IV
Of the Limits to the Authority of Society Over the Individual
What, then, is the rightful limit to the sovereignty of the individual over himself ? Where does the authority of society begin? How much of human life should be assigned to individuality, and how much to society?
Each will receive its proper share, if each has that which more particularly concerns it. To individuality should belong the part of life in which it is chiefly the individual that is interested; to society, the part which chiefly interests society.
Though society is not founded on a contract, and though no good purpose is answered by inventing a contract in order to deduce social obligations from it, every one who receives the protection of society owes a return for the benefit, and the fact of living in society renders it indispensable that each should be bound to observe a certain line of conduct towards the rest. This conduct consists first, in not injuring the interests of one another; or rather certain interests, which, either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding, ought to be considered as rights; and secondly, in each person's bearing his share (to be fixed on some equitable principle) of the labours and sacrifices incurred for defending the society or its members from injury and molestation. These conditions society is justified in enforcing at all costs to those who endeavour to withhold fulfilment. Nor is this all that society may do. The acts of an individual may be hurtful to others, or wanting in due consideration for their welfare, without going the length of violating any of their constituted rights. The offender may then be justly punished by opinion, though not by law. As soon as any part of a person's conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others, society has jurisdiction over it, and the question whether the general welfare will or will not be promoted by interfering with it, becomes open to discussion. But there is no room for entertaining any such question when a person's conduct affects the interests of no persons besides himself, or needs not affect them unless they like (all the persons concerned being of full age, and the ordinary amount of understanding). In all such cases there should be perfect freedom, legal and social, to do the action and stand the consequences.
It would be a great misunderstanding of this doctrine to suppose that it is one of selfish indifference, which pretends that human beings have no business with each other's conduct in life, and that they should not concern themselves about the well-doing or well-being of one another, unless their own interest is involved. Instead of any diminution, there is need of a great increase of disinterested exertion to promote the good of others. But disinterested benevolence can find other instruments to persuade people to their good, than whips and scourges, either of the literal or the metaphorical sort. I am the last person to undervalue the self-regarding virtues; they are only second in importance, if even second, to the social.
It is equally the business of education to cultivate both. But even education works by conviction and persuasion as well as by compulsion, and it is by the former only that, when the period of education is past, the self-regarding virtues should be inculcated. Human beings owe to each other help to distinguish the better from the worse, and encouragement to choose the former and avoid the latter. They should be for ever stimulating each other to increased exercise of their higher faculties, and increased direction of their feelings and aims towards wise instead of foolish, elevating instead of degrading, objects and contemplations. But neither one person, nor any number of persons, is warranted in saying to another human creature of ripe years, that he shall not do with his life for his own benefit what he chooses to do with it. He is the person most interested in his own well-being: the interest which any other person, except in cases of strong personal attachment, can have in it, is trifling, compared with that which he himself has; the interest which society has in him individually (except as to his conduct to others) is fractional, and altogether indirect: while, with respect to his own feelings and circumstances, the most ordinary man or woman has means of knowledge immeasurably surpassing those that can be possessed by any one else. The interference of society to overrule his judgment and purposes in what only regards himself, must be grounded on general presumptions; which may be altogether wrong, and even if right, are as likely as not to be misapplied to individual cases, by persons no better acquainted with the circumstances of such cases than those are who look at them merely from without. In this department, therefore, of human affairs, Individuality has its proper field of action. In the conduct of human beings towards one another, it is necessary that general rules should for the most part be observed, in order that people may know what they have to expect; but in each person's own concerns, his individual spontaneity is entitled to free exercise. Considerations to aid his judgment, exhortations to strengthen his will, may be offered to him, even obtruded on him, by others; but he himself is the final judge. All errors which he is likely to commit against advice and warning, are far outweighed by the evil of allowing others to constrain him to what they deem his good.
I do not mean that the feelings with which a person is regarded by others, ought not to be in any way affected by his self-regarding qualities or deficiencies. This is neither possible nor desirable. If he is eminent in any of the qualities which conduce to his own good, he is, so far, a proper object of admiration. He is so much the nearer to the ideal perfection of human nature. If he is grossly deficient in those qualities, a sentiment the opposite of admiration will follow. There is a degree of folly, and a degree of what may be called (though the phrase is not unobjectionable) lowness or depravation of taste, which, though it cannot justify doing harm to the person who manifests it, renders him necessarily and properly a subject of distaste, or, in extreme cases, even of contempt: a person could not have the opposite qualities in due strength without entertaining these feelings. Though doing no wrong to any one, a person may so act as to compel us to judge him, and feel to him, as a fool, or as a being of an inferior order: and since this judgment and feeling are a fact which he would prefer to avoid, it is doing him a service to warn him of it beforehand, as of any other disagreeable consequence to which he exposes himself. It would be well, indeed, if this good office were much more freely rendered than the common notions of politeness at present permit, and if one person could honestly point out to another that he thinks him in fault, without being considered unmannerly or presuming. We have a right, also, in various ways, to act upon our unfavourable opinion of any one, not to the oppression of his individuality, but in the exercise of ours. We are not bound, for example, to seek his society; we have a right to avoid it (though not to parade the avoidance), for we have a right to choose the society most acceptable to us. We have a right, and it may be our duty, to caution others against him, if we think his example or conversation likely to have a pernicious effect on those with whom he associates. We may give others a preference over him in optional good offices, except those which tend to his improvement. In these various modes a person may suffer very severe penalties at the hands of others, for faults which directly concern only himself; but he suffers these penalties only in so far as they are the natural, and, as it were, the spontaneous consequences of the faults themselves, not because they are purposely inflicted on him for the sake of punishment. A person who shows rashness, obstinacy, self-conceit - who cannot live within moderate means - who cannot restrain himself from hurtful indulgences - who pursues animal pleasures at the expense of those of feeling and intellect - must expect to be lowered in the opinion of others, and to have a less share of their favour-able sentiments; but of this he has no right to complain, unless he has merited their favour by special excellence in his social relations, and has thus established a title to their good offices, which is not affected by his demerits towards himself.
What I contend for is, that the inconveniences which are strictly inseparable from the unfavourable judgment of others, are the only ones to which a person should ever be subjected for that portion of his conduct and character which concerns his own good, but which does not affect the interests of others in their relations with him. Acts injurious to others require a totally different treatment. Encroachment on their rights; infliction on them of any loss or damage not justified by his own rights; falsehood or duplicity in dealing with them; unfair or ungenerous use of advantages over them; even selfish abstinence from defending them against injury - these are fit objects of moral reprobation, and, in grave cases, of moral retribution and punishment. And not only these acts, but the dispositions which lead to them, are properly immoral, and fit subjects of disapprobation which may rise to abhorrence. Cruelty of disposition; malice and ill-nature; that most anti-social and odious of all passions, envy; dissimulation and insincerity; irascibility on insufficient cause, and resentment disproportioned to the provocation; the love of domineering over others; the desire to engross more than one's share of advantages (the πλεονεξια of the Greeks); the pride which derives gratification from the abasement of others; the egotism which thinks self and its concerns more important than everything else, and decides all doubtful questions in its own favour; - these are moral vices, and constitute a bad and odious moral character: unlike the self-regarding faults previously mentioned, which are not properly immoralities, and to whatever pitch they may be carried, do not constitute wickedness. They may be proofs of any amount of folly, or want of personal dignity and self-respect; but they are only a subject of moral reprobation when they involve a breach of duty to others, for whose sake the individual is bound to have care for himself. What are called duties to ourselves are not socially obligatory, unless circumstances render them at the same time duties to others. The term duty to oneself, when it means anything more than prudence, means self-respect or self-development; and for none of these is any one accountable to his fellow-creatures, because for none of them is it for the good of mankind that he be held accountable to them.
The distinction between the loss of consideration which a person may rightly incur by defect of prudence or of personal dignity, and the reprobation which is due to him for an offence against the rights of others, is not a merely nominal distinction. It makes a vast difference both in our feelings and in our conduct towards him, whether he displeases us in things in which we think we have a right to control him, or in things in which we know that we have not. If he displeases us, we may express our distaste, and we may stand aloof from a person as well as from a thing that displeases us; but we shall not therefore feel called on to make his life uncomfortable. We shall reflect that he already bears, or will bear, the whole penalty of his error; if he spoils his life by mismanagement, we shall not, for that reason, desire to spoil it still further: instead of wishing to punish him, we shall rather endeavour to alleviate his punishment, by showing him how he may avoid or cure the evils his conduct tends to bring upon him. He may be to us an object of pity, perhaps of dislike, but not of anger or resentment; we shall not treat him like an enemy of society: the worst we shall think ourselves justified in doing is leaving him to himself, if we do not interfere benevolently by showing interest or concern for him. It is far otherwise if he has infringed the rules necessary for the protection of his fellow-creatures, individually or collectively. The evil consequences of his acts do not then fall on himself, but on others; and society, as the protector of all its members, must retaliate on him; must inflict pain on him for the express purpose of punishment, and must take care that it be sufficiently severe. In the one case, he is an offender at our bar, and we are called on not only to sit in judgment on him, but, in one shape or another, to execute our own sentence: in the other case, it is not our part to inflict any suffering on him, except what may incidentally follow from our using the same liberty in the regulation of our own affairs, which we allow to him in his.
The distinction here pointed out between the part of a person's life which concerns only himself, and that which concerns others, many persons will refuse to admit. How (it may be asked) can any part of the conduct of a member of society be a matter of indifference to the other members? No person is an entirely isolated being; it is impossible for a person to do anything seriously or permanently hurtful to himself, without mischief reaching at least to his near connexions, and often far beyond them. If he injures his property, he does harm to those who directly or indirectly derived support from it, and usually diminishes, by a greater or less amount, the general resources of the community. If he deteriorates his bodily or mental faculties, he not only brings evil upon all who depended on him for any portion of their happiness, but disqualifies himself for rendering the services which he owes to his fellow-creatures generally; perhaps becomes a bur-then on their affection or benevolence; and if such conduct were very frequent, hardly any offence that is committed would detract more from the general sum of good. Finally, if by his vices or follies a person does no direct harm to others, he is nevertheless (it may be said) injurious by his example; and ought to be compelled to control himself, for the sake of those whom the sight or knowledge of his conduct might corrupt or mislead.
And even (it will be added) if the consequences of misconduct could be confined to the vicious or thoughtless individual, ought society to abandon to their own guidance those who are manifestly unfit for it? If protection against themselves is confessedly due to children and persons under age, is not society equally bound to afford it to persons of mature years who are equally incapable of self-government? If gambling, or drunkenness, or incontinence, or idleness, or uncleanliness, are as injurious to happiness, and as great a hindrance to improvement, as many or most of the acts prohibited by law, why (it may be asked) should not law, so far as is consistent with practicability and social convenience, endeavour to repress these also? And as a supplement to the unavoidable imperfections of law, ought not opinion at least to organize a powerful police against these vices, and visit rigidly with social penalties those who are known to practise them? There is no question here (it may be said) about restricting individuality, or impeding the trial of new and original experiments in living. The only things it is sought to prevent are things which have been tried and condemned from the beginning of the world until now; things which experience has shown not to be useful or suitable to any person's individuality. There must be some length of time and amount of experience, after which a moral or prudential truth may be regarded as established: and it is merely desired to prevent generation after generation from falling over the same precipice which has been fatal to their predecessors.
I fully admit that the mischief which a person does to himself may seriously affect, both through their sympathies and their interests, those nearly connected with him, and in a minor degree, society at large. When, by conduct of this sort, a person is led to violate a distinct and assignable obligation to any other person or persons, the case is taken out of the self-regarding class, and becomes amenable to moral disapprobation in the proper sense of the term. If, for example, a man, through intemperance or extravagance, becomes unable to pay his debts, or, having undertaken the moral responsibility of a family, becomes from the same cause incapable of supporting or educating them, he is deservedly reprobated, and might be justly punished; but it is for the breach of duty to his family or creditors, not for the extravagance. If the resources which ought to have been devoted to them, had been diverted from them for the most prudent investment, the moral culpability would have been the same. George Barnwell murdered his uncle to get money for his mistress, but if he had done it to set himself up in business, he would equally have been hanged. Again, in the frequent case of a man who causes grief to his family by addiction to bad habits, he deserves reproach for his unkindness or ingratitude; but so he may for cultivating habits not in themselves vicious, if they are painful to those with whom he passes his life, or who from personal ties are dependent on him for their comfort. Whoever fails in the consideration generally due to the interests and feelings of others, not being compelled by some more imperative duty, or justified by allowable self-preference, is a subject of moral disapprobation for that failure, but not for the cause of it, nor for the errors, merely personal to himself, which may have remotely led to it. In like manner, when a person disables himself, by conduct purely self-regarding, from the performance of some definite duty incumbent on him to the public, he is guilty of a social offence. No person ought to be punished simply for being drunk; but a soldier or a policeman should be punished for being drunk on duty. Whenever, in short, there is a definite damage, or a definite risk of damage, either to an individual or to the public, the case is taken out of the province of liberty, and placed in that of morality or law.
But with regard to the merely contingent, or, as it may be called, constructive injury which a person causes to society, by conduct which neither violates any specific duty to the public, nor occasions perceptible hurt to any assignable individual except himself; the inconvenience is one which society can afford to bear, for the sake of the greater good of human freedom. If grown persons are to be punished for not taking proper care of themselves, I would rather it were for their own sake, than under pretence of preventing them from impairing their capacity of rendering to society benefits which society does not pretend it has a right to exact. But I cannot consent to argue the point as if society had no means of bringing its weaker members up to its ordinary standard of rational conduct, except waiting till they do something irrational, and then punishing them, legally or morally, for it. Society has had absolute power over them during all the early portion of their existence: it has had the whole period of childhood and nonage in which to try whether it could make them capable of rational conduct in life. The existing generation is master both of the training and the entire circumstances of the generation to come; it cannot indeed make them perfectly wise and good, because it is itself so lamentably deficient in goodness and wisdom; and its best efforts are not always, in individual cases, its most successful ones; but it is perfectly well able to make the rising generation, as a whole, as good as, and a little better than, itself. If society lets any considerable number of its members grow up mere children, incapable of being acted on by rational consideration of distant motives, society has itself to blame for the consequences. Armed not only with all the powers of education, but with the ascendancy which the authority of a received opinion always exercises over the minds who are least fitted to judge for themselves; and aided by the natural penalties which cannot be prevented from falling on those who incur the distaste or the contempt of those who know them; let not society pretend that it needs, besides all this, the power to issue commands and enforce obedience in the personal concerns of individuals, in which, on all principles of justice and policy, the decision ought to rest with those who are to abide the consequences. Nor is there anything which tends more to discredit and frustrate the better means of influencing conduct, than a resort to the worse. If there be among those whom it is attempted to coerce into prudence or temperance, any of the material of which vigorous and independent characters are made, they will infallibly rebel against the yoke. No such person will ever feel that others have a right to control him in his concerns, such as they have to prevent him from injuring them in theirs; and it easily comes to be considered a mark of spirit and courage to fly in the face of such usurped authority, and do with ostentation the exact opposite of what it enjoins; as in the fashion of grossness which succeeded, in the time of Charles II, to the fanatical moral intolerance of the Puritans. With respect to what is said of the necessity of protecting society from the bad example set to others by the vicious or the self-indulgent; it is true that bad example may have a pernicious effect, especially the example of doing wrong to others with impunity to the wrong-doer. But we are now speaking of conduct which, while it does no wrong to others, is supposed to do great harm to the agent himself: and I do not see how those who believe this, can think otherwise than that the example, on the whole, must be more salutary than hurtful, since, if it displays the misconduct, it displays also the painful or degrading consequences which, if the conduct is justly censured, must be supposed to be in all or most cases attendant on it.
But the strongest of all the arguments against the interference of the public with purely personal conduct, is that when it does interfere, the odds are that it interferes wrongly, and in the wrong place. On questions of social morality, of duty to others, the opinion of the public, that is, of an overruling majority, though often wrong, is likely to be still oftener right; because on such questions they are only required to judge of their own interests; of the manner in which some mode of conduct, if allowed to be practised, would affect themselves. But the opinion of a similar majority, imposed as a law on the minority, on questions of self-regarding conduct, is quite as likely to be wrong as right; for in these cases public opinion means, at the best, some people's opinion of what is good or bad for other people; while very often it does not even mean that; the public, with the most perfect indifference, passing over the pleasure or convenience of those whose conduct they censure, and considering only their own preference. There are many who consider as an injury to themselves any conduct which they have a distaste for, and resent it as an outrage to their feelings; as a religious bigot, when charged with disregarding the religious feelings of others, has been known to retort that they disregard his feelings, by persisting in their abominable worship or creed. But there is no parity between the feeling of a person for his own opinion, and the feeling of another who is offended at his holding it; no more than between the desire of a thief to take a purse, and the desire of the right owner to keep it. And a person's taste is as much his own peculiar concern as his opinion or his purse. It is easy for any one to imagine an ideal public, which leaves the freedom and choice of individuals in all uncertain matters undisturbed, and only requires them to abstain from modes of conduct which universal experience has condemned. But where has there been seen a public which set any such limit to its censorship? or when does the public trouble itself about universal experience? In its interferences with personal conduct it is seldom thinking of anything but the enormity of acting or feeling differently from itself; and this standard of judgment, thinly disguised, is held up to mankind as the dictate of religion and philosophy, by nine-tenths of all moralists and speculative writers. These teach that things are right because they are right; because we feel them to be so. They tell us to search in our own minds and hearts for laws of conduct binding on ourselves and on all others. What can the poor public do but apply these instructions, and make their own personal feelings of good and evil, if they are tolerably unanimous in them, obligatory on all the world?
The evil here pointed out is not one which exists only in theory; and it may perhaps be expected that I should specify the instances in which the public of this age and country improperly invests its own preferences with the character of moral laws. I am not writing an essay on the aberrations of existing moral feeling. That is too weighty a subject to be discussed parenthetically, and by way of illustration. Yet examples are necessary, to show that the principle I maintain is of serious and practical moment, and that I am not endeavouring to erect a barrier against imaginary evils. And it is not difficult to show, by abundant instances, that to extend the bounds of what may be called moral police, until it encroaches on the most unquestionably legitimate liberty of the individual, is one of the most universal of all human propensities.
As a first instance, consider the antipathies which men cherish on no better grounds than that persons whose religious opinions are different from theirs, do not practise their religious observances, especially their religious abstinences. To cite a rather trivial example, nothing in the creed or practice of Christians does more to envenom the hatred of Mahomedans against them, than the fact of their eating pork. There are few acts which Christians and Europeans regard with more unaffected disgust, than Mussulmans regard this particular mode of satisfying hunger. It is, in the first place, an offence against their religion; but this circumstance by no means explains either the degree or the kind of their repugnance; for wine also is forbidden by their religion, and to partake of it is by all Mussulmans accounted wrong, but not disgusting. Their aversion to the flesh of the 'unclean beast' is, on the contrary, of that peculiar character, resembling an instinctive antipathy, which the idea of uncleanness, when once it thoroughly sinks into the feelings, seems always to excite even in those whose personal habits are anything but scrupulously cleanly, and of which the sentiment of religious impurity, so intense in the Hindoos, is a remarkable example. Suppose now that in a people, of whom the majority were Mussulmans, that majority should insist upon not permitting pork to be eaten within the limits of the country. This would be nothing new in Mahomedan countries. [1] Would it be a legitimate exercise of the moral authority of public opinion? and if not, why not? The practice is really revolting to such a public. They also sincerely think that it is forbidden and abhorred by the Deity. Neither could the prohibition be censured as religious persecution. It might be religious in its origin, but it would not be persecution for religion, since nobody's religion makes it a duty to eat pork. The only tenable ground of condemnation would be, that with the personal tastes and self-regarding concerns of individuals the public has no business to interfere.
To come somewhat nearer home: the majority of Spaniards consider it a gross impiety, offensive in the highest degree to the Supreme Being, to worship him in any other manner than the Roman Catholic; and no other public worship is lawful on Spanish soil. The people of all Southern Europe look upon a married clergy as not only irreligious, but unchaste, indecent, gross, disgusting. What do Protestants think of these perfectly sincere feelings, and of the attempt to enforce them against non-Catholics? Yet, if mankind are justified in interfering with each other's liberty in things which do not concern the interests of others, on what principle is it possible consistently to exclude these cases? or who can blame people for desiring to suppress what they regard as a scandal in the sight of God and man? No stronger case can be shown for prohibiting anything which is regarded as a personal immorality, than is made out for suppressing these practices in the eyes of those who regard them as impieties; and unless we are willing to adopt the logic of persecutors, and to say that we may persecute others because we are right, and that they must not persecute us because they are wrong, we must beware of admitting a principle of which we should resent as a gross injustice the application to ourselves.
