战争艺术诸分支

战争依其字面含义就是战斗(fighting),因为在那被广义地称为战争的多方面活动中,只有战斗才是唯一有效的成分。然而,战斗是以物质力为手段的、精神力和物质力的拼搏较量。精神力不可被忽略乃不说自明,因为心理状态总是对战争中被使用的种种力量有最关键的影响。

战斗的必要很快就导致人们去从事种种特殊发明,以便使自己从中夺得优势。由于这些,战斗模式经历了种种重大变迁;然而,不管它以什么方式进行,其概念依然如故,战斗总是战争的构成。

各种发明向来都是供单兵战斗者使用的最早的武器和装备。它们必须在战争开始以前,就提供出来,并被学会使用。它们要适合战斗的性质,并以此来决定其样式;可是显然,投身于这些器械的活动是不同于战斗本身的另码事;它只是战斗的准备,而不是战斗的进行。显而易见,对战斗概念来说,武装和装备并非必不可少,因为纯粹的徒手搏击也是战斗。

战斗决定了关于武器装备的一切,这些反过来又改变了战斗模式;因此,这两者间存在互动。

尽管如此,战斗本身依然是一种完全特殊的活动,尤其是因为它在一种完全特殊的环境亦即危险环境中进行。

于是,如果在任何地方有必要将两类不同的活动明确区别开来,那就是在这里;而且,为明了这一理念的重要性,我们只需要想起某一个领域内卓越的个人能力,如何往往在另一个领域证明一钱不值,只是最无用的雕虫小技而已。

同样,完全不难在理念上将一类活动与另一类区隔开来,如果我们将全副武装、装备齐全的战斗部队视为既定的手段,要有利可图地使用它,就只需要知道它们的总效果。

因此,战争艺术就其本意而言,是在战斗中使用既定手段的艺术,除“战争操作”(Conduct of War)外我们无法给它一个更好的名称。另一方面,在一种更广泛的意义上,即一切由于战争才存在的活动,因而部队的整个创建:征召、武装、装备和演练,都属于战争艺术。

要造就一种健全的理论,就极有必要将这两类活动区别开来,因为容易明白假如每场战争都始于筹建武装部队,并将如此组织起来的部队设定为进行战争的一个基本条件,理论就可能只适用于可得兵力恰好完全与之适合的少数案例。反之,如果我们希望有一种理论,能适合大多数案例,同时在任何案例中都不会全然无用,它就必须基于那些最通用的手段及其最重要的效能。 〔1〕

因此,战争操作乃是战斗的形成和进行。假如这战斗是单独一项行动,就没有做任何进一步划分的必要,可是战斗由或多或少若干各自都自成一体的单项行动组成,我们称它们为交战(engagements 〔2〕 ),就像我们在第一篇第一章里表明的那样,并且由这些单项构成新的实体。由此有了全然不同的活动,即形成和操作这些单项交战自身的活动,组合起它们互相间对战争最终目的的看法。前者称为战术,后者称为战略。

战术与战略的划分现在被近乎普遍使用,每个人都还算不错地知道任何单项事实要冠以哪个名称,同时不很明白这么分类依据的理由。然而,在实践中盲目信奉这样的划分时,它们必定有深切的根源。我们探索了这根源,或可说正是大多数人的习惯用法令我们使用它。另一方面,我们认为这些概念由某些著作家试图确立的定义——随意又勉强的定义,不符合这些术语的普遍习惯用法。

因此,按照我们的分类,战术是关于如何在交战中使用武装力量的理论;战略是关于如何为了战争的目的而使用交战的理论。

只有当我们考察交战时,我们才能清楚地说明如何更细致地确定单项或独立的交战这一概念;眼下,我们必须这样说:就空间而言,亦即在同时发生的多项交战中,交战的统一以个人指挥的移动范围为限;可是就时间而言,亦即在彼此紧密接续的多项交战中,交战延续到发生在每项交战中的转折点被全然度过为止。

可能发生含糊不定的情况,例如若干项交战或许可认为也是单独一项交战,然而这不会推翻我们业已采用的区分依据,因为区分真实事物的所有依据都有这种情况,都以一种差别渐减的方式去做区分。因此,在战争中肯定可以有这样的行动:它在视角没有丝毫改变的情况下,既可被视作是战略的,也可被一样好地视作是战术的;例如,非常漫长的阵地如同一串据点,在多个地点作渡河准备,等等。

我们的分类仅仅涉及和涵盖使用作战力量。然而,在战争中有许多辅助它、但仍与它大为不同的活动;有时紧密相联,有时关系较远。所有这些活动都与作战部队的保障相关,正如其创建和训练先于其使用,其保障始终是一项必要条件。然而,严格地看,由此与之相关的一切活动始终要被认作只是战斗的准备;它们肯定不过是密切关联到战斗的活动,因而它们贯穿于军事行动始终,在重要性上与兵力的实际使用交替占先。我们因而有理由将它们以及其他准备活动排除在狭义的战争艺术之外,即排除在严格称呼的战争操作之外;而且,如果我们要服从一切理论的头号原则,即消除一切参差不齐的异质因素,我们就必须这么做。谁会将整个一系列给养和管理包括在真正的“战争操作”内?它们虽然总是与部队的实际使用交相互动,但仍是某种与之根本不同的事情。

我们在本书第一篇第三章里说过,由于战斗或交战是唯一直接有效的活动,因而所有其他活动的脉络都被包括在战斗或交战内,因为它们全都终结于其中。以此,我们指的是所有其他活动都由此被指定了一个目的,它们按照它们自身特有的法则必须力求达到这个目的。在此,我们必须略微深入地探讨这个科目。

构成交战以外的活动的科目多种多样。

有一个部分一方面属于交战本身,与交战同一;而在另一方面它服务于作战部队的保障。别一个部分纯属给养,由于互动而对交战仅有一种因其结果的有限影响。在一方面属于战斗本身的各个科目是行军、宿营和驻扎,它们设定了部队的那么多不同境况,而在部队被设定处在的场合,必定总是有交战想象。

另一些只属于保障的科目是给养、照顾病号和供应并维修武器装备。

行军与部队的使用完全一致。交战中的行军行动一般称作调遣,无疑不一定包括武器的使用,但那么完全和必然地与之结合,构成了我们所谓交战的一个必需的组成部分。然而,交战之外的行军只是执行战略措施而非其他。战略规划决定一场战役将在何时、何地并以什么兵力去打,而行军是将此付诸实施的唯一手段。

因此,交战以外的行军是战略的一个工具,然而并非据此只是一个战略问题,由于执行它的部队可能随时参与一场可能的交战,因而其执行既服从战略规则,也同样服从战术规则。倘若我们规定一个纵队走一条河的特定一边,或者一列山岭的特定一脉,那么就是一项战略措施,因为它包含这样的打算:如果行军期间必得有一场交战,那就在山岭或河流的这特定一侧而非另一侧战斗。

然而,倘若一个纵队不是走穿经山谷的道路,而是沿平行的山脊行进,或为行军便利而将自己分成若干分支纵队,那么这些就是战术安排,因为它们关乎我们将在被预料到的交战中使用部队的方式。

特定的行军阵式始终与随时准备交战相关,从而是战术性质的,因为它不过是可能发生的战斗的初始或预备部署。

行军是战略依以分布其有效要素,即交战的工具,但这些交战往往仅凭它们的效果显现,而非呈现在它们的实际进程细节中,因而必然发生理论上这工具常常取代有效要素的情况。于是,我们听人说决定性的巧妙行军,实际上这指的是这些行军导致的交战结合体。这一概念替换太自然,表达方式的简洁太吸引人,以致不需要改变,但它仍然只是一串简缩了的概念,就此,如果我们要避免犯错的话,我们决不能忘记完整的含义。

倘若我们赋予战略结合体一种独立于战术效果的力量,我们就犯了此说明的错。我们读到行军与调遣结合,目的实现,与此同时却丝毫未提到交战,由此得出结论说战争中有着不战而败敌的办法。直到后面,我们才能证明这错误的丰富含义。

可是,尽管行军可绝对视为交战的一个必需的组成部分,却仍有某些方面不属于交战,因而既不是战术性的,也不是战略性的。这些方面包括一切仅仅关乎部队的膳宿的安排、桥梁的搭建、道路,等等。这些只是条件;许多情况下它们与作战部队[的使用] 〔3〕 紧密关联,甚至可以差不多等同之,例如在敌人眼皮底下搭建一座桥梁的时候;然而,它们本身始终是外在的活动,关于它们的理论并不构成战争操作理论的一部分。

宿营,我们以此指部队的所有按照集中方式、因而是战斗序列作的安顿布置,与驻扎或住宿相区分。它是一种休息因而休整复元状态;然而与此同时,它也是在所选地点准备战斗的战略部署;而且,由于它采取的方式,也包含基本的战线;因此,它是战略和战术两者必不可少的组成部分。

为了部队更好地休整复元,以驻扎取代宿营。它因而有如宿营,是有关部队位置和范围的战略问题;它也是战术问题,关系到它的旨在随时准备战斗的内部布局。

无疑,宿营和驻扎工作通常还将另一个目的与部队的休整结合起来,例如保护一个地区,据守一个有利位置;然而,它很可以只是为了前者。 〔4〕 我们提醒读者:战略可以伴随多种不同目的,因为显得有利的一切都可以是一场交战的目的,而维护战争据以进行的工具必定很经常成为战略的局部组合的目的。

因此,如果在这样的情况下战略只帮助部队的维护,那么我们并非由此而处于战略领域之外:部队的使用仍然是主要关切,因为那是它们在战区的任何地方安顿布置的目的。 〔5〕

然而,如果营寨或营房内的部队保障要求有并非军队业内的活动,例如建造棚屋,以沥青涂抹帐篷,提供营寨或营房内的给养和卫生服务,那么此类活动就既不属于战略,也不属于战术。

壕沟的选址和修建显然是战斗规程的一部分,从而是战术问题,只要是关乎到实际修建,甚至它们都不属于战争操作理论;此类工作所需的知识和技能事实上是一支有组织的军队固有的内在素质,作战理论将之视作当然。

在因为不与交战关联而属于一支武装部队的纯粹维持工作的各科目中间,部队本身的食物供给排在首位,因为它必须差不多天天要做,而且要为每个单兵做。正因为如此,它彻底渗透到军事行动的全部战略方面:我们说构成战略的各个方面,是因为在一场交战进行期间,部队的给养难得会对计划的修改有任何影响,虽然此事足可设想。因而,对于部队给养的关注主要与战略互动,没有什么比发现供给考虑影响到关于一场战役和战争的战略方针更常见。 〔6〕 可是,无论这些供给考虑多么频繁多么重要,部队的给养始终依然是一种与部队的使用全然不同的活动,前者仅凭其结果对后者有影响。

我们提到过的管理活动其他分支离部队的使用更远得多。照顾伤病员虽然对一支军队的福利非常重要,但只直接影响到军队中的一小部分成员,因而对其余成员仅有微弱和间接的影响。武器装备的保全和替换除了由于部队的机能而构成它们内在固有的一种连续不断的活动外,只是周期性地发生,因而很少影响战略规划。

然而,我们在此必须提防一个失误。在某些情况下,这些科目确实有决定性意义。医院和军需库离得多远很容易被想象成唯一原因,解释非常重要的战略决定。我们既不想辩驳这一点,也不想将它撇入冷宫。然而,我们眼下关注的不是一个具体案例的特殊事实,而是抽象的理论;因此,我们断言这么一种影响太罕见,够不上在战争操作理论中赋予有关卫生措施和军需弹药供应的理论一种重要性,以便值得在战争操作理论中以关于给部队提供饮食肯定必需的同样的方式,包含对种种不同方式和体系的考虑,那是上述各门理论可以给出的。

倘若我们清楚地理解了我们思考的结果,那么属于战争的种种活动本身就分为两个主要类别,分为仅仅“战争准备”与“战争本身”。因而,这一划分也必须在理论中做出。

战争准备方面的知识,连同其技能应用,涉及所有战斗兵力的创建、训练和维护;我们不讨论应当给它们什么总称,但我们明白,包括在内的有火炮部队、防御工事、所谓基本战术、各类战斗兵力的全部组织和管理,还有所有诸如此类的事情。关于战争本身的理论则关注于使用这些准备好了的手段去追求战争的目的。它有求于前一类的只是其结果,即理解为了使用而掌握的手段的主要特性。我们将此称作狭义的“战争艺术”,或曰“战争操作理论”或“兵力运用理论”,对我们来说它们全都意味着同一件事。

因而,这一理论将交战当作真正的战斗,而将行军、宿营和驻扎当作多少与之一致的状况。部队的给养将仅如其他既定情况那样,以其结果进入考虑,而不是作为属于交战的一种活动。

被如此狭义地看待的战争艺术本身分为战术和战略。前者关乎单项交战的形式,后者关乎它的使用。两者都仅经交战将自己与行军、宿营和驻扎状况联系起来,这些状况按照它们与战斗形式或战斗意义的关系而成为战术的或战略的。

无疑,将有许多读者会认为,对作为战术与战略而如此紧密相联的两类事作这仔细区隔纯属多余,因为这对战争操作本身没有直接影响。我们承认,期望一种理论上的区别对战场有直接影响将是迂腐的。

然而,每一种理论的头号任务,在于厘清一向交互缠结、而且可以说有如乱麻混淆不明的概念和观念;只是在对名称和概念确立了准确理解时,我们才可望在清晰性和简便性方面取得进展,也才能肯定作者与读者总是从同一个视角看问题。战术和战略是两类在时间和空间上彼此渗透的活动,同时又是本质上有别的活动,直到关于每类活动的性质的清晰概念得到确立为止,它们的内在法则和彼此间关系根本无法被人心知晓。

全然漠视这一点的人必定要么否定一切理论考虑,要么在自己的理解方面尚未苦于全无定见支撑的混乱不清、令人困惑的种种观念,这些观念有时枯燥陈腐,有时异想天开,有时游移空泛,导致不了任何令人满意的结果,而我们却经常不得不就战争操作聆听和阅读它们,因为科学考察精神迄今几乎全未被用于这些论题。

注释

〔1〕  “及其最重要的效能”(“and their most significant effects”):系依从霍华德和帕雷特英译本第128页。相应的格雷厄姆英译文为“而且只是就出自它们的实际效果去关注它们”(“and in respect to these only on the actual results springing from them”)。

〔2〕  依从霍华德和帕雷特英译本第128页。格雷厄姆英译文译作combats.

〔3〕  方括号和其中的文字为中译者所加,系依据霍华德和帕雷特英译本第130页:“They may be closely linked with the use of troops and be virtually identified with them”.

〔4〕  霍华德和帕雷特英译本在此为(第130页)“然而它的目的可能只是让部队休息。”

〔5〕  在此依从霍华德和帕雷特英译本第130页。格雷厄姆英译文的相应文句为“我们仍然从事作战部队的使用,它在任何地点的任何安顿布置就是这样的使用,不管战区何在”(“we are still engaged with the use of military force, because every disposition of that force upon any point whatever of the theatre of War is such a use”),似有误。

〔6〕  依据霍华德和帕雷特英译本第131页。相应的格雷厄姆英译文略有不妥:“没有什么比联系这供给考虑去发现一场战役和战争的主要战略性质更常见”(“there is nothing more common than for the leading strategic features of a campaign and War to be traced out in connexion with a view to this supply)。

论战争理论

1.起初的“战争艺术”概念仅指兵力准备

从前,对术语“战争艺术”或“战争科学”仅理解为所有那些关乎物质因素的知识分支和技能应用。武器的设计、制作和使用, 〔1〕 防御工事和壕沟的修建,一支军队的内部组织与其运输机制:这些就是上述知识分支和技能的主题。它们全都旨在确立一支适于在战争中使用的武装力量,全都只涉及属于物质世界的事情和单方活动,事实上只是从较低级的手艺逐级进至一种较精致的呆板的艺术。这一切与战争本身的关系恰如制剑工匠的手艺与剑术的关系。在危险时刻和连续不断的与敌互动状态中运用兵力,在所拟的方向上运用特定的智力和情感力,还未被哪怕只是考虑过。

2.真正的战争艺术最初见于围城战

我们在围城战中最先瞥见一定程度的作战指导,瞥见某种智力才能作用,作用于被放在它们控制之下的物质力量。可是,一般说来它颇有限,只是很快就再度体现在新的物质形态中,例如进路、堑壕、反进路、排炮等等,而这较高智能作用采取的每一步都由某个这样的结果标志;它只是将这些物质发明按序串接起来所需的连线。智力在这类战争中难以显示自己,除了表现在这些东西上面,因而近乎所有必需的都是以此方式造就。

3.然后战术试图在同一方向上起步

此后,战术试图基于它的工具的特性将其成分结构转变为一个总的体系。 〔2〕 这确实将这工具引领到野战战场,然而不是导向自由的智力活动,而是导向造就一支被其刻板的布阵方式和战斗序列搞得有如自动机器的军队,只能根据字面命令移动,意在像钟表部件那样步步运行。

4.真正的战争操作仅偶尔隐约露头

所谓战争操作本身,亦即准备得适于最具体需要的手段的使用,未被认作是理论的任何合适的主题,而被认作是一种应当仅由天然智能处理的事情。随着战争从中世纪的逼近格斗演变成一种更规则化和更复杂的形态,人们不得不就此做些零落的思考,但它们大多仅偶尔见于回忆录和史事叙述,而且一定程度上是隐匿不明的。

5.对军事事件的思考招致对理论的需求

随着对战争的思忖继续增多和战史日益更带评论性质,出现了对固定的基本准则和具体规则的迫切需求,为的是在就军事事件自然兴起的争辩中,口舌之战可得到某种解决。这一论争漩涡既不围绕任何要害中枢,也不依据任何重要法则,从而必定令人大感厌恶。

6.制定明确理论的努力

因此,出现了为战争操作制定基本准则、具体规则乃至理念体系的努力。由此,一个明确的目的被提了出来,但茫然不见战争操作在这方面的无穷困难。如前所述,战争操作在任何方向上都没有确定的界限,但每一理念体系都有逻辑综合的有限性,由此导致了这么一种理论与实践之间无法调和的对立。

7.局限于物质因素

理论著作家们够快地感觉到了这一论题的困难,并且自以为有权利靠一个办法摆脱它,那就是让他们的准则和体系只涉及物质因素和一方活动。他们的目的如同在备战科学领域那样,是达到完全可靠和清澈见底的结果,从而只考虑能被计算的东西。

8.数量优势

数量上的优势是个物质状态,是从获取胜利所需的所有各因素中间选出的,因为通过时间和空间的结合,它能被置于数学法则之下。漠视所有其他情势可认为是可能的,办法在于假设它们在双方都均等,从而彼此抵消。如果这是为了按照其对比初步了解这一个因素,这本来很好,然而,将它当作一个永久的规则,以便将数量优势认作是唯一的法则,并将战争艺术的全部奥秘归入一个公式——一定时候在一定的点上部署大量优势兵力,乃是一种抗不过现实的过分简单化。 〔3〕

9.部队给养

有一个理论流派做了一个尝试,即同样将另一个物质因素系统化,办法是按照军队预先确立的内部组织,将部队给养定为高级战争操作的至高无上的决定因素。确实,他们以此方式得出了具体的数字,然而是基于一些任意武断的计算的数字,所以经受不了实际应用的考验。

10.基地

一位足智多谋的作者试图将整个一大批科目集中在单一概念——基地概念内,其中某些互相间确有非物质关系。 〔4〕 这包括部队给养、部队兵员和装备保全、与母国间的来往交通保障以及最后——在必要情况下——撤退保障;而且,他首先主张用这一基地概念取代所有这些,后主张用基地的长宽(范围)取代基地本身,最后主张用部队与基地线构成的角度取代此长宽:做好所有这些只是为了取得一个全然无用的纯几何结果。事实上,这徒劳无用必不可免,如果我们想到不违背真实、不撇去某些被包含在初始概念中的东西,就不可能做出其中随便哪个取代。基地概念确实为战略所必需,将它设想了出来值得称赞;可是,像我们已叙述的那样使用它却完全不可接受,只能导致种种片面的结论,它们已迫使这些理论家走入违背常识的歧途,即相信包围式进攻有决定性效果。

11.内线

作为对此歧途的反应,另一项几何式准则即所谓内线准则随后被抬高到主宰地位。虽然这项准则基于一个可靠的基础,即基于交战是战争中唯一有效的手段这事实,但恰恰由于它的纯几何性质,它仍然只是单面理论的另一个实例,永不能支配真实的情势。

12.所有这些企图皆可驳斥

所有这些理论企图都只在它们的分析方面被认为是促进了对真理的认识,但在综合方面,在其规定和规则方面,它们就太不适用了。

它们寻求既定量,而在战争中一切都是未定的,估算总是不得不凭变量做出。

它们只将注意力引到物质因素上,而全部军事行动到处为精神因素及其影响渗透。

它们只关注一方的活动,而战争是一种不断的互动状态,其影响是互相的。

13.它们将天才排除出规则 〔5〕

此类出自片面观点的糟糕理论达不到的一切,皆处于科学境域之外:它们属于天才的王国,凌驾于规则之上。

满足于在这贫瘠的规则之地四处爬行的军人多么可怜!它对天才来说太糟糕,天才可以藐视它,或许还可以嘲笑它。天才所为必定是最好的规则,理论能做的最好的莫过于表明它怎样如此和为何如此。

与心灵对立的理论多么可怜!它无法以任何谦卑弥补此对立,而且它越是谦卑,嘲笑和藐视就会越快地将之逐出现实生活。

14.一旦精神因素被考虑进来理论就面对的困难

一旦接触到精神因素领域,每一种理论就变得更困难,困难得无以复加。建筑师和画家,只要一和物质打交道,就很明白自己要干什么;并且对该物的力学和光学解释全无争论。然而,一旦精神活动开始起作用,心理印象和情感产生出来,其整套规则就立即化为含糊的理念。

医学主要关乎身体现象;它的业务关乎肉体机能,后者会变化不止,在两个不同时刻决不会完全一样。这使得它实践起来非常困难,导致医生的判断力比他的科学知识更重要;可是,倘若一种精神影响被添入,困难会增加多少?我们又该给予精神病医生多高的评价?

