore it is at least possible for God to make a rightangled triangle in which the square of the base is not equal to the squares of the sides.
I do not see what can be said in reply to this,except that the speaker in question does not perceive the rightangled triangle clearly and distinctly.But how do I succeed in perceiving my own mind more clearly and distinctly than they perceive the nature of a triangle? For they are just as certain that the triangle in the semicircle has one right angle,which is the de finition of a rightangled triangle,as I am certain,from the fact that I am thinking,that I exist.
However,they are mistaken in thinking that it does not belong to the nature of this triangle,which they know clearly and distinctly is rightangled,that the square on its base,etc.Likewise,why may I not be mistaken in thinking that nothing else belongs to my nature,which I know clearly and distinctly is a thinking thing,apart from the fact that I am a thinking thing? It may perhaps belong to my nature that I am an extended thing.
(b)I have one more difficulty.How does he avoid committing the fallacy of a vicious circle when he says that we are certain that what is perceived clearly and distinctly is true only because God exists? But we can be certain that God exists only because we perceive it clearly and distinctly.Therefore before we are certain that God exists we have to be certain that whatever we perceive clearly and distinctly is true.
There is something else that I forgot.It seems false to me–something that our illustrious author claims as certain–that there can be nothing in him insofar as he is a thinking thing of which he is not aware.However,he understandsthephrase‘himself,insofarasheisa thinkingthing’to mean only his mind insofar as it is distinct from his body.But is there anyone who does not see that there may be things in the mind of which the mind is not aware? The mind of an infant in its mother's womb has the power of thinking;but it is not aware of it.There are innumerable similar examples,which I will not mention.
Replies
(a)However,our learned friend argues at this point:even though I am capable of having some knowledge of myself without any knowledge of the body,it does not follow that this knowledge is complete and adequate,so that I could be certain of not being mistaken when I exclude the body from my essence.He explains the argument by reference to a triangle inscribed in a semicircle.We can understand clearly and distinctly that it is a rightangled triangle even if we are unaware,or even if we deny,that the square on its base is equal to the squares on its sides but we cannot infer that it is possible to have a [rightangled] triangle in which the square on the base is not equal to the squares on the sides.
However,this example differs in many ways from what I proposed.First of all,although a triangle might be taken concretely to be a substance,the property of having the square on the base equal to the squares on the sides is certainly not a substance.Therefore neither of these may be understood as complete things in the same sense in which the mind and body are complete;nor can either of them be called a thing in the sense in which Isaid,‘It is enough that I can understand one thing(that is,a complete thing)without another …etc.,’and this is clear from the words which follow:‘besides,I find in myself faculties,etc.’I did not call these faculties things,but I distinguished them carefully from things or substances.
Secondly,although we can understand clearly and distinctly that a triangle in a semicircle is rightangled without realizing that the square on its base is equal to the squares on its sides,we cannot,however,understand clearly,in a similar way,a triangle in which the square on the base is equal to the squares on the sides without realizing,at the same time,that it is rightangled.In contrast,we are capable of perceiving clearly and distinctly the mind without the body and the body without the mind.
Thirdly,although it is possible to have a concept of a triangle inscribed in a semicircle in such a way that the equality between the square on the base and the squares on the sides is not included in the concept,it is not possible to have this concept in such a way that one does not understand that there is some relation between the square on the base and the squares on the sides in this triangle.Therefore,as long as one does not know what that relation is,one cannot deny anything about it except whatever we understand clearly as not belonging to the triangle.This could never include the relation of equality.However,there is nothing at all included in the concept of a body that belongs to the mind,and there is nothing in the concept of the mind that belongs to the body.
Thus,although I said that‘it is enough that I understand clearly and distinctly one thing without another,etc.,’it is not possible to continue as follows:‘But I clearly and distinctly understand this triangle,’and so on.The reason is,first of all,that the relation between the square on the base and the squares on the sides is not a complete thing.Secondly,the relation of equality is understood clearly only in a rightangled triangle.Thirdly,no one can understand the triangle distinctly if they deny the relation between the squares on the base and the sides.
(b)I did not use a vicious circle when I said that we are certain that what we perceive clearly and distinctly is true only because God exists,and that we are certain that God exists only because we perceive it clearly.I have explained this adequately in my reply to the Second Objections,…by distinguishing between what we actually perceive clearly and what we remember having perceived clearly some time earlier.For we are certain,initially,that God exists because we consider the reasons that prove it.Subsequently,however,it is enough that we remember that we perceived something clearly in order to be certain that it is true.That would not be enough unless we knew that God exists and that he does not deceive.