The preceding instances may be objected to, although unreasonably, as drawn from contingencies impossible among us: opinion, in this country, not being likely to enforce abstinence from meats, or to interfere with people for worshipping, and for either marrying or not marrying, according to their creed or inclination. The next example, however, shall be taken from an interference with liberty which we have by no means passed all danger of. Wherever the Puritans have been sufficiently powerful, as in New England, and in Great Britain at the time of the Commonwealth, they have endeavoured, with considerable success, to put down all public, and nearly all private, amusements: especially music, dancing, public games, or other assemblages for purposes of diversion, and the theatre. There are still in this country large bodies of persons by whose notions of morality and religion these recreations are condemned; and those persons belonging chiefly to the middle class, who are the ascendant power in the present social and political condition of the kingdom, it is by no means impossible that persons of these sentiments may at some time or other command a majority in Parliament. How will the remaining portion of the community like to have the amusements that shall be permitted to them regulated by the religious and moral sentiments of the stricter Calvinists and Methodists? Would they not, with considerable peremptoriness, desire these intrusively pious members of society to mind their own business? This is precisely what should be said to every government and every public, who have the pretension that no person shall enjoy any pleasure which they think wrong. But if the principle of the pretension be admitted, no one can reasonably object to its being acted on in the sense of the majority, or other preponderating power in the country; and all persons must be ready to conform to the idea of a Christian commonwealth, as understood by the early settlers in New England, if a religious profession similar to theirs should ever succeed in regaining its lost ground, as religions supposed to be declining have so often been known to do.
To imagine another contingency, perhaps more likely to be realized than the one last mentioned. There is confessedly a strong tendency in the modern world towards a democratic constitution of society, accompanied or not by popular political institutions. It is affirmed that in the country where this tendency is most completely realized - where both society and the government are most democratic - the United States - the feeling of the majority, to whom any appearance of a more showy or costly style of living than they can hope to rival is disagreeable, operates as a tolerably effectual sumptuary law, and that in many parts of the Union it is really difficult for a person possessing a very large income, to find any mode of spending it, which will not incur popular disapprobation. Though such statements as these are doubtless much exaggerated as a representation of existing facts, the state of things they describe is not only a conceivable and possible, but a probable result of democratic feeling, combined with the notion that the public has a right to a veto on the manner in which individuals shall spend their incomes. We have only further to suppose a considerable diffusion of Socialist opinions, and it may become infamous in the eyes of the majority to possess more property than some very small amount, or any income not earned by manual labour. Opinions similar in principle to these, already prevail widely among the artizan class, and weigh oppressively on those who are amenable to the opinion chiefly of that class, namely, its own members. It is known that the bad workmen who form the majority of the operatives in many branches of industry, are decidedly of opinion that bad workmen ought to receive the same wages as good, and that no one ought to be allowed, through piecework or otherwise, to earn by superior skill or industry more than others can without it. And they employ a moral police, which occasionally becomes a physical one, to deter skilful workmen from receiving, and employers from giving, a larger remuneration for a more useful service. If the public have any jurisdiction over private concerns, I cannot see that these people are in fault, or that any individual's particular public can be blamed for asserting the same authority over his individual conduct, which the general public asserts over people in general.
But, without dwelling upon supposititious cases, there are, in our own day, gross usurpations upon the liberty of private life actually practised, and still greater ones threatened with some expectation of success, and opinions propounded which assert an unlimited right in the public not only to prohibit by law everything which it thinks wrong, but in order to get at what it thinks wrong, to prohibit any number of things which it admits to be innocent.
Under the name of preventing intemperance, the people of one English colony, and of nearly half the United States, have been interdicted by law from making any use whatever of fermented drinks, except for medical purposes: for prohibition of their sale is in fact, as it is intended to be, prohibition of their use. And though the impracticability of executing the law has caused its repeal in several of the States which had adopted it, including the one from which it derives its name, an attempt has notwithstanding been commenced, and is prosecuted with considerable zeal by many of the professed philanthropists, to agitate for a similar law in this country. The association, or 'Alliance' as it terms itself, which has been formed for this purpose, has acquired some notoriety through the publicity given to a correspondence between its Secretary and one of the very few English public men who hold that a politician's opinions ought to be founded on principles. Lord Stanley's share in this correspondence is calculated to strengthen the hopes already built on him, by those who know how rare such qualities as are manifested in some of his public appearances, unhappily are among those who figure in political life. The organ of the Alliance, who would 'deeply deplore the recognition of any principle which could be wrested to justify bigotry and persecution', undertakes to point out the 'broad and impassable barrier' which divides such principles from those of the association. 'All matters relating to thought, opinion, conscience, appear to me', he says, 'to be without the sphere of legislation; all pertaining to social act, habit, relation, subject only to a discretionary power vested in the State itself, and not in the individual, to be within it.' No mention is made of a third class, different from either of these, viz. acts and habits which are not social, but individual; although it is to this class, surely, that the act of drinking fermented liquors belongs. Selling fermented liquors, however, is trading, and trading is a social act. But the infringement complained of is not on the liberty of the seller, but on that of the buyer and consumer; since the State might just as well forbid him to drink wine, as purposely make it impossible for him to obtain it. The Secretary, however, says, 'I claim, as a citizen, a right to legislate whenever my social rights are invaded by the social act of another.' And now for the definition of these 'social rights'. 'If anything invades my social rights, certainly the traffic in strong drink does. It destroys my primary right of security, by constantly creating and stimulating social disorder. It invades my right of equality, by deriving a profit from the creation of a misery I am taxed to support. It impedes my right to free moral and intellectual development, by surrounding my path with dangers, and by weakening and demoralizing society, from which I have a right to claim mutual aid and intercourse.' A theory of 'social rights', the like of which probably never before found its way into distinct language: being nothing short of this - that it is the absolute social right of every individual, that every other individual shall act in every respect exactly as he ought; that whosoever fails thereof in the smallest particular, violates my social right, and entitles me to demand from the legislature the removal of the grievance. So monstrous a principle is far more dangerous than any single interference with liberty; there is no violation of liberty which it would not justify; it acknowledges no right to any freedom whatever, except perhaps to that of holding opinions in secret, without ever disclosing them: for, the moment an opinion which I consider noxious passes any one's lips, it invades all the 'social rights' attributed to me by the Alliance. The doctrine ascribes to all mankind a vested interest in each other's moral, intellectual, and even physical perfection, to be defined by each claimant according to his own standard.
Another important example of illegitimate interference with the rightful liberty of the individual, not simply threatened, but long since carried into triumphant effect, is Sabbatarian legislation. Without doubt, abstinence on one day in the week, so far as the exigencies of life permit, from the usual daily occupation, though in no respect religiously binding on any except Jews, is a highly beneficial custom. And inasmuch as this custom cannot be observed without a general consent to that effect among the industrious classes, therefore, in so far as some persons by working may impose the same necessity on others, it may be allowable and right that the law should guarantee to each the observance by others of the custom, by suspending the greater operations of industry on a particular day. But this justification, grounded on the direct interest which others have in each individual's observance of the practice, does not apply to the self-chosen occupations in which a person may think fit to employ his leisure; nor does it hold good, in the smallest degree, for legal restrictions on amusements. It is true that the amusement of some is the day's work of others; but the pleasure, not to say the useful recreation, of many, is worth the labour of a few, provided the occupation is freely chosen, and can be freely resigned. The operatives are perfectly right in thinking that if all worked on Sunday, seven days' work would have to be given for six days' wages: but so long as the great mass of employments are suspended, the small number who for the enjoyment of others must still work, obtain a proportional increase of earnings; and they are not obliged to follow those occupations, if they prefer leisure to emolument. If a further remedy is sought, it might be found in the establishment by custom of a holiday on some other day of the week for those particular classes of persons. The only ground, therefore, on which restrictions on Sunday amusements can be defended, must be that they are religiously wrong; a motive of legislation which never can be too earnestly protested against. 'Deorum injuriæ Diis curæ.' It remains to be proved that society or any of its officers holds a commission from on high to avenge any supposed offence to Omnipotence, which is not also a wrong to our fellow-creatures. The notion that it is one man's duty that another should be religious, was the foundation of all the religious persecutions ever perpetrated, and if admitted, would fully justify them. Though the feeling which breaks out in the repeated attempts to stop railway travelling on Sunday, in the resistance to the opening of Museums, and the like, has not the cruelty of the old persecutors, the state of mind indicated by it is fundamentally the same. It is a determination not to tolerate others in doing what is permitted by their religion, because it is not permitted by the persecutor's religion. It is a belief that God not only abominates the act of the misbeliever, but will not hold us guiltless if we leave him unmolested.
I cannot refrain from adding to these examples of the little account commonly made of human liberty, the language of downright persecution which breaks out from the press of this country, whenever it feels called on to notice the remarkable phenomenon of Mormonism. Much might be said on the unexpected and instructive fact, that an alleged new revelation, and a religion founded on it, the product of palpable imposture, not even supported by the prestige of extraordinary qualities in its founder, is believed by hundreds of thousands, and has been made the foundation of a society, in the age of newspapers, railways, and the electric telegraph. What here concerns us is, that this religion, like other and better religions, has its martyrs; that its prophet and founder was, for his teaching, put to death by a mob; that others of its adherents lost their lives by the same lawless violence; that they were forcibly expelled, in a body, from the country in which they first grew up; while, now that they have been chased into a solitary recess in the midst of a desert, many in this country openly declare that it would be right (only that it is not convenient) to send an expedition against them, and compel them by force to conform to the opinions of other people. The article of the Mormonite doctrine which is the chief provocative to the antipathy which thus breaks through the ordinary restraints of religious tolerance, is its sanction of polygamy; which, though permitted to Mahomedans, and Hindoos, and Chinese, seems to excite unquenchable animosity when practised by persons who speak English, and profess to be a kind of Christians. No one has a deeper disapprobation than I have of this Mormon institution; both for other reasons, and because, far from being in any way countenanced by the principle of liberty, it is a direct infraction of that principle, being a mere rivetting of the chains of one-half of the community, and an emancipation of the other from reciprocity of obligation towards them. Still, it must be remembered that this relation is as much voluntary on the part of the women concerned in it, and who may be deemed the sufferers by it, as is the case with any other form of the marriage institution; and however surprising this fact may appear, it has its explanation in the common ideas and customs of the world, which teaching women to think marriage the one thing needful, make it intelligible that many a woman should prefer being one of several wives, to not being a wife at all. Other countries are not asked to recognize such unions, or release any portion of their inhabitants from their own laws on the score of Mormonite opinions. But when the dissentients have conceded to the hostile sentiments of others, far more than could justly be demanded; when they have left the countries to which their doctrines were unacceptable, and established themselves in a remote corner of the earth, which they have been the first to render habitable to human beings; it is difficult to see on what principles but those of tyranny they can be prevented from living there under what laws they please, provided they commit no aggression on other nations, and allow perfect freedom of departure to those who are dissatisfied with their ways. A recent writer, in some respects of considerable merit, proposes (to use his own words) not a crusade, but a civilizade , against this polygamous community, to put an end to what seems to him a retrograde step in civilization. It also appears so to me, but I am not aware that any community has a right to force another to be civilized. So long as the sufferers by the bad law do not invoke assistance from other communities, I cannot admit that persons entirely unconnected with them ought to step in and require that a condition of things with which all who are directly interested appear to be satisfied, should be put an end to because it is a scandal to persons some thousands of miles distant, who have no part or concern in it. Let them send missionaries, if they please, to preach against it; and let them, by any fair means (of which silencing the teachers is not one) oppose the progress of similar doctrines among their own people. If civilization has got the better of barbarism when barbarism had the world to itself, it is too much to profess to be afraid lest barbarism, after having been fairly got under, should revive and conquer civilization. A civilization that can thus succumb to its vanquished enemy, must first have become so degenerate, that neither its appointed priests and teachers, nor anybody else, has the capacity, or will take the trouble, to stand up for it. If this be so, the sooner such a civilization receives notice to quit, the better. It can only go on from bad to worse, until destroyed and regenerated (like the Western Empire) by energetic barbarians.
[1] The case of the Bombay Parsees is a curious instance in point. When this industrious and enterprising tribe, the descendants of the Persian fire-worshippers, flying from their native country before the Caliphs, arrived in Western India, they were admitted to toleration by the Hindoo sovereigns, on condition of not eating beef. When those regions afterwards fell under the dominion of Mahomedan conquerors, the Parsees obtained from them a continuance of indulgence, on condition of refraining from pork. What was at first obedience to authority became a second nature, and the Parsees to this day abstain both from beef and pork. Though not required by their religion, the double abstinence has had time to grow into a custom of their tribe; and custom, in the East, is a religion.
V
Applications
The principles asserted in these pages must be more generally admitted as the basis for discussion of details, before a consistent application of them to all the various departments of government and morals can be attempted with any prospect of advantage. The few observations I propose to make on questions of detail, are designed to illustrate the principles, rather than to follow them out to their consequences. I offer, not so much applications, as specimens of application; which may serve to bring into greater clearness the meaning and limits of the two maxims which together form the entire doctrine of this Essay, and to assist the judgment in holding the balance between them, in the cases where it appears doubtful which of them is applicable to the case.
The maxims are, first, that the individual is not accountable to society for his actions, in so far as these concern the interests of no person but himself. Advice, instruction, persuasion, and avoidance by other people if thought necessary by them for their own good, are the only measures by which society can justifiably express its dislike or disapprobation of his conduct. Secondly, that for such actions as are prejudicial to the interests of others, the individual is accountable, and may be subjected either to social or to legal punishment, if society is of opinion that the one or the other is requisite for its protection.
In the first place, it must by no means be supposed, because damage, or probability of damage, to the interests of others, can alone justify the interference of society, that therefore it always does justify such interference. In many cases, an individual, in pursuing a legitimate object, necessarily and therefore legitimately causes pain or loss to others, or intercepts a good which they had a reasonable hope of obtaining. Such oppositions of interest between individuals often arise from bad social institutions, but are unavoidable while those institutions last; and some would be unavoidable under any institutions. Whoever succeeds in an overcrowded profession, or in a competitive examination; whoever is preferred to another in any contest for an object which both desire, reaps benefit from the loss of others, from their wasted exertion and their disappointment. But it is, by common admission, better for the general interest of mankind, that persons should pursue their objects undeterred by this sort of consequences. In other words, society admits no right, either legal or moral, in the disappointed competitors, to immunity from this kind of suffering; and feels called on to interfere, only when means of success have been employed which it is contrary to the general interest to permit - namely, fraud or treachery, and force.
Again, trade is a social act. Whoever undertakes to sell any description of goods to the public, does what affects the interest of other persons, and of society in general; and thus his conduct, in principle, comes within the jurisdiction of society: accordingly, it was once held to be the duty of governments, in all cases which were considered of importance, to fix prices, and regulate the processes of manufacture. But it is now recognized, though not till after a long struggle, that both the cheapness and the good quality of commodities are most effectually provided for by leaving the producers and sellers perfectly free, under the sole check of equal freedom to the buyers for supplying themselves elsewhere. This is the so-called doctrine of Free Trade, which rests on grounds different from, though equally solid with, the principle of individual liberty asserted in this Essay. Restrictions on trade, or on production for purposes of trade, are indeed restraints; and all restraint, quâ restraint, is an evil: but the restraints in question affect only that part of conduct which society is competent to restrain, and are wrong solely because they do not really produce the results which it is desired to produce by them. As the principle of individual liberty is not involved in the doctrine of Free Trade, so neither is it in most of the questions which arise respecting the limits of that doctrine; as for example, what amount of public control is admissible for the prevention of fraud by adulteration; how far sanitary precautions, or arrangements to protect workpeople employed in dangerous occupations, should be enforced on employers. Such questions involve considerations of liberty, only in so far as leaving people to themselves is always better, cœteris paribus , than controlling them: but that they may be legitimately controlled for these ends, is in principle undeniable. On the other hand, there are questions relating to interference with trade, which are essentially questions of liberty; such as the Maine Law, already touched upon; the prohibition of the importation of opium into China; the restriction of the sale of poisons; all cases, in short, where the object of the interference is to make it impossible or difficult to obtain a particular commodity. These interferences are objectionable, not as infringements on the liberty of the producer or seller, but on that of the buyer.
One of these examples, that of the sale of poisons, opens a new question; the proper limits of what may be called the functions of police; how far liberty may legitimately be invaded for the prevention of crime, or of accident. It is one of the undisputed functions of government to take precautions against crime before it has been committed, as well as to detect and punish it afterwards. The preventive function of government, however, is far more liable to be abused, to the prejudice of liberty, than the punitory function; for there is hardly any part of the legitimate freedom of action of a human being which would not admit of being represented, and fairly too, as increasing the facilities for some form or other of delinquency. Nevertheless, if a public authority, or even a private person, sees any one evidently preparing to commit a crime, they are not bound to look on inactive until the crime is committed, but may interfere to prevent it. If poisons were never bought or used for any purpose except the commission of murder, it would be right to prohibit their manufacture and sale. They may, however, be wanted not only for innocent but for useful purposes, and restrictions cannot be imposed in the one case without operating in the other. Again, it is a proper office of public authority to guard against accidents. If either a public officer or any one else saw a person attempting to cross a bridge which had been ascertained to be unsafe, and there were no time to warn him of his danger, they might seize him and turn him back, without any real infringement of his liberty; for liberty consists in doing what one desires, and he does not desire to fall into the river. Nevertheless, when there is not a certainty, but only a danger of mischief, no one but the person himself can judge of the sufficiency of the motive which may prompt him to incur the risk: in this case, therefore, (unless he is a child, or delirious, or in some state of excitement or absorption incompatible with the full use of the reflecting faculty) he ought, I conceive, to be only warned of the danger; not forcibly prevented from exposing himself to it. Similar considerations, applied to such a question as the sale of poisons, may enable us to decide which among the possible modes of regulation are or are not contrary to principle. Such a precaution, for example, as that of labelling the drug with some word expressive of its dangerous character, may be enforced without violation of liberty: the buyer cannot wish not to know that the thing he possesses has poisonous qualities. But to require in all cases the certificate of a medical practitioner, would make it sometimes impossible, always expensive, to obtain the article for legitimate uses. The only mode apparent to me, in which difficulties may be thrown in the way of crime committed through this means, without any infringement, worth taking into account, upon the liberty of those who desire the poisonous substance for other purposes, consists in providing what, in the apt language of Bentham, is called 'preappointed evidence'. This provision is familiar to every one in the case of contracts. It is usual and right that the law, when a contract is entered into, should require as the condition of its enforcing performance, that certain formalities should be observed, such as signatures, attestation of witnesses, and the like, in order that in case of subsequent dispute, there may be evidence to prove that the contract was really entered into, and that there was nothing in the circumstances to render it legally invalid: the effect being, to throw great obstacles in the way of fictitious contracts, or contracts made in circumstances which, if known, would destroy their validity. Precautions of a similar nature might be enforced in the sale of articles adapted to be instruments of crime. The seller, for example, might be required to enter in a register the exact time of the transaction, the name and address of the buyer, the precise quality and quantity sold; to ask the purpose for which it was wanted, and record the answer he received. When there was no medical prescription, the presence of some third person might be required, to bring home the fact to the purchaser, in case there should afterwards be reason to believe that the article had been applied to criminal purposes. Such regulations would in general be no material impediment to obtaining the article, but a very considerable one to making an improper use of it without detection.
The right inherent in society, to ward off crimes against itself by antecedent precautions, suggests the obvious limitations to the maxim, that purely self-regarding misconduct cannot properly be meddled with in the way of prevention or punishment. Drunkenness, for example, in ordinary cases, is not a fit subject for legislative interference; but I should deem it perfectly legitimate that a person, who had once been convicted of any act of violence to others under the influence of drink, should be placed under a special legal restriction, personal to himself; that if he were afterwards found drunk, he should be liable to a penalty, and that if when in that state he committed another offence, the punishment to which he would be liable for that other offence should be increased in severity. The making himself drunk, in a person whom drunkenness excites to do harm to others, is a crime against others. So, again, idleness, except in a person receiving support from the public, or except when it constitutes a breach of contract, cannot without tyranny be made a subject of legal punishment; but if, either from idleness or from any other avoidable cause, a man fails to perform his legal duties to others, as for instance to support his children, it is no tyranny to force him to fulfil that obligation, by compulsory labour, if no other means are available.