15.在战争中决不能排除精神因素

但现在战争活动从不只针对物质;它总是同时针对将活力赋予这物质的精神因素,而要将两者彼此隔开是不可能的。

可是,精神因素只能被心灵察觉,而且这在每一个人哪里都不一样,在同一个人往往不同时候也不一样。

由于危险是战争中一切在其内运行的普遍环境,因而判断力各有不同地主要受勇气、自我力量感影响。这在一定程度上是水晶镜片,所有现象经过它才抵达知性。

然而无可怀疑,仅通过经验,这些东西可取得一定的客观价值。

人人知道一项突袭、一项侧翼或后背攻击的心理效应。一旦敌人掉头后撤,每个人就都较少去想到其勇气,并且与遭到追击时相比,要冒大得多的风险去追击。人人都根据敌方将领所广泛传说的才能、年龄和经验去判断他们,并且相应决定自己的行动方针。人人都审视己方部队和敌方部队的锐气状态和情绪。在人的精神性质领域的所有这些和类似的效应已由经验确定,它们总是重现不已,因而使我们有理由将之算作它们那类的客观因素。确实,一种无视它们的理论会成为什么样子? 〔6〕

无疑,经验是这些真理的一个必不可少的内涵。没有任何理论、任何将领应当搬弄心理谬见和哲理诡辩。

16.战争操作理论的主要困难

为了清楚地理解包含在一个战争操作理论中的命题的困难,从而推断出这么一个理论的必然特征,我们必须更仔细地考察构成战争活动的性质的主要特性。

17.第一特性:精神因素及其效应(敌对感)

这些特性中间的第一个在于精神因素及其效应。

战斗究其根源,是敌对感的表现,然而在我们称作战争的大规模战斗中,敌对感往往转为只是一种敌对看法,而且通常不存在那寓于个人对个人的敌对感。尽管如此,战斗从来不在未有这样的情感被带入冲突的情况下消退。我们的战争中难得不见民族仇恨,它取代了个人对个人心怀的敌意。然而,在它也不存在的场合,敌对感由战斗本身燃起;因为,任何一个人根据上司的命令对我们施行的暴力行为将在我们心里激起对他的报复和复仇欲,快于对根据其命令做出这行为的上峰权力者。此乃人性或——倘若我们愿说的话——动物性,但仍是事实。理论家们很倾向于将理论上的战斗视为一种抽象的实力较量,全无情感的参与,这是他们自觉地犯下的千百错误之一,因为他们全然昧于其后果。

除了那自然出于战斗本身的激情外,还有别的激情,它们并非本质上属于战斗,但由于其联系,容易与之协同,那就是野心、权力欲、所有各种热情等等。

18.危险造就的影响(勇气)

最后,战斗招致危险这一因素,一切战争活动必定在其内生存和进行,如鸟在空中,鱼在水里。然而,危险的影响全都转变为激情,无论是直接地——即本能地——还是经过知性中介。前一种情况下的影响会是一种避险欲望,倘若避不了险,则会是恐惧和焦虑。如果未发生这样的影响,那就是因为勇气抗衡本能。然而,勇气根本不是一种知性实在,却同样是一种激情,有如恐惧;恐惧企盼肉体安在,勇气企盼精神不损。因而,勇气是一种较高尚的本能。然而,因为它如此,它就不会允许自己被用作无生命的工具,恰恰按照指令起作用。因此,勇气并非只是抗衡危险以抵消危险的影响,它是一种自主的特殊力量。

19.危险影响的范围

然而,我们要准确估计危险对战争中首要角色的影响,就决不能将其范围限于当时的肉体危险。它支配这角色不仅通过威胁他本人,也通过威胁所有被付托给他的人,不仅在它实际展现的时刻,也经想象在所有其他相关时刻,不仅直接地由它本身,也间接地由责任感,造成十倍地加重了统帅的心理负担。谁能够主张或决定一场大战役而不多少感到心里紧张或苦恼,由于这么一项重大决战行动包含的危险和责任而紧张或苦恼?我们可以说,战争行动只要是真正的行动而非单纯的状态,就从不处于危险之外。

20.其他激情因素

如果说我们关注那些被战争特有的敌对和危险激起的情感,那么我们并未因此将所有其他伴随人一生的情感排除在战争之外。它们也会足够经常地在那里找到驻足之地。无疑,我们可以说许多激情小作用在这严肃的生死大事中被压抑下去;然而这只是就那些在较低层次干事的人来说才成立,他们被赶入一个个危险和费力状态,看不见生活中的其余事情,变得不习惯于油滑欺骗,因为死神在前此技无用,从而达到了那一向最好地代表军人职业的军人的英武朴实性。在较高层次上情况不同,因为一个人的级别越高,他就越须环顾四周,看得宽远;于是就来了方方面面的关切,连同好的和坏的激情的多相作用。嫉妒与慷慨、骄傲与谦卑、严苛与温情:所有这些可以作为有效因素出现在这出大活剧之中。

21.智力特性

如同情感特征,统帅的智力特征特也非常重要。将期望自一个喜好空想、反复无常和缺乏经验的头脑者,与将期望自一个冷静智慧的头脑者,大不一样。

22.智力特质的多样性导致目的追求方式的多样性

有人认为智力特质的影响主要在较高军阶上才会感受到,因为我们越是晋升,它就越是增强。正是智力特质的这种很大的多样性,导致了我们在第一篇里注意到的目的追求方式的多样性,并在决定事态进程方面,赋予或然性和偶然性的作用那么一种大得不成比例的重要性。

23.第二个特性:活反应

战争行动的第二个特性是活反应,连同由此而来的互动。我们在此不谈论估计这反应的困难,因为它被包括在先前讲过的对待心理力因素的困难之中;我们谈论的是互动,依其本性,是拒斥任何像固定规划那样东西的。在行动提供的所有具体数据中,任何举措对敌人产生的效应是最突出的;然而,每一种理论都必定固守现象类型(或曰现象群),永不能在其自身中加入真正独特的案例:无论什么情况下都必须依靠判断力和才能。因此自然而然,在像战争这样的事务里——它在依据一般情况的战争规划方面如此经常地因意外和独个的偶然事变受挫——总的来说,更多的是必须依靠才能;理论指南能有的用处要比在任何别的事务中少。

24.第三个特性:一切具体信息的不确定性

最后,战争中一切具体数据的很大不确定性是个独特的困难,因为一切行动都必须一定程度上在仅仅朦胧不清的环境中被规划,它并非罕见地有如迷雾和月光所致,令事情显得夸张怪异。

才能必须去发现这朦胧弱光未照明的一切。因此,鉴于客观知识的匮乏,必须再度依靠才能,或运气惠顾。

25.绝对的理论绝无可能

凭此类素材,我们只能对自己说绝无可能为战争艺术构建一种脚手架似的理论,确保统帅在方方面面都有一种外在支撑可依。在他施展自身才能的那些情况下,他会发现自己离开了这一理论脚手架,并与之抵牾;而且,不管它可能被编造得如何多面,我们说过的同一个结果都会随之而来,那就是才能和天才超越法则行事,理论有悖现实。

26.理论据此成为可能的所余途径

(困难并非到处一样大)

有两个摆脱这一困难的途径。首先,我们就军事行动的一般性质说了的话并非以同样方式适用于每个人的行动,不管他的地位可以多高多低。在较低军阶上,更要求有自我牺牲精神,但认识和判断遇到的困难较小,小得无以复加。偶然性的天地较有限。目的和手段在数量上较少。具体数据更明确,大多包含在实际可见的事情里。然而,我们越是向上升,困难就越多越大,直至在总司令那里它们达到最高峰为止,因而就他来说,几乎一切都必须靠天才应对。

不仅如此,按照一种符合其性质的军事活动分解,困难并非到处都一样,而是活动越表现为物质性的,困难就越小,它们越变得是心理性的,越成为影响意志的动机,困难就越大。因而,与使用理论规则确定战斗本身[的目的]相比,较容易依据理论规则确定战斗的序列和操作。在战斗中,物质武器彼此冲突,虽然不乏心理因素,但物质因素必定主导。然而,在战斗产生的效应中,当物质结果转变为[进一步行动的]动机时, 〔7〕 我们就必须只关注心理本性。简言之,与制定战略理论相比,战术理论较容易制定。

27.理论须是探究性质而非信条性质的

理论成为可能的第二个途径,在于认为理论不必是行动指令。作为通则,每当一类活动一次又一次主要处理同样的对象,有着同样的目的和手段——即使可以有小的变动和数量相应的组合多样性——这样的对象就能成为理性探究的主题。然而,这样的探究正是每个理论的最为本质的部分,并且有独特的资格被称作理论。它是一种对主题的分析性调查,可使我们密切了解主题;而且,如果它被应用于经验,在我们这里就是军事史,它就导致透彻地熟悉经验。理论越接近达到这后一目标,就越是从知识的客观形式转变为在行动中的技能的主观形态,并且因此越会在情势只允许个人才能决定事情的场合证明自己有效;它将在这才能本身中显示自己的成效。如果理论探查那构成战争的主题,更分明地将乍看来似乎混为一团的东西分开,充分地解释手段的各项特性,表明它们很可能有的种种效应,使对象的性质显现清晰,并且以本质上评析性地探查照亮整个战争领域:如果这样,它就完成了主要任务。于是,理论成了希望使自己从书本熟悉战争的人的指南;它为他照亮整条道路,便利他的进步,训练他的判断力,保护他免入陷阱歧途。

假如一位专家花费半生,去努力彻底厘清一个朦胧不清的主题,他对之就很可能比一个试图在短时间内精通它的人懂得多。理论确立后,前后相继的每个人就可以不必经历同样的劳作去开拓田地,艰辛翻耕,而是可以见到阡陌齐整,作物现成。它当训练未来将帅的头脑,或者宁可说指引他的自我教育,而不是陪伴他前往战场,恰如一位明智的导师培养和激发一名青年的智能发展,而非在他整个一生中始终牵领他走。

如果格言和规则本身出自理论设立的考虑,真理自发地结晶为这晶体形态,那么理论就不会抗拒智能的这一自然趋势。相反,在真理的拱门臻于这么一块拱顶石的情况下,理论则会凸显真理,但这只是为了符合理性的哲理法则,分明地显现所有的思路汇集的那个点,而不是为了从它制出一项代数公式,以便在战场上使用。因为,甚至这些格言和规则,也更多地是在思考者头脑中帮助确定它的惯常思考进程的主要梗概,而不是作为路标给它指明实施行动的路径。

28.依据这观点,理论成为可能且不再与实践相悖

采取这观点,就有了一种被提供出来的可能性,那就是形成一种关于战争操作的令人满意即有用的理论,永不与现实相悖;而且,将只依赖理性对待去使之符合行动,理论与实践之间不再会有荒唐的鸿沟,往往在藐视常识的情况下造就的一种不合情理的理论,然而狭隘和无知的头脑同样经常以之作为借口去辩护自己的天然无能。

29.理论因此考虑目的和手段的性质

——战术目的和战术手段

理论因此必须考虑手段和目的的性质。

在战术方面,手段是经过训练要从事交战的部队。目标为胜利。这个概念的精确定义此后在考虑交战时可以得到更好的说明。这里,我们只好将敌人退出战场定做胜利的标志。靠这胜利,战略达到了为交战指定的目的,构成其特定意义的目的,这肯定对胜利的性质有某种影响。一项意在削弱敌人武装部队的胜利,不同于一项仅被预定令我们占有一处位置的胜利。因此,一场交战的意义可以对交战的准备和进行有一种明显的影响,从而也将是战术方面的一个考虑对象。

30.总是与手段的应用相伴的境况

正是有某些境况始终与交战相伴,或多或少地影响其结果,因而在应用兵力时必须加以考虑。

这些境况就是战斗场所(地形)、时辰和天气。

31.场所

我们认为最好以“国土和地形”之名来解释场所,严格地说来,如果交战发生在一片完全平坦和未经耕作的平地上,可能没有任何影响。

这种情况可以发生在一个大草原地区,可是在欧洲各个业经耕作的地区,就差不多纯属想象。因而,难以设想一场在国土和地形全无影响的文明国家之间的交战。

32.时辰

由于昼夜之间的差别,时辰影响交战;可是,这种影响当然延伸到超过这些区分的限界,因为每场交战都有一定的延续时间,大规模交战持续多个小时。在准备一场大交战时,它是在早上开始还是在晚上开始根本不同。与此同时,许多战斗无疑可以进行而无关时辰问题,而且一般来说它的影响无关紧要。

33.天气

天气更难得有任何决定性影响,而且大多只是由于迷雾它才起作用。

34.战略目的和战略手段

战略达到其目的的手段起初只是胜利,即战术结果,最终则是那些直接导向和平的事宜。为此目的它的手段的应用同时伴有种种境况,因此对此应用有或多或少的影响。

35.与战略手段的应用相伴的境况

这些境况一是国土和地形,前者包括整个战区的领土和居民,二是时辰和季节,最后是天气,特别是任何罕有的天气状况,例如严重冰冻,等等。

36.这些构成新的手段

将这些境况与一场交战的结果结合在一起,战略就赋予这结果——连同因而交战——一种特别的意义,在它面前设立一个特殊目的。然而,当这目的并非那种直接导向和平的目的、因而一项从属目的时,它只应被视为一个手段;因此在战略上,我们可以不管其意义如何有别,将各场交战的结果或胜利都看作手段。占领一处位置便是一场交战就地形而言的这么一个结果。然而,不仅各有特别目的的不同的交战要被认作手段,而且每个更高的、我们可以在指向一个共同目的的交战合成中见到的目的,也要被认为是个手段。一场冬季战役便是就季节而言的这么一个合成。

因此,剩下作为目的的,仅有那些可被设想为直接导向和平的那些事宜。理论按照其影响的性质与其相互关系,探查所有这些目的和手段。

37.战略只从经验推导出要被审视的目的和手段

第一个问题是:战略怎样列出这些事的一个完整无遗的目录?假如有一种导致绝对结果的哲理探究,那么它会变得缠身于逻辑必然将其排除出战争操作和战争理论的所有那些困难。 〔8〕 因而,它转向经验,将自己的关注放在军事史能提供的那些交战合成上面。无疑,以此方式能达到的莫过于一种有限的理论,但只适合诸如在史册中展示的种种境况。然而,这一不完整性必不可免,因为在任何场合理论都必须要么从历史中推导出有关的东西,要么与历史作比较。此外,这一不完整性在每个场合都更多地是理论上的而非真实的。

这方法的一大好处是,理论不可能迷失在种种深奥探究、细微差别和奇想怪论之中,而是必定始终讲求实际。

38.对手段的分析应当走多远

另一个问题是:理论在其手段分析方面应当走多远?显然,只应当远得形式上各自分立的各因素在实践中有重要意义。 〔9〕 不同武器的打击距离和效果对战术非常重要,它们的制作——虽然这些效果由其而来——却是件不相干的事;因为,战争操作并非从定量的木炭、硫磺和硝石制出火药,从定量的铜和锡制出火炮:用于战争操作的定量物是现成的武器及其效能。战略使用地图,而不需费神去管三角测量;它不为取得最佳军事结果而探究国土怎样细分为各省各区,人民怎样受到教育和治理;相反,它将它见到的欧洲国家的共同体的现状当作既定之事务,观察何处大为不同的状况对战争有显著影响。

39.所需知识的极大简化

不难设想,以此方式,理论的对象范围大为简化,战争操作所需的知识大为减少。一般战争行动需要巨量的知识和技能应用,这是一支全副武装的军队进入战场以前必须具备的;现在,它们结合为几个大结果,以待它们能在实际的战争中达到它们的最终目的,正如一国的条条溪流会合为几大江河,然后奔流入海。须由将要操作战争行动的人研究的,只有那些直接涌入战争之海的活动。

40.这解释了伟大将领的迅速成长,以及为何一位将领不是一位学问家

我们思考的这一结果事实上如此必然,任何别的都会令我们不信任其准确性。只有如此,才能解释人们为何那样经常地表现得在战争中成功非凡,而且确实是在高军阶上,甚至在最高统帅阶级上,他们先前的职业一直性质全然不同。确实,为何作为通则,最杰出的将领却从未出自很有学问或真正博学的军官层,而是大多身为因其地位状况无法获取大量知识者。因此,那些认为以详尽的灌输去开始一位未来将领的教育乃实属必需甚或有利的人,一向被讥为荒唐的学究。这不难表明这么一种方针的有害倾向,因为人的头脑由灌输的知识熏陶,由赋予其思想的方向训导。如果头脑本身未将它当作某种可厌之物加以拒斥,就只有伟大的东西才能使之伟大;渺小的东西只能使之渺小。

41.先前的矛盾

因为战争所需知识的这种简化遭到漠视,这知识总是与整大堆累赘即附属知识和附属技能混杂在一起,所以由此而来与现实生活事态的显著矛盾无法得到解决,除非将它全都归因于天才,天才不需要任何理论,也没有任何理论能为天才被制定出来。

42.因此,知识的有用性遭到否认,一切被归因于天生才能

主要依据常识的人感觉到最高等的天才与满腹学问的学究之间的鸿沟——有待填平的巨大鸿沟;他们在某种程度上成为自由思想者,完全拒绝相信理论,断定战争操作是人的一种天然机能,他发挥的或多或少,取决于他随身带到世界上来的这方面或大或小的才能。不能否认,这些人比那些看重谬误理论的人接近真理;与此同时,不难看到这么一种观点本身乃夸大之辞。没有某种理念,任何人类认识活动都无可能;然而,这些理念至少大多是获得的而非先天固有的,并构成他的知识。因此,唯一的问题在于,这些理念应当是什么种类的;如果我们说它们应当针对人在战争中不得不直接对付的那些事,我们就认为我们回答了这个问题。

43.知识必须被塑造得适合职位

在军事活动领域之内,所需的知识必须按照指挥官的职位各有不同。倘若某人处于低级职位,知识将针对较小和较有限的问题;而若职位较高,知识就针对较大和较广泛的问题。陆军元帅不会卓越地指挥一个骑兵团,骑兵头领也无法统率各路大军。 〔10〕