As regards the claim that there can be nothing within the mind insofar as it is a thinking thing of which it is not aware;that seems to be selfevident to me,because we cannot understand anything in the mind,understood in this way,which is not a thought or which does not depend on thought.Otherwise it would not belong to the mind insofar as it is a thinking thing,and we cannot have any thought in us of which we are not aware at the time wehave it.For this reason I do not doubt that the mind begins to think and,at the same time,to be aware of its thinking as soon as it is put into the body of an infant,even if subsequently it does not remember it because the impressions of those thoughts do not survive in its memory.
But it should be noted that,although we are always actually aware of the acts or operations of our mind,we are not always aware of our mental faculties or powers,except potentially.Thus,for example,when we are engaged in using some faculty,we are actually aware of the faculty immediately if the faculty in question is in the mind.It follows that,if we fail to become aware of it,we can deny that it is in our mind.
Fifth Objections
(a)You establish that this claim,‘I am,I exist,’is true whenever you assert it or think about it.But I do not see why you need so much complexity since you had other reasons for being certain,and it was true,that you exist.You could have concluded the same thing from any of your other actions,since we know by the natural light of reason that whatever acts must exist.
(b)When you say,later on,that the universe of things is in some way more perfect if some of its parts are liable to error than if they are all alike,that is the same as claiming that the perfection of a republic would be somehow greater if some of its citizens were evil than if they wereall good.It follows that,just as it seems obvious that a ruler should prefer if all the citizens were good,it likewise seems as if the author of the universe should have arranged that all its parts would be created immune to error and would be so.Although you can say that the perfection of those who are immune to error appears greater in comparison with those who are liable to error,that is true only by accident.Likewise,the virtue of good people,although it shines out in some way in comparison with those who are evil,shines out only by accident.Thus,just as it is not desirable that some citizens should be evil in order to show up those who are good,it seems,likewise,that it ought not to have been arranged that some parts of the universe would be subject to error so that those who are immune to error would appear better.
You say that you have no right to complain if God chose a certain role for you in the world which was not the most perfect or the primary one of all.But that does not resolve the doubt about why it was not enough for him to give you the lowest role among those which were perfect,rather than one which was imperfect.For although it does not seem wrong if a ruler does not appoint all citizens to the highest offices and,instead,has some in middlerank offices and others again in lower offices,a ruler would still be criticized if they not only assigned some citizens to the lowest offices but also assigned depraved functions to others.
(c)As regards your idea of yourself,there is nothing to add to what I have already said,especially about the SecondMeditation.For it becomes clear there that,far from having a clear and distinct idea of yourself,you seem to have none at all.The reason is this:although you recognize that you are thinking,you do not know what kind of thing you,who are thinking,are.Since this operation alone is known,the most important thing,namely the substance that operates,is still hidden from you.Hence the following comparison comes to mind:you could be said to resemble a blind person who,when they feel heat and are advised that it comes from the sun,think they have a clear and distinct idea of the sun in the sense that,if anyone asks what the sun is,they can reply:it is a thing that produces heat.
But you go on to add that,not only are you a thinking thing,but you are not an extended thing.However,I shall overlook the fact that this was said without proof when it was still in question and I shall ask,firstly:do you then have a clear and distinct idea of yourself? You say you are not extended;you say what you are not,rather than what you are.In order to have a clear and distinct idea or,what amounts to the same thing,to have a true and genuine idea of something,is it not necessary to know the thing positively and,as I would say,affirmatively,and is it enough to know that it is not something else? Thus,would it be a clear and distinct idea of Bucephalus if someone knew only that Bucephalus is not afly?
But rather than insist on this point,I prefer to ask:as a thing which is not extended,then,are you not spread thoughout the body? I do not know what your answer might be because,even though I acknowledged from thebeginning that you were only in the brain,I discovered that by conjecture rather than by following your views directly.I based my conjecture on the following phrase,which is found later,where you say that you are not affected by all parts of the body but only by the brain or by one small part of it.It was not at all clear whether you were therefore only in one part of the brain or whether you were in the whole body but were affected only by one part of it,in the same way as we commonly say that the soul is spread throughout the body but,despite that,it sees only through the eye.
(d)I make the same claim about the animal spirits that you have to transmit in order to feel,to receive messages,or to move.Let us leave aside the fact that we cannot understand–if you yourself are at a particular point–how you are able to impress a motion on them unless you are a body or unless you have a body with which you could touch them and at the same time start them moving.For if you say that they move themselves and that you merely direct their motion,remember that you denied elsewhere that a body can move itself;one could therefore conclude that you are the cause of their motion.You would also have to explain to us how such direction works without some exertion and therefore some motion on your part.How can there be any pressure on something and on its motion,without mutual contact between the mover and what is moved? How can we have contact without a body(something which is so clear by thenatural light of reason),since‘nothing can touch or be touched without a body.’