Again, there are many acts which, being directly injurious only to the agents themselves, ought not to be legally interdicted, but which, if done publicly, are a violation of good manners, and coming thus within the category of offences against others, may rightfully be prohibited. Of this kind are offences against decency; on which it is unnecessary to dwell, the rather as they are only connected indirectly with our subject, the objection to publicity being equally strong in the case of many actions not in themselves condemnable, nor supposed to be so.
There is another question to which an answer must be found, consistent with the principles which have been laid down. In cases of personal conduct supposed to be blameable, but which respect for liberty precludes society from preventing or punishing, because the evil directly resulting falls wholly on the agent; what the agent is free to do, ought other persons to be equally free to counsel or instigate? This question is not free from difficulty. The case of a person who solicits another to do an act, is not strictly a case of self-regarding conduct. To give advice or offer inducements to any one, is a social act, and may, therefore, like actions in general which affect others, be supposed amenable to social control. But a little reflection corrects the first impression, by showing that if the case is not strictly within the definition of individual liberty, yet the reasons on which the principle of individual liberty is grounded, are applicable to it. If people must be allowed, in whatever concerns only themselves, to act as seems best to themselves at their own peril, they must equally be free to consult with one another about what is fit to be so done; to exchange opinions, and give and receive suggestions. Whatever it is permitted to do, it must be permitted to advise to do. The question is doubtful, only when the instigator derives a personal benefit from his advice; when he makes it his occupation, for subsistence or pecuniary gain, to promote what society and the State consider to be an evil. Then, indeed, a new element of complication is introduced; namely, the existence of classes of persons with an interest opposed to what is considered as the public weal, and whose mode of living is grounded on the counteraction of it. Ought this to be interfered with, or not? Fornication, for example, must be tolerated, and so must gambling; but should a person be free to be a pimp, or to keep a gambling-house? The case is one of those which lie on the exact boundary line between two principles, and it is not at once apparent to which of the two it properly belongs. There are arguments on both sides. On the side of toleration it may be said, that the fact of following anything as an occupation, and living or profiting by the practice of it, cannot make that criminal which would otherwise be admissible; that the act should either be consistently permitted or consistently prohibited; that if the principles which we have hitherto defended are true, society has no business, as society, to decide anything to be wrong which concerns only the individual; that it cannot go beyond dissuasion, and that one person should be as free to persuade, as another to dissuade. In opposition to this it may be contended, that although the public, or the State, are not warranted in authoritatively deciding, for purposes of repression or punishment, that such or such conduct affecting only the interests of the individual is good or bad, they are fully justified in assuming, if they regard it as bad, that its being so or not is at least a disputable question: That, this being supposed, they cannot be acting wrongly in endeavouring to exclude the influence of solicitations which are not disinterested, of instigators who cannot possibly be impartial - who have a direct personal interest on one side, and that side the one which the State believes to be wrong, and who confessedly promote it for personal objects only. There can surely, it may be urged, be nothing lost, no sacrifice of good, by so ordering matters that persons shall make their election, either wisely or foolishly, on their own prompting, as free as possible from the arts of persons who stimulate their inclinations for interested purposes of their own. Thus (it may be said) though the statutes respecting unlawful games are utterly indefensible - though all persons should be free to gamble in their own or each other's houses, or in any place of meeting es tablished by their own subscriptions, and open only to the members and their visitors - yet public gambling-houses should not be permitted. It is true that the prohibition is never effectual, and that, whatever amount of tyrannical power may be given to the police, gambling-houses can always be maintained under other pretences; but they may be compelled to conduct their operations with a certain degree of secrecy and mystery, so that nobody knows anything about them but those who seek them; and more than this, society ought not to aim at. There is considerable force in these arguments. I will not venture to decide whether they are sufficient to justify the moral anomaly of punishing the accessary, when the principal is (and must be) allowed to go free; of fining or imprisoning the procurer, but not the fornicator, the gambling-house keeper, but not the gambler. Still less ought the common operations of buying and selling to be interfered with on analogous grounds. Almost every article which is bought and sold may be used in excess, and the sellers have a pecuniary interest in encouraging that excess; but no argument can be founded on this, in favour, for instance, of the Maine Law; because the class of dealers in strong drinks, though interested in their abuse, are indispensably required for the sake of their legitimate use. The interest, however, of these dealers in promoting intemperance is a real evil, and justifies the State in imposing restrictions and requiring guarantees which, but for that justification, would be infringements of legitimate liberty.
A further question is, whether the State, while it permits, should nevertheless indirectly discourage conduct which it deems contrary to the best interests of the agent; whether, for example, it should take measures to render the means of drunkenness more costly, or add to the difficulty of procuring them by limiting the number of the places of sale. On this as on most other practical questions, many distinctions require to be made. To tax stimulants for the sole purpose of making them more difficult to be obtained, is a measure differing only in degree from their entire prohibition; and would be justifiable only if that were justifiable. Every increase of cost is a prohibition, to those whose means do not come up to the augmented price; and to those who do, it is a penalty laid on them for gratifying a particular taste. Their choice of pleasures, and their mode of expending their income, after satisfying their legal and moral obligations to the State and to individuals, are their own concern, and must rest with their own judgment. These considerations may seem at first sight to condemn the selection of stimulants as special subjects of taxation for purposes of revenue. But it must be remembered that taxation for fiscal purposes is absolutely inevitable; that in most countries it is necessary that a considerable part of that taxation should be indirect; that the State, therefore, cannot help imposing penalties, which to some persons may be prohibitory, on the use of some articles of consumption. It is hence the duty of the State to consider, in the imposition of taxes, what commodities the consumers can best spare; and a fortiori , to select in preference those of which it deems the use, beyond a very moderate quantity, to be positively injurious. Taxation, therefore, of stimulants, up to the point which produces the largest amount of revenue (supposing that the State needs all the revenue which it yields) is not only admissible, but to be approved of.
The question of making the sale of these commodities a more or less exclusive privilege, must be answered differently, according to the purposes to which the restriction is intended to be subservient. All places of public resort require the restraint of a police, and places of this kind peculiarly, because offences against society are especially apt to originate there. It is, therefore, fit to confine the power of selling these commodities (at least for consumption on the spot) to persons of known or vouched-for respectability of conduct; to make such regulations respecting hours of opening and closing as may be requisite for public surveillance, and to withdraw the licence if breaches of the peace repeatedly take place through the connivance or incapacity of the keeper of the house, or if it becomes a rendezvous for concocting and preparing offences against the law. Any further restriction I do not conceive to be, in principle, justifiable. The limitation in number, for instance, of beer and spirit houses, for the express purpose of rendering them more difficult of access, and diminishing the occasions of temptation, not only exposes all to an inconvenience because there are some by whom the facility would be abused, but is suited only to a state of society in which the labouring classes are avowedly treated as children or savages, and placed under an education of restraint, to fit them for future admission to the privileges of freedom. This is not the principle on which the labouring classes are professedly governed in any free country; and no person who sets due value on freedom will give his adhesion to their being so governed, unless after all efforts have been exhausted to educate them for freedom and govern them as freemen, and it has been definitively proved that they can only be governed as children. The bare statement of the alternative shows the absurdity of supposing that such efforts have been made in any case which needs be considered here. It is only because the institutions of this country are a mass of inconsistencies, that things find admittance into our practice which belong to the system of despotic, or what is called paternal, government, while the general freedom of our institutions precludes the exercise of the amount of control necessary to render the restraint of any real efficacy as a moral education.
It was pointed out in an early part of this Essay, that the liberty of the individual, in things wherein the individual is alone concerned, implies a corresponding liberty in any number of individuals to regulate by mutual agreement such things as regard them jointly, and regard no persons but themselves. This question presents no difficulty, so long as the will of all the persons implicated remains unaltered; but since that will may change, it is often necessary, even in things in which they alone are concerned, that they should enter into engagements with one another; and when they do, it is fit, as a general rule, that those engagements should be kept. Yet, in the laws, probably, of every country, this general rule has some exceptions. Not only persons are not held to engagements which violate the rights of third parties, but it is sometimes considered a sufficient reason for releasing them from an engagement, that it is injurious to themselves. In this and most other civilized countries, for example, an engagement by which a person should sell himself, or allow himself to be sold, as a slave, would be null and void; neither enforced by law nor by opinion. The ground for thus limiting his power of voluntarily disposing of his own lot in life, is apparent, and is very clearly seen in this extreme case. The reason for not interfering, unless for the sake of others, with a person's voluntary acts, is consideration for his liberty. His voluntary choice is evidence that what he so chooses is desirable, or at the least endurable, to him, and his good is on the whole best provided for by allowing him to take his own means of pursuing it. But by selling himself for a slave, he abdicates his liberty; he forgoes any future use of it beyond that single act. He therefore defeats, in his own case, the very purpose which is the justification of allowing him to dispose of himself. He is no longer free; but is thenceforth in a position which has no longer the presumption in its favour, that would be afforded by his voluntarily remaining in it. The principle of freedom cannot require that he should be free not to be free. It is not freedom, to be allowed to alienate his freedom. These reasons, the force of which is so conspicuous in this peculiar case, are evidently of far wider application; yet a limit is everywhere set to them by the necessities of life, which continually require, not indeed that we should resign our freedom, but that we should consent to this and the other limitation of it. The principle, however, which demands uncontrolled freedom of action in all that concerns only the agents themselves, requires that those who have become bound to one another, in things which concern no third party, should be able to release one another from the engagement: and even without such voluntary release, there are perhaps no contracts or engagements, except those that relate to money or money's worth, of which one can venture to say that there ought to be no liberty whatever of retractation. Baron Wilhelm von Humboldt, in the excellent essay from which I have already quoted, states it as his conviction, that engagements which involve personal relations or services, should never be legally binding beyond a limited duration of time; and that the most important of these engagements, marriage, having the peculiarity that its objects are frustrated unless the feelings of both the parties are in harmony with it, should require nothing more than the declared will of either party to dissolve it. This subject is too important, and too complicated, to be discussed in a parenthesis, and I touch on it only so far as is necessary for purposes of illustration. If the conciseness and generality of Baron Humboldt's dissertation had not obliged him in this instance to content himself with enunciating his conclusion without discussing the premises, he would doubtless have recognized that the question cannot be decided on grounds so simple as those to which he confines himself. When a person, either by express promise or by conduct, has encouraged another to rely upon his continuing to act in a certain way - to build expectations and calculations, and stake any part of his plan of life upon that supposition - a new series of moral obligations arises on his part towards that person, which may possibly be overruled, but cannot be ignored. And again, if the relation between two contracting parties has been followed by consequences to others; if it has placed third parties in any peculiar position, or, as in the case of marriage, has even called third parties into existence, obligations arise on the part of both the contracting parties towards those third persons, the fulfilment of which, or at all events the mode of fulfilment, must be greatly affected by the continuance or disruption of the relation between the original parties to the contract. It does not follow, nor can I admit, that these obligations extend to requiring the fulfilment of the contract at all costs to the happiness of the reluctant party; but they are a necessary element in the question; and even if, as von Humboldt maintains, they ought to make no difference in the legal freedom of the parties to release themselves from the engagement (and I also hold that they ought not to make much difference), they necessarily make a great difference in the moral freedom. A person is bound to take all these circumstances into account, before resolving on a step which may affect such important interests of others; and if he does not allow proper weight to those interests, he is morally responsible for the wrong. I have made these obvious remarks for the better illustration of the general principle of liberty, and not because they are at all needed on the particular question, which, on the contrary, is usually discussed as if the interest of children was everything, and that of grown persons nothing.
I have already observed that, owing to the absence of any recognized general principles, liberty is often granted where it should be withheld, as well as withheld where it should be granted; and one of the cases in which, in the modern European world, the sentiment of liberty is the strongest, is a case where, in my view, it is altogether misplaced. A person should be free to do as he likes in his own concerns; but he ought not to be free to do as he likes in acting for another, under the pretext that the affairs of the other are his own affairs. The State, while it respects the liberty of each in what specially regards himself, is bound to maintain a vigilant control over his exercise of any power which it allows him to possess over others. This obligation is almost entirely disregarded in the case of the family relations, a case, in its direct influence on human happiness, more important than all others taken together. The almost despotic power of husbands over wives needs not be enlarged upon here, because nothing more is needed for the complete removal of the evil, than that wives should have the same rights, and should receive the protection of law in the same manner, as all other persons; and because, on this subject, the defenders of established injustice do not avail themselves of the plea of liberty, but stand forth openly as the champions of power. It is in the case of children, that misapplied notions of liberty are a real obstacle to the fulfilment by the State of its duties. One would almost think that a man's children were supposed to be literally, and not metaphorically, a part of himself, so jealous is opinion of the smallest interference of law with his absolute and exclusive control over them; more jealous than of almost any interference with his own freedom of action: so much less do the generality of mankind value liberty than power. Consider, for example, the case of education. Is it not almost a self-evident axiom, that the State should require and compel the education, up to a certain standard, of every human being who is born its citizen? Yet who is there that is not afraid to recognize and assert this truth? Hardly any one indeed will deny that it is one of the most sacred duties of the parents (or, as law and usage now stand, the father), after summoning a human being into the world, to give to that being an education fitting him to perform his part well in life towards others and towards himself. But while this is unanimously declared to be the father's duty, scarcely anybody, in this country, will bear to hear of obliging him to perform it. Instead of his being required to make any exertion or sacrifice for securing education to the child, it is left to his choice to accept it or not when it is provided gratis! It still remains unrecognized, that to bring a child into existence without a fair prospect of being able, not only to provide food for its body, but instruction and training for its mind, is a moral crime, both against the unfortunate offspring and against society; and that if the parent does not fulfil this obligation, the State ought to see it fulfilled, at the charge, as far as possible, of the parent.
Were the duty of enforcing universal education once admitted, there would be an end to the difficulties about what the State should teach, and how it should teach, which now convert the subject into a mere battle-field for sects and parties, causing the time and labour which should have been spent in educating, to be wasted in quarrelling about education. If the government would make up its mind to require for every child a good education, it might save itself the trouble of providing one. It might leave to parents to obtain the education where and how they pleased, and content itself with helping to pay the school fees of the poorer classes of children, and defraying the entire school expenses of those who have no one else to pay for them. The objections which are urged with reason against State education, do not apply to the enforcement of education by the State, but to the State's taking upon itself to direct that education: which is a totally different thing. That the whole or any large part of the education of the people should be in State hands, I go as far as any one in deprecating. All that has been said of the importance of individuality of character, and diversity in opinions and modes of conduct, involves, as of the same unspeakable importance, diversity of education. A general State education is a mere contrivance for moulding people to be exactly like one another: and as the mould in which it casts them is that which pleases the predominant power in the government, whether this be a monarch, a priesthood, an aristocracy, or the majority of the existing generation, in proportion as it is efficient and successful, it establishes a despotism over the mind, leading by natural tendency to one over the body. An education established and controlled by the State should only exist, if it exist at all, as one among many competing experiments, carried on for the purpose of example and stimulus, to keep the others up to a certain standard of excellence. Unless, indeed, when society in general is in so backward a state that it could not or would not provide for itself any proper institutions of education, unless the government undertook the task: then, indeed, the government may, as the less of two great evils, take upon itself the business of schools and universities, as it may that of joint stock companies, when private enterprise, in a shape fitted for undertaking great works of industry, does not exist in the country. But in general, if the country contains a sufficient number of persons qualified to provide education under government auspices, the same persons would be able and willing to give an equally good education on the voluntary principle, under the assurance of remuneration afforded by a law rendering education compulsory, combined with State aid to those unable to defray the expense.
The instrument for enforcing the law could be no other than public examinations, extending to all children, and beginning at an early age. An age might be fixed at which every child must be examined, to ascertain if he (or she) is able to read. If a child proves unable, the father, unless he has some sufficient ground of excuse, might be subjected to a moderate fine, to be worked out, if necessary, by his labour, and the child might be put to school at his expense. Once in every year the examination should be renewed, with a gradually extending range of subjects, so as to make the universal acquisition, and what is more, retention, of a certain minimum of general knowledge, virtually compulsory. Beyond that minimum, there should be voluntary examinations on all subjects, at which all who come up to a certain standard of proficiency might claim a certificate. To prevent the State from exercising, through these arrangements, an improper influence over opinion, the knowledge required for passing an examination (beyond the merely instrumental parts of knowledge, such as languages and their use) should, even in the higher classes of examinations, be confined to facts and positive science exclusively. The examinations on religion, politics, or other disputed topics, should not turn on the truth or falsehood of opinions, but on the matter of fact that such and such an opinion is held, on such grounds, by such authors, or schools, or churches. Under this system, the rising generation would be no worse off in regard to all disputed truths, than they are at present; they would be brought up either churchmen or dissenters as they now are, the State merely taking care that they should be instructed churchmen, or instructed dissenters. There would be nothing to hinder them from being taught religion, if their parents chose, at the same schools where they were taught other things. All attempts by the State to bias the conclusions of its citizens on disputed subjects, are evil; but it may very properly offer to ascertain and certify that a person possesses the knowledge, requisite to make his conclusions, on any given subject, worth attending to. A student of philosophy would be the better for being able to stand an examination both in Locke and in Kant, whichever of the two he takes up with, or even if with neither: and there is no reasonable objection to examining an atheist in the evidences of Christianity, provided he is not required to profess a belief in them. The examinations, however, in the higher branches of knowledge should, I conceive, be entirely voluntary. It would be giving too dangerous a power to governments, were they allowed to exclude any one from professions, even from the profession of teacher, for alleged deficiency of qualifications: and I think, with Wilhelm von Humboldt, that degrees, or other public certificates of scientific or professional acquirements, should be given to all who present themselves for examination, and stand the test; but that such certificates should confer no advantage over competitors, other than the weight which may be attached to their testimony by public opinion.
It is not in the matter of education only, that misplaced notions of liberty prevent moral obligations on the part of parents from being recognized, and legal obligations from being imposed, where there are the strongest grounds for the former always, and in many cases for the latter also. The fact itself, of causing the existence of a human being, is one of the most responsible actions in the range of human life. To undertake this responsibility - to bestow a life which may be either a curse or a blessing - unless the being on whom it is to be bestowed will have at least the ordinary chances of a desirable existence, is a crime against that being. And in a country either over-peopled, or threatened with being so, to produce children, beyond a very small number, with the effect of reducing the reward of labour by their competition, is a serious offence against all who live by the remuneration of their labour. The laws which, in many countries on the Continent, forbid marriage unless the parties can show that they have the means of supporting a family, do not exceed the legitimate powers of the State: and whether such laws be expedient or not (a question mainly dependent on local circumstances and feelings), they are not objectionable as violations of liberty. Such laws are interferences of the State to prohibit a mischievous act - an act injurious to others, which ought to be a subject of reprobation, and social stigma, even when it is not deemed expedient to superadd legal punishment. Yet the current ideas of liberty, which bend so easily to real infringements of the freedom of the individual in things which concern only himself, would repel the attempt to put any restraint upon his inclinations when the consequence of their indulgence is a life or lives of wretchedness and depravity to the offspring, with manifold evils to those sufficiently within reach to be in any way affected by their actions. When we compare the strange respect of mankind for liberty, with their strange want of respect for it, we might imagine that a man had an indispensable right to do harm to others, and no right at all to please himself without giving pain to any one.
I have reserved for the last place a large class of questions respecting the limits of government interference, which, though closely connected with the subject of this Essay, do not, in strictness, belong to it. These are cases in which the reasons against interference do not turn upon the principle of liberty: the question is not about restraining the actions of individuals, but about helping them: it is asked whether the government should do, or cause to be done, something for their benefit, instead of leaving it to be done by themselves, individually, or in voluntary combination.
The objections to government interference, when it is not such as to involve infringement of liberty, may be of three kinds.
The first is, when the thing to be done is likely to be better done by individuals than by the government. Speaking generally, there is no one so fit to conduct any business, or to determine how or by whom it shall be conducted, as those who are personally interested in it. This principle condemns the interferences, once so common, of the legislature, or the officers of government, with the ordinary processes of industry. But this part of the subject has been sufficiently enlarged upon by political economists, and is not particularly related to the principles of this Essay.