44.战争知识很简单,但同时并非很容易

虽然战争知识很简单,也就是说只针对那么少的问题,而且只管最终结果,但是实施的艺术并非因此很容易。战争活动一般经受的困难,我们已经在第一篇内谈到;在此,我们撇开那些只有靠勇气才能够克服的困难,保有智力活动在低级职位上无非简单容易的观点;但随级别升高难度增大,在最高级即总司令职位上,战争知识就要算作最困难的人类智力活动之一。

45.论这种知识的性质

一支军队的统帅既不需要是个博学的历史探究者,也不需要是个公法学家,然而他必须熟谙高级国务;他必须懂得并能正确判断传统倾向、所涉利益、当前有关问题和主要人物性格;他不必是个慎密的人物观察者和锐利的性格分析家,但他必须知道他所指挥的那些人的性格、情感、习惯、缺陷和爱好。他不必懂得有关炮车制造或辕马驾驭的任何事情,但他必须了解如何准确估算困难境况下按照所需时间的纵队行军。关于这些问题的知识无法靠一套科学公式和技术方法强行产生:它们只会通过在对事对人的观察中以准确的判断去获取,得益于一种理解这两者的特殊才能。

因此,一个高级职位所必需的军事行动知识的特征如下:它只能经过一种特殊的才能去获取,依凭观察,从而依凭探究和思考,而这种才能作为一种智识直觉,懂得如何从生活现象中只抽取本质或精神,犹如蜜蜂从花朵只汲取花蜜;除了依凭探究和思考,它还要依凭生活经验去获取。生活永不会因其丰富的教益产生一位牛顿或一位欧拉,但它可以产生伟大的战争估算者,例如孔代 〔11〕 或弗雷德里克 〔12〕

因此,不必为了维护军事活动的智识尊严,我们竟诉诸谎言或愚蠢的迂腐。历史上从未有过一位头脑局促、心灵狭隘的伟大杰出的统帅,却有着多得不胜枚举的在低级职位上最卓越地效力后、在最高级职位上始终不及平庸的人,原因是他们智识能力不足。当然,按照他们的权力大小程度,即使在那些拥有总司令职务的人中间,这种智识能力也可以有所不同。

46.科学必须成为艺术 〔13〕

现在,我们还须考虑一个条件,它对战争操作知识来说比任何别的都更必要,亦即这知识必须彻底融入头脑,几乎完全不再是某种客观的东西。在差不多所有别的技艺和职业中,积极的从事者能够使用他只学过一次而不再沉浸于其精神和含意中的真理,那是他从灰尘覆盖的书本里提取的。甚至他现成在手不断使用的真理对他来说也可以始终是某种外在的东西。如果建筑师拿起笔,通过一种复杂的计算确定了一座桥墩的支撑力,这种作为结果被发现的真理并非出于他的头脑。他首先必须费力找资料,然后将这些资料纳入一番心智运作,这些规则不是他发现的,他只不过或许在当时部分地明白了它们,并将之像是依凭机器似的灵巧应用起来。然而在战争中,情况从来不是这样。心理反应,还有事情变动不息的形态,使得统帅必须心载他的知识的全部智能装置,得以在任何地方任何关头他都能从他本人给出所需的决定。通过与他本人的心灵和生命的这一完全同化,知识转变成真正的能力。为何在战绩卓著的人那里一切似乎都那么容易,为何一切都被归诸于天生才能,原因就在于此。我们说天生才能,是为了由此将它与那靠观察和探究形成和成熟的才能区分开来。

我们认为,通过这些思考,我们阐明了战争操作理论面对的困难问题,指出了它的解决途径。

在我们将战争操作分解成的两个领域,即在战术和战略中,关于后者的理论如前所述无疑包含最大困难,因为前者差不多限于一个有限的对象领域;后者却处理种种直接导向和平的事情,从而使自己面对无穷无尽的可能性。由于不得不始终考虑这些事情的大多是总司令,因而他要对付的那部分战略问题特别受制于这种困难。

因此,理论,尤其是它包含最高效劳的部分,在战略上要比在战术上快得多地止步于对事情的简单考虑,满足于帮助统帅去洞察事情,与他的整个思想融合在一起,使他的进程容易些和可靠些;理论决不强迫他为了服从一个客观真理而放弃他自己的信念。 〔14〕

注释

〔1〕  依据霍华德和帕雷特英译本第133页。格雷厄姆的相关英译文为“the patter and preparation and the mode of using arms”,似有误。

〔2〕  依据霍华德和帕雷特英译本第133页;该处还为“它的工具”做了一个编者注:“即武装部队”。格雷厄姆对前半句的英译为“tactics attempted to give to the mechanism of its joints the character of a general disposition”(赋予它的成分机制一种总的布局特性)。

〔3〕  “过分简单化”:依据霍华德和帕雷特英译本第135页。格雷厄姆英译文在此为“局限性”(restriction)。

〔4〕  这后半句依据霍华德和帕雷特英译本第135页。格雷厄姆英译文在此作“amongst which sundry relations even with immaterial forces found their way in as well”(其中还可见各式各样的甚至与非物质因素的关系)。

〔5〕  依从霍华德和帕雷特英译本第136页。格雷厄姆英译文在此作“As a rule they exclude genius”(作为通则它们排除创造能力)。“天才”是克劳塞维茨的一个重要概念,指智力和情感力运用意义上的创造性能力,既可以是政治/军事统帅的,也可以是军队甚而国民大众的。

〔6〕  依从霍华德和帕雷特英译本第137页。格雷厄姆英译文此句作:“What could we do with any theory which should leave them out of consideration?”(我们能怎么对待任何竟无视它们的理论?)

〔7〕  两处方括号和其内的文字系中译者所加,依据霍华德和帕雷特英译本第140页。

〔8〕  依从霍华德和帕雷特英译本第144页。格雷厄姆英译文的相应文句为“it would become entangled in all those difficulties which the logical necessity of the conduct of War and its theory exclude”(它会变得缠身于战争操作和战争理论的逻辑必然排除的所有那些困难),似略有不妥。

〔9〕  “在实践中有重要意义”:依据霍华德和帕雷特英译本第144页,格雷厄姆英译文作“present themselves for consideration in practice”(展示自身以供实践考虑)。

〔10〕  后半句依从霍华德和帕雷特英译本第146页,格雷厄姆英译文仅作“反之亦然”。

〔11〕  路易二世·德·波盘(孔代亲王)(1621-1686):法国军人和政治家,大贵族孔代家族的最著名人物,被誉为17世纪欧洲最杰出的将领之一,最辉煌的战绩为三十年战争中经罗克鲁瓦战役(1643)击败西班牙大军。

〔12〕  即弗雷德里克二世,史称腓特烈大王(1712-1786):普鲁士国王(1740-1786),统治期间普鲁士军力大增长,领土大扩张,战争经历主要为奥地利继承战争和七年战争,为欧洲现代史上最卓越的军事统帅之一。

〔13〕  霍华德和帕雷特英译本将此标题译作“知识必须成为能力”(第147页)。

〔14〕  “放弃他自己的信念”:依从霍华德和帕雷特英译本第147页,格雷厄姆英译文为“into opposition with himself”(与他自己作对)。

战争艺术或科学

1.用语依然未定

(能力与知识。科学的目标是知识;艺术的目标是创造性能力) 〔1〕

这些术语里选用哪个,看来依然未定,而且虽然事情简单,却似乎没有任何人准确地知道它应当依据什么理由得到确定。我们已经在别的地方说过,“知”异于“行”。这两者那么不同,不应当轻易地将一个误认为另一个。“行”无法恰当地写在任何书本里,因而“艺术”也决不应当见于一本书的书名。可是,由于我们已经习惯在观念里以艺术理论或干脆以艺术为名,将实践一门艺术所必需的各类知识(它们各自可以各是纯粹的科学)总合在一起,因而连贯的做法是保持这区分理由,并在目标是从事“行”(能干)的时候将一切称为艺术,例如建筑艺术;当目标是纯知识的时候,将一切称为科学,例如数学科学,天文科学。每一种艺术中可以包含某些完全的科学:这容易理解,不应令我们困惑。可是,仍然值得指出,没有某些艺术成分,就同样没有任何科学。例如在数学里,数字和代数的使用就是一种艺术,但这只是许多例子中间的一个。原因在于,不管在人类成就 〔2〕 的合成结果中,知识与能力之间的差别怎样明白可感,但仍难以在人本身那里追踪出它们的分界线。

2.将认知与判断分开的困难

(战争艺术)

一切思维确实都是艺术。逻辑学家在何处划下界线,出自认知的假设在何处结束——即判断在何处发端,艺术就在何处开始。然而不止于此:即便心理认知同样是判断,因而是艺术;最后,甚至依靠理智的认知也是如此。简言之,如果不能想象一个人只拥有认知才能而无判断力,或者反过来只拥有判断力而无认知才能,则艺术与科学的永远无法完全彼此分开也是难以想象的。只有这些精妙的启明元素越将自身体现为存在物的外在形态,各自的领域才越显得分开。现在重复一遍:目的为创造和产出之处是艺术王国;目的为探究和知识之处由科学支配。据此顺理成章,说“战争艺术”比说“战争科学”更合适。

就讲那么多,因为我们不能没有这些概念。然而,现在我们进一步断言,战争严格地说既不是一门艺术,也不是一门科学;正是从这些概念出发,才导致采取一个错误方向,使得战争被认为与其他艺术和科学同等无差,并且导致了许多错误的类比。

这确实已在过去感受到了,因此有言说战争是一门手艺;然而这么说失大于得,因为一门手艺只是一种低级艺术,并且本身同样受制于限定不移的和僵硬刻板的法则。事实上,战争艺术确曾在某个时期像一门手艺那般持续——我们指的是雇佣兵首领时期,但是当时它接受这一方向是由于外在原因而非内在缘由;军事史表明,它在那个时期多么不符合事情的本性。

3.战争是人类交往的一部分

因此我们说,战争不属于艺术和科学领域,而属于社会生活领域。它是一种由流血解决的重大利益冲突,并且仅在这方面有别于其他冲突。与其将它比作任何艺术,不如比作商业竞争,那也是人的利益冲突和活动抵触;它更近似国家政治,后者可视为一类大规模的商业竞争。此外,国家政治是孕育战争的子宫,战争的轮廓以一种雏形状态隐藏在其中,就像胚胎状上的生物的特性。

4.差别

根本差别在于,战争不是施加在无生命物体上的意志活动,有如机械艺术;也不是施加在一个有生命但仍消极顺从的对象上的意志活动,有如创造性艺术中的人类智力和人类情感,而是针对一个有生命并做出反应的力量的意志活动。显然,艺术和科学范畴多么不适用于此类活动;而且,我们同时能够懂得,不断寻找和追求那有如可以从死的物质世界发现出来的法则只能导致不断的错误。然而,某些人要在战争艺术方面模仿的正是机械艺术。全无可能模仿创造性艺术,因为它们本身不太需要法则和规则,而那些一向被认为不足和片面、迄今为止的模仿尝试,总是被舆论、情感和习惯的潮流损害和荡涤。

这么一种像在战争中发生和解决的活生生力量的冲突是否服从一般法则,这些法则能否指示出一个有用的行动方针,将在本篇里部分地得到探查;然而,有一点很明确:它像所有其他不超出我们的理解力的论题那样,可以被一个探究性的头脑解释,多少弄清它的内在关系,而且仅此就足以理解理论的思路。

注释

〔1〕  括号内后半句依从霍华德和帕雷特英译本第148页,格雷厄姆英译文为“Science when mere knowing; Art, when doing, is the object”(纯知为科学;行事时,艺术为目标),似不够妥当。

〔2〕  依从霍华德和帕雷特英译本第148页,格雷厄姆英译文为“human knowledge”(人类知识)。

方法和常规 〔1〕

为了清晰地在概念上说明我们的方法和行动常规——它们在战争中起那么重要的作用——我们须被允许匆匆谈论一下经此支配行动世界的逻辑等级,它有如被正式构设的官员等级。

法则,在严格应用于认知和行动的最广泛意义上,显然包含某种按其字面含意主观的和任意的东西,并且表达我们和那些外在于我们的事物恰恰依赖的东西。作为一个认识对象,法则是事物与其效应相互间的关系;作为一个意志对象,它是一个行为动因,因而等同于命令或禁律。

原则与此相似,也是这么一种行动法则,但不具有刻板的限定含意,而只是法则的精神和方向,为的是在真实世界的多样性不能被囿于法则的限定形式时,为判断力留下更多的自由运用余地。由于判断力必须自己决定原则不适用的场合,因而原则成了行动者的真正助手或指南。

原则在它出自客观真理的时候是客观的,因而对一切人都价值等同;如果它包含主观因素,并因此只对指定它的人自己来说有某种价值,它就是主观的,因而一般被称为箴言(Maxim)。

规则常用为法则,而含意和原则一致,因为我们说“没有全无例外的规则”而不说“没有全无例外的法则”,表明用规则一词我们给自己保留了更多的自由运用余地。

在另一个含义上,规则是手段:经单独一个显然相关的特性辨识出一项深层的真理,从而使我们能够从这特性推导出总的行动准则。 〔2〕 属于此类的是所有竞技规则,数学中的所有简捷规程,等等。

方针和条规是对许多小境况有影响的规定,这些境况对一般法则来说太多,且微不足道。

最后,方法或曰行事模式是一种老是重复发生的程序,从若干可能的程序中选出;而常规是由方法而非一般原则或特殊规定决定的程序。据此,要在其中应用常规的案例必定要假设成在它们的根本部分上相似。由于它们不可能都如此,因而重要的是至少尽可能多的应当是如此;换言之,应当按照那些最可能的案例来设计常规。因此,常规并非基于已定的特殊假设,而是基于诸多案例互相间的平均或然性;它的最终趋向在于确立一个平均真理,其不断的和统一的应用不久便获得某种机械装置性质,最终差不多自动成事。

认知法则这一概念并非战争操作所必需,因为复杂的战争现象并不那么规整,而规整之事并不那么复杂,所以我们依靠法则而非依靠简单真理获益更多。在简明的理念和语言足够的地方,诉诸复杂就成为迂腐做作。行动法则这一概念则不能被用于战争操作理论,因为鉴于战争现象的可变性和多样性,其中没有总的性质有资格称作法则的规定。

然而,原则、规则、规定和方法却是对一个战争操作理论来说必不可少的概念,只要这理论导向明确的信条,因为在信条内,真理本身只能结晶为这样的形态。

由于战术是理论在其中能够达到最接近明确的信条地步的战争操作分支,因而这些概念会最频繁地在其中出现。

除了在某种特殊的紧急场合外,不要用骑兵对抗未被击破的步兵;战斗中只在有效射程之内使用火器;尽可能节省兵力以备最后决战:这些就是战术原则。它们中间没有哪一条可被绝对地用于每种情况,然而指挥官必须始终将这些记在心里,为的是寓于其中的真理的好处在这真理能够有利的情况下可以不被丢失。

如果敌人的移动能从其营寨反常的烹饪时间中推断出来,如果部队在战斗中的有意暴露预示了一场佯攻,那么察觉真实的这种方式就称为规则,因为从单独一个可见的情势中,可抽引出与这情势相符的结论。

战斗中,敌人刚开始拉出火炮,便立即以新一番冲劲去攻击。如果这是一条规则,那么依据这特定的事实的,是一种针对总的敌情的行动方针,它从上述事实推断出来,那就是敌人打算放弃战斗,开始撤军,而且既不能在如此撤军时认真抵抗,也不能使其后撤秩序井然地渐次退兵。

只要规制和方法作为现行原则被灌输给受训部队,它们就将备战理论纳入战争操作。有关部队组建、操练和战地勤务的整套条规乃是规制和方法:在操练条规中前者无上显赫,在战地勤务条规中则后者占据支配地位。实际的战争操作即基于这些东西,因而要将它们当作既定的行事模式接纳过来;并使之见于战争操作理论。

然而,就兵力使用方面可被取舍的那些活动来说,不能有规制,亦即不能有明确限定的条规,因为它们会取消行动自由。另一方面,方法作为任务出现时执行任务的一种笼统的、如前所述依据平均或然性谋划的方式,或者作为被一直贯彻到应用的、原则和规则的一种支配性影响,肯定可以见于战争操作理论,只要它们不被展示为某种与它们的真实性质有别的东西,不被展示为绝对和必定的行动模式(体系),而是最佳的笼统方式,可据此临机处置,用作当时捷径去取代一种特定的安排。

不过,如果我们想想下述情况,那么在战争操作中,方法的频繁应用就会被看作极为根本和不可避免者:如果我们想想多少行动依据纯粹的猜测,或在全然的不确定中进行,因为一方受到阻碍,无法了解影响另一方的部署的所有境况,或因为即使它已真正得知这些影响另一方各项决定的境况,但由于它们的范围和它们将含的种种安排,它没有足够的时间贯彻所有必要的反制措施——因此战争中的举措必定总是依据一定数量的可能性去谋划;还有,如果我们想想属于一个单独事件的鸡毛蒜皮之事是如何多不胜数,它们因此要和它一起被考虑进来,因此除了设想它们互相抵消,除了仅仅依据一般和或然去做出我们的安排外,没有任何别的办法;最后,如果我们想想由于军阶越往下军官就越多,因而军事活动层次越低,必须留给个人的真正辨识和成熟判断的事就越少,而且当我们达到那些除军务规制和经验提供以外全无其他看法的军阶时,我们必须以近似于这些规制的有条不紊的常规办法去帮助他们。这将既有助于支持他们的判断力,也有助于阻挡那些过分的和错误的看法,这在经验的代价如此高昂的一个领域尤为可怕。

除了行动中常规方法的这种绝对必要外,我们还必须认识到它有正面裨益,亦即通过不断重复例行的演练,部队的动作就变得敏捷、精确和稳当,减少惯常的摩擦,使这机器运行得更顺畅。

因此,行动者的职位军阶越往下,常规就越被广泛使用,变得越不可缺少;相反,越往上它的使用就越减少,直到在最高军阶上完全消失为止。由于这个原因,它更多地属于战术而非战略领域。

战争在其最高方面不是由内在多样性互相抵消的无数小事件构成,这些小事件依据或好或坏的方法得到或好或坏的操控。战争是由各自分开的决定性大事件构成的,这些事件必须由各自独立处理。这不像一块茎干作物田,完全不管每棵茎干的特殊形态,只依照收割工具是好是坏来被或好或坏地收割;相反,它像一组大树,必须根据每根独立树干的特殊形态和倾度,凭判断挥斧砍伐。

在军事活动中,究竟可允许操作常规达到多高层次当然不是按照实际军阶决定,而是按照事情性质决定;它所以最少影响到最高军阶,只是因为这些军阶的行事范围最广泛。常规战斗序列,前卫和前哨的常规布局,是一位将领不仅依以约束他的下属、在某些场合也依以约束他自己的方法。无疑,它们可以是将领自己设计,并且可以由其按照具体情况去应用,但只要是基于部队和武器的总的特性,它们也可以是一个理论科目。相反,任何方法,靠它要给出明确限定的战争或战役计划,犹如出自机器那样随时现成可用,都绝对一钱不值。

只要不存在任何能被认可的理论,亦即任何关于战争操作的富有见识的论著,常规行事方法就不能不在高层逾越它的适当界限,因为这些活动领域中的人并非总有机会——通过探究和接触较高利益来教育自己的机会。在理论家和评论家的不切实际、前后矛盾的专题论著中,他们无法找到自己的路径,他们的健全的常识拒斥它们;他们具备的不是知识,而是取自经验的东西,因而在那些允许并要求自由的个人迎对的场合,他们现成地运用经验给他们的办法,那就是模仿伟大的将领们实际用过的种种特殊方法,据此一种行事常规油然而生。如果我们见到腓特烈大王的将领们总是出现在所谓倾斜战斗序列中,法国大革命的将领们总是使用一种依凭延长战线的变向运动,波拿巴的副手们依凭集中大量兵力热血冲劲急急进攻,那么在行事模式的反复再现中,我们分明认出一种被采用的常规,从而明白常规行事方法能够上达近乎最高的领域。倘若一种经改善的理论便利了战争操作研习,熏陶了上升到最高指挥的人们的头脑和判断力,那么常规行事方法就不再会达到那么高,而且它的要被认为必不可少的很大部分将因此至少依据理论本身得到形成,而非出自纯粹的模仿。不管一位伟大统帅如何卓越超群地行事,在他的行事方式中总是有某种主观的东西;而且,如果他有某种风格,那么他的一大部分个性就包含其中,但又并非总是符合模仿他风格者的个性。