Replies
(a)When you say that I could have concluded the same thing from any of my other actions apart from thinking,you depart a long way from the truth because the only action of which I am completely certain(with the metaphysical certainty that is at issue here)is my thinking.For example,I cannot argue:I walk,therefore I exist,except to the extent that being conscious of my walking is a thought.The inference is certain only when applied to thought but not when applied to the motion of the body,which is something nonexistent in dreams during which,nonetheless,it seems to me that I am walking.Thus from the fact that I think I am walking,I infer most properly the existence of the mind that thinks this thought but not the existence of the body that walks.The same applies to other actions.
(b)You assume here and elsewhere that the fact that we are subject to error is a positive imperfection when(especially with respect to God)it is merely the negation of a greater perfection in creatures.Nor is the analogy appropriate between the citizens of a republic and the parts of the universe.The evil of its citizens,when referred to a republic,is something positive;but the fact that human beings are subject to error or that they do not have every perfection is not something positive when referred to the good of the universe.It would be more appropriate to suggest an analogy between someone who wanted to have the whole human body covered with eyes so that itwould appear more beautiful(because it seems to them that the eye is the most beautiful part of the body),and someone who thinks that there should be no creatures in the universe who are subject to error,that is,who are not completely perfect.
(c)It is easy to refute what you say about the idea of the sun that a blind person gets from its heat alone.For the blind person can have a clear and distinct idea of the sun as something that heats,even if they do not have a similar idea of the sun as a thing that illuminates.Nor is the comparison valid between me and the blind person.In the first place,knowledge of a thing that thinks is much more extensive than knowledge of anything that heats and,in fact,it is much more extensive than what we know about anything else,as was shown in the appropriate place.Secondly,no one can argue that the idea of the sun that the blind person acquires does not contain everything that can be perceived about the sun except those who,endowed with sight,are also aware of its light and shape.But not only do you not know more about the mind than me–you do not even know what I know;in this context,therefore,you are more like the blind person and I,together with the whole human race,could at most be said to be oneeyed.
(d)Even if the mind were united to the whole body it would not necessarily follow that it is extended throughout the body,because it is not essential to it to be extended but only to think …Nor,therefore,is it necessary for it to be a body,even if it has the power to move a body.
Sixth Objections
(a)The sixth difficulty arises from the indifference attributed to judgement and liberty.You deny that indifference belongs to the perfection of the will and claim that it belongs only to its imperfection,so that there is no indifference whenever the mind perceives clearly what should be believed,or what should or should not be done.If this is accepted,do you not see that you destroy God's freedom by taking away the indifference of his freedom when he creates this particular world rather than some other world or none at all? However,it is an article of faith that God was eternally indifferent about creating one particular world,or many worlds,or no world at all.At the same time,who would doubt that God always perceived what was to be done or not done with the clearest understanding? Therefore,a very clear perception and understanding does not remove the indifference of the will.
(b)We do not understand why,as you claim,there are no real accidents in any body or substance that could exist by God's power without any subject and that,in fact,do exist in that way in the Eucharist.However,there is no reason for our professors to be upset until they see whether that is demonstrated in your physics,which we look forward to seeing.They are reluctant to believe that this question will be presented there so clearly that they will be both enabled and obliged to accept it,and to reject the traditional view.
(c)How is it possible for the truths of geometry and metaphysics,such as those you mention,to be immutable and eternal but not be independent of God? What kind of causality is involved in their dependence on God? Could he not then have arranged things so that the nature of a triangle did not exist? And I would like to know:how could he have arranged eternally that it is not true that twice four is eight,or that a triangle does not have three angles? Either these truths depend completely on an intellect while it is thinking them or on things that exist;or else they are independent,since God does not seem capable of having arranged that any of those essences or truths did not exist eternally.
(d)The ninth difficulty concerns us greatly,when you claim that we should distrust the operations of the senses,and that intellectual certainty is much greater than the certainty of sensation.What happens,however,if the intellect has no certainty unless it got it originally from welldisposed senses and if,indeed,it cannot correct the error of any sense unless some other sense first corrects that error? A stick in water seems to be bent as a result of refraction,despite the fact that it is straight.What corrects that mistake? Is it the intellect? Not at all–it is the sense of touch.The same applies to other cases.Thus if you employ all the senses when they are appropriately disposed and if they always report the same thing,you will achieve the highest certainty of which human beings are capable;but this will often escape you if you put your trust in the operation of the mind,because it is often mistaken about things that it believed were completely indubitable.