The second objection is more nearly allied to our subject. In many cases, though individuals may not do the particular thing so well, on the average, as the officers of government, it is nevertheless desirable that it should be done by them, rather than by the government, as a means to their own mental education - a mode of strengthening their active faculties, exercising their judgment, and giving them a familiar knowledge of the subjects with which they are thus left to deal. This is a principal, though not the sole, recommendation of jury trial (in cases not political); of free and popular local and municipal institutions; of the conduct of industrial and philanthropic enterprises by voluntary associations. These are not questions of liberty, and are connected with that subject only by remote tendencies; but they are questions of development. It belongs to a different occasion from the present to dwell on these things as parts of national education; as being, in truth, the peculiar training of a citizen, the practical part of the political education of a free people, taking them out of the narrow circle of personal and family selfishness, and accustoming them to the comprehension of joint interests, the management of joint concerns - habituating them to act from public or semi-public motives, and guide their conduct by aims which unite instead of isolating them from one another. Without these habits and powers, a free constitution can neither be worked nor preserved; as is exemplified by the too-often transitory nature of political freedom in countries where it does not rest upon a sufficient basis of local liberties. The management of purely local business by the localities, and of the great enterprises of industry by the union of those who voluntarily supply the pecuniary means, is further recommended by all the advantages which have been set forth in this Essay as belonging to individuality of development, and diversity of modes of action. Government operations tend to be everywhere alike. With individuals and voluntary associations, on the contrary, there are varied experiments, and endless diversity of experience. What the State can usefully do, is to make itself a central depository, and active circulator and diffuser, of the experience resulting from many trials. Its business is to enable each experimentalist to benefit by the experiments of others; instead of tolerating no experiments but its own.
The third, and most cogent reason for restricting the interference of government, is the great evil of adding unnecessarily to its power. Every function superadded to those already exercised by the government, causes its influence over hopes and fears to be more widely diffused, and converts, more and more, the active and ambitious part of the public into hangers-on of the government, or of some party which aims at becoming the government. If the roads, the railways, the banks, the insurance offices, the great joint-stock companies, the universities, and the public charities, were all of them branches of the government; if, in addition, the municipal corporations and local boards, with all that now devolves on them, became departments of the central administration; if the employés of all these different enterprises were appointed and paid by the government, and looked to the government for every rise in life; not all the freedom of the press and popular constitution of the legislature would make this or any other country free otherwise than in name. And the evil would be greater, the more efficiently and scientifically the administrative machinery was constructed - the more skilful the arrangements for obtaining the best qualified hands and heads with which to work it. In England it has of late been proposed that all the members of the civil service of government should be selected by competitive examination, to obtain for those employments the most intelligent and instructed persons procurable; and much has been said and written for and against this proposal. One of the arguments most insisted on by its opponents, is that the occupation of a permanent official servant of the State does not hold out sufficient prospects of emolument and importance to attract the highest talents, which will always be able to find a more inviting career in the professions, or in the service of companies and other public bodies. One would not have been surprised if this argument had been used by the friends of the proposition, as an answer to its principal difficulty. Coming from the opponents it is strange enough. What is urged as an objection is the safety-valve of the proposed system. If indeed all the high talent of the country could be drawn into the service of the government, a proposal tending to bring about that result might well inspire uneasiness. If every part of the business of society which required organized concert, or large and comprehensive views, were in the hands of the government, and if government offices were universally filled by the ablest men, all the enlarged culture and practised intelligence in the country, except the purely speculative, would be concentrated in a numerous bureaucracy, to whom alone the rest of the community would look for all things: the multitude for direction and dictation in all they had to do; the able and aspiring for personal advancement. To be admitted into the ranks of this bureaucracy, and when admitted, to rise therein, would be the sole objects of ambition. Under this régime, not only is the outside public ill-qualified, for want of practical experience, to criticize or check the mode of operation of the bureaucracy, but even if the accidents of despotic or the natural working of popular institutions occasionally raise to the summit a ruler or rulers of reforming inclinations, no reform can be effected which is contrary to the interest of the bureaucracy. Such is the melancholy condition of the Russian empire, as shown in the accounts of those who have had sufficient opportunity of observation. The Czar himself is powerless against the bureaucratic body; he can send any one of them to Siberia, but he cannot govern without them, or against their will. On every decree of his they have a tacit veto, by merely refraining from carrying it into effect. In countries of more advanced civilization and of a more insurrectionary spirit, the public, accustomed to expect everything to be done for them by the State, or at least to do nothing for themselves without asking from the State not only leave to do it, but even how it is to be done, naturally hold the State responsible for all evil which befals them, and when the evil exceeds their amount of patience, they rise against the government and make what is called a revolution; whereupon somebody else, with or without legitimate authority from the nation, vaults into the seat, issues his orders to the bureaucracy, and everything goes on much as it did before; the bureaucracy being unchanged, and nobody else being capable of taking their place.
A very different spectacle is exhibited among a people accustomed to transact their own business. In France, a large part of the people having been engaged in military service, many of whom have held at least the rank of non-commissioned officers, there are in every popular insurrection several persons competent to take the lead, and improvise some tolerable plan of action. What the French are in military affairs, the Americans are in every kind of civil business; let them be left without a government, every body of Americans is able to improvise one, and to carry on that or any other public business with a sufficient amount of intelligence, order, and decision. This is what every free people ought to be: and a people capable of this is certain to be free; it will never let itself be enslaved by any man or body of men because these are able to seize and pull the reins of the central administration. No bureaucracy can hope to make such a people as this do or undergo anything that they do not like. But where everything is done through the bureaucracy, nothing to which the bureaucracy is really adverse can be done at all. The constitution of such countries is an organization of the experience and practical ability of the nation, into a disciplined body for the purpose of governing the rest; and the more perfect that organization is in itself, the more successful in drawing to itself and educating for itself the persons of greatest capacity from all ranks of the community, the more complete is the bondage of all, the members of the bureaucracy included. For the governors are as much the slaves of their organization and discipline, as the governed are of the governors. A Chinese mandarin is as much the tool and creature of a despotism as the humblest cultivator. An individual Jesuit is to the utmost degree of abasement the slave of his order, though the order itself exists for the collective power and importance of its members.
It is not, also, to be forgotten, that the absorption of all the principal ability of the country into the governing body is fatal, sooner or later, to the mental activity and progressiveness of the body itself. Banded together as they are - working a system which, like all systems, necessarily proceeds in a great measure by fixed rules - the official body are under the constant temptation of sinking into indolent routine, or, if they now and then desert that mill-horse round, of rushing into some half-examined crudity which has struck the fancy of some leading member of the corps: and the sole check to these closely allied, though seemingly opposite, tendencies, the only stimulus which can keep the ability of the body itself up to a high standard, is liability to the watchful criticism of equal ability outside the body. It is indispensable, therefore, that the means should exist, independently of the government, of forming such ability, and furnishing it with the opportunities and experience necessary for a correct judgment of great practical affairs. If we would possess permanently a skilful and efficient body of functionaries - above all, a body able to originate and willing to adopt improvements; if we would not have our bureaucracy degenerate into a pedantocracy, this body must not engross all the occupations which form and cultivate the faculties required for the government of mankind.
To determine the point at which evils, so formidable to human freedom and advancement, begin, or rather at which they begin to predominate over the benefits attending the collective application of the force of society, under its recognized chiefs, for the removal of the obstacles which stand in the way of its well-being; to secure as much of the advantages of centralized power and intelligence, as can be had without turning into governmental channels too great a proportion of the general activity - is one of the most difficult and complicated questions in the art of government. It is, in a great measure, a question of detail, in which many and various considerations must be kept in view, and no absolute rule can be laid down. But I believe that the practical principle in which safety resides, the ideal to be kept in view, the standard by which to test all arrangements intended for overcoming the difficulty, may be conveyed in these words: the greatest dissemination of power consistent with efficiency; but the greatest possible centralization of information, and diffusion of it from the centre. Thus, in municipal administration, there would be, as in the New England States, a very minute division among separate officers, chosen by the localities, of all business which is not better left to the persons directly interested; but besides this, there would be, in each department of local affairs, a central superintendence, forming a branch of the general government. The organ of this superintendence would concentrate, as in a focus, the variety of information and experience derived from the conduct of that branch of public business in all the localities, from everything analogous which is done in foreign countries, and from the general principles of political science. This central organ should have a right to know all that is done, and its special duty should be that of making the knowledge acquired in one place available for others. Emancipated from the petty prejudices and narrow views of a locality by its elevated position and comprehensive sphere of observation, its advice would naturally carry much authority; but its actual power, as a permanent institution, should, I conceive, be limited to compelling the local officers to obey the laws laid down for their guidance. In all things not provided for by general rules, those officers should be left to their own judgment, under responsibility to their constituents. For the violation of rules, they should be responsible to law, and the rules themselves should be laid down by the legislature; the central administrative authority only watching over their execution, and if they were not properly carried into effect, appealing, according to the nature of the case, to the tribunals to enforce the law, or to the constituencies to dismiss the functionaries who had not executed it according to its spirit. Such, in its general conception, is the central superintendence which the Poor Law Board is intended to exercise over the administrators of the Poor Rate throughout the country. Whatever powers the Board exercises beyond this limit, were right and necessary in that peculiar case, for the cure of rooted habits of maladministration in matters deeply affecting not the localities merely, but the whole community; since no locality has a moral right to make itself by mismanagement a nest of pauperism, necessarily overflowing into other localities, and impairing the moral and physical condition of the whole labouring community. The powers of administrative coercion and subordinate legislation possessed by the Poor Law Board (but which, owing to the state of opinion on the subject, are very scantily exercised by them), though perfectly justifiable in a case of first-rate national interest, would be wholly out of place in the superintendence of interests purely local. But a central organ of information and instruction for all the localities, would be equally valuable in all departments of administration. A government cannot have too much of the kind of activity which does not impede, but aids and stimulates, individual exertion and development. The mischief begins when, instead of calling forth the activity and powers of individuals and bodies, it substitutes its own activity for theirs; when, instead of informing, advising, and, upon occasion, denouncing, it makes them work in fetters, or bids them stand aside and does their work instead of them. The worth of a State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it; and a State which postpones the interests of their mental expansion and elevation, to a little more of administrative skill, or of that semblance of it which practice gives, in the details of business; a State which dwarfs its men, in order that they may be more docile instruments in its hands even for beneficial purposes - will find that with small men no great thing can really be accomplished; and that the perfection of machinery to which it has sacrificed everything, will in the end avail it nothing, for want of the vital power which, in order that the machine might work more smoothly, it has preferred to banish.
图书在版编目(CIP)数据
奇迹和偶像崇拜:英汉对照/(法)伏尔泰著;孙平华,曾娟译.—北京:中译出版社,2015.11
(企鹅口袋书系列·伟大的思想)
ISBN 978–7–5001–4351–2
Ⅰ.①奇… Ⅱ.①伏…②孙…③曾… Ⅲ.①伏尔泰,F-M.A.(1694~1778)—哲学思想 Ⅳ.①B565.25
中国版本图书馆CIP数据核字(2015)第270774号
(著作权合同登记:图字01-2015-7261号)
Penguin Books Ltd, Registered Offices: 80 Strand, London WC2R 0RL, England
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Dictionnaire Philosophique first published 1764
This translation first published in Penguin Classics 1972
This selection published in Penguin Books 2005
Translation copyright © Theodore Besterman, 1972
Taken from the Penguin Classics edition of the Philosophical Dictionary
translated and edited by Theodore Besterman
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《伟大的思想》中文版序
企鹅《伟大的思想》丛书2004年开始出版。在英国,已付梓八十种,尚有二十种计划出版。美国出版的丛书规模略小,德国的同类丛书规模更小一些。丛书销量已远远超过二百万册,在全球众多读者间,尤其是学生当中,普及了哲学和政治学。中文版《伟大的思想》丛书的推出,迈出了新的一步,令人欢欣鼓舞。
推出这套丛书的目的是让读者再次与一些伟大的非小说类经典著作面对面地交流。太久以来,确定版本依据这样一个假设——读者在教室里学习这些著作,因此需要导读、详尽的注释、参考书目等。此类版本无疑十分有用,但我想,如果能够重建托马斯·潘恩《常识》或约翰·罗斯金《艺术与人生》初版时的环境,营造更具亲和力的氛围,也许是一件有趣的事。这样,读者除了原作者及其自身的理性思考外没有其他参照。
这样做有一定的缺陷:每位作者的话难免有难解或不可解之处,一些重要的背景知识会缺失。例如,读者对亨利·梭罗创作时的情形毫无头绪,也不了解该书的接受情况以及影响;不过,这样做的优点也显而易见。最突出的优点是:作者的初衷又一次变得重要起来——托马斯·潘恩的愤怒、查尔斯·达尔文的灵光、塞内加的隐逸。这些作家在许多国家影响着许多人的生活,其影响难以估量;长达几个世纪,读他们书的乐趣罕有匹敌。没有亚当·斯密或阿图尔·叔本华,或无法想象我们今天的世界。这些小书的创作年代久远,但其中的话语彻底改变了我们的政治学、经济学、智力生活、社会规划和宗教信仰。
《伟大的思想》丛书一直求新求变。地域不同,收录的作家亦不同。在中国或美国,一些作家更受欢迎。英国《伟大的思想》收录的一些作家在其他地方则默默无闻。称其为“伟大的思想”,我们亦慎之又慎。思想之伟大,在于其影响之深远,而不意味着这些思想是“好”的,实际上一些书或可列入“坏”思想之列。丛书中很多作家受到同一丛书其他作家的很大影响,例如,马塞尔·普鲁斯特承认受约翰·罗斯金影响很大,米歇尔·德·蒙田也承认深受塞内加影响,但其他作家彼此憎恶,如果发现他们被收入同一丛书,一定会气愤难平。不过,读者可自行判明这些思想是否合理。我们衷心希望,您可以从阅读这些杰作中获得乐趣。
《伟大的思想》出版者
西蒙·温德尔
Introduction to the Chinese
Editions of Great Ideas
Penguin's Great Ideas series began publication in 2004. In the UK we now have 80 copies in print with plans to publish a further 20. A somewhat smaller list is published in the USA and a related, even smaller series in Germany. The books have sold now well over two million copies and have popularized philosophy and politics for many people around the world — particularly students. The launch of a Chinese Great Ideas series is an extremely exciting new development.
The intention behind the series was to allow readers to be once more face to face with some of the great non- fiction classics. For too long the editions of these books were created on the assumption that you were studying them in the classroom and that the student needed an introduction, extensive notes, a bibliography and so on. While this sort of edition is of course extremely useful, I thought it would be interesting to recreate a more intimate feeling — to recreate the atmosphere in which, for example, Thomas Paine's Common Sense or John Ruskin's On Art and Life was first published — where the reader has no other guide than the original author and his or her own common sense.
This method has its severe disadvantages — there will inevitably be statements made by each author which are either hard or impossible to understand, some important context might be missing. For example the reader has no clue as to the conditions under which Henry Thoreau was writing his book and the reader cannot be aware of the book's reception or influence. The advantages however are very clear — most importantly the original intentions of the author become once more important. The sense of anger in Thomas Paine, of intellectual excitement in Charles Darwin, of resignation in Seneca — few things can be more thrilling than to read writers who have had such immeasurable influence on so many lives, sometimes for centuries, in many different countries. Our world would not make sense without Adam Smith or Arthur Schopenhauer — our politics, economics, intellectual lives, social planning, religious beliefs have all been fundamentally changed by the words in these little books, first written down long ago.
The Great Ideas series continues to change and evolve. In different parts of the world different writers would be included. In China or in the United States there are some writers who are liked much more than others. In the UK there are writers in the Great Ideas series who are ignored elsewhere. We have also been very careful to call the series Great Ideas — these ideas are great because they have been so enormously influential, but this does not mean that they are Good Ideas — indeed some of the books would probably qualify as Bad Ideas. Many of the writers in the series have been massively influenced by others in the series — for example Marcel Proust owned so much to John Ruskin, Michel de Montaigne to Seneca. But others hated each other and would be distressed to find themselves together in the same series! But readers can decide the validity of these ideas for themselves. We very much hope that you enjoy these remarkable books.
Simon Winder
Publisher
Great Ideas
分册总目录
Introduction to the Chinese Editions of Great Ideas
Voltaire Miracles and Idolatry
企鹅口袋书系列·伟大的思想
奇迹和偶像崇拜
(英汉双语)
[法]伏尔泰 著
[英]西奥多·贝斯特曼 英译
孙平华 曾娟 汉译
中国出版集团
中译出版社
译者导读
伏尔泰(Voltaire,1694年11月21日—1778年5月30日),原名弗朗索瓦-马利·阿鲁埃(François- Marie Arouet),伏尔泰是其笔名,法国著名思想家、哲学家、文学家,启蒙运动公认的领袖和导师,被誉为“法兰西思想之父”。他一生著作颇丰,涉猎广泛,在哲学和文学上造诣颇深,代表作有《哲学词典》《查第格》和《老实人》。除此之外,他还写有诸多哲理散文,其散文短小精悍,论说以讽刺见长,常常抨击天主教教会的教条,以激发人类质疑的精神,促使人们做到不盲从、不迷信。伏尔泰崇尚自由和科学,以捍卫公民自由,特别是信仰自由和司法公正而闻名于世,他的著作和思想与托马斯·霍布斯及约翰·洛克一道,对美国革命和法国大革命发挥了深远的影响。
本书《奇迹和偶像崇拜》是伏尔泰的一部哲理散文选集,集合了28篇优秀的哲理短文。本书所讨论的话题各异,涉猎极广,但多是从宗教概念出发引申出作者独有的思考。书中文章或驳斥盛行宗教观念的错误之处、或考证宗教文献的出处与真伪、或探讨宗教仪式的历史演变与背后的真实含义、或分析人类之本性与所犯之罪恶、或讨论各个时代宗教会议的决议与成就、或探寻人类的宗教狂热与传播、或讨论平等的实现与不平等的来源、或阐述国家制度的发展与世界公民的特质、或鉴别宗教故事中神迹的真伪、或讨论伟大的存在之链是否真的存在、或批评人们对偶像崇拜的误判、或为历史上遭到诬陷之人正名、或品评君王、圣徒、圣地与殉道之事、或探寻上帝之神迹、或探究人类享乐之习性与非理性之偏见……
总之,伏尔泰哲理散文说理透彻、机智冷隽,字里行间饱含辛辣的讽刺,思想有诸多独到之处,他用戏谑的笔调讲述荒诞不经之事,以此阐明深刻的哲理,发人深省。伏尔泰作为一名自然神论者,提倡对不同的宗教信仰采取宽容的态度,文中时刻体现着他崇尚自由与科学,开放包容的特质。此书对于培养人们独立思考能力与质疑精神具有很强的启发效应,这是了解伏尔泰思想的佳作之一。
目 录
天 使
天使(angel)一词,在希腊语中是信使之意。波斯人有佩里斯 [1] 、希伯来人有马拉克姆(Malakim),希腊人则有代莫诺伊(Daimonoi)。知晓了这些人物,我们对天使就有了非常深入的认识。
然而,我们却发现一个非常有趣的事实,极具启发性,那就是人的思想在潜意识中,总想在神与人之间安排一些中间角色。于是,早在远古时期,就创造了魔鬼与魔仆。人间的帝王国君也通过信使发布诏令,当然上帝也指派了自己的使者,比如墨丘利(Mercury)和艾里斯(Iris),他们都是使者,都是上帝的信使。
而希伯来人,作为唯一接受过上帝亲自引导的人类子民,起初并未给神赐的天使们命名,而是在被囚禁于巴比伦之时,借用迦勒底人(Chaldeans)给的名字。米迦勒(Michael)和加百列(Gabriel)两位天使最先由但以理(Daniel)命名,彼时他还是一名被困于巴比伦的犹太人奴隶。而居住在尼尼微(Nineveh)的犹太人托比特(Tobit),在与儿子一同去向犹太人加倍尔(Gabael)收账的路途中结识了天使拉斐尔(Raphael)。
然而,贵为犹太人教规的《利未记》和《申命记》却丝毫未曾提及过天使的存在,遑论尊崇。更有甚者,撒都该人(Sadducees),即古代犹太人,根本就不相信天使。
可是,犹太人在他们的历史故事中又对天使之事讨论颇多。他们认为天使是有形的,背生双翼,与异教徒所伪称的墨丘利脚踝处生有双翼如出一辙。有时,天使们能将双翼隐匿于衣裳之内,他们能吃能喝,并能在营救罗德(Loth)之时,吸引索多玛(Sodom)人对其欲行淫辱之事,所以怎能说天使们没有肉身呢?