与此同时,要将主观的常规或风格完全逐出战争操作,既不可能也不对头:如果理论没有能力预见到这一般特性,并将它纳入自己的考虑,就只能被认为是显现了一场战争的一般特性对其各个独立事件的影响,这影响也只能这样表现出来。有什么比法国革命战争有它本身的行事风格这一点更自然的吗?什么理论能够容纳这独特的风格?危险只在于,源于一个特殊场合的这么一种风格能轻而易举地延续过久,因为在情势难以觉察变化的同时它仍照旧。这是理论能靠清晰合理的评析去防止的。1806年时,普鲁士将领——在扎尔费尔德的路易亲王、在耶拿附近多恩伯格的陶恩钦、在卡佩伦多夫前面的格拉瓦尔特和在它后面的吕歇尔 〔3〕 ——统统以腓特烈大王的倾斜序列将自己投入毁灭虎口,使得霍恩洛厄 〔4〕 麾下全军覆没,比任何军队曾在战场上遭到过的覆没更彻底: 〔5〕 这全是以一种已经过时了的风格,再加上常规导致的极度愚蠢造成的。

注释

〔1〕  在此和在下面第8段“常规”处,格雷厄姆英译文使用直接出自德语Methodismus一词的Methodicism。霍华德和帕雷特英译本第151页则将此标题译作“Method and Routine”(方法和常规),并添附注“德语Methodismus没有精确的英语等同词”,然后在下面第8段将这个词译作“routine”(常规)。

〔2〕  依据霍华德和帕雷特英译本第151页。格雷厄姆英译文作“used of discerning a recondite truth in a particular sign lying close at hand, in order to attach to this particular sign the law of action directed upon the whole truth”(被用来辨识寓于近旁一个特殊迹象内的一项深奥的真理,为的是将针对真理总体的行动准则附于这一特殊迹象),似不够确切。

〔3〕  普鲁斯亲王路易·斐迪南(1772-1806):腓特烈大王的侄子,1806年时为普鲁士宫廷内主张恢复对拿破仑战争的主要人物之一,在同年的扎尔费尔德战役中麾下近万人的部队被拿破仑军队歼灭,本人亦被杀。博吉斯拉夫·弗里德里希·埃曼纽尔·冯·陶恩钦(1760-1824):18世纪普鲁士名将弗里德里希·博吉斯拉夫·冯·陶恩钦之子,在1806年普鲁士惨遭决定性大败的耶拿战役中率领霍恩洛厄军团先锋部队据守多恩伯格,但在法军进攻下被迫撤出。莱因霍尔德·冯·格拉瓦尔特:耶拿战役中的普军师长,所率一个骑兵旅和三个步兵团在卡佩伦多夫被法军歼灭。

〔4〕  弗雷德里·路易(霍恩洛厄—英格尔芬根亲王)(1746-1818):普鲁士大贵族,耶拿战役前在普鲁士军界享有盛誉,战役中担任普军左翼统帅,惨败,两周后率残余部队投降尾随追击的法军,被囚于法国达两年。

〔5〕  在此依据霍华德和帕雷特英译本第155页,格雷厄姆英译文为“manage to ruin Hohenlohe's Army in a way that no Army was ever ruined, even on the field of field of battle”,似有误,误在将“ever”写为“even”。

评 析 〔1〕

理论原理对现实生活的影响,更多地经由评析而非信条产生,因为评析是将抽象的真理应用于真实事件,因而不仅使这类真理更接近生活,还通过不断重复应用使头脑更习惯于这类真理。因此我们认为,为理论确定视角后,紧接着必须为评析确定视角。

我们将评析与对历史事件的简单讲述区别开来,后者以年月顺序排列事件,或者至多仅触及它们的较近的原因。

在这评析中,可以观察到三种不同的智力运作:

第一,历史探查和确定可疑事实。此乃历史探究本身,与理论没有共同之处。

第二,从结果往回追溯原因。此乃真正的评析性探究,它对理论来说必不可少,因为在理论中有待确立、支撑甚或仅靠经验说明的一切,唯有靠此方式才能得到处理。

第三,检验所用的手段。此乃本来意义上的批评,其中包含褒贬;也是理论帮助历史之处,或者确切说要从历史汲取教益。

在这后两个历史探究的真正评析性部分,一切都将事情追踪到其原本要素上,也就是说上溯到无疑的真理,而不像经常那样半途而止,停在某个武断的前提或假设上。

谈到从结果追溯原因,往往还有无法逾越的困难,以致真正的原因不为人知。生活中不会像在战争中那样,经常发生这种情况:在战争中,事件难得被充分得知,动机更是如此,因为动机一直被统帅或许是有意掩藏起来,或是具有一种无常和偶然性质,而湮没无闻。因此,评析性史实一般必须与历史探查携手并进,即便如此,因果联系缺失仍然往往会表现出来,将效果认作已知原因的必然结果看来站不住脚。因而,必定出现空缺,亦即历史结果不能用来提供教益。理论能要求的一切,在于探查应被严格进行到此,然后止步而不提取结论。只有在已知的被搞成非得足以作为结果的一种解释,从而被赋予一种虚假的重要性时,真正的危险就蹦出来了。

除了这一困难,评析性探究还遇到另一个大的内在困难,即战争中的事件进展很少出自一个简单原因,而是出自若干原因的共同作用,因此本着不偏不倚的精神从一系列事件上溯到它们的起源是不够的,赋予每个起作用的原因应有的分量同样必要。这样就导致对它们的性质作更细致的探查,评析性探究也由此可以将我们导入理论领域本身。

批判性思考,亦即对手段的检验,导致下述问题:哪些是所用手段的特有效应?这些效应是否契合指挥者的计划?

手段的特有效应导致探查它们的性质,因而又将我们导入理论领域。

我们已经见到,在评析中,一切都取决于达到确定无疑的真理;因而,我们决不能止步于武断的、别人不接受的命题,这也是为了避免由于他还未找到一个他满意的命题,或由于他尚不能把握一个命题,会至少间或地像一个人利用一位主宰者那样,去利用一个片断来显示一位将领的错误。他们大多没有能力在不随处求助科学军事理论的某些碎片的情况下论理说道。这些碎片当中最小的系由单纯的科学词汇和譬喻构成,往往不过是评析性史实的装饰花边。出于事情的本性,属于一个体系的所有技术和科学的表达方式只要遭到歪曲,被用作普遍公理或玲珑晶莹的小法宝——它们比朴实的言谈更有表现力——如果它们曾经不无恰当的话,便立即变得全不恰当。

于是有了一种情况:我们的理论和评论书籍并非直截了当、内容可懂的(其中作者总是至少知道自己说什么,读者也知道自己读什么),而是充斥着构成扰人盲点的技术词语,在那里作者与读者分道扬镳。然而,它们常常还更糟,只是毫无内核的空壳。作者本人对他所指的东西没有清楚的认识,满足于含糊的想法,若是以明白的语言表达,就会即使对他自己来说也不会满意的。

评析方面的第三个弊端是误用史例,卖弄博学。我们已经说过战争艺术史是什么,也将在专门几章里进一步说明我们对史例和军事史的看法。仅以很粗略的方式触及的一个事实就可以用来支持最对立的观点,或是三四个这样的性质最杂异的事实,从最遥远的地方和时代取出来合堆在一起的事实,一般都会弄乱搞混判断和理解而不表明任何东西;它们暴露在阳光下的时候,只是证明是用来炫耀作者学问的破烂垃圾。

此类晦涩暧昧、部分谬误、混乱不清的武断的观念能有什么实际裨益?极少,少得使理论因此一贯与实践截然对立,常常遭到持战场军人素质无可置疑论的人们的嘲笑。

然而,如果理论是下面的样子,情况就不可能如此:它使用简明的语言,自然而然地对待那些构成战争操作艺术的东西,只是试图确定能够被确定的事情;它规避任何虚妄的做作,不去牛头不对马嘴地炫耀科学形式和展示历史类同,始终贴近主题,并且与那些必须依靠自己的天然才智在战场上操作战事者携手前行。

注释

〔1〕  霍华德和帕雷特英译本第156页为标题“评析”(Critical Analysis)加了一个注:“德文术语Kritik在此指‘评论、评析、评价和解释’而非‘批评’(criticism)。”格雷厄姆英译文将此标题译作‘批评’(Criticism)。

论史例 〔1〕

取自历史的范例令事事清晰,并且提供实证科学方面最好的证据说明。这有力地适用于战争艺术,胜过适用于任何其他。沙恩荷尔斯特将军 〔2〕 写了历来就实际的战争所曾写过的最佳手册,他断言史例无比重要,而且自己令人赞叹地运用了它们。假如他活过了那场他在其中殒命的战争,那么他的炮兵论著修订本的第四部分本将给出一个更大的证据,证明他依以对待自身经验的观察能力和教诲能力。 〔3〕

然而,理论著作家们难得如此运用史例;他们更经常地运用它们的方式确切地说意在让心智不获满足,并且冒犯判断力。因此我们认为,专门考察对史例的运用和误用至关重要。

无疑,作为战争艺术的基础的各知识分支处于实证科学名下;因为,虽然它们很大程度上源出于事情的本质,但我们在大部分情况下仍只能从经验去了解这本质自身;此外,实际应用因受到那么多情势作了修改,以致仅从手段的本质永不能完全了解效果。

火药是我们的军事活动的大手段,其效果只是靠经验才得知,而且直到眼下,种种实验仍在不断进展,以便更充分地探查它们。火药赋予每秒1000呎加速度的一颗铁球击碎它在行进途中碰上的一切活物:这本身明白易懂,不需要经验来告诉我们;但是,在产生这种效果时,涉及上百成千那么多情势,其中某些仅靠经验才能了解!而且,我们必须探究的不只是物质效果,还有心理效果要探知,而且仅靠经验才能被辨识;除了通过经验,没有任何其他了解和认识途径。在中世纪,当火器刚发明时,由于制作粗糙,其物质效果与现在的火器相比微不足道,但它们的心理效果大得多。一个人必须眼见由波拿巴教导和率领的兵群之一的坚毅——在最猛烈、最连续不断的火炮轰击之下的坚毅,才能懂得经历过危险战场上长期实战磨练的部队能够成就什么,其时它们历经多胜的征战生涯,已经达到要求自己做出最大努力这一崇高的准则。对此,依凭纯理念,没有哪个会相信。另一方面,许多人都知道目前有为欧洲列强效劳的这样的部队:它们容易被仅仅几发炮射驱散。

然而,没有任何实证科学、因而没有任何战争艺术理论能够一直靠历史证据证明其正确无误;而且,在某种程度上,靠个别事实也难支持经验。如果一旦发觉任何手段在战争中有效,就会重复使用;一国仿效另一国,这事成了时髦,在经验支持下以此方式变得流行起来,并在理论中占得一席之地,后者满足于得到一般经验以表明它的起源,而非证明其真理性。

然而,倘若经验要被用来推翻某个现行手段、证实什么可疑的或引入某种新东西,那么情况就大为不同;此时必须援引特定的史例作为证据。

现在,倘若我们仔细考虑应用历史证据,四个视角就马上为此目的展现出来:

第一,它们仅可用作一项理念的说明。在每个抽象考虑中,它很容易被误解,或者根本无法被搞懂:当一位作者担心这个时,一项历史例解有助于提供关于他的理念的所需说明,保证他的理念能被读者搞懂。

其次,它可以充作一项理念的应用,因为依凭一个范例,就有机会显示那些较细小的情势的作用,那在一项理念的任何笼统的表述中不可能全都被囊括进去并得到说明;因为确实,理论与经验的差别就在于此。这两种情况都属于本来意义上的范例,接下来两种则属于历史证据。

第三,一项历史事实可被特地提到,为的是支持某人已经提出的东西。如果我们只须证明一项事实或效应的可能性,这对所有情况都已足够了。

最后,即第四,从一个历史事件的环境细节,并且通过将若干这样的细节集合在一起,我们可以推断出某种理论,因此在此证明本身中就有其真正的证据。

就这些用途中间的第一种而言,一般所需的无非是对案例的粗略关注,因为它只被部分使用。历史正确性仅为次要考虑;一项杜撰的案例或许也可以服务于目的,但历史实例总是会更受青睐,因为它们使自身例解的观念更接近实际生活。

第二种用途设定各项事件有一种情势关联,但历史真实性还是次要的,而就此要说的与在第一种情况下一样。

对第三种用途来说,仅援引一项不受怀疑的事实一般已足够。如果断言工事设防阵地在某些条件下就可以达到其目的,那么为支持这个断言就只须提到邦策尔维茨阵地。

然而,如果一项抽象真理要靠讲述一项历史案例来证明,那么这案例中涉及的一切都必须以最深入最完全的方式来分析;一定程度上,必须在读者眼前仔细地展开。这项工作做得越低效,证据就会越薄弱,就越有必要依靠多个案例提供证明性证据,那是在单一案例中缺乏的,因为我们有权利假定,在某一定数量的案例中,我们没有能力提供更细微的细节在效应方面互相抵消。

倘若我们想以取自经验的证据,表明骑兵最好置于后面,而不是与步兵共处一条线上,或者表明若无决定性的数量优势,试图以在一个战场上或在一个战区里——亦即战术上或战略上——分得很开的各个纵队搞包抄运动就非常冒险,那么在第一个场合,具体举出某些在其中骑兵处于侧翼的输了的战斗,连同某些在其中骑兵处于步兵后面的赢了的战斗,就还不够;在第二个场合,提到里沃利战役和瓦格拉姆战役 〔4〕 、提到1796年时奥地利人在意大利战区的进攻,或者提到同一年法国人对德意志战区的进攻,也同样不够。这些战斗序列或进攻计划如何根本助成了这些特定案例中的灾难性结果,必须通过仔细追溯出种种情势和事变去表明。然后,才会显现出这样的阵列或措施要在多大程度上遭到谴责:这一点很有必要表明这一点,因为全盘谴责往往不符合真实情况。

我们已经说过,当不可能做出对事实的详情叙述的时候,所欠缺的证明力可以在一定程度上由一些被援引的案例提供;然而,这是一个很危险的摆脱困难的办法,但仍被大为滥用。不是举一个得到很好说明的例子,而是涉及三四个例子,从而搞得貌似证据有力。可是有这样的情况:被拿出来的整打案例很可能因为是经常发生的事实,以至一打与其结果相反的其他案例也可能容易拿出,而被认为一钱不值。例如,有人能随便举出十几个输了的战斗,在其中被击败的一方以互相分开的纵队进攻,那么我们也能举出十几个赢了的战斗,在其中被采纳的是同样的阵式。显然,以此方式不会产生任何结果。

仔细考虑这些不同的情况,就会看到史例多么容易被误用。

一个事件若被粗略地提到,而非在所有方面都得到仔细分析,那么它就有如一个极远处的对象,从每个角度看都好像一样,各方面的细节无法识别。这样的例子实际上一向用来支持最相反的多种观点。对有些人来说,道恩 〔5〕 的各场战役是审慎样板和技能楷模。对另一些人来说,它们只是胆怯范例和犹豫典型。1797年波拿巴穿越诺里克阿尔卑斯山可以被说成显现了最卓越的大胆果断,但也可以被说成是一项十足的鲁莽之举。他在1812年的战略性失败可以展示为干劲过度,或干劲不足所致。所有这些观点都已提出,而且容易明白它们很可能会冒出来,因为每个人对事件的因果关系的看法各有不同。与此同时,这些互相对立的观点无法彼此调和,因而其中一种必是错的。

我们非常感激杰出人士弗居伊埃雷 〔6〕 ,因为他将大量史例写进了回忆录。许多非如此本可能湮没不闻的历史事件由此保存了下来,而且就提出的实例可被认作意在例解和证实理论断言而论,他是最早将理论——即抽象——观念与战争实际联结起来的人之一。然而,在一位不偏不倚的读者看来,他很少有可能达到他自己提出的目标,那就是以史例证明理论原理。因为,虽然他有时非常细致地叙述事件,但仍经常未能表明,抽引出来的推论必然出自这些事件的内在联系。

因粗略涉及历史事件产生的另一项弊端,在于有些读者全然不知这些事件,或者无法充分回忆它们,来把握作者的意思,于是不得不要么盲目接受所言,要么依然满腹狐疑。

要在读者眼前以一种必需的方式将历史事件聚在一起或展现开来,以便能用作证据,极为困难;因为,作者往往缺乏手段,也没有那么多的时间和篇幅;然而我们认为,在目标是确立一个新的或可争议的观点时,单独一个彻底分析过的例子远比十个粗略涉及的例子有效得多。这些皮相展示的大害,不在于作者当作证据抛出的故事名不符实,而在于他并未充分熟识主题,在于这类马虎潦草、肤浅空洞的历史对待所能引发出的大量错误观点和理论构建妄图——只有当作者将自己的责任定为依据事件的准确联系,推断出他公诸于众的一切新东西,并且力图依据历史去证明这些新东西时,它们才不会出现。

当我们确信史例运用会遭遇的这些困难,同时又确信(运用此类例子的)必要性时,我们就会发现,即只要足够真确和详细,晚近的军事史是提取该类例子的天然的最佳领域。

在古远时代,战争情势和战争方法不同;因而其事件在理论或实践上对我们来说用处不大;此外,军事史有如其他每一类历史,在时间的长河中自然失去了许多起初清晰可见的细节详貌,变得色彩淡漠少有生气,就像一幅退色或发暗了的图画;于是,最终或许只留下因此显得份量过大的块面和主貌。

如果我们看当前的战事状态,那么我们可以说,至少就武器装备而言,奥地利继承战争以来的战争几乎是唯一与当前大为相似的战争,而且尽管已有许多大小不等的重要改变,但它们仍能提供重要教益。就西班牙继承战争来说,情况就很不一样,因为火器的使用当时还远未那么趋近完美,骑兵依然是最重要的兵种。我们越往回追溯,军事史就越不那么有用,越变得模糊不清和缺乏细节。最无用的是古代军事史。

然而,这种无用也并非全然绝对,它只涉及那些依赖细节了解或其中战法已变之事的论题。虽然关于在瑞士人对奥地利人、勃艮第人和法国人打的战役中所用的战术我们所知甚少,但我们仍然能从中找到明确无疑的证据,证明它们是优秀步兵对最佳骑兵的优势得到展示的首批战役。对雇佣兵首领时代的一番笼统的概览教导我们,整个战争操作方法在于如何倚赖所用工具;因为在任何时代,战争中使用的兵力都未具备一种专门工具的那么多特征,构成那么全然有别于民族共同体其余部分的一个阶层。第二次布匿战争中,罗马人进攻迦太基的西班牙和非洲领地的方式令人难忘,当时汉尼拔仍旧坚持驻足意大利。这是个极有教益的研究主题,因为对间接防卫行动中有关的国家和军队的一般状况有足够了解。

可是,越往下深究具体详情,在性质上越偏离最一般状况,我们就越少能从久远的时代中寻求范例和经验教益,因为我们既没有准确判断相应事件的手段,也无法将它们应用于我们的全然不同的战法。

然而很不幸,谈论古代一向是历史著作家们追求的时髦。我们不应说其中可能包含多大部分的附庸风雅和江湖骗术;但总的来说,我们未能从他们的作品中发现任何旨在教导和说服的诚实意图和认真努力,因而我们只能将此类引述视作修饰,用以填补空缺和掩盖弊端。

如弗居伊埃雷提议做的那样,完全依靠史例去教授战争艺术,正如他所做的,将是个巨大的贡献;然而,那将是一个人一生的全部工作,并且承担此事的人首先必须有长期的个人实际战争经验,以此具备从事这一任务的素质。

无论是谁,只要勃勃雄心地要承担这么一项任务,就让他为自己的虔诚的事业去做准备吧,犹如为一趟路途遥远的朝圣做准备;让他献出自己的时间,不惜任何牺牲,不怕任何世俗显贵或世俗权力,超越一切个人虚荣心和虚假羞耻感,为的是——用《拿破仑法典》 〔7〕 的话说——讲真理,整个真理,只是真理。

注释

〔1〕  依据霍华德和帕雷特英译本第170页的标题,格雷厄姆英译文作“On Examples”(论范例)。

〔2〕  格尔哈德·约翰·冯·沙恩荷尔斯特(1755-1813):普鲁士军事改革家,克劳塞维茨的精神恩师,1807年起历任陆军大臣和军事改组委员会主席等职,努力推行改革,建立速成兵制度,短期内打破了拿破仑对普军的限制,1811年在法国政府压力和普鲁士宫廷保守派非难下被迫解职,1813年德意志民族解放战争期间出任普军元帅布吕歇尔的参谋长,战斗中负重伤,不久后身亡。

〔3〕  “依以对待自身经验的观察能力和教诲能力”:依从霍华德和帕雷特英译本第170页。格雷厄姆英译文就此作“the observing and enlightened spirit in which he sifted matters of experience”(他细致审视经验事务的观察精神和开导气度)。

〔4〕  里沃利战役:1797年1月在意大利里沃利进行,其间拿破仑·波拿巴率领法军23,000人击败奥地利军28,000人,系法国意大利战役中的一场关键性胜利。瓦格拉姆战役:拿破仑战争中最著名的大战役之一,1809年7月初在维也纳附近的瓦格拉姆进行,其间拿破仑亲率的法国大军击败奥地利查理大公麾下奥军主力,双方死伤八万人以上,第五次反法同盟战争由此结束。

〔5〕  利奥波德·约瑟夫·冯·道恩伯爵(1705-1766):奥地利陆军元帅,用兵谨慎细致,参加奥地利继承战争,战后负责改组奥地利陆军和建立军事学院,七年战争初期曾击败普鲁士腓特烈大王,任奥军统帅,后于1760年11月在著名的托尔高战役中大败于腓特烈之手并身受重伤。

〔6〕  德·弗居伊埃雷子爵(安图瓦内·德·帕斯·德·弗居伊埃雷)(1648-1711):法国陆军中将,参加过路易十四时代初期的多场战争和战役,后因言论不慎被贬,旋撰写有关这些战事的回忆录,构成伏尔泰《路易十四时代》的部分重要资料基础。

〔7〕  依据霍华德和帕雷特英译本第174页,格雷厄姆英译文的相应用语为“the French code”(法兰西法典)。

Carl von Clausewitz

On the Nature of War



TRANSLATED BY

J. GRAHAM







PENGUIN BOOKS — GREAT IDEAS

On the Nature of War CONTENTS

Introduction of the Author

What is War?