(e)Could you also provide us with a reliable rule,and with criteria which are certain,that would make us certain when we understand one thing without another so completely that it is certain that one is so distinct from the other that it is capable of subsisting separately,at least by the power of God? In other words,how can we know certainly,clearly and distinctly,that an intellectual distinction was not made by the intellect itself but that it derives from the things themselves? For when we think about the immensity of God without thinking about his justice or when we think about his existence without thinking about the Son and the Holy Spirit,do we not perceive that existence,or that God exists,completely without the other persons of the Trinity? Someone who has no faith could deny the existence of the Son or the Holy Spirit in the same way as you deny that mind or thought belong to the body.Just as it is invalid to conclude that the Son or Holy Spirit is essentially distinct from God or could exist apart from God so,likewise,no one will concede to you that human thought or the human mind is distinct from the body even though you conceive of one without the other or deny one of the other,even though you do not think that this results from any mental abstraction on your part…
Finally,as long as we do not know what bodies and their motions can do,and since you confess that no one can know everything that God was able to give and what he gave to a particular subject unless God himself reveals it to us,who could know that God has not placed in certain bodies a power and property of doubting,thinking,etc.?
Replies
(a)As regards freedom of the will,the kind of freedom that God has is very different from ours.It is selfcontradictory to claim that God's will was not eternally indifferent with respect to everything that has happened or that will ever happen,because one cannot imagine any good or truth,anything to be believed or to be done or omitted,the idea of which was in the mind of God prior to his will determining that it should be such.Nor am I speaking here of temporal priority;it was not even prior in order or in nature,or in what is called‘reasoned reason’in such a way that the idea of good would impel God to choose one thing rather than another.For example,he did not choose to create the world in time because he saw that this would be better than creating it eternally;nor did he will that the three angles of a triangle should be equal to two right angles because he knew that it was impossible to have it otherwise,and so on.On the contrary,it was because he decided to create the world in time that this is better than if it had been created eternally;and it was because he willed that the three angles of a triangle should be necessarily equal to two right angles that this is consequently true and that it is impossible for it to be otherwise.And so on for other examples …Thus the supreme indifference of God is the strongest evidence for his omnipotence.But in the case of human beings,since they find that the nature of every good and every truth has already been determined by God and that their wills cannot tend towards anything else,it is clear thatthey will embrace what is good or true more willingly and therefore more freely insofar as they perceive it clearly,and that they are never indifferent except when they do not know what is better or more true or when they do not see the distinction between them so clearly that they are unable to have any doubt.Thus the indifference that applies to human freedom is very different from that which applies to divine freedom.Nor is it relevant here that the essences of things are said to be indivisible because,firstly,no essence can apply univocally to God and to human beings.Secondly,indifference is not essential to human freedom,for we are not free only when ignorance of what is right makes us indifferent;we are much more free when a clear perception impels us to pursue something.
(b)In order to reject the reality of accidents it seems to me unnecessary to look for any reasons apart from those that I have already presented.Firstly,every sensation occurs through touch and therefore nothing can be sensed apart from the surface of bodies.But if there were real accidents,they would have to be something other than the surface of bodies(which is nothing but a mode).Therefore,if there are any such accidents,they cannot be sensed.
Secondly,it is completely contradictory to claim that there are real accidents,because whatever is real can exist apart from any other subject and whatever is capable of existing separately in this way is a substance rather than an accident.Nor is it relevant that real accidents are said to be incapable of being separated from their subjects‘naturally’,and that this can happen only by God's power.For something to happen naturally is the same as happening by the ordinary power of God,and this does not differ in any way from his extraordinary power and does not add anything extra to things.Thus if everything that can exist naturally without a subject is a substance,it follows that anything that can exist without a subject even by the extraordinary power of God,however great it is,must also be called a substance.I acknowledge that one substance can be related to another substance in an accidental way;however,when this happens,it is not the substance itself which has the form of an accident but it is merely the manner in which it is related to the other substance.For example,when clothing is accidentally related to a human being,it is not the clothing itself,but being clothed,which is an accident.However,the main reason that motivated philosophers to postulate real accidents was that they thought that,without them,sensory perception could not be explained.For that reason I promised,in my physics,to provide a detailed exposition of each of the senses.Not that I wish anyone to believe me about any of these things;rather,given what I had already written in the Dioptrics,I thought that careful readers would easily be able to anticipate what I can offer about the other senses.