据迈蒙尼德(Maimonides)所言,古代犹太人传统上认为天使有十级天阶之分:1.纯粹圣洁的圣天使(chaios acodesh);2.敏捷迅速的座天使(ofamin);3.强壮有力的力天使(oralim);4.神之火焰焰天使(chasmalim);5.生命之火炽天使(seraphim);6.上帝信使及副手玛拉基(malachim);7.神之判官埃洛伊(eloim);8.神之子(ben eloim);9.神之像(cherubim);10.神之肉身(ychim)。
《摩西五经》并未记载有关天使堕落的故事,最先声称此事的是先知以赛亚(Isaiah),他在呼吁巴比伦国王之时,说道:“称颂者到底怎么了?对于他的堕落,松柏之类的正直之人都拍手称快?从天堂坠落,你到底怎么样了?哦,赫勒(Hellel),晨之明星?”这里的赫勒译为拉丁文时变成了路西法(Lucifer),随后路西法这个名字,饱含寓意,给予了在天堂中参加过战斗的天使长。最终,这个本意为晨星与黎明的名字,成了魔鬼的代名词。
基督教的信仰是以天使的堕落为基础的。那些反叛的天使,被驱逐出久居的天界,驱赶至地球中心的地狱,最终变成了魔鬼。而化身为蛇的魔鬼引诱了夏娃,让人类受到诅咒。耶稣前来救赎人类,最终战胜了恶魔,但是恶魔现在仍然还在引诱我们。然而,这一圣传仅见于旁经《以诺书》,并且与公认的圣传也存在巨大差异。
圣·奥古斯丁(saint Augustine)在他的第109封信中,毫不犹豫地赋予了善、恶两类天使苗条敏捷的身形。教皇格列高利二世将天使等级浓缩至九个,而犹太人则认为有十个等级,分别是:炽天使(seraphim)、智天使(cherubim)、座天使(thrones)、主天使(dominations)、德天使(virtues)、力天使(powers)、天使长(archangels),以及给与其他八级天使名字的天使。
在犹太人的神殿中,有两位智天使,均是牛鹰二首六翼。现在我们在绘画中,将他们描绘成一个飞翔着、耳下生有一对微型翅膀的脑袋。而天使和天使长在绘画中的形象则是背生双翼的婴孩。至于座天使和主天使,还没有人考虑过去描绘他们的形象。
圣·托马斯(saint Tomas),在《诫命108》(Question108 )中的第二章中说到,与炽天使一样,座天使和智天使都与上帝很亲近,因为他们都是上帝的座驾。斯科茨(Scotus)曾统计过天使的数量,总共约有10万名。东方、希腊和罗马古典神话中都存在善恶天使,这说明了每个人都有善恶天使之分,从生至死,一个助人,一个害人。但我们现在仍不清楚这些善恶天使是否能从一端不断转移到另一端,是否得到了救赎。关于这个问题,可以参见圣·托马斯的神学总论。
至于天使住在哪儿,是住在天空中,在虚空里,抑或是行星上,我们都不得而知。当然上帝也不希望我们知道。
[1] 佩里斯(Peris),波斯神话中一种美丽的仙女。下文中的Malakim, Daimonoi均是神之使者之意。——译者注
动 物
动物如同机器,是被剥夺了认知与感觉的死物,它们日复一日,重复着相同的动作,学习不了,进步不得,如此云云,而持有此等看法的人实在是太粗鄙无知了!
确实如此!一只鸟儿倚墙筑巢时造半圆巢,倚角筑巢时造四分之一圆巢,倚树筑巢时便造圆形巢,这只鸟儿做所有事不都是这样吗?一只你已经训练了三个月的猎狗,难道经过训练后,它还没有之前懂得更多吗?金丝雀能立即重复你所教的曲调吗?你不是要花很长时间教它吗?你没见过它犯错误,然后更正自己吗?
你判断我有感觉、有记忆、有思想,是因为我向你提过这些吗?不!我没有提过。你见我回到家中,神情忧虑,动作急切地要寻找报纸,我记得将报纸放在了抽屉里,于是我拉开抽屉,找到了报纸,随后开心地开始看报。你判断我有过忧虑、有过快乐,也判断我有记忆、有认知。
那就以同样的方式来看待一只找不见主人的狗。它在每条过道上来回寻觅,叫声悲戚,躁动不安,在楼梯间上上下下,逐个屋子寻找主人的踪影。最终,它在书房找到了亲爱的主人,通过轻声叫唤,上下跳跃,来回蹭抚来表现它万分欣喜的心情。
然而,野蛮人却抓住了这只远比人类更看重友谊的狗。他们将它固定在桌子上,活生生地解剖了它,向人展示它的肠膜系静脉。你会发现它具备所有你拥有的感觉器官。机械论者,回答我,自然让这动物具备所有的感觉器官,难道只是为了让它无法感知吗?它能无动于衷吗?不要假想自然会制造这种荒谬的矛盾。
可是,这一学派的领袖们却在探问动物的灵魂。我不懂这个问题:一棵树能借助纤维吸收在树体内循环的树液,也能发芽、长叶和结果,你会问我什么是树的灵魂吗?它已经获得了那些馈赠;动物有感觉,有记忆,还有些想法。那是谁给予了这些馈赠?是谁赋予了它们这样的能力?就是那能让土地上的草木生长,能让地球被太阳吸引之人。
亚里士多德说,“动物的灵魂是以实体形式存在着的”。持此相同看法的在后世相继有阿拉伯学派、天使学派和索邦神学,此后就后继无人了。
另外一些哲学家们则认为,“动物的灵魂是物质的”。其实相较其他人,此种观点也未取得多大进步。当被问到什么是物质性灵魂时,这些哲学家们也答不上来。于是,他们不得不承认物质性灵魂其实就只是个感觉问题而已。然而,究竟是什么给予了这种感觉呢?答案就是实质性灵魂,换言之,是一个实质性灵魂给予另一个实质性灵魂感觉。这种循环,他们不能打破。
让我们来听听其他动物们对动物的解读吧。他们声称灵魂是一个灵性的存在体,肉体死亡时,灵魂也随之消散,但是又有什么证据来证明这种灵魂的存在呢?你又是如何看待这种灵性的存在体的呢?这些存在体在现实生活中有感觉、有记忆、有想法、懂适应,却永不知道一个六岁的小孩懂得什么?你又是依据什么来想象这种不是肉体的存在体会随着肉体的死亡而消亡呢?最愚蠢的人莫过于那些声称灵魂既非肉体又非灵体的人。您看这有一个绝佳的理论!说到灵体,我们知道是非肉身的、但未可知的东西,仅此而已。于是,这些绅士们的理论逻辑就是这样的:动物的灵魂是个实体,但这个实体既非肉身,也非不是肉身的东西。
话说回来,引起如此多矛盾性错误的原因到底是什么呢?原因就在于人类那在弄清楚事物是否存在之前,先弄清楚这个事物究竟是什么的长久习惯。移动的榫舌、风箱的阀门,就被称作是风箱的灵魂。那什么是灵魂呢?在我看来,灵魂就是那阀门,当我鼓动风箱时,它下降、引入空气、扩张自己、再将空气挤压进入管道。
在这里,我们没有异于机器的灵魂。但究竟是什么鼓动了动物的“风箱”呢?我已经告诉了你,操控之人就是那操控天地星辰之人。那位说着“Deus est anima brutorum”(上帝是动物们的灵魂)的哲人无疑是正确的,可惜他本可以走得更远。
反三位一体论者
非基督徒的异教徒们虽然认同耶稣是救世主,是人神的中间人,但是他们却绝不认同基督徒们所普遍接受的一条教义,即:位格三位一体,三种位格同时存在于同一神圣本体中,第二位格(圣子)由第一位格(圣父)所生,第三位格(圣灵)由其他两位位格所出。异教徒们认为此条教义最有悖于逻辑。
这条难以理解的教义并未出现在《圣经》之中。
没有经文能赋予它权威,也没有文章能让它在不偏离《圣经》文本本意的情况下,获得更清晰、更自然、与真理和常识更一致的蕴意。
相信在同一神圣本体中存在几种不同的位格,那么圣父(耶和华)就不再是唯一的真神,圣子和圣灵也加入了真神的行列。而这种观念,是基督教犯下的最愚笨无知、最危险万分的错误,因为这根本就是在提倡多神论,做法与基督教的反对者们如出一辙。
声称只有唯一的真神,同时也声称唯一的真神拥有三种位格,并且每种位格都是真神。这两种说法本就相互矛盾。
一个本体和三种位格的区分在《圣经》中从未出现。
这明显是个错误,因为本体不可能少于位格,位格也不可能少于本体。
三位一体中的三种位格,或者说是三种不同的实体,或者说是神圣本体的外性,又或者说是那本就无差别的同一本体。
第一种情况,创造了三个神。
第二种情况,神由诸多外性组成,人信奉外性,并将外性变异成位格。
第三种情况,一个不可分割的主体被毫无用处、毫无根据地分割开来,在主体内部并未进行区分的东西被区分为三种。
如果说,这三种个性既不是神圣本体中的不同实体,也不是神圣本体中的外性,那么人们就很难说服自己这三种个性到底是什么。
当然,也不可相信最顽固、最坚定的三位一体论者,对于这三种位格,在不分割实体,从而不增多数量的情况下,是以何种方式存在于神体内的这个问题,会有何种见解。
连圣·奥古斯丁在此问题上历经了千次论证推理之后,仍觉错误和晦涩,他也不得不承认三位一体说不清、道不明。
后来,三位一体论者引述了这位神父的话(这做法实际上非常异常):“当被问到这三者到底是什么时,人类的语言已不足以去表达,也没有特定术语去描述这三者。而说到存在三种位格,其实我们不是为了表达些什么,而是因为我们必须要说些什么,不能保持沉默。(Dictum est tres personae, non ut aliquid diceretur, sed ne taceretur.)”(《论三位一体》V.ix[De Trinitate ])
现代神学家对此问题也没有更好的阐述。
当被问到如何理解“位格”一词时,他们只是解释说,这是一种特定的、难以言说的划分方式,让人们在唯一的神圣本体中去区分圣父、圣子和圣灵。
对这些术语的解释,他们的回答难以让人满意。因为依他们所言,这些术语表明,三位一体中的三种位格存在着令人难以理解的关系。
据上所述,我们可以概括出,现代神学家与正统基督教信奉者之间的基本争论就在于此问题上,即上帝是否有三者之分(这三者我们毫无概念),以及这三者之间是否存在特定的联系(这种联系我们也丝毫不知)。
基于上述所言,现代神学家们做出结论,认为相信使徒们的权威,遵从他们的做法将会明智许多。使徒们从不讨论三位一体,在宗教活动里也从不使用《圣经》中未出现过的术语,比如三位一体、位格、本体、本质、本质的、身合、道成肉身、创世、圣灵的发出等等诸如此类的术语。这些术语毫无实际意义,不指代自然界中的任何真实存在的东西,只能在理解上引发错误、模糊、晦涩且不完善的想法。
“地上三者做见证,生命之液、水、血液,此三者为一体。天上三者做见证,圣父、圣言和圣灵,此三者为一体。”此段文字选自《约翰福音》中的使徒书信,《约翰福音》由福音传道者约翰撰写。大师卡尔梅(dom Calmet)在其论文中针对此段文字做过一些评述。他承认这两段文字从未出现在任何古《圣经》之中。他认为如果圣·约翰在一封书信中提到了三位一体,却在他自己撰写的福音书中只字不提,这做法未免太过奇怪。另外在福音书权威版中也找不到与此教条相关的任何痕迹,在《新约》外典中也是如此。所有这些原因,也许就能解释为什么反三位一体论者成功地让历届宗教会议没有正式确认三位一体论。但是,异教徒们对宗教会议常常不以为意,因此我们也不知道应当如何去说服他们。就让我们单纯地相信反三位一体,并希望他们也能如此。
启示录
殉道者贾斯廷(Justin Martyr)记录了公元170年的历史,他首次提到了《启示录》,并认为该书的作者是耶稣门徒、福音传道者圣·约翰。在与犹太人泰福(Trypho)的对话中,当他被问到是否相信耶路撒冷终有一天会复原如初时,贾斯廷给予了肯定回答,就像其他所有拥有正统思想的基督徒那样。他说道:“我们之中有位名叫约翰的人,是耶稣十二门徒之一,约翰预言说,耶路撒冷的信徒前后将延续一千年之久。”
统治一千年这个观念长久地扎根在基督徒的思想里,这段时期是绅士贵族们的最爱。埃及人的灵魂在千年之末可修复肉身。而在同样的时空里,维吉尔(Virgil)笔下的灵魂正在炼狱中接受审判。一千年后的新耶路撒冷将有十二道门,来纪念十二门徒,门的形状为正方形,长宽高均为12000视距尺(stadia) [1] ,即500里格(league) [2] ,也就是说门的高度也有500里格之高,住在顶层想必会极不舒适。然而,这就是《启示录》第二十一章中的预言。
坚信圣·约翰是《启示录》作者的人,贾斯廷是第一位。然而也有人反对他的说法,因为贾斯廷在与犹太人泰福的对话中还说过,根据门徒们的描述,耶稣基督在进入约旦之时,约旦河河水翻滚沸腾,漫天火焰。然而,并无门徒有此类记载。
贾斯廷还非常自信地引用了西比尔巫语。更有甚者,他还声称在埃及法洛斯岛灯塔(Pharos)处看到了疯人院遗迹,该院在希律王(Herod)时期曾关押了72位释道者。有人很不幸地见过这些疯人院,那人的证词似乎暗示着贾斯廷也曾被关押在那儿。
稍晚时期出现,并也坚信千禧年的圣·艾雷尼厄斯(saint Irenaeus)说过,他从一位老人那儿得知圣·约翰撰写了《启示录》一书。然而,圣·艾雷尼厄斯自己也饱受责难,因为他认为世上只有四册福音书,原因在于世界只有四部分、只有四种主要风向以及以西结(Ezekiel)只看到了四种动物。他将这种逻辑推理过程称之为论证。我们必须承认,艾雷尼厄斯所做的论证推理,与贾斯廷的所见所闻,同样精彩绝伦。
亚历山大的克莱门特(Clement of Alexandria)在他的《雷克塔》(Electa )中提到说,圣·约翰仅仅只撰写了一项启示录,但此项非常重要。德尔图良(Tertullian)是一名伟大而虔诚的教徒,坚信千禧年,他不仅断言圣·约翰预言了耶路撒冷的复兴,以及信徒将统治耶路撒冷一千年之久,还声称新的耶路撒冷已经开始形成。巴勒斯坦的所有基督教徒,甚至异教徒,在夜之末尾已经连续四十天看到了新的耶路撒冷,但不幸的是,这座城市白天一旦来临便消失无踪。
在圣·约翰福音书的前言中,以及奥利金(Origen)的《圣经讲道》(Homilies )里都引用了《启示录》中的神谕,但是他也引用了西比尔巫语。圣徒亚历山大的丹尼斯(saint Denis of Alexandria),他记录了截至三世纪中期的历史,在他的分章之一(此分章由尤西比乌斯[Eusebius]保存)中提到说,几乎所有的有识之士都认为《启示录》成书必有渊源。也提到说此书的作者并不是圣·约翰,而是一名叫作克林妥(Cerinthus)的人,此人借用了约翰这个伟大的名字,以便让他的思想得以传播。
于公元360年举行的老底嘉(Laodicea)宗教会议并未将《启示录》纳入正典书卷。奇怪的是老底嘉宗教会议作为宣扬《启示录》的目标场所,竟然拒绝了这本是它命中注定的财富。此外,参与该会议的以弗所(Ephesus)的主教们,竟然也拒绝承认《启示录》的作者就是安葬在以弗所的圣·约翰。
由此可见,圣·约翰就算身处坟墓,仍然极具影响力,能够不间断地将这世间捣鼓得上上下下。相信圣·约翰并未真正死亡的人,也认定《启示录》并非他所作。但是,千禧年的信奉者仍对此坚信不疑。苏尔比基乌斯·塞维鲁(Sulpicius Severus)在其《宗教史》第九卷中说到,那些不承认、不接受《启示录》的人是无情且不恭的。后经历诸多犹疑,历经教会万般责难,苏尔比基乌斯·塞维鲁的观点最终获胜。此事经过阐释,教会最终认定《启示录》由圣·约翰所作,无可争辩,此后再无上诉。
基督教各教派团体都结合自身情况,对《启示录》中的预言加以运用。英国人受此预言启发,发动了英国大革命,路德教派给德国造成了不小的麻烦,法国革命者推翻了查理九世的统治,以及凯瑟琳·德·梅迪茜(Catherine de Medicis)的摄政。这些都是秉持正义,行大道的行动。博胥埃(Bossuet)和牛顿都为《启示录》撰写了评论。然而,总体来说,博胥埃和牛顿之所以声名远播,更多的是因为激昂演说与伟大发现,而非他们对《启示录》所做的评论。
[1] 视距尺,长度单位,1视距尺约合607英尺或185米。——译者注
[2] 里格,长度单位,1里格约等于3英里。——译者注
无神论者和无神论
Ⅰ
在以前的时代,每一位拥有秘密技能的人都有被当成巫师的风险;每一种新生的教派都会被谴责说在秘密宗教仪式中屠杀孩童;每一位不屑于僵化教条的思想家都会饱受愚蠢之人的谴责,被狂热分子、无赖流氓指责为无神论者。
勇敢的阿那克萨哥拉(Anaxagoras)坚持认为双轮战车上的阿波罗并不是太阳神,他就被世人称作是无神论者,从而不得不开始逃亡。
亚里士多德也曾被一名教士谴责持有无神论,亚里士多德非但没能成功地惩罚这位谴责者,反而是自己隐退到了卡尔基斯(Chalcas)。然而,希腊历史上最可憎的事件就是苏格拉底之死。阿里斯托芬尼(Aristophanes)(评论家们多倾慕此人,因为他是希腊人,但评论家们似乎忘记了苏格拉底也是希腊人)是第一个让希腊人相信苏格拉底是无神论者的人。
而我们现在的社会,是不会容忍阿里斯托芬这种既不喜剧也不诗人的喜剧诗人颠倒黑白,将圣·劳伦特(Saint-Laurent)的光明正义塑造成滑稽丑剧的。在我看来,阿里斯托芬此人比普鲁塔克笔下所描绘的更加低贱不堪,卑鄙无耻。充满智慧的普鲁塔克这样评价这个骗子,“阿里斯托芬的语言泄露了他卑鄙的品行:他的语言完全是由最低下,最恶心的嘲弄言语组成,人们不会觉得有趣,有识之士与谦谦君子也会发现他人品不佳,他的傲慢,让人难以忍受,体面人着实厌恶他的恶毒。”
紧接着上场的就是滑稽剧中的小丑塔伯里(Tabarin)。顺便提一句,达希耶夫人(mme Dacier),苏格拉底的崇拜者,竟然也对塔伯里十分仰慕。塔伯里准备了毒药,毒药被那臭名昭著的法官使用,毒死了希腊史上道德最崇高的人。
雅典城里的制革工人、补鞋匠和裁缝们都为一个滑稽剧拍手喝彩,在这剧中,苏格拉底被人用篮子吊在半空中,公然宣告世上没有上帝,并吹嘘说他在教授哲学之时还偷了一件外套。整整一个民族,他们的政府允许的自由竟然如此伤风败俗,实在是应当好好享受发生在他们身上的报应,即先成为罗马人的奴隶,如今又受到土耳其人的奴役。
我们先忽略罗马共和国与我们的时代相距的这一整段时期。罗马人要比希腊人明智得多,他们从不因为哲学家的观点而去迫害他们,所以并不能认为罗马帝国的继承者是野蛮人。神圣罗马帝国皇帝腓德烈二世一与教皇闹掰,就被教皇谴责说是无神论者,指责他与他的总理大臣德·维内斯(de Vineis)共同撰写了《三个骗子》(Three Impostors )这本书。
当伟大的总理大臣洛比达(de L'Hospital)宣称要反对迫害时,他立刻被谴责信仰无神论。一个耶稣会士的身份不及阿里斯托芬尼,正如阿里斯托芬尼的身份比不上荷马一样。然而在宗教狂热者眼中,荷马这可怜人的名字也会变得荒谬无比。总之,在耶稣会士格拉斯(Garasse)眼中,他会发现到处都有无神论者,他谎称西奥多·德·贝茨(Théodore de Bèze)是个无神论者,也引导大众误解瓦尼尼(Vanini)。
瓦尼尼悲惨的结局并未像苏格拉底的死那样让我们满怀遗憾和愤慨,因为他只是一个毫无功绩的外邦空谈家。但是,瓦尼尼毕竟不是一个所谓的无神论者。恰好相反,他是一个贫穷的那不勒斯教士,职业的传道士和神学者,他探究事物的本质,宇宙的共性,他的内心里没有一丝无神论的思想。他对上帝的理解在神学上是最彻底、最正确的。在他看来:上帝是众生之父、无需任何人;是脱离时间限制的永恒存在,无处不在却又从不现身;上帝没有过去,没有未来,他超越、统治和拥有所有事物;他亘古不变,无穷无尽,却又永不分离,他的力量就是他的意愿等等。