End and Means in War

Branches of the Art of War

On the Theory of War

Art or Science of War

Methodicism

Criticism

On Examples

返回分册总目录

Introduction of the Author

That the conception of the scientific does not consist alone, or chiefly, in system, and its finished theoretical constructions, requires nowadays no exposition. System in this treatise is not to be found on the surface, and instead of a finished building of theory, there are only materials.

The scientific form lies here in the endeavour to explore the nature of military phenomena to show their affinity with the nature of the things of which they are composed. Nowhere has the philosophical argument been evaded, but where it runs out into too thin a thread the Author has preferred to cut it short, and fall back upon the corresponding results of experience; for in the same way as many plants only bear fruit when they do not shoot too high, so in the practical arts the theoretical leaves and flowers must not be made to sprout too far, but kept near to experience, which is their proper soil.

Unquestionably it would be a mistake to try to discover from the chemical ingredients of a grain of corn the form of the ear of corn which it bears, as we have only to go to the field to see the ears ripe. Investigation and observation, philosophy and experience, must neither despise nor exclude one another; they mutually afford each other the rights of citizenship. Consequently, the propositions of this book, with their arch of inherent necessity, are supported either by experience or by the conception of War itself as external points, so that they are not without abutments.

It is, perhaps, not impossible to write a systematic theory of War full of spirit and substance, but ours, hitherto, have been very much the reverse. To say nothing of their unscientific spirit, in their striving after coherence and completeness of system, they overflow with commonplaces, truisms, and twaddle of every kind. If we want a striking picture of them we have only to read Lichtenberg's extract from a code of regulations in case of fire.

If a house takes fire, we must seek, above all things, to protect the right side of the house standing on the left, and, on the other hand, the left side of the house on the right; for if we, for example should protect the left side of the house on the left, then the right side of the house lies to the right of the left, and consequently as the fire lies to the right of this side, and of the right side (for we have assumed that the house is situated to the left of the fire), therefore the right side is situated nearer to the fire than the left, and the right side of the house might catch fire if it was not protected before it came to the left, which is protected. Consequently, something might be burnt that is not protected, and that sooner than something else would be burnt, even if it was not protected; consequently we must let alone the latter and protect the former. In order to impress the thing on one's mind, we have only to note if the house is situated to the right of the fire, then it is the left side, and if the house is to the left it is the right side.

In order not to frighten the intelligent reader by such commonplaces, and to make the little good that there is distasteful by pouring water upon it, the Author has preferred to give in small ingots of fine metal his impressions and convictions, the result of many years' reflection on War, of his intercourse with men of ability, and of much personal experience. Thus the seemingly weakly bound-together chapters of this book have arisen, but it is hoped they will not be found wanting in logical connexion. Perhaps soon a greater head may appear, and instead of these single grains, give the whole in a casting of pure metal without dross.

What is War?

1. Introduction

We propose to consider first the single elements of our subject, then each branch or part, and, last of all, the whole, in all its relations - therefore to advance from the simple to the complex. But it is necessary for us to commence with a glance at the nature of the whole, because it is particularly necessary that in the consideration of any of the parts their relation to the whole should be kept constantly in view.

2. Definition

We shall not enter into any of the abstruse definitions of War used by publicists. We shall keep to the element of the thing itself, to a duel. War is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale. If we would conceive as a unit the countless number of duels which make up a War, we shall do so best by supposing to ourselves two wrestlers. Each strives by physical force to compel the other to submit to his will: each endeavours to throw his adversary, and thus render him incapable of further resistance.

War therefore is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will.

Violence arms itself with the inventions of Art and Science in order to contend against violence. Selfimposed restrictions, almost imperceptible and hardly worth mentioning, termed usages of International Law, accompany it without essentially impairing its power. Violence, that is to say, physical force (for there is no moral force without the conception of States and Law), is therefore the means; the compulsory submission of the enemy to our will is the ultimate object. In order to attain this object fully, the enemy must be disarmed, and disarmament becomes therefore the immediate object of hostilities in theory. It takes the place of the final object, and puts it aside as something we can eliminate from our calculations.

3. Utmost use of force

Now, philanthropists may easily imagine there is a skilful method of disarming and overcoming an enemy without causing great bloodshed, and that this is the proper tendency of the Art of War. However plausible this may appear, still it is an error which must be extirpated; for in such dangerous things as War, the errors which proceed from a spirit of benevolence are the worst. As the use of physical power to the utmost extent by no means excludes the cooperation of the intelligence, it follows that he who uses force unsparingly, without reference to the bloodshed involved, must obtain a superiority if his adversary uses less vigour in its application. The former then dictates the law to the latter, and both proceed to extremities to which the only limitations are those imposed by the amount of counteracting force on each side.

This is the way in which the matter must be viewed, and it is to no purpose, it is even against one's own interest, to turn away from the consideration of the real nature of the affair because the horror of its elements excites repugnance.

If the Wars of civilized people are less cruel and destructive than those of savages, the difference arises from the social condition both of States in themselves and in their relations to each other. Out of this social condition and its relations War arises, and by it War is subjected to conditions, is controlled and modified. But these things do not belong to War itself; they are only given conditions; and to introduce into the philosophy of War itself a principle of moderation would be an absurdity.

Two motives lead men to War: instinctive hostility and hostile intention. In our definition of War, we have chosen as its characteristic the latter of these elements, because it is the most general. It is impossible to conceive the passion of hatred of the wildest description, bordering on mere instinct, without combining with it the idea of a hostile intention. On the other hand, hostile intentions may often exist without being accompanied by any, or at all events by any extreme, hostility of feeling. Amongst savages views emanating from the feelings, amongst civilized nations those emanating from the understanding, have the predominance; but this difference arises from attendant circumstances, existing institutions, etc., and, therefore, is not to be found necessarily in all cases, although it prevails in the majority. In short, even the most civilized nations may burn with passionate hatred of each other.

We may see from this what a fallacy it would be to refer the War of a civilized nation entirely to an intelligent act on the part of the Government, and to imagine it as continually freeing itself more and more from all feeling of passion in such a way that at last the physical masses of combatants would no longer be required; in reality, their mere relations would suffice - a kind of algebraic action.

Theory was beginning to drift in this direction until the facts of the last War taught it better. If War is an act of force, it belongs necessarily also to the feelings. If it does not originate in the feelings, it reacts, more or less, upon them, and the extent of this reaction depends not on the degree of civilization, but upon the importance and duration of the interests involved.

Therefore, if we find civilized nations do not put their prisoners to death, do not devastate towns and countries, this is because their intelligence exercises greater influence on their mode of carrying on War, and has taught them more effectual means of applying force than these rude acts of mere instinct. The invention of gunpowder, the constant progress of improvements in the construction of firearms, are sufficient proofs that the tendency to destroy the adversary which lies at the bottom of the conception of War is in no way changed or modified through the progress of civilization.

We therefore repeat our proposition, that War is an act of violence pushed to its utmost bounds; as one side dictates the law to the other, there arises a sort of reciprocal action, which logically must lead to an extreme. This is the first reciprocal action, and the first extreme with which we meet (first reciprocal action).

4. The aim is to disarm the enemy

We have already said that the aim of all action in War is to disarm the enemy, and we shall now show that this, theoretically at least, is indispensable.

If our opponent is to be made to comply with our will, we must place him in a situation which is more oppressive to him than the sacrifice which we demand; but the disadvantages of this position must naturally not be of a transitory nature, at least in appearance, otherwise the enemy, instead of yielding, will hold out, in the prospect of a change for the better. Every change in this position which is produced by a continuation of the War should therefore be a change for the worse. The worst condition in which a belligerent can be placed is that of being completely disarmed. If, therefore, the enemy is to be reduced to submission by an act of War, he must either be positively disarmed or placed in such a position that he is threatened with it. From this it follows that the disarming or overthrow of the enemy, whichever we call it, must always be the aim of Warfare. Now War is always the shock of two hostile bodies in collision, not the action of a living power upon an inanimate mass, because an absolute state of endurance would not be making War; therefore, what we have just said as to the aim of action in War applies to both parties. Here, then, is another case of reciprocal action. As long as the enemy is not defeated, he may defeat me; then I shall be no longer my own master; he will dictate the law to me as I did to him. This is the second reciprocal action, and leads to a second extreme (second reciprocal action).

5. Utmost exertion of powers

If we desire to defeat the enemy, we must proportion our efforts to his powers of resistance. This is expressed by the product of two factors which cannot be separated, namely, the sum of available means and the strength of the Will. The sum of the available means may be estimated in a measure, as it depends (although not entirely) upon numbers; but the strength of volition is more difficult to determine, and can only be estimated to a certain extent by the strength of the motives. Granted we have obtained in this way an approximation to the strength of the power to be contended with, we can then take a review of our own means, and either increase them so as to obtain a preponderance, or, in case we have not the resources to effect this, then do our best by increasing our means as far as possible. But the adversary does the same; therefore, there is a new mutual enhancement, which, in pure conception, must create a fresh effort towards an extreme. This is the third case of reciprocal action, and a third extreme with which we meet (third reciprocal action).

6. Modification in the reality

Thus reasoning in the abstract, the mind cannot stop short of an extreme, because it has to deal with an extreme, with a conflict of forces left to themselves, and obeying no other but their own inner laws. If we should seek to deduce from the pure conception of War an absolute point for the aim which we shall propose and for the means which we shall apply, this constant reciprocal action would involve us in extremes, which would be nothing but a play of ideas produced by an almost invisible train of logical subtleties. If, adhering closely to the absolute, we try to avoid all difficulties by a stroke of the pen, and insist with logical strictness that in every case the extreme must be the object, and the utmost effort must be exerted in that direction, such a stroke of the pen would be a mere paper law, not by any means adapted to the real world.

Even supposing this extreme tension of forces was an absolute which could easily be ascertained, still we must admit that the human mind would hardly submit itself to this kind of logical chimera. There would be in many cases an unnecessary waste of power, which would be in opposition to other principles of statecraft; an effort of Will would be required disproportioned to the proposed object, which therefore it would be impossible to realize, for the human will does not derive its impulse from logical subtleties.

But everything takes a different shape when we pass from abstractions to reality. In the former, everything must be subject to optimism, and we must imagine the one side as well as the other striving after perfection and even attaining it. Will this ever take place in reality? It will if,



(I). War becomes a completely isolated act, which arises suddenly, and is in no way connected with the previous history of the combatant States.

(2). If it is limited to a single solution, or to several simultaneous solutions.

(3). If it contains within itself the solution perfect and complete, free from any reaction upon it, through a calculation beforehand of the political situation which will follow from it.

7. War is never an isolated act

With regard to the first point, neither of the two opponents is an abstract person to the other, not even as regards that factor in the sum of resistance which does not depend on objective things, viz. the Will. This Will is not an entirely unknown quantity; it indicates what it will be tomorrow by what it is today. War does not spring up quite suddenly, it does not spread to the full in a moment; each of the two opponents can, therefore, form an opinion of the other, in a great measure, from what he is and what he does, instead of judging of him according to what he, strictly speaking, should be or should do. But, now, man with his incomplete organization is always below the line of absolute perfection, and thus these deficiencies, having an influence on both sides, become a modifying principle.

8. War does not consist of a single instantaneous blow

The second point gives rise to the following considerations:

If War ended in a single solution, or a number of simultaneous ones, then naturally all the preparations for the same would have a tendency to the extreme, for an omission could not in any way be repaired; the utmost, then, that the world of reality could furnish as a guide for us would be the preparations of the enemy, as far as they are known to us; all the rest would fall into the domain of the abstract. But if the result is made up from several successive acts, then naturally that which precedes with all its phases may be taken as a measure for that which will follow, and in this manner the world of reality again takes the place of the abstract, and thus modifies the effort towards the extreme.

Yet every War would necessarily resolve itself into a single solution, or a sum of simultaneous results, if all the means required for the struggle were raised at once, or could be at once raised; for as one adverse result necessarily diminishes the means, then if all the means have been applied in the first, a second cannot properly be supposed. All hostile acts which might follow would belong essentially to the first, and form in reality only its duration.

But we have already seen that even in the preparation for War the real world steps into the place of mere abstract conception - a material standard into the place of the hypotheses of an extreme: that therefore in that way both parties, by the influence of the mutual reaction, remain below the line of extreme effort, and therefore all forces are not at once brought forward.

It lies also in the nature of these forces and their application that they cannot all be brought into activity at the same time. These forces are the armies actually on foot, the country, with its superficial extent and its population, and the allies.

In point of fact, the country, with its superficial area and the population, besides being the source of all military force, constitutes in itself an integral part of the efficient quantities in War, providing either the theatre of war or exercising a considerable influence on the same.

Now, it is possible to bring all the movable military forces of a country into operation at once, but not all fortresses, rivers, mountains, people, etc. - in short, not the whole country, unless it is so small that it may be completely embraced by the first act of the War. Further, the cooperation of allies does not depend on the Will of the belligerents; and from the nature of the political relations of states to each other, this cooperation is frequently not afforded until after the War has commenced, or it may be increased to restore the balance of power.

That this part of the means of resistance, which cannot at once be brought into activity, in many cases, is a much greater part of the whole than might at first be supposed, and that it often restores the balance of power, seriously affected by the great force of the first decision, will be more fully shown hereafter. Here it is sufficient to show that a complete concentration of all available means in a moment of time is contradictory to the nature of War.

Now this, in itself, furnishes no ground for relaxing our efforts to accumulate strength to gain the first result, because an unfavourable issue is always a disadvantage to which no one would purposely expose himself, and also because the first decision, although not the only one, still will have the more influence on subsequent events, the greater it is in itself.

But the possibility of gaining a later result causes men to take refuge in that expectation, owing to the repugnance in the human mind to making excessive efforts; and therefore forces are not concentrated and measures are not taken for the first decision with that energy which would otherwise be used. Whatever one belligerent omits from weakness, becomes to the other a real objective ground for limiting his own efforts, and thus again, through this reciprocal action, extreme tendencies are brought down to efforts on a limited scale.

9. The result in war is never absolute

Lastly, even the final decision of a whole War is not always to be regarded as absolute. The conquered State often sees in it only a passing evil, which may be repaired in after times by means of political combinations. How much this must modify the degree of tension, and the vigour of the efforts made, is evident in itself.

10. The probabilities of real life take the place of the conceptions of the extreme and the absolute

In this manner, the whole act of War is removed from the rigorous law of forces exerted to the utmost. If the extreme is no longer to be apprehended, and no longer to be sought for, it is left to the judgement to determine the limits for the efforts to be made in place of it, and this can only be done on the data furnished by the facts of the real world by the laws of probability. Once the belligerents are no longer mere conceptions, but individual States and Governments, once the War is no longer an ideal, but a definite substantial procedure, then the reality will furnish the data to compute the unknown quantities which are required to be found.

From the character, the measures, the situation of the adversary, and the relations with which he is surrounded, each side will draw conclusions by the law of probability as to the designs of the other, and act accordingly.

11. The political object now reappears

Here the question which we had laid aside forces itself again into consideration, viz. the political object of the War. The law of the extreme, the view to disarm the adversary, to overthrow him, has hitherto to a certain extent usurped the place of this end or object. Just as this law loses its force, the political object must again come forward. If the whole consideration is a calculation of probability based on definite persons and relations, then the political object, being the original motive, must be an essential factor in the product. The smaller the sacrifice we demand from our opponent, the smaller, it may be expected, will be the means of resistance which he will employ; but the smaller his preparation, the smaller will ours require to be. Further, the smaller our political object, the less value shall we set upon it, and the more easily shall we be induced to give it up altogether.

Thus, therefore, the political object, as the original motive of the War, will be the standard for determining both the aim of the military force and also the amount of effort to be made. This it cannot be in itself, but it is so in relation to both the belligerent States, because we are concerned with realities, not with mere abstractions. One and the same political object may produce totally different effects upon different people, or even upon the same people at different times; we can, therefore, only admit the political object as the measure, by considering it in its effects upon those masses which it is to move, and consequently the nature of those masses also comes into consideration. It is easy to see that thus the result may be very different according as these masses are animated with a spirit which will infuse vigour into the action or otherwise. It is quite possible for such a state of feeling to exist between two States that a very trifling political motive for War may produce an effect quite disproportionate - in fact, a perfect explosion.

This applies to the efforts which the political object will call forth in the two States, and to the aim which the military action shall prescribe for itself. At times it may itself be that aim, as, for example, the conquest of a province. At other times the political object itself is not suitable for the aim of military action; then such a one must be chosen as will be an equivalent for it, and stand in its place as regards the conclusion of peace. But also, in this, due attention to the peculiar character of the States concerned is always supposed. There are circumstances in which the equivalent must be much greater than the political object, in order to secure the latter. The political object will be so much the more the standard of aim and effort, and have more influence in itself, the more the masses are indifferent, the less that any mutual feeling of hostility prevails in the two States from other causes, and therefore there are cases where the political object almost alone will be decisive.

If the aim of the military action is an equivalent for the political object, that action will in general diminish as the political object diminishes, and in a greater degree the more the political object dominates. Thus it is explained how, without any contradiction in itself, there may be Wars of all degrees of importance and energy, from a War of extermination down to the mere use of an army of observation. This, however, leads to a question of another kind which we have hereafter to develop and answer.

12. A suspension in the action of war unexplained by anything said as yet

However insignificant the political claims mutually advanced, however weak the means put forth, however small the aim to which military action is directed, can this action be suspended even for a moment? This is a question which penetrates deeply into the nature of the subject.