(c)It is evident to those who consider the immensity of God that there cannot be anything at all that does not depend on him,not only anything that subsists but even any order or law,or any reason for what is good or true.Otherwise,as indicated a little earlier,God would nothave been completely indifferent in creating what he created.For if there had been some essence of goodness prior to his creative command,that would have determined God to do what is best;instead,he determined himself with respect to what should be done at that time and it is for that reason,as it says in Genesis,that‘they are very good’.In other words,the reason why they are good depends on the fact that he chose to make them in that way.Nor is there any reason to inquire about what type of cause is involved in the way in which this goodness and other truths,both mathematical and metaphysical,depend on God.Given that the classi fication of causes was established by those who may not have considered this type of cause,it would hardly be surprising if they failed to give it a special name.Despite that,however,they did provide a name for it;it can be called an efficient cause in the same way in which a king can be the efficient cause of a law,even though the law is not something physical but is only what is called a moral entity.Nor is there any need to ask how God could have brought it about that,from eternity,twice four would not be equal to eight,and so on.I confess that we cannot understand that.But,since I do understand well that there cannot be any kind of entity that does not depend on God and that it is easy for God to arrange certain things so that we human beings cannot understand how they could be other than they are,it would be unreasonable for us to doubt something that we understand well simply because we do not understand something else that we know is beyond our comprehension.Therefore,it should not be thought that eternal truths depend on the human intellect or onother existing things;they depend on God alone who,as the supreme legislator,instituted them from eternity.
(d)In order to understand the certainty of sensation properly,one must distinguish three levels,as it were,of sensation.When the bodily organ is merely affected by external objects,that belongs to the first level;and this can be nothing more than the motion of particles of that sensory organ and the change in shape or position which results from that motion.The second level includes everything that follows immediately in the mind from the fact that it is united with this bodily organ;this includes perceptions of pain,pleasure,thirst,hunger,colours,sound,taste,smell,heat,cold and so on,which in the Sixth Meditation were said to arise from the union and,as it were,the merging of the mind with the body.The third level includes all the judgements that we have been accustomed to make about external things since our earliest years,on the occasion of motions in a bodily organ.
For example,when I see a stick one should not imagine that various‘intentional species’fly from the stick to my eye,but simply that rays of light are reflected from the stick and trigger certain motions in the optic nerve and,as a result,in the brain(as I explained at sufficient length in the Dioptrics).The first level of sensation consists in this motionof thebrain,whichwehaveincommonwithbrute animals.The second level follows from this,and includes only the perception of the colour or light which is reflected from the stick;this arises from the fact that the mind is so closely joined with the brain that it is affected by motions that occur in the brain.Nothing more than this should beincluded in sensation if we wish to distinguish it carefully from the intellect.However,if I judge that the stick,which is located outside me,is coloured as a result of the sensation of colour by which I am affected;likewise,if from the extension of the colour,and from its boundary and its position in relation to parts of my brain,I reason about the size of the stick,its shape and its distance from me;even though this is commonly attributed to sensation and I have classi fied it under the third level of sensation,it is evident that it depends on the intellect alone.And I have demonstrated in the Dioptrics that size,distance and shape can be perceived only by reasoning from one of these properties to another.The only difference is that we attribute to the intellect the things that we now judge for the first time as a result of some new observation,whereas we refer to sensation the judgements that we have made since our earliest years,in exactly the same way as we still do,about things that affected our senses or whatever we have concluded from them by inference.The reason for this is that we reason and judge so quickly,as a result of habit or,rather,we remember judgements that we made earlier about similar things,that we fail to distinguish these operations from a simple sensory perception.
It is clear from this that when we say that‘intellectual certainty is much greater than the certainty of sensation’,that means simply that the judgements which we make in our maturity as a result of new observations are more certain than those we made uncritically in our earliest years;and that is undoubtedly true.It is obvious that the first or second levels of sensation are not at issue in this context,because there can be no falsehood in those.When it is said,then,that a stick appears bent in water as a result of refraction,that is the same as saying that it appears to us in such a way that an infant would judge that it is bent and that we ourselves would judge likewise if we followed the prejudices that we acquired from our earliest years.But if one adds here that this mistake is corrected not by the intellect but by the sense of touch,I cannot accept that.For even though we judge that the stick is straight by touching it,and thus by judging in the manner to which we have become accustomed since childhood and which is consequently called‘sensation’,that is not sufficient to correct the visual mistake.We also need some reason to decide to believe the judgement based on touch rather than the judgement based on sight and,since this reason was not present in our infancy,it is attributed to the intellect rather than to sensation.Thus even in this very example,it is only the intellect that corrects the mistake of sensation,nor can anyone identify any other case in which error arises from trusting our intellect rather than sensation.