柏拉图认为上帝创造万物,从最微小至最宏大,形成一个生命链,而这一生命链的顶端则系于上帝那永恒的王座之上。瓦尼尼深信此点,以复兴柏拉图的美好理想为己任,并深以为傲,还得到了阿威罗伊(Averroes)的支持。实际上,这种想法比真理更崇高,而这种想法离无神论如此之远,就如同生命之远离虚空。
瓦尼尼四处游历以寻找财富,却不断陷入争论。而这些争论很不幸地让他远离了财富。他树立死敌的数量等同于与之理论的学者和学究们的数量。瓦尼尼的不幸并无他因,只因他在争论中所表现出的狂热与野蛮招致了很多神学家的憎恶。他与一个叫弗兰科(Francon)或称弗兰科尼(Franconi)的人发生过争执,而这个弗兰科又是他敌人们的朋友,理所当然,弗兰科指责他是传播无神论的无神论者。
这位弗兰科(或弗兰科尼),凭借少数几名证人,在审判瓦尼尼期间,泯灭人性地坚持自己的说辞。交叉询问时,瓦尼尼被问及对上帝存在的看法,他回答说,就像教会那样,信仰唯一的、三位一体的上帝。捡起一根稻草,他说到:“这小小的东西就足以证明造物主的存在。”然后,他就植物的生长和运动发表了一番不错的演说,当他谈到上帝存在的必要性时,他说没有上帝,就没有植物的运动与生长。
当时,身处图卢兹的首席法官格拉蒙(Grammont)在其《法国的历史》一书中记载了这次演说。然而,格拉蒙却因为偏见,断言瓦尼尼的说辞不是源于内心的信念,而是出于恐惧或功利之心。
那首席法官格拉蒙这一武断而狠毒的判决是基于什么原因呢?显而易见,瓦尼尼的回答本可以让他免受无神论的指控。然而,到底发生了什么事?原来这个不幸的外国传教士还是个药物行家。他们在瓦尼尼的家中发现了一只活生生的大蟾蜍,这只蟾蜍就在一个盛满水的器皿里,因此他们指控瓦尼尼是巫师。他们还声称,这只蟾蜍就是瓦尼尼信奉的神,他书中的几段内容还被指控说含有不虔诚的意义。这种事做起来轻而易举,通常就是把否认当成回答,再恶意曲解一些有歧义的短语,让本是干净清白的词句变得污秽不堪。最终,这些刻意打压瓦尼尼的小集团成功地让法官做出判决,将这不幸之人处死。
显而易见,想要为瓦尼尼的死亡辩护,就需要谴责那些卑鄙之人所做的可怕之事。默森里(Mersenne)心胸狭窄,疯狂过度,竟诬陷瓦尼尼“和他的十二个旨在劝慰所有国家皈依无神论的使徒离开了那不勒斯”。真是愚笨呀!一个穷困潦倒的教士怎能有钱供养十二个人?他是怎么说服那十二个那不勒斯人,甘愿花费巨资,冒着生命危险,与他一同游历,去各地传播这令人憎恶且反动的教义呢?一个国王是否足够强大富有去供养十二个无神论传道士?默森里神父制造如此可恶的谬论,真是前无古人,但后有来者,报纸、历史词典都受到他的传染,这热爱喧嚣轰鸣的世界也毫无怀疑,坚信这极具传奇色彩的谬论。
贝耳(Bayle)在《多样的思想》(Pensées diverses )一书中也把瓦尼尼说成是一位无神论者。他用此例去证明“一个无神论者的社会是能够存在的”这样一个悖论。他信誓旦旦地保证说,瓦尼尼道德崇高,是自己哲学观点的殉道者。然而,贝耳在这两个方面都犯了错误。瓦尼尼曾模仿伊拉斯谟写过《对话》,在此文中,他自白说自己有位情妇,名叫伊莎贝拉。瓦尼尼就如自己所描述的那般行事大胆,但无论如何,他绝不是无神论者。
瓦尼尼死后一个世纪,学者拉·克劳兹(La Croze)和一位笔名为菲内特(Philète)的人试图为他正名。然而,人们对于一个忧伤的那不勒斯人的回忆,一个写作糟糕的人,实在无法提起兴趣,他们所写的辩护词,鲜有人问津。
比格拉斯更博学多才的耶稣会士阿杜恩(Hardouin)在《无神论探讨》(Athei detecti )一书中曾谴责笛卡尔、阿诺(Arnauld)、帕斯卡(Pascal)、尼科尔(Nicole)和梅尔布朗斯(Malebranche)信仰无神论,所幸的是这些人并未重蹈瓦尼尼悲惨命运的覆辙。
结合上文罗列出的事实,我们继续来讨论贝耳所关注的道德伦理问题,即“一个无神论者的社会能否存续”的问题。首先让我们来观察一下,人们在这个问题上发生争论时,自相矛盾的程度究竟有多大:贝耳观点最激烈的反对者,以及以最侮辱人的话语否定无神论者社会存在可能性的人,都毫无畏惧,坚持认为无神论是一种由中国主导的宗教。
毫无疑问,他们对中国政府的看法都是错误的。只要阅读一下这个广袤国度所颁布的诏书,他们就会发现这些诏书的内容都是布道,所宣扬的全是神灵、天子、因果报应。
与此同时,他们在“无神论者社会存在的可能性”这一问题上也没少犯错误,我不懂贝耳先生怎能忘记那样一个绝好的实例,本来完全可以支撑他的论点。
一个无神论者的社会为什么看似无法存在呢?原因有三:一是不受上帝约束而成长的人类应该无法适应群居生活;二是法律对于隐蔽性犯罪基本无用;三是人类需要一个报复心重的上帝去惩罚此世或来世逃脱了人间法律制裁的恶人。
摩西律法没有涉及来世,没有提到死后惩罚,也没有告诉第一代犹太人灵魂是永恒不朽的,这是事实,但是犹太人非但没有成为逃避神圣复仇的无神论者,反而成为了人类中最虔诚的信徒。他们不仅相信上帝是永恒存在着的,而且还认定上帝就出现在他们中间,无处不在,他们害怕上帝会惩罚自己,会降罪子女,会阻断家庭的幸福,甚至会为第四代子孙担心害怕,上帝的这种督查考验着实威力无穷。
然而,异教徒中一些宗派是不存在上帝督查考验的,比如怀疑论者质疑世间万物;柏拉图信奉者保留对所有事物的看法;享乐主义者坚信上帝不能干涉人间之事,在内心深处并不相信上帝的存在。他们认为灵魂不是实体,而是与肉体同生共死的虚幻意志,所以他们不受上帝的束缚,而受道德与荣誉的影响。罗马元老院中的元老和骑士们是真正的无神论者,因为对于从不害怕上帝、对上帝也毫无所求的人来说,上帝是不存在的。所以,恺撒和西塞罗时代的罗马元老院才是真正的无神论者大本营。
伟大演说家西塞罗在名为“为克鲁恩修斯” [1] 的演说中,他对集会中的元老们说:“死亡能给他造成什么伤害?我们拒绝所有有关地狱的愚笨而不实的寓言。死亡能带走他什么东西呢?什么也带不走,只能带走疼痛的感觉。”
处死罪犯,死并不是对罪犯的惩罚;死亡并不代表什么;死亡只是我们苦难的结束;死亡是快乐而非痛苦的时刻。对于这些观点,恺撒难道有发表反对意见?西塞罗和整个元老院难道不接受这些看法吗?就算恺撒是卡塔琳娜(Catalina)的朋友,并且还想从西塞罗手下挽救自己朋友的性命。因此,这些举世闻名的世界征服者和立法者们对上帝都无敬畏之心,他们是彻头彻尾的无神论者。
随后,贝耳探究了偶像崇拜是否比信仰无神论更加危险。不信神明与对于神明浅薄无知,此二者两相比较,前者是否是更大的罪过?关于此点,贝耳与普鲁塔克的看法一致。普鲁塔克认为相较于拥有错误观点来说,还不如没有观点来得好。然而,依据普鲁塔克的看法,显而易见,希腊人敬畏谷物女神刻瑞斯、海神尼普顿和主神朱庇特要比无所畏惧要好太多。与此同时,维护誓言的神圣地位也是必须,我们所信赖的人应当是那些相信错误誓言会招致惩罚的人,而不是那些认为胡乱发誓也不会受到惩戒的人。毋庸置疑,在一个文明城市里,存在一种宗教,就算不太完善,但较于全无宗教来说,还是要有用很多。
所以说贝耳应当去探讨宗教狂热与无神论,这两者之间哪一种更危险。毫无疑问,相较于无神论来说,宗教狂热所带来的危险当然要强出千百倍。因为无神论并不嗜血,但宗教狂热却热衷于此;无神论并不赞成犯罪,但宗教狂热却热衷犯罪。跟随《高卢事物注疏》(Commentarium rerum Gallicarum )一书的作者,让我们一起来假设一下总理大臣洛比达是名无神论者。他颁布的法令可行亲民,推行的政策仁爱和睦,可是宗教狂热者们却杀害了圣·巴多罗买(saint Bartholomew)。霍布斯(Hobbes)也被视作无神论者,然而他生活平静而简单,可在他所处的时代,宗教狂热者们在英格兰、苏格兰和爱尔兰泛滥成灾,流血事件时有发生。斯宾诺莎不仅是名无神论者,同时还宣扬无神论。当然他并未参与对巴纳菲尔德(Barneveldt)的司法暗杀,也不是他将德·维特(de Witt)兄弟扯成碎片,折磨致死。
大部分无神论者都是性情莽撞、又受到误导的学者。他们逻辑推理不严密、不懂创世、不知恶魔起源,也不知道其他许多难解的事物,因为无法解释,所以就转向事物永恒性与必然性的假说。
雄心勃勃、骄奢淫逸的人几乎不会花时间去论证,去接纳一个不完备的理论。他们与其做其他事也不会去比较卢克莱修(Lucretius) [2] 和苏格拉底之间的区别,这就是当下的行事之风。
而罗马元老院的情况却不是如此。元老院上下几乎全由理论和实践上皆是无神论者组成,也就是说,他们既不信天意,也不信来世。这个元老院是哲学家、酒色之徒和野心勃勃之人的大本营,他们都很危险,是他们毁了共和国。享乐主义在罗马帝国皇帝统治下大行其道。元老院中的无神论者在苏拉(Sulla)和恺撒时代曾经是煽动反叛的人,而在奥古斯都(Augustus)和提比略(Tiberius)时代又成了无神论者的奴隶。
我不想与一个信仰无神论的王子有任何瓜葛,他会认为将我塞进炮管会非常有用,我也确信我会被塞进去;如果我是一个君主,我不想有信奉无神论的朝臣,因为他们的兴趣就是要将我毒死,那样每天我都需要随身携带解毒剂。由此看来,帝王国君和各类民众都绝对有必要将神灵、上帝、统治者和因果报应的概念深深地植入脑海。
贝耳在《关于慧星的思考》(Pensées sur les comètes )一书中提到说存在信奉无神论的人。卡菲尔人、霍屯督人、图皮南布人,以及其他许多小型部族都没有上帝。也许是这样,但这也并不意味着他们否认上帝的存在。他们既不否认,也不认同上帝,因为他们从未听说。告诉他们上帝的存在,他们就会相信。告诉他们所有事情都是自然而然发生的,他们也会相信。称他们为无神论者或反笛卡尔主义者(anti- Cartesians)都是适当的,因为他们既不认同,也不反对笛卡尔。他们就是真正的孩童,既不是无神论者也不是有神论者,他们是白纸一张。
那我们从中可以得出什么结论呢?结论就是:无神论对统治阶级、对学者们来说都是莫大的邪恶,就算是对于生活简单的学者来说,也是如此,因为学者们可利用所学知识去影响统治者。然而,无神论的危害就算没有宗教狂热来的那么强烈,但对于品德来说,也是致命伤。总而言之,自从哲学家们认识到了没有种子就没有蔬菜,没有筹备就没有种子,同时依靠腐烂不可以生产粮食之后,现在比起过去而言,无神论者已经少了很多。
非哲学的数学家们拒绝接受终极因,但是真正的哲学家们是接受的。正如一位著名作家所言:传道士告诉孩子们上帝的存在,而牛顿向明智之人演示上帝的存在。
Ⅱ
灵魂里的暴君因为唯利是图,欺诈行骗招致我们的反感,这灵魂暴君还强迫一些虚弱的心灵去否定被恶魔侮辱着的上帝。如果此事的责任不在于无神论者,那谁才是责任人呢?榨取民脂民膏的吸血鬼迫使无力的民众去背叛国王的频率有多高呢?
依靠吸食我们血肉而壮大的人向我们大声吼道:“确信一头母驴会说话;相信一条鱼在吞食一个人三天之后会将其安全无损地抛回海边;全能的上帝命令一个犹太先知(即以西结)去吃粪便,命令另一个先知(即何西阿书)去购买两个妓女并与她们生下子嗣,不要对此抱有怀疑。这字字都是真理、纯洁之上帝所说的话语。要么相信显而易见令人厌恶的东西,要么相信数学上完全不可能之事。否则,仁慈的上帝将会用地狱中的烈火将你烧成灰烬。这不仅限于成千上万个世纪的时间,而是贯穿了永恒,不管你有无肉体。”
这些难以置信的愚蠢之事不仅引起个性软弱、鲁莽之人的反感,也招致心性坚定、明智之人的不耻。他们说:“我们的宗教领袖们将上帝描述成所有物种中最愚蠢、最野蛮的事物,所以上帝是不存在的。”但是他们应该说:“我们的宗教领袖们将他们自己的愚蠢与狂怒强加给上帝,所以上帝恰恰是他们所宣称那样的反面,上帝明智仁善,程度等同于所被宣称的疯狂邪恶的程度。”这就是有识之士的结论。但是这些倘若被一个宗教狂热分子听到,那他会将他们告发至执法官和教士处,然后这个执法官会将他们置于慢火中活活烧死,并坚信自己是在模仿神圣的上帝来惩治这些不敬之人。
[1] 《为克鲁恩修斯》(For Cluentius)是古罗马著名演说家西塞罗为克鲁恩修斯(Cluentius)辩护所发表的演说,公元前66年,克鲁恩修斯被其母亲控告毒杀继父。——译者注
[2] 卢克莱修(Lucretius,前99—前55),古罗马哲学家及诗人,具有唯物主义观点,反对神创论,著有哲学长诗《物性论》。——译者注
洗 礼
洗礼在希腊语中意为浸礼。通常以感官为导向的人类,很容易联想到在洗涤肉体的同时也是在净化灵魂。而此事,在很大程度上,都要归功于那些在埃及神殿穹顶下洗礼的发起人和首次进行实践的祭司。自远古时期以来,印度人就以恒河之水净化自身,至今这一仪式仍然十分盛行。后来这仪式传给了希伯来人,他们为所有皈依犹太教的外邦人举行洗礼,这仪式的重要性丝毫不逊色于割礼。除埃塞俄比亚外,所有的女人都不要求实行割礼,但需要举行洗礼。因为洗礼代表一种重生,人能被赋予全新的灵魂,正如埃及的传统那样。关于这点,参见伊皮法纽 [1] ,迈蒙尼德 [2] 和《革马拉》 [3] 。
约翰在约旦举行过洗礼,他甚至还为耶稣举行了洗礼。而耶稣,这个从未为别人举行过洗礼的人,却让这个古老仪式变得圣洁、神圣。其实,每条教义本身都无意义,只是上帝将他的祝福融入了他所选择的教义之中。很快,洗礼就成了基督教的首要宗教仪式和信徒的主要标志。耶路撒冷的首批15名大主教虽然都受过割礼,但是是否都行过洗礼却无法确定。
可是,这一神圣仪式在基督教的头一个世纪里遭到了滥用。死亡之时等待接受洗礼成了最稀松平常之事,其中的典型事例就是康斯坦丁大帝。以下是他对洗礼的看法:洗礼可以洗净世间任何东西,所以我可以杀尽妻儿亲人,之后只要受洗,照样可以进入天堂。实际上他也如此做了。但这是一个很极端的例子,其实接受神圣洗礼之前等死的习俗已经渐渐消亡了。
希腊人总将洗礼等同于浸礼。8世纪末期,拉丁人在将他们的宗教传入高卢和德国后发现,在气候严寒的国家实行浸礼会冻死孩童,于是用简单的淋水取代了浸礼。他们还因为此事经常受到希腊教会的谴责。
迦太基大主教圣·塞浦路斯(saint Cyprian)曾被问到那些全身只受过微量水洗的人是否真的受洗了。他在第76封信中回答道:有几个教会不相信这些轻微受洗过的人是基督徒,但是就他自己而言,他觉得他们是基督徒,只不过相较于那些根据习俗受过三次浸礼的人,毫无疑问得到的祝福要少得多。
就基督徒来说,一个人一旦受洗,那么他就被教会正式接纳为信徒了。在受洗之前,他就只是一个初学者。想要被教会接受,就需要有保证人、监护人,这些人会被授予一个类似于教父一样的名字,只有这样,教会才能确认这新的基督教徒能始终保持信仰,而不会沉溺于其他秘密宗教。这就是为什么在头几个世纪里,关于基督教的秘密宗教仪式,连同伊希斯 [4] 和依洛西斯 [5] 的秘密宗教仪式,基督徒都没有受到正确的指引。
亚历山大的区利罗 [6] 在他反对朱利安大帝的小册子中这样说道:“我会谈论洗礼,就算我的言语会传到非基督徒的耳中,我也不怕。”
早在二世纪时,他们就已经开始为儿童举行洗礼。基督徒们期望他们的孩子受到洗礼,这是人之常情,因为不受洗就会受到诅咒。最终将洗礼的举行时间定在孩子出生一周后,因为这时间也是犹太教为孩子举行割礼的时间。尽管人在死亡时接受洗礼盛行于三世纪,但是这一习俗至今仍是希腊教会的传统。
根据教会中最严格的教父的说法,婴儿出生后一周内死亡是受到了诅咒。但是在五世纪时,皮特·克索罗格斯 [7] 发明了地狱边境一说。地狱边境就是一种轻量级地狱,更确切地说,是地狱的边境部分,是地狱的郊区,是未受洗礼的儿童和在耶稣降生之前已去世的正直的人死后的栖身之所。从此以后,人们认为耶稣死后进入的是地狱的边境而非地狱。
降生在阿拉伯的沙漠之中的基督徒能否用沙子进行洗礼一事也引起过各方争论,最后的答案是不可以。又问玫瑰香水是否可以用来进行洗礼,答案是纯净水是必要的,但是浑浊水也可以使用。显而易见,所有的规则主要取决于首次创立该规则牧师的谨慎程度。
……
洗礼:补充
受到洗浴盆的启发而认为一壶水能洗净所有的罪恶,是个多么奇怪的观点呀!之所以所有的孩子都接受洗礼,是因为再没有比这更荒谬的观点能假定所有的孩子都是罪犯,假定他们都被拯救了,直到他们长大到懂事的年龄并能开始犯罪为止。所以尽可能快地屠戮他们以求让他们相信天堂。这个结论是如此地逻辑严密,以至于存在一个虔诚的教派,致力于毒杀所有刚受洗的婴儿。这些信徒的辩解是如此的理所当然,他们说:“对于这些纯洁无瑕的小东西,我们给予最大的善意,我们这是在防止他们变得邪恶,不让他们品尝生活的艰辛,我们是在赋予他们永生。”
[1] 伊皮法纽(Epiphanius,约310或320—403),萨拉米斯(Salamis)大主教,被东正教和基督教视为圣徒。著有《帕那里昂》( Panarion ),详细反击了80种异端邪说。——译者注
[2] 迈蒙尼德(Maimonides,1135—1204),出生于西班牙,被认为是中世纪最伟大的犹太哲学家、犹太教法学家、科学家、神学家和医学家。——译者注
[3] 《革马拉》( Gemara ),犹太教口传律法集《塔木德经》( Talmud )的后半部和释义部分,为《密西拿》的补编和说明。——译者注
[4] 伊希斯(Isis),埃及宗教里司生育和繁殖的女神。——译者注
[5] 依洛西斯(Eleusis),古希腊城市,依洛西斯秘密宗教仪式的发祥地。——译者注
[6] 亚历山大的区利罗(Cyril of Alexandria,376—444),又译区利罗一世,412—444年间于罗马帝国统治下的埃及亚历山大城任亚历山大宗主教。区利罗著作甚多,积极参与当时关于耶稣基督的神性和人性的争论。——译者注
[7] 皮特·克索罗格斯(Peter Chrysologos,约380—450),拉文那(Ravenna)大主教。——译者注
食人族
我讨论过爱。从讨论人类相亲相爱到讨论人类互相啃食,实现这个转换很是艰难。但是食人族又千真万确地存在着。在美洲已经发现过一些。然而在远古时代,偶尔会吃人血肉的,并不只有独眼巨人 [1] ,可能其他一些人也会如此。尤维纳利斯(Juvenal)就曾描述说古埃及人,一个如此明智博学,以其律法完善、人民虔诚、崇拜鳄鱼与洋葱而著称的民族,他们中的丹德拉人(Denderites)竟然也吃掉了一个落入他们之手的敌人。尤维纳利斯讲述的这个故事并非异端邪说,这宗罪恶几乎就在他眼皮底下发生,当时他就在埃及,离丹德拉(Dendera)不远。他在连接日记的文件夹里还引证了以前吃同胞血肉的加斯科涅人(Gascons)和桑加提人(Sagantines)。
1725年,四个野蛮人被人从密西西比带到枫丹白露,我有幸能有机会和他们对话。我问其中一个女人是否吃过人,她很无辜地回答说,她吃过。我震惊了。她解释说吃掉敌人的尸体好过敌人被野兽吞食,胜利者有这个特权。在对阵战或者野战中,我们杀死邻居,为乌鸦和蠕虫只留下最少量的食物。只要有惨状,就会有犯罪。当一个人被杀死了,死后尸体是被士兵吃掉还是被乌鸦或者狗吃掉,这又有什么关系呢?