Every transaction requires for its accomplishment a certain time which we call its duration. This may be longer or shorter, according as the person acting throws more or less dispatch into his movements.

About this more or less we shall not trouble ourselves here. Each person acts in his own fashion; but the slow person does not protract the thing because he wishes to spend more time about it, but because by his nature he requires more time, and if he made more haste would not do the thing so well. This time, therefore, depends on subjective causes, and belongs to the length, so called, of the action.

If we allow now to every action in War this, its length, then we must assume, at first sight at least, that any expenditure of time beyond this length, that is, every suspension of hostile action, appears an absurdity; with respect to this it must not be forgotten that we now speak not of the progress of one or other of the two opponents, but of the general progress of the whole action of the War.

13. There is only one cause which can suspend the action, and this seems to be only possible on one side in any case

If two parties have armed themselves for strife, then a feeling of animosity must have moved them to it; as long now as they continue armed, that is, do not come to terms of peace, this feeling must exist; and it can only be brought to a standstill by either side by one single motive alone, which is, that he waits for a more favourable moment for action. Now, at first sight, it appears that this motive can never exist except on one side, because it, eo ipso, must be prejudicial to the other. If the one has an interest in acting, then the other must have an interest in waiting.

A complete equilibrium of forces can never produce a suspension of action, for during this suspension he who has the positive object (that is, the assailant) must continue progressing; for if we should imagine an equilibrium in this way, that he who has the positive object, therefore the strongest motive, can at the same time only command the lesser means, so that the equation is made up by the product of the motive and the power, then we must say, if no alteration in this condition of equilibrium is to be expected, the two parties must make peace; but if an alteration is to be expected, then it can only be favourable to one side, and therefore the other has a manifest interest to act without delay. We see that the conception of an equilibrium cannot explain a suspension of arms, but that it ends in the question of the expectation of a more favourable moment.

Let us suppose, therefore, that one of two States has a positive object, as, for instance, the conquest of one of the enemy's provinces - which is to be utilized in the settlement of peace. After this conquest, his political object is accomplished, the necessity for action ceases, and for him a pause ensues. If the adversary is also contented with this solution, he will make peace, if not, he must act. Now, if we suppose that in four weeks he will be in a better condition to act, then he has sufficient grounds for putting off the time of action.

But from that moment the logical course for the enemy appears to be to act that he may not give the conquered party the desired time. Of course, in this mode of reasoning a complete insight into the state of circumstances on both sides is supposed.

14. Thus a continuance of action will ensue which will advance towards a climax

If this unbroken continuity of hostile operations really existed, the effect would be that everything would again be driven towards the extreme; for, irrespective of the effect of such incessant activity in inflaming the feelings, and infusing into the whole a greater degree of passion, a greater elementary force, there would also follow from this continuance of action a stricter continuity, a closer connexion between cause and effect, and thus every single action would become of more importance, and consequently more replete with danger.

But we know that the course of action in War has seldom or never this unbroken continuity, and that there have been many Wars in which action occupied by far the smallest portion of time employed, the whole of the rest being consumed in inaction. It is impossible that this should be always an anomaly; suspension of action in War must therefore be possible, that is no contradiction in itself. We now proceed to show how this is.

15. Here, therefore, the principle of polarity is brought into requisition

As we have supposed the interests of one Commander to be always antagonistic to those of the other, we have assumed a true polarity. We reserve a fuller explanation of this for another chapter, merely making the following observation on it at present.

The principle of polarity is only valid when it can be conceived in one and the same thing, where the positive and its opposite the negative completely destroy each other. In a battle both sides strive to conquer; that is true polarity, for the victory of the one side destroys that of the other. But when we speak of two different things which have a common relation external to themselves, then it is not the things but their relations which have the polarity.

16. Attack and defence are things differing in kind and of unequal force. Polarity is, therefore, not applicable to them

If there was only one form of War, to wit, the attack of the enemy, therefore no defence; or, in other words, if the attack was distinguished from the defence merely by the positive motive, which the one has and the other has not, but the methods of each were precisely one and the same: then in this sort of fight every advantage gained on the one side would be a corresponding disadvantage on the other, and true polarity would exist.

But action in War is divided into two forms, attack and defence, which, as we shall hereafter explain more particularly, are very different and of unequal strength. Polarity therefore lies in that to which both bear a relation, in the decision, but not in the attack or defence itself.

If the one Commander wishes the solution put off, the other must wish to hasten it, but only by the same form of action. If it is A's interest not to attack his enemy at present, but four weeks hence, then it is B's interest to be attacked, not four weeks hence, but at the present moment. This is the direct antagonism of interests, but it by no means follows that it would be for B's interest to attack A at once. That is plainly something totally different.

17. The effect of polarity is often destroyed by the superiority of the defence over the attack, and thus the suspension of action in war is explained

If the form of defence is stronger than that of offence, as we shall hereafter show, the question arises, Is the advantage of a deferred decision as great on the one side as the advantage of the defensive form on the other? If it is not, then it cannot by its counter-weight overbalance the latter, and thus influence the progress of the action of the War. We see, therefore, that the impulsive force existing in the polarity of interests may be lost in the difference between the strength of the offensive and the defensive, and thereby become ineffectual.

If, therefore, that side for which the present is favourable, is too weak to be able to dispense with the advantage of the defensive, he must put up with the unfavourable prospects which the future holds out; for it may still be better to fight a defensive battle in the unpromising future than to assume the offensive or make peace at present. Now, being convinced that the superiority of the defensive (rightly understood) is very great, and much greater than may appear at first sight, we conceive that the greater number of those periods of inaction which occur in war are thus explained without involving any contradiction. The weaker the motives to action are, the more will those motives be absorbed and neutralized by this difference between attack and defence, the more frequently, therefore, will action in warfare be stopped, as indeed experience teaches.

18. A second ground consists in the imperfect knowledge of circumstances

But there is still another cause which may stop action in War, viz. an incomplete view of the situation. Each Commander can only fully know his own position; that of his opponent can only be known to him by reports, which are uncertain; he may, therefore form a wrong judgement with respect to it upon data of this description, and, in consequence of that error, he may suppose that the power of taking the initiative rests with his adversary when it lies really with himself. This want of perfect insight might certainly just as often occasion an untimely action as untimely inaction, and hence it would in itself no more contribute to delay than to accelerate action in War. Still, it must always be regarded as one of the natural causes which may bring action in War to a standstill without involving a contradiction. But if we reflect how much more we are inclined and induced to estimate the power of our opponents too high than too low, because it lies in human nature to do so, we shall admit that our imperfect insight into facts in general must contribute very much to delay action in War, and to modify the application of the principles pending our conduct.

The possibility of a standstill brings into the action of War a new modification, inasmuch as it dilutes that action with the element of time, checks the influence or sense of danger in its course, and increases the means of reinstating a lost balance of force. The greater the tension of feelings from which the War springs, the greater therefore the energy with which it is carried on, so much the shorter will be the periods of inaction; on the other hand, the weaker the principle of warlike activity, the longer will be these periods: for powerful motives increase the force of the will, and this, as we know, is always a factor in the product of force.

19. Frequent periods of inaction in war remove it further from the absolute, and make it still more a calculation of probabilities

But the slower the action proceeds in War, the more frequent and longer the periods of inaction, so much the more easily can an error be repaired; therefore, so much the bolder a General will be in his calculations, so much the more readily will he keep them below the line of the absolute, and build everything upon probabilities and conjecture. Thus, according as the course of the War is more or less slow, more or less time will be allowed for that which the nature of a concrete case particularly requires, calculation of probability based on given circumstances.

20. Therefore, the element of chance only is wanting to make of war a game, and in that element it is least of all deficient

We see from the foregoing how much the objective nature of War makes it a calculation of probabilities; now there is only one single element still wanting to make it a game, and that element it certainly is not without: it is chance. There is no human affair which stands so constantly and so generally in close connexion with chance as War. But together with chance, the accidental, and along with it good luck, occupy a great place in War.

21. War is a game both objectively and subjectively

If we now take a look at the subjective nature of War, that is to say, at those conditions under which it is carried on, it will appear to us still more like a game. Primarily the element in which the operations of War are carried on is danger; but which of all the moral qualities is the first in danger? Courage. Now certainly courage is quite compatible with prudent calculation, but still they are things of quite a different kind, essentially different qualities of the mind; on the other hand, daring reliance on good fortune, boldness, rashness, are only expressions of courage, and all these propensities of the mind look for the fortuitous (or accidental), because it is their element.

We see, therefore, how, from the commencement, the absolute, the mathematical as it is called, nowhere finds any sure basis in the calculations in the Art of War; and that from the outset there is a play of possibilities, probabilities, good and bad luck, which spreads about with all the coarse and fine threads of its web, and makes War of all branches of human activity the most like a gambling game.

22. How this accords best with the human mind in general

Although our intellect always feels itself urged towards clearness and certainty, still our mind often feels itself attracted by uncertainty. Instead of threading its way with the understanding along the narrow path of philosophical investigations and logical conclusions, in order, almost unconscious of itself, to arrive in spaces where it feels itself a stranger, and where it seems to part from all well-known objects, it prefers to remain with the imagination in the realms of chance and luck. Instead of living yonder on poor necessity, it revels here in the wealth of possibilities; animated thereby, courage then takes wings to itself, and daring and danger make the element into which it launches itself as a fearless swimmer plunges into the stream.

Shall theory leave it here, and move on, self-satisfied with absolute conclusions and rules? Then it is of no practical use. Theory must also take into account the human element; it must accord a place to courage, to boldness, even to rashness. The Art of War has to deal with living and with moral forces, the consequence of which is that it can never attain the absolute and positive. There is therefore everywhere a margin for the accidental, and just as much in the greatest things as in the smallest. As there is room for this accidental on the one hand, so on the other there must be courage and self-reliance in proportion to the room available. If these qualities are forthcoming in a high degree, the margin left may likewise be great. Courage and self-reliance are, therefore, principles quite essential to War; consequently, theory must only set up such rules as allow ample scope for all degrees and varieties of these necessary and noblest of military virtues. In daring there may still be wisdom, and prudence as well, only they are estimated by a different standard of value.

23. War is always a serious means for a serious object. Its more particular definition

Such is War; such the Commander who conducts it; such the theory which rules it. But War is no pastime; no mere passion for venturing and winning; no work of a free enthusiasm: it is a serious means for a serious object. All that appearance which it wears from the varying hues of fortune, all that it assimilates into itself of the oscillations of passion, of courage, of imagination, of enthusiasm, are only particular properties of this means.

The War of a community — of whole Nations, and particularly of civilized Nations — always starts from a political condition, and is called forth by a political motive. It is, therefore, a political act. Now if it was a perfect, unrestrained, and absolute expression of force, as we had to deduce it from its mere conception, then the moment it is called forth by policy it would step into the place of policy, and as something quite independent of it would set it aside, and only follow its own laws, just as a mine at the moment of explosion cannot be guided into any other direction than that which has been given to it by preparatory arrangements. This is how the thing has really been viewed hitherto, whenever a want of harmony between policy and the conduct of a War has led to theoretical distinctions of the kind. But it is not so, and the idea is radically false. War in the real world, as we have already seen, is not an extreme thing which expends itself at one single discharge; it is the operation of powers which do not develop themselves completely in the same manner and in the same measure, but which at one time expand sufficiently to overcome the resistance opposed by inertia or friction, while at another they are too weak to produce an effect; it is therefore, in a certain measure, a pulsation of violent force more or less vehement, consequently making its discharges and exhausting its powers more or less quickly — in other words, conducting more or less quickly to the aim, but always lasting long enough to admit of influence being exerted on it in its course, so as to give it this or that direction, in short, to be subject to the will of a guiding intelligence. Now, if we reflect that War has its root in a political object, then naturally this original motive which called it into existence should also continue the first and highest consideration in its conduct. Still, the political object is no despotic lawgiver on that account; it must accommodate itself to the nature of the means, and though changes in these means may involve modification in the political objective, the latter always retains a prior right to consideration. Policy, therefore, is interwoven with the whole action of War, and must exercise a continuous influence upon it, as far as the nature of the forces liberated by it will permit.

24. War is a mere continuation of policy by other means

We see, therefore, that War is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means. All beyond this which is strictly peculiar to War relates merely to the peculiar nature of the means which it uses. That the tendencies and views of policy shall not be incompatible with these means, the Art of War in general and the Commander in each particular case may demand, and this claim is truly not a trifling one. But however powerfully this may react on political views in particular cases, still it must always be regarded as only a modification of them; for the political view is the object, War is the means, and the means must always include the object in our conception.

25. Diversity in the nature of wars

The greater and the more powerful the motives of a War, the more it affects the whole existence of a people. The more violent the excitement which precedes the War, by so much the nearer will the War approach to its abstract form, so much the more will it be directed to the destruction of the enemy, so much the nearer will the military and political ends coincide, so much the more purely military and less political the War appears to be; but the weaker the motives and the tensions, so much the less will the natural direction of the military element — that is, force — be coincident with the direction which the political element indicates; so much the more must, therefore, the War become diverted from its natural direction, the political object diverge from the aim of an ideal War, and the War appear to become political.

But, that the reader may not form any false conceptions, we must here observe that by this natural tendency of War we only mean the philosophical, the strictly logical, and by no means the tendency of forces actually engaged in conflict, by which would be supposed to be included all the emotions and passions of the combatants. No doubt in some cases these also might be excited to such a degree as to be with difficulty restrained and confined to the political road; but in most cases such a contradiction will not arise, because by the existence of such strenuous exertions a great plan in harmony therewith would be implied. If the plan is directed only upon a small object, then the impulses of feeling amongst the masses will be also so weak that these masses will require to be stimulated rather than repressed.

26. They may all be regarded as political acts

Returning now to the main subject, although it is true that in one kind of War the political element seems almost to disappear, whilst in another kind it occupies a very prominent place, we may still affirm that the one is as political as the other; for if we regard the State policy as the intelligence of the personified State, then amongst all the constellations in the political sky whose movements it has to compute, those must be included which arise when the nature of its relations imposes the necessity of a great War. It is only if we understand by policy not a true appreciation of affairs in general, but the conventional conception of a cautious, subtle, also dishonest craftiness, averse from violence, that the latter kind of War may belong more to policy than the first.

27. Influence of this view on the right understanding of military history, and on the foundations of theory

We see, therefore, in the first place, that under all circumstances War is to be regarded not as an independent thing, but as a political instrument; and it is only by taking this point of view that we can avoid finding ourselves in opposition to all military history. This is the only means of unlocking the great book and making it intelligible. Secondly, this view shows us how Wars must differ in character according to the nature of the motives and circumstances from which they proceed.

Now, the first, the grandest, and most decisive act of judgement which the Statesman and General exercises is rightly to understand in this respect the War in which he engages, not to take it for something, or to wish to make of it something, which by the nature of its relations it is impossible for it to be. This is, therefore, the first, the most comprehensive, of all strategical questions. We shall enter into this more fully in treating of the plan of a War.

For the present we content ourselves with having brought the subject up to this point, and having thereby fixed the chief point of view from which War and its theory are to be studied.

28. Result for theory

War is, therefore, not only chameleon-like in character, because it changes its colour in some degree in each particular case, but it is also, as a whole, in relation to the predominant tendencies which are in it, a wonderful trinity, composed of the original violence of its elements, hatred and animosity, which may be looked upon as blind instinct; of the play of probabilities and chance, which make it a free activity of the soul; and of the subordinate nature of a political instrument, by which it belongs purely to the reason.

The first of these three phases concerns more the people; the second, more the General and his Army; the third, more the Government. The passions which break forth in War must already have a latent existence in the peoples. The range which the display of courage and talents shall get in the realm of probabilities and of chance depends on the particular characteristics of the General and his Army, but the political objects belong to the Government alone.

These three tendencies, which appear like so many different law-givers, are deeply rooted in the nature of the subject, and at the same time variable in degree. A theory which would leave any one of them out of account, or set up any arbitrary relation between them, would immediately become involved in such a contradiction with the reality, that it might be regarded as destroyed at once by that alone.

The problem is, therefore, that theory shall keep itself poised in a manner between these three tendencies, as between three points of attraction.

The way in which alone this difficult problem can be solved we shall examine in the book on the 'Theory of War'. In every case the conception of War, as here defined, will be the first ray of light which shows us the true foundation of theory, and which first separates the great masses and allows us to distinguish them from one another.

End and Means in War

Having in the foregoing chapter ascertained the complicated and variable nature of War, we shall now occupy ourselves in examining into the influence which this nature has upon the end and means in War.

If we ask, first of all, for the object upon which the whole effort of War is to be directed, in order that it may suffice for the attainment of the political object, we shall find that it is just as variable as are the political object, and the particular circumstances of the War.

If, in the next place, we keep once more to the pure conception of War, then we must say that the political object properly lies out of its province, for if War is an act of violence to compel the enemy to fulfil our will, then in every case all depends on our overthrowing the enemy, that is, disarming him, and on that alone. This object, developed from abstract conceptions, but which is also the one aimed at in a great many cases in reality, we shall, in the first place, examine in this reality.

In connexion with the plan of a campaign we shall hereafter examine more closely into the meaning of disarming a nation, but here we must at once draw a distinction between three things, which, as three general objects, comprise everything else within them. They are the military power, the country, and the will of the enemy.

The military power must be destroyed, that is, reduced to such a state as not to be able to prosecute the War. This is the sense in which we wish to be understood hereafter, whenever we use the expression 'destruction of the enemy's military power'.

The country must be conquered, for out of the country a new military force may be formed.

But even when both these things are done, still the War, that is, the hostile feeling and action of hostile agencies, cannot be considered as at an end as long as the will of the enemy is not subdued also; that is, its Government and its Allies must be forced into signing a peace, or the people into submission; for whilst we are in full occupation of the country, the War may break out afresh, either in the interior or through assistance given by Allies. No doubt, this may also take place after a peace, but that shows nothing more than that every War does not carry in itself the elements for a complete decision and final settlement.

But even if this is the case, still with the conclusion of peace a number of sparks are always extinguished which would have smouldered on quietly, and the excitement of the passions abates, because all those whose minds are disposed to peace, of which in all nations and under all circumstances there is always a great number, turn themselves away completely from the road to resistance. Whatever may take place subsequently, we must always look upon the object as attained, and the business of War as ended, by a peace.

Branches of the Art of War

War in its literal meaning is fighting, for fighting alone is the efficient principle in the manifold activity which in a wide sense is called War. But fighting is a trial of strength of the moral and physical forces by means of the latter. That the moral cannot be omitted is evident of itself, for the condition of the mind has always the most decisive influence on the forces employed in War.

The necessity of fighting very soon led men to special inventions to turn the advantage in it in their own favour: in consequence of these the mode of fighting has undergone great alterations; but in whatever way it is conducted its conception remains unaltered, and fighting is that which constitutes War.

The inventions have been from the first weapons and equipments for the individual combatants. These have to be provided and the use of them learnt before the War begins. They are made suitable to the nature of the fighting, consequently are ruled by it; but plainly the activity engaged in these appliances is a different thing from the fight itself; it is only the preparation for the combat, not the conduct of the same. That arming and equipping are not essential to the conception of fighting is plain, because mere wrestling is also fighting.

Fighting has determined everything appertaining to arms and equipment, and these in turn modify the mode of fighting; there is, therefore, a reciprocity of action between the two.

Nevertheless, the fight itself remains still an entirely special activity, more particularly because it moves in an entirely special element, namely, in the element of danger.

If, then, there is anywhere a necessity for drawing a line between two different activities, it is here; and in order to see clearly the importance of this idea, we need only just to call to mind how often eminent personal fitness in one field has turned out nothing but the most useless pedantry in the other.

It is also in no way difficult to separate in idea the one activity from the other, if we look at the combatant forces fully armed and equipped as a given means, the profitable use of which requires nothing more than a knowledge of their general results.

The Art of War is therefore, in its proper sense, the art of making use of the given means in fighting, and we cannot give it a better name than the 'Conduct of War'. On the other hand, in a wider sense all activities which have their existence on account of War, therefore the whole creation of troops, that is levying them, arming, equipping, and exercising them, belong to the Art of War.