我们尊敬死者甚于尊敬生者。两者都应当受到我们的尊敬。国家之所以文明在于我们不会将屈服的敌人置于烤肉叉上。因为一旦允许吃掉敌人,那很快我们也会吃掉自己的同胞,这对社会公德来说将会是一种双重的诅咒。但是文明国度并非总是文明的,因为所有人在很长时间里都曾是野蛮人。在这世界所经历的无数次革命中,人类种群的数量有时巨大,有时稀少。如今大象、狮子和老虎数量锐减的现象,也曾发生在人类身上。所以,当人类聚居在一个狭小区域,又无诸多技艺,他们就都是猎人,以杀死的猎物为食的习惯就很容易导致他们对待敌人就像对待他们的猎物野鹿和野猪一样。以人献祭是迷信,但以人为食是必需。
有两种罪,一种是为了向神表达敬意,将幼小的祭品用束带装饰好,然后在虔诚的集会中,将刀插入祭品心脏;另一种则是吃掉一个为了自卫而杀死的恶棍。这两种罪,哪一种更严重呢?
然而,男孩被当做祭品献祭的事例要比被当做食物吃掉的事例多得多。其中,犹太人就献祭。这种仪式被称为咒逐,这是真正意义上的献祭。《利未记》第27章明确要求不要放过那些已经致力于服侍上帝的生魂,但是没有规定说他们应该被吃掉,他们只是受到这种命运的威胁。我们也已经知道摩西对犹太人说,如果他们不观看这些仪式,那么不只是他们会有这种渴望,就连母亲也会吃掉自己的孩子。在以西结时代,犹太人一定有吃人的习惯,因为在第39章他向犹太人预言说,上帝不只会让他们敌人的战马成为他们的食物,甚至骑马者和其他的战士也会成为他们的食物。这千真万确。但是为什么犹太人实际上又没有成为食人族呢?这本应是唯一一件事能使这些上帝选民成为世上最令人厌恶的人。
在一些有关克伦威尔时期英格兰历史的书上,我曾经读到过一件奇闻轶事:都柏林有一个油脂蜡烛商贩售卖用英格兰人的油脂制作的、质量上乘的蜡烛。一段时间后,她的一个顾客向她抱怨说蜡烛质量没那么好了。她说“哎,这是因为这个月英格兰人缺货。”我想问谁才是罪人?是那些杀死英格兰人的刽子手?还是这个将他们的脂肪做成蜡烛的女人呢?
[1] 独眼巨人,希腊神话中的人物,身体强壮、固执、感情冲动。——译者注
确信与确信度
“你的朋友克里斯托弗多大年龄?”
“28岁。我俩打小就认识,我见过他的结婚证,知道他什么时候举行的洗礼。他28岁,这一点毫无疑问,我很确定。”
此人如此确信,其他20多人也证明了此事,然而我刚听完回答,就发现克里斯托弗出于某种不为人知的原因,利用一些小手段将实际举行洗礼的日期提前了。那些回答我问题的人到现在都还没意识到这个错误。他们犯了错,却不自知地坚持错误。
哥白尼出现之前,如果你问“今天太阳会升起吗?会降落吗?”那么所有人可能都会这样回答你:“当然,我们万分肯定。”他们都万分肯定,确信无疑,然而他们都错了。
曾经在很长的岁月里,符咒、占卜和神魔附身在世人眼中都是确信无疑的事情。那个时候,认同并对这些神奇之物确信无疑的人何其多也!如今,这种确信度在一定程度上有所变弱。
曾经有一名学习几何学的年轻人来拜访过我。他不理解三角形的定义。我就问他说:“一个三角形的三个角等于两个直角,你不觉得确定无疑吗?”他回答说,他对这个命题连一个清楚的认识都没有,根本谈不上确定无疑。于是,我向他演示了这道命题,然后他就对此确信无疑了,并且终生都会如此。
数学上的这种确定性不同于其他类别的确定性,它是亘古不变的,然而其他类别的确定性仅仅只是可能性,一旦加以验证,就会变成错误。
我存在、我思考、我感受苦痛!所有这类问题是否也与几何真理一样确定呢?答案是肯定的,为什么呢?原因在于此类真理都可以由同一条原则加以证明,此原则就是一个事物不可能同时存在又不存在。我不可能同时存在又不存在,感知又不感知。一个三角形不可能同时有又没有180度,而这180度恰好是两个直角的总和。
所以,对于我的存在和感知的物理确定性与数学上的确定性,尽管种类不同,但是他们具有同等的价值。
但这并不适用于那些基于表象或者由众口一词而得来的确定性。
“真的吗?”你告诉我“北京真是存在吗?我们没有从北京得来的纺织品吗?国度不同,见解不同的人,虽会对彼此口诛笔伐,但是对于北京的存在却都确信无疑。他们没有向你保证说这座城市是真实存在的吗?”我回答说,对于我而言,北京存在着只是一件很可能的事情,我不会赌上我的性命说这座城市是存在的,但是,在任何时候,我都会赌上我的性命说一个三角形的三个角等于两个直角。
《大百科辞典》中的有些内容真的非常可笑。比如,里面有篇文章写道:如果整个巴黎都说德·萨克斯元帅 [1] 复活了,那么人们就该对此确信无疑,正如人们都相信巴黎人所说的德·萨克斯元帅取得了丰特努瓦之战胜利一样。那我请您考虑一下,想想这个逻辑是多么的令人钦佩:当所有的巴黎人告诉我一些在原则上可能发生的事情时,我相信他们;所以当他们告诉我一些在原则上、在生理上不可能发生的事情时,我仍旧必须相信他们。
显而易见,这篇文章的作者就是想博人一笑。而另一名作者在文章末尾还陷入狂乱状态,写作自相矛盾,估计这也是想逗人一笑吧。而对于我这么一个试图从这本辞典中挑出问题的人来说,所谓的确信离我太远。
[1] 德·萨克斯,全名莫里斯·德·萨克斯(Maurice de Saxe,1696—1750),法国元帅。军事才能突出,曾领导法国战胜英荷联军取得丰特努瓦战役的胜利。——译者注
性 格
“性格”一词源于希腊语,是印记、雕刻之意。性格是大自然铭刻于我们人类体内之物。我们可以抹除性格吗?这是个高深的问题。如果我有一个鹰钩鼻,两只猫儿眼,那我可以将它们隐藏在面具之下。那对于自然赋予我的性格,我可以让它变得更好吗?一个生性狂暴、暴躁易怒的人,去法国国王弗朗索瓦一世面前抱怨说他受到了不公正待遇。但王子的面容、朝臣的敬意、以及他正身处的这个地方,都会给他留下深刻的印象:不知不觉中,他会垂下眼睑,放柔声音,来表现他的谦恭。人们会觉得他个性自然温顺,身处朝臣们中间时,甚至会有些惊慌失措。但是,如果弗朗索瓦一世精于观察面相,那么从他那低垂却隐藏火焰的眼睛里,从那紧绷的面部肌肉里,从那紧紧闭合的嘴唇上,国王就能很轻易地发现,此人并不像他所表现出来的那样谦卑恭顺。此人跟随国王一起去帕维亚,一起被俘,一道被关押在马德里的监狱里。此时,弗朗索瓦一世国王的形象在此人心中就起了变化,此人对他曾经顶礼膜拜的国王已经相当熟悉。有一天,当他为国王脱骑马靴时,手法不对,国王又想起自己的不幸,一下子就暴怒起来。于是乎,这人就把国王送给了魔鬼,将国王的靴子扔出了窗外。
西斯都五世本性急躁、顽固倔强、傲慢自大、鲁莽冲动、报复心重、嚣张骄纵。他在见习修士期间进行过苦修,他的本性看似有所柔化。然而,当他声名鹊起、大权加身之时,一名侍者侍奉不周,让他暴怒,他就用自己的拳头将这侍者击倒在地。西斯都五世在威尼斯任审问者一职时,行事傲慢无礼,在成为红衣主教之后,他想成为教皇的野心肆意膨胀。这种野心膨胀侵蚀了他的本性,他将自己的人性与性格隐匿于黑暗之中,他假装谦逊,身体虚弱,直到被选为教皇。一当选,他就恢复了所有强行压制着的本性。他是最傲慢自大、最暴怒专制的最高统治者。
Naturam expellas furca, tamen ipsa redibit.
(就算用干草叉将本性暂时驱逐,但它总会回归)
Chassez le naturel, il revient au galop.
宗教和道德只能束缚但不能摧毁本性。修道院里的嗜酒者,就算将喝酒量减至每餐只喝一杯苹果酒,不会再喝醉,但他永远还是爱酒。
年岁的增加会让性格有所弱化。但是一棵树结出的果子,有些尽管较次,总归是同一种类。树会起疙瘩、长苔藓,会被虫蛀,但是它总还是一颗橡树或者梨树。如果我们可以改变自己的性格,那么也许我们会给自己创造一种性格,我们会成为自然的主宰。我们可以给予自己什么东西呢?难道我们所拥有的还不够吗?尝试着在充满惰性的群众里连绵不断地发起活动、尝试着用冷漠去给滚烫冲动的灵魂降温、也尝试着激发那些无品位、无悟性的人群生出对音乐、对诗歌的热爱与品位。如果你能为生而眼盲的人带去光明,那么再没有什么能比这更加成功的了。我们可以去完善、调节或者隐藏自然赋予我们的东西,但是我们不能肆意为自己创造东西。
一个农民曾被告知说:“你这鱼塘里鱼太多了,它们无法茁壮成长;你农田里动物太多了,食草不够,它们会减重。”听从这劝告之后,梭鱼吃了这人一半的鲤鱼,狼群吃了一半的绵羊,剩下的就长肥了。农民会为这种管理方式而欢呼雀跃吗?这农民其实就是你自己,你自身的一种热情吞噬了其他热情,你还以为自己战胜了自己。有位九十高龄的老将军偶然遇见一些年轻的军官正与镇上的女人们调情,他怒气冲冲地说道:“绅士们,这就是我给你们树立的榜样吗?”难道我们自己不都与这位九十岁的老将军大同小异吗?
宗教会议
毫无疑问,所有的宗教会议阐述教义绝无谬误,因为会议的成员都是有智慧的人。在他们的集会中,感情用事、阴谋诡计、喜辩好战、仇恨嫉妒、偏见傲慢都不可能占主导地位。
但是为什么如此多的宗教会议又会彼此冲突呢?这是个会被问到的问题。这就要检验我们的信仰了,每一个会议就其本身而言都是正确的。
罗马天主教只相信梵蒂冈认可的宗教会议;希腊天主教则只信任君士坦丁堡认可的宗教会议。而新教徒对此两者都加以嘲弄。所以说每个人都想着自己应该被满足。
在这里,我只提及影响大的会议,规模小的略去不提。
第一个就是尼西亚(Nicaea)会议。该会议于公元325年召开,召开原因主要是康斯坦丁大帝吩咐奥蒂斯(Ozius)给迷惑的亚历山大教士写了一封重要的信,信中说道:“你是在为一些无关紧要的事情争论,这些细微之处在理性之人看来毫无价值。”这里提到的事主要就是:耶稣是上帝创造的,还是自存的。此事与道德无关,这点是核心。耶稣是受到时间限制还是凌驾于时间之上,这怎么说均是不妥。在历经众多解读之后,会议最终决定圣子与圣父同龄同质。这个解读虽然我们难以理解,然而正是由于这个缘故,圣子变得更加庄严崇高。但是,却有17名主教反对这项教令,据亚历山大所著的编年史记载(此编年史保存在牛津),还有2000名教士也持反对意见。然而,高级教士对贫穷困苦的底层教士的意见通常是不屑一顾的。尽管出现这种情况,第一次宗教会议对于三位一体还是不存在争议的。教条这样写道:“我们相信耶稣与圣父同质同体,是神之神,是光之光,是上帝所生而非创造。我们也相信圣灵。”在这里我们必须承认圣灵遭受了比较随意的对待。
尼西亚会议的附录中还记载到:由于分不清辨不明哪些是《旧约》和《新约》的真经,哪些是伪经,迷惑的神父们将所有经书混杂无序地置于祭坛之上,不被认可的经书就会掉到地上。如此优雅讲究的仪式竟然没有被继承流传下来,真是可惜呀!
第一次尼西亚会议成员由317位在阐述教义方面绝不会出错的主教们组成,此次会议之后,另一会议在里米尼 [1] 召开,与会成员多达400名主教,这还不包括塞琉西亚的一大队人马,将近200人。这600名主教,在历经四个月的争论之后,一致同意剥夺耶稣与圣父同质的特性。之后,除了索齐尼派教徒(Socinians),会议又恢复了耶稣与圣父同质的特性。所以说,怎样做都是可以的。
公元431年举行的以弗所会议也是最重要的会议之一。君士坦丁堡大主教、异教徒伟大的迫害者聂斯脱利(Nestorius)认为耶稣实际上就是上帝,但是耶稣的母亲绝对不是上帝的母亲,只是耶稣的母亲,因为这一看法他遭到了圣·赛瑞利(saint Cyril)的谴责。然而,之后在这同一会议上,聂斯脱利的支持者们废黜了圣·赛瑞利。这些事情使得圣灵的处境非常难堪。
亲爱的读者们,在这里请仔细注意,福音书对于同实体性这一词尚未发表任何意见,对于圣母玛利亚是否是上帝之母,以及那些引发主教们集会的争执点也未发表任何意见。
欧迪奇(Eutyches)是名修道士,他极力反对聂斯脱利,认为聂斯脱利所宣扬的“耶稣其实是两个人”是异端邪说,是可怕断言。为了更好地否定对手的观点,他还断言说耶稣只有一种本性。一位名为弗拉维亚(Flavian)的君士坦丁堡主教不同意他的观点,认为耶稣具有二重本性是绝对必需的。449年,无数的宗教会议在以弗所举行。这次会议的参会人数是以往人数的四分之一,与355年举行的小型锡尔塔(Cirta)会议以及一个在迦太基举行的会议规模相当。会上弗拉维亚饱受攻击、遍体鳞伤,然而耶稣还是被赋予了二重本性。但是,卡尔西登(Chalcedon)会议又将耶稣的本性减少到一种。
我跳过那些讨论细枝末节的会议,直达第六次君士坦丁堡大型宗教会议,会议旨在确认只拥有一种本性的耶稣,是否有过两种欲念。为了讨好上帝,你会意识到此点的重要性。
正如此前诸多会议都由国王们召集一样,此次会议由康斯坦丁二世(绰号“大胡子”)召集。罗马主教的使者们坐于左侧,君士坦丁堡和安提俄克(Antioch)的主教们则坐在右侧。我不知道罗马的谄媚者们是否视左方座位为上座,但是无论如何,耶稣在此事上就有两种欲念。
摩西律法禁止将耶稣图像化,因此,画家和雕塑家在犹太人中从不吃香。除了路加(Luke)画的圣母玛利亚,耶稣图像从未出现过。无论怎样,犹太人从不崇拜耶稣基督的图像。然而,基督徒们直到四世纪末都还在崇拜着耶稣的图像,他们对于这种精湛的美术技艺已经相当熟悉。这种错误的做法严重泛滥,以至于到了八世纪,康斯坦丁五世科普罗尼穆斯(Constantine Copronymus)召集了320名主教在君士坦丁堡举行宗教会议,强烈谴责图像崇拜,并为其打下了偶像崇拜的烙印。
还有那位后来挖了她儿子眼睛的伊琳娜女皇于787年召开了尼西亚第二次会议,该会议恢复了图像崇拜。如今要为此次会议正名,理由通常是:这种对图像的崇拜是二等崇拜的一种(对圣徒的尊崇),而非最高崇拜(专对上帝之崇拜)。
然而,到底是二等崇拜还是最高崇拜,794年,查理曼大帝在法兰克福召集了另一场会议,该会议指责第二次尼西亚会议,认为它是盲目的偶像崇拜。教皇哈德良四世派遣了两名使者参加此会议,但并不召集人。
第一次由教皇召集而举行的大型宗教会议是1139年举行的第一次拉特兰(Lateran)会议。约有1000名主教参加,然而,此次会议除了诅咒那些抱怨教会太富有的人之外,没有取得任何成果。
1179年,教皇亚历山大三世召集举行了另一场拉特兰会议,此次会议只讨论了教规问题,但是红衣主教的地位在此次会议上第一次超过了主教。
另一场重要的会议是1215年举行的拉特兰会议。此次会上,教皇英诺森三世将图卢兹伯爵逐出教会,剥夺了他所有的财产。在这次会议上,首次出现了与变质论相关的问题。
1245年,还是当时皇城的里昂举行了大型宗教会议,在此期间,教皇英诺森四世将皇帝腓特烈二世逐出教会,进而废黜,永世放逐。也就是在这次会议上,红衣主教们被授予红帽,用来提醒他们自己必须沐浴在皇帝支持者们的鲜血之中。此次会议摧毁了斯瓦比亚家族(house of Swabia),使得意大利和德国30年里都处于无政府状态。
1311年,在维也纳举行的大会上,圣殿骑士团被废除(the order of the Templars),骑士团的主要成员们,基于许多毫无事实根据的指控,饱受谴责与最严酷恐怖的刑讯逼供。
1414年,举行了康斯坦茨(Constance)大会,该大会废黜了教皇约翰二十三世,指控他罪行1000种。此会议还以顽固不化的罪名烧死了约翰·胡斯(John Huss)和布拉格的哲罗姆(Jerome of Prague)。因为在当时,相较于谋杀、强奸、买卖圣职和鸡奸,顽固不化是项更严重的犯罪。
1431年的巴塞尔(Basle)大会不被罗马教会承认,原因在于此次会议未经罗马教会同意就废黜了教皇尤金四世。
罗马人将1512年举行的第五次拉特兰宗教会议也视为一次大会,此次会议由教皇尤里乌斯二世(Julius II)召集,但遭到法国皇帝路易十二世的反对。然而,随着尤里乌斯二世这样一位战士式的教皇离世,此次会议也化为乌有。
最后就是特伦托(Trent)大会,此会议在教规问题上在法国并无权威。但是,它的教规却是无可挑剔的,因为根据弟兄 [2] 保罗·萨比(fra Paolo Sarpi)的说法,圣灵每周都会借助信使之身从罗马来到特伦托。但是弟兄保罗·萨比的说辞总有一丝异端邪说的感觉。
[1] 里米尼(Rimini),古称“阿里米努姆”。意大利北部城市。位于圣马力诺东北的马雷基亚河口,滨亚得里亚海。——译者注
[2] 弟兄:Fra,用于意大利教士姓名前的称号。——译者注
狂 热
狂热,这一希腊词语意为内脏的骚乱,内心的激动。希腊人创造这一词语,是否旨在描述一种感觉,那就是当人被深深感动时,神经受到震动,内脏膨胀紧绷,心脏强烈收缩,暴乱的情绪横冲直撞,从内脏直灌大脑?
或者说,创造狂热这一词语的目的,不是用来描述内脏的骚动,而是首先用来描述女祭司皮提亚(Pythia)在德尔斐(Delphi)的三脚祭坛上,借助特制的道具,来接受阿波罗神谕时的激动心情呢?
我们如何理解狂热?在我们的情绪之中又有何细微差别?赞赏、敏感、情绪、悲痛、震惊、酷爱、狂暴、疯癫、激怒、愤怒:这些都是一个悲惨的灵魂可能经历的情绪状态。
一位几何学家观看一场感人肺腑的悲剧:他只看到该局的结构精巧。他身旁的年轻人深受感动却未有任何发现。一位女子掩面而泣,另一年轻人深受感染,以至于决定自己也去书写一个悲剧,他很不幸地被狂热这种疾病传染了。
百人队长或军团将校将战争视为一种有利可图的贸易,他们踏入战场就如一个盖屋匠爬上屋顶一样。恺撒见到亚历山大大帝的雕像时还会哭泣。
奥维德(Ovid)觉得爱情有趣好笑,萨福(Sappho)则对爱情狂热不已,如果说真的是这种狂热侵蚀了萨福的生命,那么也是因为狂热在萨福这里早已变成了癫狂。
党派之分极大地助推了这种狂热之情,任何团体都有其忠实狂热的追随者。
狂热,说到底,就是误入歧途的虔诚之心。有那年轻的苦行僧,盯着鼻尖,反复祈祷,直到自己坚信倘若身负50磅重的枷锁,那么神会由衷地感激他。脑海中充斥着对梵天的无尽想象,他陷入沉睡,在睡梦中他也无可避免地看到了自己的身影。有时,在沉睡与清醒之间,他的眼睛还会闪烁着星光点点:他看到梵天闪闪发光,为此他陷入狂喜之境,而这种狂喜之疾再也无法治愈。
理智与狂热并存是世上最稀有之事。理智在于看事物总看到本质。醉酒之人视物出现重影之时,他已经丧失理智。而狂热恰恰就像是烈酒:它能使血管骚动、神经震颤、彻底地摧毁理智;它也能只引发些许震动,促使大脑稍稍活动。此时就是雄辩之能大爆发,绝妙诗歌横空出世之时,这种有理智指导的狂热使他们的技艺才能变得完美。在过去时代,当人们提到从未被其他艺术家们提及之物时,通常会认为这是受到了神的启发。
理智怎么能控制狂热呢?原因在于诗人首先会在画布上勾画出结构,此时理智主导了画笔。然而,当他继续着笔,赋予人物灵动与生气时,想象力迸发,狂热取得主导地位:这就是一匹赛马,在合理铺设的赛道上,猛力向前奔跑。
平 等
狗与狗之间,马与马之间,存在欠债关系吗?当然不存在,同类动物之间,从不依赖彼此。但是对于接受了神之光,拥有理智的人类来说,结果又是怎样的呢?结果是奴隶制盛行于世界各地。
世界理应如此运行,那就是:倘若人们发现这个世界舒适惬意、物质充足、气候适宜,那么显而易见,人奴役人的现象将不可能发生。就让这个世界遍布健康的果实、让维系生命的空气不再带给我们疾病和死亡、让人们不再拥有比鹿儿更多的贪念,那么成吉思汗和帖木儿,除了他们自己的子嗣,就不会再有其他的仆人,因为子嗣已经完全足够照顾他们养老了。
所有四足动物、鸟类和爬行类动物都享受着这种自然的状态,人类也应和它们一样快乐,这时控制奴役就会成为一种虚妄,一种所有人都不会接受的荒谬,原因就是既然不需要服侍,又为何要去渴求、要去占有仆人呢?
如果一些内心残暴,但力量充沛的个人想要征服较弱的邻居,那么也不会成功,因为,在他们这种压迫者采取行动之前,被压迫者就会结盟,一同抗争。
由此看来,若无欲望,人人都会平等。但是我们人类这个物种,拥有的低劣品性使得人与人之间形成隶属关系。不平等其实并不是真正的罪恶,依赖才是。世上有人被称为殿下,有人被称为圣座,这些称号无关紧要,但是要去服侍他们则是艰难万分。
一个富裕的大家族所耕种的土地土壤肥沃,两个临近的小家族土地贫瘠。很明显,这两个贫穷的家族要么服侍、要么杀死这个豪族。其中一个贫穷家族献出劳动,获取面包;另外一个发动攻击、惨遭毒打。前者成为仆人和劳工,后者则成为奴隶。
在我们这个不幸的世界里,人类居住的社会都被分成两个阶级,即统治者和被统治者。而这两个阶级又细分成一千个阶层,这一千个阶层也继续往下细分。
并不是所有的被压迫者都会感到不幸。他们大多数都出生在那样的环境里,不断地劳动能阻止他们对自己现状的关注。但是,一旦他们察觉,就会发生战争,比如像发生在罗马人民党与元老院之间的对抗,也如发生在德国、英格兰和法国的农民起义。所有的这些战争早晚都是以奴役弱者而结束,强大一方资金雄厚,而资金在很多情况下都是万能的。我只说在很多情况下,因为并不是说在每个国家都是如此。一些善用刀剑武器的国家通常能征服那些富裕但缺乏勇气的国家。
每个人生来都有强大的欲望,渴求征服、财富和享乐,对于闲适的渴望也十分强烈。于是,每个人都想将别人的钱财、妻子或女人据为己有,成为他们的主人,征服他们来满足自己善变的喜好、或者放置不管、又或者只做一些令人愉悦的事情。显而易见,好处如此多多,人与人之间实现平等着实不太可能,正如两位传道士或者两位神学教授之间不可能不嫉妒彼此一样。
除非大批无产却有用处的阶级存在,否则人类无以为继。因为一个富有的人当然不会放弃自己肥沃的土地,转而耕种你那贫瘠的土地。如果你需要一双鞋子,法官是无法帮你做一双的。于是,平等就成为最理所当然却也是最虚妄不实的东西。
但是,人类通常喜欢尽可能地在每件事上走极端,所以这种不平等也被夸大了。有些国家规定公民无权离开自己的国家,尽管他们降生在这国家纯粹是偶然。显而易见,这法律的意思就是:这个国家治理得很差,差到需要我们严禁个人逃脱,因为我们害怕人人都会逃走。那就做得好一点,让你所有的臣民都心甘情愿地留在家中,并吸引外来者的到来。
每个人都有相信自己的权利,在人的内心深处,人人生而平等。当然这并不是说要红衣主教的厨子命令其主人来准备饭菜,只是说厨子可以这样说:“我和主人都是人,我和他一样出生在泪水之中,他和我一样要遭受同样的苦难,历经同样的葬礼而消逝。我们都是动物,拥有同样的功能。如果土耳其人俘获了罗马人,那么我就会是红衣主教,我的主人就会是厨子,他会是我的仆人。”这些话公正合理,但是就算是伟大的土耳其征服了罗马,那这厨子照样得坚守自己的岗位,否则每个人类社会都会腐化堕落。
对于一个既不是红衣主教的厨子,也没有任何公职的人来说,如果他为人温和谦恭,却为那充满了施舍和蔑视味道的周遭环境而恼怒,明显地发现有些身居高位者,相较于自己而言,学识、智慧、道德品性都无法相比,也发现自己在他们的候客室里等待,疲乏不已,那他应该如何?当然应该离开。
祖 国
祖国就是几个家族的合成体。当我们没有利益冲突时,出于自爱,通常都会坚定地支持自己的家族,所以出于同样的自爱,我们都会支持自己的乡村和城镇,这些地方就被叫做祖国。祖国疆域越大,我们对它的爱就越淡,因为被分割的爱是被弱化了的爱,要我们温柔体贴地去爱一个过于庞大,成员甚至素不相识的家实在太难。
一个满怀雄心抱负,想要成为行政官、护民官、裁判官、执政官、独裁者的人叫嚣着他热爱自己的国家,但是实际上他只爱自己。人人都想护财保命,都想确保自己能安稳地睡在家中,权利不被他人霸占,不需挪地休息。于是,所有人都有着同样的愿望,最终私人利益演变成公共利益,当我们传达着自己的希望时,我们也在传达公众的利益。
世上国家治理之初,都以共和制度开始,因为这是符合人类本性的正常道路。少许几个家族首先聚集起来对付熊和狼,只拥有粮食的家族与只拥有木头的家族互补有无。
发现美洲大陆之时,我们也发现陆上的所有部落都实行共和体制,在这整片大陆上只有两个王国。1000个国家中只发现两个国家被征服。
古代时期也是如此。在伊特鲁利亚(Etruria)和罗马的小国国王之前,欧洲实行的都是共和制。这种制度,在如今的非洲仍在实行。的黎波里、突尼斯、阿尔及利亚和往北地区仍然居住着这样一群人,他们以世界开始之初的生活方式生活着,自由而平等,他们之间,没有主人和臣民之分,没有金钱也没有欲求。所养的羊羔哺育他们,羊羔的皮毛温暖他们,泥土和树木所建的小屋就是他们的避难所。他们臭气熏天,却从未察觉,相较于我们而言,他们的生存和死亡都来得更加平静。
在我们欧洲,没有君主的共和国有八个,分别是:威尼斯、荷兰、瑞士、热那亚、卢卡、拉古萨、日内瓦和圣马里诺。波兰、瑞典和英格兰可以视作是拥有国王的共和国,但是只有波兰才是真正的符合。
如今,国家实行君主制或者共和制,哪一个更好?这个问题已经被争论了4000年。拿这个问题去向富人征求解决方式,他们倾向于贵族制;去问民众,他们则倾向于民主制。只有国王们想要君主制,那么为什么几乎世界上所有的国家都被君主统治着呢?去问那些建议在猫脖子上悬挂铃铛的老鼠们吧。但是真正的原因是,我以前说过的,人无法管理自身。
据说,一个好的爱国者常常是其余人类的敌人。好公民老加图(the elder Cato)在元老院发表演说时,常说:“这是我的观点,让迦太基毁灭吧。”想做一个好的爱国者,就是希望自己的城市通过商贸变得富有,通过武器变得强大。显而易见,一个国家得必有另一个国家失,而征服一个国家也不可能一帆风顺。
所以这就是人类的情况,强壮自己的祖国必然以邻为沟壑。而世界公民就是那些不求自己国家强大或弱小,不在乎自身富有或贫穷的人。
洪 水
是否有段时间洪水吞没了整个地球呢?这从自然规律上来说绝无可能。
海洋逐步覆盖地球各个部分尚有可能,但是这个进程缓慢,将持续无数个世纪。艾格·莫尔特(Aigues-Mortes)、弗雷瑞斯(Fréjus)和拉文纳(Ravenna)都曾是良港,用了500年的时间海水才从这些地方撤退,留下了两块干燥的陆地。但照这样的速度,显而易见,海洋要绕过整个地球将需要250万年的时间。值得注意的是,这段时间与地轴向右运转并与赤道重合所花费的时间非常相近。此运转极有可能发生,人们对此已经猜测了50年,而要完成这一运转,需要超过230万年的时间。
在各个岩层以及因海水撤退而形成的几块陆地上发现的河床和贝壳层,都是无可争议的证据,证明海洋生物一点一滴地沉淀在那曾是海岸的陆地上。但是,与此同时,那淹没全球的洪水从自然科学上来说,完全是荒谬而虚妄的。重力定律、流体运动定律以及水量的不足都证明此事绝无可能。我无意质疑摩西五经中记载的世纪大洪水的真实性,相反,此洪水是一个奇迹,是一个人们必须相信的奇迹。正因为是一个奇迹,所以它并不受自然法则的约束。
在这洪水的故事里,所有的事物都是奇迹。40天连续降雨淹没了整个陆地,水平面比最高的山峰还要高出15腕尺,这是奇迹;天空中有大瀑布,有门,有出口是奇迹;所有动物能从世界各个角落集聚而来进入方舟是奇迹;诺亚能找到足够的食物喂养它们十个月之久是奇迹;所有动物能在方舟之中找到他们各自的房间是奇迹;它们中的大多数能存活下来是奇迹;它们离开方舟后能找到食物是奇迹;而勒·佩尔蒂埃(Le Pelletier)认为他已经清楚地解释了动物是如何适应方舟生活并喂养自己的,这也是一个奇迹,另一种类型的奇迹。
洪水的故事是我们所听到的所有故事里最具奇迹色彩的,若要去解释它,那会显得非常愚蠢。这故事是我们信念中所坚信的神秘事物之一,信念就是相信逻辑推理不相信的东西,这本身也是一个奇迹。
所以,大洪水的故事与巴别塔、巴兰的母驴、耶利哥(Jericho)在号角声中陨落、水变成鲜血、红海之路以及所有因上帝为帮助其选民而屈尊所产生的神迹一样,如出一辙。这些都是超越人类认知的深奥之事。
伟大的存在之链
一想到事物存在着层次,上有最至高无上的神,下有最轻简的原子,这一无限之阶梯,使世人难免惊讶万分。但是,若仔细观测,这一伟大的空想就会幻灭,正如所有的鬼怪都会在鸡鸣之时逃遁一样。
这一幻想首先无声地从无生命物质过渡到有细胞组织的物质、从纯植物到植虫、从植虫到动物、从动物到人类、再由人类到精神,而这些精神拥有轻巧的无形之体后,就成为了非物质的实体,最后,这些实体,经过上千个不同的等级排名,从美到完美最终上升到上帝本身。这一等级必须得到权贵之人的青睐,他们将此等级比作教皇、红衣主教、大主教、主教、教区长、教区牧师、一般神父、主祭、副主祭,然后是修道士,这一列队最终以托钵僧结束。
其实,上帝与最完美的物种之间的距离要远远大于圣父与神学院院长之间的距离。院长可以成为教皇,但是上帝所创造的最完美的灵魂却不可能成为上帝,因为上帝与他之间存在永恒的沟壑。
这一链条,这一声称植物与动物之间存在层次之分的链条也已经被摧毁。骨螺已经灭绝。犹太人被禁止吃狮鹫和伊克西翁(ixion)。但不管博加特(Bochart)会说什么,这两个物种已经从世界上消失。那链条到底在哪里呢?
尽管有些物种我们没有失去,但是,显而易见,它们是可以被摧毁消灭的。狮子和犀牛的数量正变得越来越稀少。
有些人种已经灭绝,这极有可能。但是我真心地希望他们存活下来了,就像白人、黑人和卡菲尔人一样,自然给予了他们能遮盖肚腹到大腿部分的腰裙;也像萨莫耶德人(Samoyedes)那样,他们的妻子拥有一个漂亮的黑色乳房。
猴子与人之间难道不存在明显的差异吗?想象一下这样一种动物:拥有两条腿,没有羽毛,拥有智慧,没有能力说话,没有人类外形,却能被我们驯服,能懂得回应人类的指示,服务人类,这样的想象不容易吧?而在这种新物种与人类之间,难道我们不能设想其他的物种吗?
神圣的柏拉图啊,你在天堂里放置了一系列超越人类的神圣实体。但是,就我们而言,我们只相信其中的很小一部分,因为信念使然。但是,你又有什么理由去相信他们呢?看来你并没有和苏格拉底的恶魔谈话,大好人老厄尔(old Er)特意复活来告诉你另一世界的秘密,看来对于这些神圣实体,他也没教授你任何东西。
所谓的存在之链在这物理世界中也没少被打断。
请问您,在行星们之间又存在怎样的层次之分呢?我们的地球大小是月球的40倍。当你跨越空间,从月球来到金星时,你会发现金星与地球一般大小。继续前进来到水星,水星以不同于金星圆形轨道的椭圆型轨道运转。它比地球小27倍,太阳则比地球大100万倍,地球是火星的5倍大小。火星运转周期为2年,它的邻居木星12年,土星30年,尽管这作为行星中最远的土星也不与木星一般大小。那这所谓的层次之分到底在哪里呢?
所以,你如何能期待存在这样一种链条,能将这浩瀚无垠的空间里的所有物种都联系在一起呢?如果有一种这样的链条,那毫无疑问也会是牛顿发现的:就是它能使世界上的所有行星能在这巨大的虚空之中相互吸引。
哦,柏拉图,享有如此多尊崇的柏拉图,恐怕你除了寓言之外,没有教会我们任何东西,除了诡辩,没有说出任何有价值的话语。
哦,柏拉图,你比你自己认为的还要作恶多端。我会被问到你是如何作恶的,但我不会回答。
地 狱
人只要生活在这个社会里,一定会注意到有些罪人逃脱了法律的惩处。他们能惩罚公开犯罪,但是对于秘密犯罪则有必要建立一个检查机制,而只有宗教才可担此重任。波斯人、迦勒底人、埃及人和希腊人创立了死后惩罚措施,而我们已知的所有古代人中只有犹太人赞同现世惩罚。基于几段晦涩难懂的文字,我们相信或者假装去相信地狱的存在是荒谬无比的,因为地狱虽然得到了犹太人古代律法、《利未记》和摩西十诫的认可,但是这些律法的作者却从未提及任何含有来世惩罚意味的字眼。人们就有权对摩西五经的汇编者这样说:“你是一个不负责任的人,既不诚实也不理性,实在担当不起你所霸占的立法者的名号。你明知地狱这样的教义对于人们来说是多么的沉重压抑,多么的急需迫切,你竟然却不言明?另外,尽管地狱这一教义已经被你周边的国家认可接受,但是你却任由这条教义被一些评论者们肆意猜测揣度。这些人来自于你死后的4000多年,他们会考究、歪曲你的话语,从中发现一些不是你本意的东西。或者你是个无知之人,完全没有意识到这一信念在埃及、迦勒底和波斯广为流传,或者你是明知这条教义,却听从了不良建议,未将其作为你们宗教的基础。”
犹太律法的立法者们至多这样回答:“我们承认自己非常无知:我们很晚才学会写字;我们的人民是未开化之人,正如所展现的那样,我们是一个在不适合人类居住的沙漠中游荡了半个世纪之久的野蛮部落;最终,通过史无前例的残酷而可恨的掠夺侵占了一个小国家。我们与文明国家毫无交往:你如何能指望我们这种最世俗的人去创造一个纯粹的精神体系呢?
我们只就生命意义上使用“精神”这一词语,意为灵魂。我们认为上帝、教长和天使都是有肉体的实质存在:灵魂和肉体之分,以及来世的概念都只能是长久冥思及微妙哲学的结果。霍屯督人(Hottentots)和黑人所居住的国家是我们国家的一百倍大,问问他们是否知道来世。上帝对作恶之人的惩罚会延续四代人,惩罚手段或是麻风病,或是暴毙,又或是剥夺他们有可能得到的一丁点财物。我们极力劝服人们相信这一点,此事我们已经做得足够。”
有人会这样回复这一辩解:“你创造了这样一个体系,它的荒谬之处不证自明,因为身体康健、家族繁荣的作恶者必定会对你嗤之以鼻。”
然后,犹太律法的辩护者会这样回答:“你错了,因为许多罪犯根本不讲道理,也因为每个人都有清晰思维。一个犯了罪的人,自己和儿子未遭受惩罚,却害怕孙子遭受牵连。另外,如果此人在今日尚无发臭的溃疡,那么在几年之内他也会感染,因为我们都容易患上这类疾病。每个家庭都有不幸之事,而这些不幸都来自于上帝之手,来自于那秘密犯罪的惩处复仇之手,而让人们相信这点,给人们灌输这样一种信念其实非常容易。”
回应这样的回答着实容易,可以如此说:“你的辩解毫无意义,因为正经体面之人失去健康和财富的事情每天都在发生,倘若没有一个家庭能逃脱代表上帝惩罚的不幸之事,那么你所有的家庭成员必然都曾是下贱卑鄙之流。”
犹太教教士可以做进一步的反驳。他会说人之本性会附带一些不幸之事,另外的不幸之事则是上帝特别赐予的。但是,人们会让这个反驳者意识到,认为而今只是自然作用的热病和冰雹是神圣的惩罚,这样的想法何其荒谬。
最终,犹太教中的法利赛派(the Pharisees)和艾赛尼派(the Essenes)信徒以自己的方式接受了地狱这一概念。这一教条已经从希腊人传播到了罗马人那里,最终被基督教徒接受。
一些教堂的神父并不相信永恒的惩罚,因为在他们看来,让一个偷了一只羊的可怜人永久地遭受火刑的惩罚是非常可笑的。维吉尔在《埃涅阿斯纪》(Aeneid)
第六卷中吟到:
…Sedet aeternumque sedebit
Infelix Theseus.
(可怜的提修斯坐着,永久地坐着。)
他暗示说提修斯永久地坐在一把椅子上,而这一姿势对他来说就是折磨,但这种暗示徒然无效。其他人则认为,提修斯并未在地狱中就坐,而是身处极乐世界。
不久之前,一个心善而正派的新教徒牧师在布道中写道,终有一天,受诅咒之人能得到原谅,惩罚的力度要与所犯罪行相当,一时的错误不应当接受永恒的惩罚。他的同行牧师们对他这一放纵性言论不屑一顾。有个人对他说:“亲爱的朋友,我同你一样也不相信地狱是永恒的,但是,对于你的女仆、裁缝,甚至你的律师来说,相信地狱着实是件好事。”