To make a sound theory it is most essential to separate these two activities, for it is easy to see that if every act of War is to begin with the preparation of military forces, and to presuppose forces so organized as a primary condition for conducting War, that theory will only be applicable in the few cases to which the force available happens to be exactly suited. If, on the other hand, we wish to have a theory which shall suit most cases, and will not be wholly useless in any case, it must be founded on those means which are in most general use, and in respect to these only on the actual results springing from them.

The conduct of War is, therefore, the formation and conduct of the fighting. If this fighting was a single act, there would be no necessity for any further subdivision, but the fight is composed of a greater or less number of single acts, complete in themselves, which we call combats, as we have shown in the first chapter of the first book, and which form new units. From this arises the totally different activities, that of the formation and conduct of these single combats in themselves, and the combination of them with one another, with a view to the ultimate object of the War. The first is called tactics, the other strategy.

This division into tactics and strategy is now in almost general use, and every one knows tolerably well under which head to place any single fact, without knowing very distinctly the grounds on which the classification is founded. But when such divisions are blindly adhered to in practice, they must have some deep root. We have searched for this root, and we might say that it is just the usage of the majority which has brought us to it. On the other hand, we look upon the arbitrary, unnatural definitions of these conceptions sought to be established by some writers as not in accordance with the general usage of the terms.

According to our classification, therefore, tactics is the theory of the use of military forces in combat. Strategy is the theory of the use of combats for the object of the War.

The way in which the conception of a single, or independent combat, is more closely determined, the conditions to which this unit is attached, we shall only be able to explain clearly when we consider the combat; we must content ourselves for the present with saying that in relation to space, therefore in combats taking place at the same time, the unit reaches just as far as personal command reaches; but in regard to time, and therefore in relation to combats which follow each other in close succession, it reaches to the moment when the crisis which takes place in every combat is entirely passed.

That doubtful cases may occur, cases, for instance, in which several combats may perhaps be regarded also as a single one, will not overthrow the ground of distinction we have adopted, for the same is the case with all grounds of distinction of real things which are differentiated by a gradually diminishing scale. There may, therefore, certainly be acts of activity in War which, without any alteration in the point of view, may just as well be counted strategic as tactical; for example, very extended positions resembling a chain of posts, the preparations for the passage of a river at several points, etc.

Our classification reaches and covers only the use of the military force. But now there are in War a number of activities which are subservient to it, and still are quite different from it; sometimes closely allied, sometimes less near in their affinity. All these activities relate to the maintenance of the military force. In the same way as its creation and training precede its use, so its maintenance is always a necessary condition. But, strictly viewed, all activities thus connected with it are always to be regarded only as preparations for fighting; they are certainly nothing more than activities which are very close to the action, so that they run through the hostile act alternate in importance with the use of the forces. We have therefore a right to exclude them as well as the other preparatory activities from the Art of War in its restricted sense, from the conduct of War properly so called; and we are obliged to do so if we would comply with the first principle of all theory, the elimination of all heterogeneous elements. Who would include in the real 'conduct of War' the whole litany of subsistence and administration, because it is admitted to stand in constant reciprocal action with the use of the troops, but is something essentially different from it?

We have said, in the third chapter of our first book, that as the fight or combat is the only directly effective activity, therefore the threads of all others, as they end in it, are included in it. By this we meant to say that to all others an object was thereby appointed which, in accordance with the laws peculiar to themselves, they must seek to attain. Here we must go a little closer into this subject.

The subjects which constitute the activities outside of the combat are of various kinds.

The one part belongs, in one respect, to the combat itself, is identical with it, whilst it serves in another respect for the maintenance of the military force. The other part belongs purely to the subsistence, and has only, in consequence of the reciprocal action, a limited influence on the combats by its results. The subjects which in one respect belong to the fighting itself are marches, camps, and cantonments, for they suppose so many different situations of troops, and where troops are supposed there the idea of the combat must always be present.

The other subjects, which only belong to the maintenance, are subsistence, care of the sick, the supply and repair of arms and equipment.

Marches are quite identical with the use of the troops. The act of marching in the combat, generally called manoeuvring, certainly does not necessarily include the use of weapons, but it is so completely and necessarily combined with it that it forms an integral part of that which we call a combat. But the march outside the combat is nothing but the execution of a strategic measure. By the strategic plan is settled when, where, and with what forces a battle is to be delivered - and to carry that into execution the march is the only means.

The march outside of the combat is therefore an instrument of strategy, but not on that account exclusively a subject of strategy, for as the armed force which executes it may be involved in a possible combat at any moment, therefore its execution stands also under tactical as well as strategic rules. If we prescribe to a column its route on a particular side of a river or of a branch of a mountain, then that is a strategic measure, for it contains the intention of fighting on that particular side of the hill or river in preference to the other, in case a combat should be necessary during the march.

But if a column, instead of following the road through a valley, marches along the parallel ridge of heights, or for the convenience of marching divides itself into several columns, then these are tactical arrangements, for they relate to the manner in which we shall use the troops in the anticipated combat.

The particular order of march is in constant relation with readiness for combat, is therefore tactical in its nature, for it is nothing more than the first or preliminary disposition for the battle which may possibly take place.

As the march is the instrument by which strategy apportions its active elements, the combats, but these last often only appear by their results and not in the details of their real course, it could not fail to happen that in theory the instrument has often been substituted for the efficient principle. Thus we hear of a decisive skilful march, allusion being thereby made to those combat-combinations to which these marches led. This substitution of ideas is too natural and conciseness of expression too desirable to call for alteration, but still it is only a condensed chain of ideas in regard to which we must never omit to bear in mind the full meaning, if we would avoid falling into error.

We fall into an error of this description if we attribute to strategical combinations a power independent of tactical results. We read of marches and manoeuvres combined, the object attained, and at the same time not a word about combat, from which the conclusion is drawn that there are means in War of conquering an enemy without fighting. The prolific nature of this error we cannot show until hereafter.

But although a march can be regarded absolutely as an integral part of the combat, still there are in it certain relations which do not belong to the combat, and therefore are neither tactical nor strategic. To these belong all arrangements which concern only the accommodation of the troops, the construction of bridges, roads, etc. These are only conditions; under many circumstances they are in very close connexion, and may almost identify themselves with the troops, as in building a bridge in presence of the enemy; but in themselves they are always extraneous activities, the theory of which does not form part of the theory of the conduct of War.

Camps, by which we mean every disposition of troops in concentrated, therefore in battle order, in contradistinction to cantonments or quarters, are a state of rest, therefore of restoration; but they are at the same time also the strategic appointment of a battle on the spot chosen; and by the manner in which they are taken up they contain the fundamental lines of the battle, a condition from which every defensive battle starts; they are therefore essential parts of both strategy and tactics.

Cantonments take the place of camps for the better refreshment of the troops. They are therefore, like camps, strategic subjects as regards position and extent; tactical subjects as regards internal organization, with a view to readiness to fight.

The occupation of camps and cantonments no doubt usually combines with the recuperation of the troops another object also, for example, the covering a district of country, the holding a position; but it can very well be only the first. We remind our readers that strategy may follow a great diversity of objects, for everything which appears an advantage may be the object of a combat, and the preservation of the instrument with which War is made must necessarily very often become the object of its partial combinations.

If, therefore, in such a case strategy ministers only to the maintenance of the troops, we are not on that account out of the field of strategy, for we are still engaged with the use of the military force, because every disposition of that force upon any point whatever of the theatre of War is such a use.

But if the maintenance of the troops in camp or quarters calls forth activities which are no employment of the armed force, such as the construction of huts, pitching of tents, subsistence and sanitary services in camps or quarters, then such belong neither to strategy nor tactics.

Even entrenchments, the site and preparation of which are plainly part of the order of battle, therefore tactical subjects, do not belong to the theory of the conduct of War so far as respects the execution of their construction, the knowledge and skill required for such work being, in point of fact, qualities inherent in the nature of an organized Army; the theory of the combat takes them for granted.

Amongst the subjects which belong to the mere keeping up of an armed force, because none of the parts are identified with the combat, the victualling of the troops themselves comes first, as it must be done almost daily and for each individual. Thus it is that it completely permeates military action in the parts constituting strategy - we say parts constituting strategy, because during a battle the subsistence of troops will rarely have any influence in modifying the plan, although the thing is conceivable enough. The care for the subsistence of the troops comes therefore into reciprocal action chiefly with strategy, and there is nothing more common than for the leading strategic features of a campaign and War to be traced out in connexion with a view to this supply. But however frequent and however important these views of supply may be, the subsistence of the troops always remains a completely different activity from the use of the troops, and the former has only an influence on the latter by its results.

The other branches of administrative activity which we have mentioned stand much further apart from the use of the troops. The care of sick and wounded, highly important as it is for the good of an Army, directly affects it only in a small portion of the individuals composing it, and therefore has only a weak and indirect influence upon the use of the rest. The completing and replacing articles of arms and equipment, except so far as by the organism of the forces it constitutes a continuous activity inherent in them - takes place only periodically, and therefore seldom affects strategic plans.

We must, however, here guard ourselves against a mistake. In certain cases these subjects may be really of decisive importance. The distance of hospitals and depots of munitions may very easily be imagined as the sole cause of very important strategic decisions. We do not wish either to contest that point or to throw it into the shade. But we are at present occupied not with the particular facts of a concrete case, but with abstract theory; and our assertion therefore is that such an influence is too rare to give the theory of sanitary measures and the supply of munitions and arms an importance in the theory of the conduct of War such as to make it worth while to include in the theory of the conduct of War the consideration of the different ways and systems which the above theories may furnish, in the same way as is certainly necessary in regard to victualling troops.

If we have clearly understood the results of our reflections, then the activities belonging to War divide themselves into two principal classes, into such as are only 'preparations for War' and into the 'War itself'. This division must therefore also be made in theory.

The knowledge and applications of skill in the preparations for War are engaged in the creation, discipline, and maintenance of all the military forces; what general names should be given to them we do not enter into, but we see that artillery, fortification, elementary tactics, as they are called, the whole organization and administration of the various armed forces, and all such things are included. But the theory of War itself occupies itself with the use of these prepared means for the object of the war. It needs of the first only the results, that is, the knowledge of the principal properties of the means taken in hand for use. This we call 'The Art of War' in a limited sense, or 'Theory of the Conduct of War', or 'Theory of the Employment of Armed Forces', all of them denoting for us the same thing.

The present theory will therefore treat the combat as the real contest, marches, camps, and cantonments as circumstances which are more or less identical with it. The subsistence of the troops will only come into consideration like other given instances in respect of its results, not as an activity belonging to the combat.

The Art of War thus viewed in its limited sense divides itself again into tactics and strategy. The former occupies itself with the form of the separate combat, the latter with its use. Both connect themselves with the circumstances of marches, camps, cantonments only through the combat, and these circumstances are tactical or strategic according as they relate to the form or to the signification of the battle.

No doubt there will be many readers who will consider superfluous this careful separation of two things lying so close together as tactics and strategy, because it has no direct effect on the conduct itself of War. We admit, certainly that it would be pedantry to look for direct effects on the field of battle from a theoretical distinction.

But the first business of every theory is to clear up conceptions and ideas which have been jumbled together, and, we may say, entangled and confused; and only when a right understanding is established, as to names and conceptions, can we hope to progress with clearness and facility, and be certain that author and reader will always see things from the same point of view. Tactics and strategy are two activities mutually permeating each other in time and space, at the same time essentially different activities, the inner laws and mutual relations of which cannot be intelligible at all to the mind until a clear conception of the nature of each activity is established.

He to whom all this is nothing, must either repudiate all theoretical consideration, or his understanding has not as yet been pained by the confused and perplexing ideas resting on no fixed point of view, leading to no satisfactory result, sometimes dull, sometimes fantastic, sometimes floating in vague generalities, which we are often obliged to hear and read on the conduct of War, owing to the spirit of scientific investigation having hitherto been little directed to these subjects.

On the Theory of War

1. The first conception of the 'Art of War' was merely the preparation of the armed forces

Formerly by the term 'Art of War', or 'Science of War', nothing was understood but the totality of those branches of knowledge and those appliances of skill occupied with material things. The pattern and preparation and the mode of using arms, the construction of fortifications and entrenchments, the organism of an army and the mechanism of its movements, were the subject of these branches of knowledge and skill above referred to, and the end and aim of them all was the establishment of an armed force fit for use in War. All this concerned merely things belonging to the material world and a one-sided activity only, and it was in fact nothing but an activity advancing by gradations from the lower occupations to a finer kind of mechanical art. The relation of all this to War itself was very much the same as the relation of the art of the sword cutler to the art of using the sword. The employment in the moment of danger and in a state of constant reciprocal action of the particular energies of mind and spirit in the direction proposed to them was not yet even mooted.

2. True war first appears in the art of sieges

In the art of sieges we first perceive a certain degree of guidance of the combat, something of the action of the intellectual faculties upon the material forces placed under their control, but generally only so far that it very soon embodied itself again in new material forms, such as approaches, trenches, counter-approaches, batteries, etc., and every step which this action of the higher faculties took was marked by some such result; it was only the thread that was required on which to string these material inventions in order. As the intellect can hardly manifest itself in this kind of War, except in such things, so therefore nearly all that was necessary was done in that way.

3. Then tactics tried to find its way in the same direction

Afterwards tactics attempted to give to the mechanism of its joints the character of a general disposition, built upon the peculiar properties of the instrument, which character leads indeed to the battlefield, but instead of leading to the free activity of mind, leads to an Army made like an automaton by its rigid formations and orders of battle, which, movable only by the word of command, is intended to unwind its activities like a piece of clockwork.

4. The real conduct of war only made its appearance incidentally and incognito

The conduct of War properly so called, that is, a use of the prepared means adapted to the most special requirements, was not considered as any suitable subject for theory, but one which should be left to natural talents alone. By degrees, as War passed from the hand-to-hand encounters of the middle ages into a more regular and systematic form, stray reflections on this point also forced themselves into men's minds, but they mostly appeared only incidentally in memoirs and narratives, and in a certain measure incognito.

5. Reflections on military events brought about the want of a theory

As contemplation on War continually increased, and its history every day assumed more of a critical character, the urgent want appeared of the support of fixed maxims and rules, in order that in the controversies naturally arising about military events the war of opinions might be brought to some one point. This whirl of opinions, which neither revolved on any central pivot nor according to any appreciable laws, could not but be very distasteful to people's minds.

6. Endeavours to establish a positive theory

There arose, therefore, an endeavour to establish maxims, rules, and even systems for the conduct of War. By this the attainment of a positive object was proposed, without taking into view the endless difficulties which the conduct of War presents in that respect. The conduct of War, as we have shown, has no definite limits in any direction, while every system has the circumscribing nature of a synthesis, from which results an irreconcileable opposition between such a theory and practice.

7. Limitation to material objects

Writers on theory felt the difficulty of the subject soon enough, and thought themselves entitled to get rid of it by directing their maxims and systems only upon material things and a one-sided activity. Their aim was to reach results, as in the science for the preparation for War, entirely certain and positive, and therefore only to take into consideration that which could be made matter of calculation.

8. Superiority of numbers

The superiority in numbers being a material condition, it was chosen from amongst all the factors required to produce victory, because it could be brought under mathematical laws through combinations of time and space. It was thought possible to leave out of sight all other circumstances, by supposing them to be equal on each side, and therefore to neutralize one another. This would have been very well if it had been done to gain a preliminary knowledge of this one factor, according to its relations, but to make it a rule for ever to consider superiority of numbers as the sole law; to see the whole secret of the Art of War in the formula, in a certain time, at a certain point, to bring up superior masses - was a restriction overruled by the force of realities.

9. Victualling of troops

By one theoretical school an attempt was made to systematize another material element also, by making the subsistence of troops, according to a previously established organism of the Army, the supreme legislator in the higher conduct of War. In this way certainly they arrived at definite figures, but at figures which rested on a number of arbitrary calculations, and which therefore could not stand the test of practical application.

10. Base

An ingenious author tried to concentrate in a single conception, that of a Base, a whole host of objects, amongst which sundry relations even with immaterial forces found their way in as well. The list comprised the subsistence of the troops, the keeping them complete in numbers and equipment, the security of communications with the home country, lastly, the security of retreat in case it became necessary; and, first of all, he proposed to substitute this conception of a base for all these things; then for the base itself to substitute its own length (extent); and, last of all, to substitute the angle formed by the army with this base: all this was done merely to obtain a pure geometrical result utterly useless. This last is, in fact, unavoidable, if we reflect that none of these substitutions could be made without violating truth and leaving out some of the things contained in the original conception. The idea of a base is a real necessity for strategy, and to have conceived it is meritorious; but to make such a use of it as we have depicted is completely inadmissible, and could not but lead to partial conclusions which have forced these theorists into a direction opposed to common sense, namely, to a belief in the decisive effect of the enveloping form of attack.

11. Interior Lines

As a reaction against this false direction, another geometrical principle, that of the so-called interior lines, was then elevated to the throne. Although this principle rests on a sound foundation, on the truth that the combat is the only effectual means in War, still it is, just on account of its purely geometrical nature, nothing but another case of one-sided theory which can never gain ascendancy in the real world.

12. All these attempts are open to objection

All these attempts at theory are only to be considered in their analytical part as progress in the province of truth, but in their synthetical part, in their precepts and rules, they are quite unserviceable.

They strive after determinate quantities, whilst in War all is undetermined, and the calculation has always to be made with varying quantities.

They direct the attention only upon material forces, while the whole military action is penetrated throughout by intelligent forces and their effects.

They only pay regard to activity on one side, whilst War is a constant state of reciprocal action, the effects of which are mutual.

13. As a rule they exclude genius

All that was not attainable by such miserable philosophy, the offspring of partial views, lay outside the precincts of science - and was the field of genius, which raises itself above rules.

Pity the warrior who is contented to crawl about in this beggardom of rules, which are too bad for genius, over which it can set itself superior, over which it can perchance make merry! What genius does must be the best of all rules, and theory cannot do better than to show how and why it is so.

Pity the theory which sets itself in opposition to the mind! It cannot repair this contradiction by any humility, and the humbler it is so much the sooner will ridicule and contempt drive it out of real life.

14. The difficulty of theory as soon as moral quantities come into consideration

Every theory becomes infinitely more difficult from the moment that it touches on the province of moral quantities. Architecture and painting know quite well what they are about as long as they have only to do with matter; there is no dispute about mechanical or optical construction. But as soon as the moral activities begin their work, as soon as moral impressions and feelings are produced, the whole set of rules dissolves into vague ideas.

The science of medicine is chiefly engaged with bodily phenomena only; its business is with the animal organism, which, liable to perpetual change, is never exactly the same for two moments. This makes its practice very difficult, and places the judgement of the physician above his science; but how much more difficult is the case if a moral effect is added, and how much higher must we place the physician of the mind?

15. The moral quantities must not be excluded in war

But now the activity in War is never directed solely against matter; it is always at the same time directed against the intelligent force which gives life to this matter, and to separate the two from each other is impossible.

But the intelligent forces are only visible to the inner eye, and this is different in each person, and often different in the same person at different times.

As danger is the general element in which everything moves in War, it is also chiefly by courage, the feeling of one's own power, that the judgement is differently influenced. It is to a certain extent the crystalline lens through which all appearances pass before reaching the understanding.

And yet we cannot doubt that these things acquire a certain objective value simply through experience.

Every one knows the moral effect of a surprise, of an attack in flank or rear. Every one thinks less of the enemy's courage as soon as he turns his back, and ventures much more in pursuit than when pursued. Every one judges of the enemy's General by his reputed talents, by his age and experience, and shapes his course accordingly. Every one casts a scrutinizing glance at the spirit and feeling of his own and the enemy's troops. All these and similar effects in the province of the moral nature of man have established themselves by experience, are perpetually recurring, and therefore warrant our reckoning them as real quantities of their kind. What could we do with any theory which should leave them out of consideration?

Certainly experience is an indispensable title for these truths. With psychological and philosophical sophistries no theory, no General, should meddle.

16. Principal difficulty of a theory for the conduct of war

In order to comprehend clearly the difficulty of the proposition which is contained in a theory for the conduct of War, and thence to deduce the necessary characteristics of such a theory, we must take a closer view of the chief particulars which make up the nature of activity in War.

17. First speciality — moral forces and their effects (Hostile feeling)

The first of these specialities consists in the moral forces and effects.

The combat is, in its origin, the expression of hostile feeling, but in our great combats, which we call Wars, the hostile feeling frequently resolves itself into merely a hostile view, and there is usually no innate hostile feeling residing in individual against individual. Nevertheless, the combat never passes off without such feelings being brought into activity. National hatred, which is seldom wanting in our Wars, is a substitute for personal hostility in the breast of individual opposed to individual. But where this also is wanting, and at first no animosity of feeling subsists, a hostile feeling is kindled by the combat itself; for an act of violence which any one commits upon us by order of his superior, will excite in us a desire to retaliate and be revenged on him, sooner than on the superior power at whose command the act was done. This is human, or animal if we will; still it is so. We are very apt to regard the combat in theory as an abstract trial of strength, without any participation on the part of the feelings, and that is one of the thousand errors which theorists deliberately commit, because they do not see its consequences.

Besides that excitation of feelings naturally arising from the combat itself, there are others also which do not essentially belong to it, but which, on account of their relationship, easily unite with it — ambition, love of power, enthusiasm of every kind, etc., etc.

18. The impressions of danger (Courage)

Finally, the combat begets the element of danger, in which all the activities of War must live and move, like the bird in the air or the fish in the water. But the influences of danger all pass into the feelings, either directly — that is, instinctively — or through the medium of the understanding. The effect in the first case would be a desire to escape from the danger, and, if that cannot be done, fright and anxiety. If this effect does not take place, then it is courage, which is a counterpoise to that instinct. Courage is, however, by no means an act of the understanding, but likewise a feeling, like fear; the latter looks to the physical preservation, courage to the moral preservation. Courage, then, is a nobler instinct. But because it is so, it will not allow itself to be used as a lifeless instrument, which produces its effects exactly according to prescribed measure. Courage is therefore no mere counterpoise to danger in order to neutralize the latter in its effects, but a peculiar power in itself.

19. Extent of the influence of danger

But to estimate exactly the influence of danger upon the principal actors in War, we must not limit its sphere to the physical danger of the moment. It dominates over the actor, not only by threatening him, but also by threatening all entrusted to him, not only at the moment in which it is actually present, but also through the imagination at all other moments, which have a connexion with the present; lastly, not only directly by itself, but also indirectly by the responsibility which makes it bear with tenfold weight on the mind of the chief actor. Who could advise, or resolve upon a great battle, without feeling his mind more or less wrought up, or perplexed by, the danger and responsibility which such a great act of decision carries in itself? We may say that action in War, in so far as it is real action, not a mere condition, is never out of the sphere of danger.

20. Other powers of feeling

If we look upon these affections which are excited by hostility and danger as peculiarly belonging to War, we do not, therefore, exclude from it all others accompanying man in his life's journey. They will also find room here frequently enough. Certainly we may say that many a petty action of the passions is silenced in this serious business of life; but that holds good only in respect to those acting in a lower sphere, who, hurried on from one state of danger and exertion to another, lose sight of the rest of the things of life, become unused to deceit, because it is of no avail with death, and so attain to that soldierly simplicity of character which has always been the best representative of the military profession. In higher regions it is otherwise, for the higher a man's rank, the more he must look around him; then arise interests on every side, and a manifold activity of the passions of good and bad. Envy and generosity, pride and humility, fierceness and tenderness, all may appear as active powers in this great drama.

21. Peculiarity of mind

The peculiar characteristics of mind in the chief actor have, as well as those of the feelings, a high importance. From an imaginative, flighty, inexperienced head, and from a calm, sagacious understanding, different things are to be expected.

22. From the diversity in mental individualities arises the diversity of ways leading to the end

It is this great diversity in mental individuality, the influence of which is to be supposed as chiefly felt in the higher ranks, because it increases as we progress upwards, which chiefly produces the diversity of ways leading to the end noticed by us in the first book, and which gives, to the play of probabilities and chance, such an unequal share in determining the course of events.

23. Second peculiarity — living reaction

The second peculiarity in War is the living reaction, and the reciprocal action resulting therefrom. We do not here speak of the difficulty of estimating that reaction, for that is included in the difficulty before mentioned, of treating the moral powers as quantities; but of this, that reciprocal action, by its nature, opposes anything like a regular plan. The effect which any measure produces upon the enemy is the most distinct of all the data which action affords; but every theory must keep to classes (or groups) of phenomena, and can never take up the really individual case in itself: that must everywhere be left to judgement and talent. It is therefore natural that in a business such as War, which in its plan — built upon general circumstances—is so often thwarted by unexpected and singular accidents, more must generally be left to talent; and less use can be made of a theoretical guide than in any other.

24. Third peculiarity — uncertainty of all data

Lastly, the great uncertainty of all data in War is a peculiar difficulty, because all action must, to a certain extent, be planned in a mere twilight, which in addition not unfrequently — like the effect of a fog or moonshine — gives to things exaggerated dimensions and an unnatural appearance.

What this feeble light leaves indistinct to the sight talent must discover, or must be left to chance. It is therefore again talent, or the favour of fortune, on which reliance must be placed, for want of objective knowledge.

25. Positive theory is impossible

With materials of this kind we can only say to ourselves that it is a sheer impossibility to construct for the Art of War a theory which, like a scaffolding, shall ensure to the chief actor an external support on all sides. In all those cases in which he is thrown upon his talent he would find himself away from this scaffolding of theory and in opposition to it, and, however many-sided it might be framed, the same result would ensue of which we spoke when we said that talent and genius act beyond the law, and theory is in opposition to reality.

26. Means left by which a theory is possible (The difficulties are not everywhere equally great)

Two means present themselves of getting out of this difficulty. In the first place, what we have said of the nature of military action in general does not apply in the same manner to the action of every one, whatever may be his standing. In the lower ranks the spirit of self-sacrifice is called more into request, but the difficulties which the understanding and judgement meet with are infinitely less. The field of occurrences is more confined. Ends and means are fewer in number. Data more distinct; mostly also contained in the actually visible. But the higher we ascend the more the difficulties increase, until in the Commander-in-Chief they reach their climax, so that with him almost everything must be left to genius.

Further, according to a division of the subject in agreement with its nature, the difficulties are not everywhere the same, but diminish the more results manifest themselves in the material world, and increase the more they pass into the moral, and become motives which influence the will. Therefore it is easier to determine, by theoretical rules, the order and conduct of a battle, than the use to be made of the battle itself. Yonder physical weapons clash with each other, and although mind is not wanting therein, matter must have its rights. But in the effects to be produced by battles when the material results become motives, we have only to do with the moral nature. In a word, it is easier to make a theory for tactics than for strategy.

27. Theory must be of the nature of observation, not of doctrine

The second opening for the possibility of a theory lies in the point of view that it does not necessarily require to be a direction for action. As a general rule, whenever an activity is for the most part occupied with the same objects over and over again, with the same ends and means, although there may be trifling alterations and a corresponding number of varieties of combination, such things are capable of becoming a subject of study for the reasoning faculties. But such study is just the most essential part of every theory, and has a peculiar title to that name. It is an analytical investigation of the subject that leads to an exact knowledge; and if brought to bear on the results of experience, which in our case would be military history, to a thorough familiarity with it. The nearer theory attains the latter object, so much the more it passes over from the objective form of knowledge into the subjective one of skill in action; and so much the more, therefore, it will prove itself effective when circumstances allow of no other decision but that of personal talents; it will show its effects in that talent itself. If theory investigates the subjects which constitute War; if it separates more distinctly that which at first sight seems amalgamated; if it explains fully the properties of the means; if it shows their probable effects; if it makes evident the nature of objects; if it brings to bear all over the field of War the light of essentially critical investigation — then it has fulfilled the chief duties of its province. It becomes then a guide to him who wishes to make himself acquainted with War from books; it lights up the whole road for him, facilitates his progress, educates his judgement, and shields him from error.

If a man of expertness spends half his life in the endeavour to clear up an obscure subject thoroughly, he will probably know more about it than a person who seeks to master it in a short time. Theory is instituted that each person in succession may not have to go through the same labour of clearing the ground and toiling through his subject, but may find the thing in order, and light admitted on it. It should educate the mind of the future leader in War, or rather guide him in his self-instruction, but not accompany him to the field of battle; just as a sensible tutor forms and enlightens the opening mind of a youth without, therefore, keeping him in leading strings all through his life.

If maxims and rules result of themselves from the considerations which theory institutes, if the truth accretes itself into that form of crystal, then theory will not oppose this natural law of the mind; it will rather, if the arch ends in such a keystone, bring it prominently out; but so does this, only in order to satisfy the philosophical law of reason, in order to show distinctly the point to which the lines all converge, not in order to form out of it an algebraical formula for use upon the battlefield; for even these maxims and rules serve more to determine in the reflecting mind the leading outline of its habitual movements than as landmarks indicating to it the way in the act of execution.

28. By this point of view theory becomes possible, and ceases to be in contradiction to practice

Taking this point of view, there is a possibility afforded of a satisfactory, that is, of a useful, theory of the conduct of War, never coming into opposition with the reality, and it will only depend on rational treatment to bring it so far into harmony with action that between theory and practice there shall no longer be that absurd difference which an unreasonable theory, in defiance of common sense, has often produced, but which, just as often, narrow-mindedness and ignorance have used as a pretext for giving way to their natural incapacity.

29. Theory therefore considers the nature of ends and means — ends and means in tactics

Theory has therefore to consider the nature of the means and ends.

In tactics the means are the disciplined armed forces which are to carry on the contest. The object is victory. The precise definition of this conception can be better explained hereafter in the consideration of the combat. Here we content ourselves by denoting the retirement of the enemy from the field of battle as the sign of victory. By means of this victory strategy gains the object for which it appointed the combat, and which constitutes its special signification. This signification has certainly some influence on the nature of the victory. A victory which is intended to weaken the enemy's armed forces is a different thing from one which is designed only to put us in possession of a position. The signification of a combat may therefore have a sensible influence on the preparation and conduct of it, consequently will be also a subject of consideration in tactics.

30. Circumstances which always attend the application of the means

As there are certain circumstances which attend the combat throughout, and have more or less influence upon its result, therefore these must be taken into consideration in the application of the armed forces.

These circumstances are the locality of the combat (ground), the time of day, and the weather.

31. Locality

The locality, which we prefer leaving for solution, under the head of 'Country and Ground', might, strictly speaking, be without any influence at all if the combat took place on a completely level and uncultivated plain.

In a country of steppes such a case may occur, but in the cultivated countries of Europe it is almost an imaginary idea. Therefore a combat between civilized nations, in which country and ground have no influence, is hardly conceivable.

32. Time of day

The time of day influences the combat by the difference between day and night; but the influence naturally extends further than merely to the limits of these divisions, as every combat has a certain duration, and great battles last for several hours. In the preparations for a great battle, it makes an essential difference whether it begins in the morning or the evening. At the same time, certainly many battles may be fought in which the question of the time of day is quite immaterial, and in the generality of cases its influence is only trifling.

33. Weather

Still more rarely has the weather any decisive influence, and it is mostly only by fogs that it plays a part.

34. End and means in strategy

Strategy has in the first instance only the victory, that is, the tactical result, as a means to its object, and ultimately those things which lead directly to peace. The application of its means to this object is at the same time attended by circumstances which have an influence thereon more or less.

35. Circumstances which attend the application of the means of strategy

These circumstances are country and ground, the former including the territory and inhabitants of the whole theatre of war; next the time of the day, and the time of the year as well; lastly, the weather, particularly any unusual state of the same, severe frost, etc.

36. These form new means

By bringing these things into combination with the results of a combat, strategy gives this result — and therefore the combat — a special signification, places before it a particular object. But when this object is not that which leads directly to peace, therefore a subordinate one, it is only to be looked upon as a means; and therefore in strategy we may look upon the results of combats or victories, in all their different significations, as means. The conquest of a position is such a result of a combat applied to ground. But not only are the different combats with special objects to be considered as means, but also every higher aim which we may have in view in the combination of battles directed on a common object is to be regarded as a means. A winter campaign is a combination of this kind applied to the season.

There remain, therefore, as objects, only those things which may be supposed as leading directly to peace. Theory investigates all these ends and means according to the nature of their effects and their mutual relations.

37. Strategy deduces only from experience the ends and means to be examined

The first question is, How does strategy arrive at a complete list of these things? If there is to be a philosophical inquiry leading to an absolute result, it would become entangled in all those difficulties which the logical necessity of the conduct of War and its theory exclude. It therefore turns to experience, and directs its attention on those combinations which military history can furnish. In this manner, no doubt, nothing more than a limited theory can be obtained, which only suits circumstances such as are presented in history. But this incompleteness is unavoidable, because in any case theory must either have deduced from, or have compared with, history what it advances with respect to things. Besides, this incompleteness in every case is more theoretical than real.

One great advantage of this method is that theory cannot lose itself in abstruse disquisitions, subtleties, and chimeras, but must always remain practical.

38. How far the analysis of the means should be carried

Another question is, How far should theory go in its analysis of the means? Evidently only so far as the elements in a separate form present themselves for consideration in practice. The range and effect of different weapons is very important to tactics; their construction, although these effects result from it, is a matter of indifference; for the conduct of War is not making powder and cannon out of a given quantity of charcoal, sulphur, and saltpetre, of copper and tin: the given quantities for the conduct of War are arms in a finished state and their effects. Strategy makes use of maps without troubling itself about triangulations; it does not inquire how the country is subdivided into departments and provinces, and how the people are educated and governed, in order to attain the best military results; but it takes things as it finds them in the community of European States, and observes where very different conditions have a notable influence on War.

39. Great simplification of the knowledge required

That in this manner the number of subjects for theory is much simplified, and the knowledge requisite for the conduct of War much reduced, is easy to perceive. The very great mass of knowledge and appliances of skill which minister to the action of War in general, and which are necessary before an army fully equipped can take the field, unite in a few great results before they are able to reach, in actual War, the final goal of their activity; just as the streams of a country unite themselves in rivers before they fall into the sea. Only those activities emptying themselves directly into the sea of War have to be studied by him who is to conduct its operations.

40. This explains the rapid growth of great generals, and why a general is not a man of learning

This result of our considerations is in fact so necessary, that any other would have made us distrustful of their accuracy. Only thus is explained how so often men have made their appearance with great success in War, and indeed in the higher ranks even in supreme Command, whose pursuits had been previously of a totally different nature; indeed how, as a rule, the most distinguished Generals have never risen from the very learned or really erudite class of officers, but have been mostly men who, from the circumstances of their position, could not have attained to any great amount of knowledge. On that account those who have considered it necessary or even beneficial to commence the education of a future General by instruction in all details have always been ridiculed as absurd pedants. It would be easy to show the injurious tendency of such a course, because the human mind is trained by the knowledge imparted to it and the direction given to its ideas. Only what is great can make it great; the little can only make it little, if the mind itself does not reject it as something repugnant.

41. Former contradictions

Because this simplicity of knowledge requisite in War was not attended to, but that knowledge was always jumbled up with the whole impedimenta of subordinate sciences and arts, therefore the palpable opposition to the events of real life which resulted could not be solved otherwise than by ascribing it all to genius, which requires no theory and for which no theory could be prescribed.

42. On this account all use of knowledge was denied, and everything ascribed to natural talents

People with whom common sense had the upper hand felt sensible of the immense distance remaining to be filled up between a genius of the highest order and a learned pedant; and they became in a manner free-thinkers, rejected all belief in theory, and affirmed the conduct of War to be a natural function of man, which he performs more or less well according as he has brought with him into the world more or less talent in that direction. It cannot be denied that these were nearer to the truth than those who placed a value on false knowledge; at the same time it may easily be seen that such a view is itself but an exaggeration. No activity of the human understanding is possible without a certain stock of ideas; but these are, for the greater part at least, not innate but acquired, and constitute his knowledge. The only question therefore is, of what kind should these ideas be; and we think we have answered it if we say that they should be directed on those things which man has directly to deal with in War.

43. The knowledge must be made suitable to the position

Inside this field of military activity, the knowledge required must be different according to the station of the Commander. It will be directed on smaller and more circumscribed objects if he holds an inferior, upon greater and more comprehensive ones if he holds a higher situation. There are Field Marshals who would not have shone at the head of a cavalry regiment, and vice versa.

44. The knowledge in war is very simple, but not, at the same time, very easy

But although the knowledge in War is simple, that is to say directed to so few subjects, and taking up those only in their final results, the art of execution is not, on that account, easy. Of the difficulties to which activity in War is subject generally, we have already spoken in the first book; we here omit those things which can only be overcome by courage, and maintain also that the activity of mind is only simple and easy in inferior stations, but increases in difficulty with increase of rank, and in the highest position, in that of Commander-in-Chief, is to be reckoned amongst the most difficult which there is for the human mind.

45. Of the nature of this knowledge

The Commander of an Army neither requires to be a learned explorer of history nor a publicist, but he must be well versed in the higher affairs of State; he must know and be able to judge correctly of traditional tendencies, interests at stake, the immediate questions at issue, and the characters of leading persons; he need not be a close observer of men, a sharp dissector of human character, but he must know the character, the feelings, the habits, the peculiar faults and inclinations of those whom he is to command. He need not understand anything about the make of a carriage, or the harness of a battery horse, but he must know how to calculate exactly the march of a column, under different circumstances, according to the time it requires. These are matters the knowledge of which cannot be forced out by an apparatus of scientific formula and machinery: they are only to be gained by the exercise of an accurate judgement in the observation of things and of men, aided by a special talent for the apprehension of both.

The necessary knowledge for a high position in military action is therefore distinguished by this, that by observation, therefore by study and reflection, it is only to be attained through a special talent which as an intellectual instinct understands how to extract from the phenomena of life only the essence or spirit, as bees do the honey from the flowers; and that it is also to be gained by experience of life as well as by study and reflection. Life will never bring forth a Newton or an Euler by its rich teachings, but it may bring forth great calculators in War, such as Condé or Frederick.

It is therefore not necessary that, in order to vindicate the intellectual dignity of military activity, we should resort to untruth and silly pedantry. There never has been a great and distinguished Commander of contracted mind, but very numerous are the instances of men who, after serving with the greatest distinction in inferior positions, remained below mediocrity in the highest, from insufficiency of intellectual capacity. That even amongst those holding the post of Commander-in-Chief there may be a difference according to the degree of their plenitude of power is a matter of course.

46. Science must become art

Now we have yet to consider one condition which is more necessary for the knowledge of the conduct of War than for any other, which is, that it must pass completely into the mind and almost completely cease to be something objective. In almost all other arts and occupations of life the active agent can make use of truths which he has only learnt once, and in the spirit and sense of which he no longer lives, and which he extracts from dusty books. Even truths which he has in hand and uses daily may continue something external to himself. If the architect takes up a pen to settle the strength of a pier by a complicated calculation, the truth found as a result is no emanation from his own mind. He had first to find the data with labour, and then to submit these to an operation of the mind, the rule for which he did not discover, the necessity of which he is perhaps at the moment only partly conscious of, but which he applies, for the most part, as if by mechanical dexterity. But it is never so in War. The moral reaction, the ever-changeful form of things, makes it necessary for the chief actor to carry in himself the whole mental apparatus of his knowledge, that anywhere and at every pulse-beat he may be capable of giving the requisite decision from himself. Knowledge must, by this complete assimilation with his own mind and life, be converted into real power. This is the reason why everything seems so easy with men distinguished in War, and why everything is ascribed to natural talent. We say natural talent, in order thereby to distinguish it from that which is formed and matured by observation and study.

We think that by these reflections we have explained the problem of a theory of the conduct of War, and pointed out the way to its solution.

Of the two fields into which we have divided the conduct of War, tactics and strategy, the theory of the latter contains unquestionably, as before observed, the greatest difficulties, because the first is almost limited to a circumscribed field of objects, but the latter, in the direction of objects leading directly to peace, opens to itself an unlimited field of possibilities. Since for the most part the Commander-in-Chief has only to keep these objects steadily in view, therefore the part of strategy in which he moves is also that which is particularly subject to this difficulty.